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Abstract 
 This dissertation analyzes the gradual transformation of southern Tanzania from a thriving 
precolonial frontier into an impoverished, peripheral borderland during the twentieth century by 
examining the region’s history of mobility– from long-distance caravan networks to the expansion of 
motorized road transportation. It argues that southern Tanzania’s real and perceived peripheralization 
began as a consequence of colonial warfare in the early 20
th
 century, particularly the First World War. 
Poverty and famine defined the Ruvuma borderland of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique in 
the aftermath of the war due to the wide-spread use of modern weaponry, scorched earth tactics, forced 
conscription, and raiding by colonial armies. The Portuguese and British colonial administrations 
neglected the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era because the region lacked adequate manpower, 
environmental conditions, and transportation infrastructure to produce and export large quantities of cash 
crops that imperial markets prioritized. The failure of colonial development schemes attempted in 
southern Tanzania after the Second World War, particularly the East African Groundnut Scheme, 
propagated and engrained negative stereotypes of the region as being incapable of “development.” 
Southern Tanzania’s dilapidated transportation infrastructure served as a persistent symbol, symptom, and 
justification for the region’s isolation and impoverishment throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras. 
 While examining the reasons behind and adverse consequences of the colonial and national 
states’ failures to construct all-weather roads in southern Tanzania, this dissertation argues that the 
region’s road transportation history provides an alternative narrative of local initiative and prosperity. 
Since the second millennium C.E., inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland utilized their mobility to 
improve their lives and relocate in response to famines, droughts, warfare, and exploitative authority. The 
introduction and expansion of motor vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s offered a valuable 
avenue for local populations to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the peripheral 
borderland. Although colonists intended for automobiles to serve as “civilizing” and “modernizing” 
technologies, African producers and migrant laborers living in proximity to the main and district roads in 
southern Tanzania appropriated motor vehicles to pursue advantageous labor and commercial markets. 
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While some Africans associated roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of migrant 
laborers’ autonomy, others perceived them as pathways and tools for socioeconomic advancement.  
 Rather than examining automobility from the standard perspective of African-European relations, 
this dissertation also explores Asian contributions. It argues that Indian entrepreneurs, wholesalers, and 
retailers were the driving force behind the expansion and success of road transportation in southern 
Tanzania between the 1920s and 1960s. One road transportation firm, in particular, spearheaded the 
growth of an Indian-dominated transportation sector in the south during the late colonial era – the 
Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. or Teeteeko. In the postcolonial period, automobiles became 
important tools that Indian businessmen utilized to contest anti-Asian national discourse portraying them 
as exploitative parasites. The Indian community in southern Tanzania tried to prove its value and 
allegiance to the nation by offering their vehicles in support of neighboring anticolonial struggles, 
humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations. Although their efforts ultimately failed, the Indian 
transportation sector left a lasting impact on southern Tanzania’s socioeconomic landscape. African 
drivers and mechanics, meanwhile, utilized their technological knowledge and social networks to find and 
retain high-paying, high-status jobs during the economically turbulent decades of the 1970s and 1980s. In 
the end, this dissertation argues that southern Tanzania remained a dynamic region whose multiethnic 
population utilized their mobility to pursue socioeconomic opportunities locally, regionally, and 
internationally. Southern Tanzania’s roads became physical manifestations and symbolic representations 
of the region’s impoverishment and peripheralization, as well as its vitality and innovation in the face of 
neglectful or exploitative state authority. 
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Introduction 
 As I loaded onto a large, “luxury” bus liner at downtown Dar es Salaam’s bustling station in July 
2015, I was filled with a mixture of excitement and trepidation for my first journey to Lindi.
1
 After years 
of reading historical works and archival records about southern Tanzania, I was finally going to see and 
experience life in the region first hand. My unease did not stem from a fear of travelling to a new place. 
My accommodations and research assistant were organized thanks to the contacts of my colleagues. I was 
also prepared with the necessary paperwork and patience to get authorization to conduct research in the 
region, district, and town. My anxiety more so fixated on the looming drive. I had read and heard 
numerous accounts about extremely uncomfortable, multi-day journeys that individuals had endured 
while heading along the horrendous Dar es Salaam-Lindi road. The tarmacked road remained incomplete 
throughout the early 2000s and annually closed for multiple months when the Rufiji River and its 
tributaries washed away sections of the road and bridges during the rainy season. There were stories of 
passengers waiting hours or days for a ferry to take them across the river; buying food from local villagers 
and choosing to sleep in the buses at night out of fear of lions. Buses also broke down frequently with 
overheated engines or broken axels – unable to take the punishing abuse of the dirt road with its countless 
potholes. Passengers had no choice but to wait indefinite periods for another vehicle to be dispatched.  
 My eight-hour and 454 km trip could not have been more different than these accounts. I sat 
comfortably in a reclined seat with air-conditioning blasting in my face, watching movies and snacking on 
sweets and juice offered by the bus conductor. There were no chicken cages under my feet, mattresses 
strapped to the bus’s roof, or passengers standing crammed together in the aisle – all of which I would 
experience when travelling on much smaller buses from Lindi to Masasi and Masasi to Newala and 
Mtwara. Only twice did we encounter short deviations from the main road onto the bumpy, dirt frontage 
road, but otherwise the trip proceeded without incident. After comfortably crossing the massive bridge 
                                                          
1
 The bus company was Millennium Coach Ltd. The ticket cost TShs. 27,000 (or approximately $17) in 2015. There 
were numerous other bus liners departing two to three times a day to Lindi, Mtwara, Masasi, and the other major 
towns in the southeast. The group of Catholic Sisters I resided with in Dar es Salaam arranged my passage, insisting 
that Millennium was one of the more reliable and comfortable carriers. 
2 
 
over the Rufiji River, I spent the rest of the journey enjoying the passing sites of villages, cashew nut and 
baobab trees, and the glistening Indian Ocean as we approached Lindi town.
2
 None of my subsequent 
road journeys to Lindi, Masasi, Newala, Mtwara, and Songea would match the comfort and ease of this 
trip, and some were physically punishing. This drive, however, left an indelible mark as I reflected upon 
the interplay between perception and reality. Inadequate infrastructure contributed to southern Tanzania’s 
impoverishment and isolation from national and global markets and politics during the twentieth century. 
Poor roads were both a consequence and justification for government neglect during the colonial and 
postcolonial eras, and helped to propagate negative stereotypes about the development capacity of the 
region and its populace. At the same time, did these stereotypes partially distort reality? I suspected that 
southern Tanzania’s roads had another story to tell about local agency, innovation, and opportunity.    
      
Figure 1.1 Dar es Salaam bus station and typical road conditions along the Dar es Salaam-Lindi Road, July 2015  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The Rufiji River Bridge (or Mkapa Bridge) is 13.5 km (8.39 miles) long, cost approximately $30 million, and was 
officially opened in August 2003. See “Rufiji Bridge Completion, Awakening the Sleeping Giant,” Africa News 
Service, 1 August 2003, accessed June 2016, http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu. 
3 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Crossing the Rufiji River towards Lindi, July 2015
3
 
 
 Utilizing a broad range of archival materials, secondary sources, and oral histories, this 
dissertation explores the historical processes that culminated in southern Tanzania’s socioeconomic 
peripheralization during the twentieth century. By analyzing the history of mobility in southern Tanzania 
– from precolonial long-distance trade networks to motorized road transportation – this dissertation offers 
new insights into the region’s gradual transformation from a thriving frontier region into an impoverished, 
peripheral borderland by the end of the British colonial era. While analyzing the region’s gradual 
marginalization and impoverishment, it also challenges stereotypes of the region as stagnant and 
backwards. Since the early second millennium, southern Tanzania formed a dynamic frontier where 
populations from across Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean interacted through long-
distance trade networks. The imposition of Portuguese and German colonial rule and the demarcation of 
the Ruvuma River as a border between southern German East Africa (GEA) and northern Portuguese East 
Africa (PEA) constricted and reoriented local and long-distance networks. However, the movement of 
people, goods, and ideas across the borderland continued. The devastation caused by colonial forces 
during the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905-07), Portuguese “pacification” campaigns (1900-1910s), and the 
First World War (1914-19) undermined stability and economic growth in the Ruvuma borderland. In the 
years following the war, northern PEA’s landscape was largely defined by exploitative plantations, 
isolated government forts, poorly maintained roads, and vacated African villages and shambas (fields). 
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Across the border, the new British administration governing the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika aimed 
in the interwar era to create a landscape of concentrated African settlements connected through a network 
of interregional roads and engaged in cash and food crop cultivation and exportation. The central state in 
Dar es Salaam, however, neglected the south and invested its limited resources in the more profitable cash 
crop producing regions serviced by the Tanga and Central Railway Lines. With limited access to exterior 
markets and lacking high-value commodity exports, southern Tanganyika became an impoverished 
periphery within the Territory and the British Empire. The failure of colonial development schemes 
attempted in the region after the Second World War (due in part to inadequate  infrastructure and local 
labor supply) propagated and engrained negative stereotypes of the region and its populace as being 
incapable of “progress” and “development.” 
 The inability of the colonial state to construct all-weather transportation infrastructure in southern 
Tanganyika contributed to the region’s real and perceived peripheralization, but it also created 
opportunities for local initiative and prosperity. The underfunded and understaffed British administration 
depended upon local leaders and private contractors to construct and maintain the region’s road networks. 
While road conditions remained poor in the face of adverse climatic and geographic conditions, they 
became the lifeline of the southern economy and administration during the interwar era. Motor vehicle 
transportation grew steadily as Indian traders exploited their speed and flexibility to expand trade 
networks and intensify their domination over the southern economy. African producers and migrant 
laborers also used motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma 
borderland region. When southern Tanganyika became the site of Britain’s postwar development schemes 
(most notably the East African Groundnut Scheme), these independent firms and entrepreneurs often 
prospered. They utilized their mobility and socioeconomic networks to profit from advantageous labor 
and commercial markets in the late 1940s and early 1950s. One road transportation firm, in particular, 
spearheaded the expansion of passenger and cargo transport across the region in the late colonial era – the 
Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. The company led an Indian-dominated transportation sector that 
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offered cultivators, traders, and migrant laborers improved access to regional and territorial markets into 
the postcolonial period.  
 Similarly to its colonial predecessor, the independent Tanzanian national government lacked the 
resources to improve southern Tanzania’s infrastructure and control the movements of its highly mobile 
populace following independence in 1961. The state instead depended upon the assistance of the private 
transportation sector to support its numerous objectives in the region, including; assisting landlocked 
Zambia, providing humanitarian relief to refugees streaming across the Ruvuma border during the 
Mozambique War of Independence, and offering military support to FRELIMO soldiers fighting against 
colonial forces in northern Mozambique. Many Indian transportation owners offered their vehicles in 
support of the state in order to prove their value and allegiance to the new nation amid rising anti-Asian 
nationalist discourse. The alliances created between the private transportation sector and the Tanzanian 
government collapsed in the early 1970s as the state nationalized private businesses and the housing 
sector. A new age of state-controlled transport followed, but did not last more than a decade due to the 
economic crises that gripped Tanzania in the 1970s and early 1980s. African drivers and mechanics in 
southern Tanzania utilized their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to adapt to the 
economic turbulence. They also took advantage of the opportunities that appeared in the transportation 
sector following the liberalization of Tanzania’s economy in the mid-1980s. In the end, this dissertation 
argues that southern Tanzania remained a dynamic region whose multiethnic population utilized their 
mobility to pursue socioeconomic opportunities locally, regionally, and internationally in the face of 
neglectful, discriminatory, invasive, and/or exploitative centralized authority.  
Background and Historiography 
 This dissertation began from a desire to determine how road transportation – both the 
construction of roads and usage of motor vehicles – impacted lives and livelihoods in Tanzania during the 
German and British colonial eras. The topic was inspired by the burgeoning historiography concerning 
roads and motor vehicles in Africa. American historians first pioneered analyses into the ambiguous 
social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental impacts of automobility – a term encompassing 
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motor vehicles, roads, and the automobile industry.
4
 Americanists such as John B. Rae, James J. Flink, 
Virginia Scharff, and Clay McShane examined the role that mass-produced motor vehicles and modern 
hard-surfaced highways had in the formation and expansion of an industrialized, capitalist, consumer-
oriented economy and society in America.
5
 Automobiles encouraged and enabled the expansion of 
American capitalism by revolutionizing production techniques, integrating urban and rural markets, 
accelerating the circulation of goods, and facilitating the accumulation of capital within numerous 
automotive-based industries.
6
 The automobile also introduced new conceptions of space in America. New 
automotive landscapes of gas stations, repair shops, drive-thru restaurants, highways, parking lots, and 
suburban neighborhoods proliferated across the country. Despite the integral role automobility played in 
American economic expansion during the twentieth century, it also produced ecological damage and 
reinforced gender, class, and racial divisions. Portrayed as a symbol of freedom and prosperity, historians 
argued that white middle- and upper-class American men used automobiles as tools to preserve social 
segregation and discrimination according to status, gender, and race.   
 Building upon the American historiography, numerous scholars conducted historical, 
anthropological, ethnographic, and sociological studies examining the ambiguous impact of automobility 
around the world.
7
 A wide range of explicitly road-related studies have emerged within African studies 
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during the past three decades. These studies stretched spatially across the continent and temporally from 
the colonial to the postcolonial era. They concentrated on the lives and labor of drivers, passengers, road 
construction workers, street traders, and roadside entrepreneurs. Historians and anthropologists examined 
how these actors engaged in informal economies, constructed unique work cultures, built identities as 
“modern” citizens, negotiated racial and gender hierarchies, and contested state authority.8 Luise White 
led scholarship that analyzed representations and symbolic meanings of roads, motor vehicles, and 
automobile operators in oral histories.
9
 She argued that complex social discourses are bound in rituals and 
stories concerning roads, automobiles, spirits, and vampires. Specialized technology often reflected 
insecurities and anxieties that communities felt about new labor processes, shifting conceptions of 
masculinity, and experiences of exploitation and extraction by colonial and national states.
10
 In the 
introduction to the edited volume, Speed of Change: Motor Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890-2000, 
Jan-Bart Gewald argued that the,  
[…] arrival of the motor vehicle was the single most important factor for change in Africa in the 
twentieth century. Its impact extended across the totality of human existence; from ecological 
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devastation to economic advancement, from cultural transformation to political change, and from 
social perceptions through to a myriad of other dimensions.
11
  
 
Gewald and his fellow contributors examined the ambivalence of roads and motor vehicles in Africa. 
Automobiles provided some Africans with improved access to health care, education, political 
movements, information, and new occupations. Automobiles were also tools that strengthened and 
extended colonialism, spread diseases, increased socioeconomic inequalities, and undermined community 
relationships. 
 The ambivalence of automobility is a predominate theme within the African historiography. 
Adeline Masquelier promoted the theme in her well-known article, “Road Mythographies: Space, 
Mobility, and the Historical Imagination in Postcolonial Niger.”12 She argued that roads simultaneously 
symbolized fear, disappointment, resentment, hope, and desire for the Mawri of post-colonial Niger. 
While roads opened markets and offered opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, they were also 
associated with memories of colonial forced labor practices and disillusionment towards the nation-state’s 
promises of prosperity. The Mawri envisioned roads as “the promise of a more rewarding life and the 
system’s failure to deliver the long-awaited blessings of modernity.”13 Published shortly after 
Masquelier’s article, Jan-Bart Gewald and Erdmute Alber analyzed the ambivalence of automobiles in 
colonial Namibia and Dahomey. Motor vehicles simultaneously represented colonial intimidation and 
domination, as well as African wealth, power, and innovation.
14
 Europeans used automobiles to 
consolidate colonial rule by visiting more households, collecting more taxes, and standardizing their 
presence among African populations. Automobiles also reaffirmed colonial racial social orders. 
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Europeans initially monopolized car ownership and operation, while Africans were often expected to line 
the road when Europeans passed. Alber contended that African spectators were physically and 
symbolically relegated to an inferior, subservient position in the imagination of Europeans – a lesser 
being who needed the guidance of technologically superior Europeans.
15
 Gewald and Alber, however, 
noted that the impact of automobiles was felt unevenly among African societies. While the expansion of 
roads brought some communities under the purview of the colonial state for the first time, those not 
accessible by road became virtually independent of colonial interference.
16
 The introduction of 
automobiles also offered advantages for some African individuals and communities. Herero men in 
Namibia created a new class of high-status, skilled professionals, including drivers and mechanics. 
Gewald concluded that possessing an automobile allowed Herero men to “improve their own status as 
well as to make a statement regarding both the sociopolitical situation in which they found themselves 
and their own modernity as vibrant human beings in tune with the technological age.”17 Jennifer A. Hart 
reached a similar conclusion with Ghanaian drivers. They used their technological knowledge and 
mobility to create new identities as “modern men” and wealthy entrepreneurs. Drivers also made claims 
to citizenship that forced the state to engage with them in political and policy discourse.
18
 In Tanzania, 
Joshua Grace argued that colonial and postcolonial states used automobiles to enforce their authority and 
implement social engineering projects, such as ujamaa in the 1970s. Tanzanian men and women 
(mechanics, drivers, and passengers), however, appropriated motor vehicles to improve their 
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socioeconomic status and construct identities that challenged discriminatory racial and gender social 
orders.
19
  
 Roads were similarly ambiguous symbols of colonial oppression and African agency. Alber 
argued that the construction and maintenance of roads literally and symbolically reaffirmed colonial 
authority, 
A neat, wide road without weeds gave a different picture of government and its control of the 
population than crooked paths between unstable settlements. The road therefore symbolized the 
new order in which the rulers could reach their subjects (and vice versa) on straight tracks. 
Although at first hardly anyone needed wide roads, they did convey a different notion of security 
and a sense of control, planning and government to the colonial officers.
20
  
 
Roads also became symbols of colonial oppression as their construction often relied upon forced labor. 
Kwabena Opare Akurang-Parry found that compulsory labor was essential for infrastructure projects in 
the Gold Coast from 1900 to 1940. British officials passed various labor ordinances in the 1930s and 
1940s that appeased international criticism of forced labor practices while permitting their continuation 
for the sake of “development.”21 Elizabeth Wrangham, however, argued that Africans voluntarily 
constructed 450 of 600 miles of roads in the Gold Coast during the First World War in order to facilitate 
local and international trade.
22
 In the case of Dahomey, Alber argued that African leaders reacted 
differently to forced labor policies. Some leaders resisted while others supported the measures because 
roads provided valuable access to markets, political and health centers, and other social spaces that 
amplified their power and influence.
23
 In the August 2013 edition of Africa: The Journal of the 
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International African Institute, five studies examined how everyday Africans experienced both the “perils 
and possibilities of roads, roadsides, traffic and transport” during and after colonialism in Kenya, 
Tanzania, Senegal, Ghana, and Sudan.
24
 Scholars illustrated that roads and motor vehicles acted as 
liberating, empowering, and oppressive technologies in Africa. They aided in the extension of colonial 
rule, intensified socioeconomic inequalities, and undermined community relationships. They also 
improved access to medical care and education, created new occupations, and offered individuals 
opportunities to contest discriminatory social orders. 
 This dissertation builds upon the historiography to examine how automobiles were used as tools 
for colonial rule and exploitation, as well as African and Asian innovation and agency in southern 
Tanzania. I chose to concentrate on southern Tanzania after examining colonial records concerning road 
and railway competition in Tanzania during the 1930s. The British colonial state instituted legislation 
strictly controlling road transport near the Central and Tanga Railways in order to protect railway 
revenues and discourage road competition.
25
 Southern Tanzania was not affected by the restrictive 
legislation because it lacked rail services. Without a railway or consistent coastal steamship services, 
southern Tanzania seemingly offered a prime opportunity to evaluate the ambivalent impacts of road 
transportation upon local populations and the colonial administration. Historians who studied southern 
Tanzania repeatedly correlated the region’s insufficient transportation infrastructure with its real and 
perceived isolation and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the nation. Felicitas Becker and Chau P. 
Johnsen Kelly argued that the scarcity of roads between interior villages, markets, and coastal towns and 
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ports undermined economic growth in southern Tanzania during the colonial era. High transportation 
costs cut into local revenues and discouraged foreign investments.
26
 Without all-weather roads connecting 
the coast to interior districts and the capital of Dar es Salaam, “Britain treated the southeastern coast as a 
veritable island.”27 Pekka Seppälä argued that residents in the south and outsiders continued to associate 
the region’s lack of roads with a “lack of modernity” after the colonial era.28 According to Priya Lal, 
inadequate transportation infrastructure occupied a “central position” in state development discourse in 
the postcolonial era. Many residents of Mtwara believed that poor roads hindered the region’s economic 
growth and deprived them of valuable state resources and “developmental capital.”29 Lal continued, 
“being left out of the new nation-state in terms of spatial integration was inextricable from a sense of 
being left behind the rest of the world in developmental terms.”30  
 Despite recognition of the integral role road transportation played in southern Tanzania’s 
practical and perceived peripheralization, an in-depth regional history of road construction and 
transportation had not been conducted.
31
 My dissertation fills this gap and analyzes the extent to which 
inadequate roads were a cause, consequence, and justification for southern Tanzania’s marginalization 
and isolation during and after the colonial era. While examining the failures of the colonial and 
postcolonial states to improve southern Tanzania’s infrastructure, this dissertation argues that the region’s 
roads offer an alternative narrative of local initiative, resilience, and prosperity. The introduction and 
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expansion of motor vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s provided a valuable avenue for local 
populations to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the peripheral borderland. While 
some Africans associated roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of autonomy, 
others perceived them as pathways and tools for social and economic advancement. African producers 
and migrant laborers living in proximity to the main and district roads appropriated motor vehicles to 
pursue advantageous labor and commercial markets during the final decades of colonialism. This 
dissertation also challenges the historiography of automobility in Africa to consider the contributions of 
Asians, rather than limiting the analysis to African-European experiences. It argues that Indian 
entrepreneurs, wholesalers, and retailers spearheaded the expansion and success of road transportation in 
southern Tanzania between the 1920s and 1960s. In the postcolonial period, automobiles served as 
important political tools that Indian businessmen utilized to contest mounting anti-Asian national 
discourse portraying them as exploitative parasites. The Indian community in southern Tanzania tried to 
prove its value and allegiance to the nation by offering their vehicles in support of neighboring 
anticolonial struggles, humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations. Although their efforts 
ultimately failed, the Indian transportation sector left a lasting impact on southern Tanzania’s social and 
economic landscape.  
 In order to determine the automobile’s impact in southern Tanzania, it was necessary to 
understand mobility patterns prior to the introduction of motor vehicles during the colonial era. Historians 
such as Edward Alpers and Andrea Seligman argued that dynamic inland and overseas long-distance trade 
networks linked South-and Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean since the early second 
millennium.
32
 When examining the directionality, composition, and purpose of these precolonial 
networks, I began reconceptualizing my perspective of “southern Tanzania” as a region. Southern 
Tanzania was not always an impoverished periphery demarcated by administrative and international 
borders; rather, it served as a fluid and profitable frontier during the precolonial era. The space 
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encompassing southern Tanzania today and the identity of the people within it are the product of human 
interactions with one another and their surrounding environment over the course of centuries. My 
dissertation concurs with historians, anthropologists, political geographers, and social scientists who 
argue that “space” impacts human thoughts and actions as it is (re)constructed and negotiated by 
humans.
33
 Rather than providing an irrelevant framework in which social life and historical events occur, 
“the spatial is an actively changing dimension of all aspects of life, a dimension that affects how people 
act and think.”34 While space is physical (as defined by geographers and surveyors), there are also social 
and analytical spaces. Humans physically and mentally construct social spaces through their interactions – 
creating kin and family networks, courts and administrative offices, overseas trade networks, shrines and 
churches, religious and intellectual associations, and so forth. According to Allen M. Howard,  
 […] physical space becomes social space as people create relationships by interacting with one 
 another, building and naming things, giving meaning to particular places, perceiving the 
 similarities and differences among places, discoursing about the relationship of people distributed 
 over space— and so on. All such acts are contested, but general agreement or understanding 
 about social space may be reached among a given group of people, at least temporarily.
35
 
 
Analytical spaces are the abstractions people “use to understand the complexities of physical and social 
space, usually by applying formal conceptual tools.”36 Regions, frontiers, borderlands, and landscapes are 
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a few of the analytical concepts scholars and ordinary individuals employ to talk about natural and social 
spaces.
37
  
 The process of constructing space and encoding it with meaning through actions, discourses, and 
ideologies – living in houses, worshipping at shrines, trading at markets – does not occur in a mechanical, 
predetermined manner. The process instead involves continuous cooperation, conflict, and negotiation 
that inevitably produce landscapes with plural meanings and realities.
38
 Jan Bender Shetler, for example, 
examined the diverse and contested meanings that African populations, colonial governments, and 
international organizations inscribed on the landscape of the Western Serengeti during the precolonial, 
colonial, and postcolonial eras.
39
 Shetler contended that since the beginning of human memory, “the 
Western Serengeti has been a profoundly humanized landscape with the stories, hopes, and challenges of 
its people deeply embedded in its rocks and hills, pools and streams, vistas and valleys.”40 The ancestors 
of the Western Serengeti peoples (early Bantu-speaking farmers) conceived of the landscape in 
ecological, social, and sacred terms. These “imagined” landscapes were challenged during the course of 
the nineteenth century by a series of ecological disasters, episodic raiding by Maasai pastoralists, and the 
region’s integration into the global Indian Ocean. The physical landscape of the Western Serengeti 
changed as the local population integrated Maasai pastoralist approaches of interacting with the landscape 
with their own understandings and “strategies of survival.”41 Some areas were depopulated and others 
recolonized into fortified settlements.
42
 The colonial era again impacted the western Serengeti’s real and 
imagined landscape. Shetler argued that British conceptions of the Serengeti as a resource for economic 
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exploitation and “development” conflicted with global conservationists’ visions of the landscape as 
pristine wilderness in need of protection from human exploitation.  
 Shetler is one of a number of historians who analyzed the manner and means by which 
colonialism attempted to (re)construct social and physical spaces throughout the world. According to 
Edward Said, Westerners simplified complex foreign societies into the inherently inferior, backwards, and 
immutable “other” – a process that allowed Westerners to justify their conquest and control of indigenous 
societies around the world.
43
 Map-making was a crucial tool in shaping European imaginations of foreign 
spaces. Benedict Anderson argued that maps and geographical surveys demarcated imperial boundaries, 
while censuses filled in the bordered spaces with inhabitants divided by quantifiable categories (race, 
ethnicity, religion, language, etc.).
44
 Imperial powers further subdivided their colonial possessions 
according to internal administrative boundaries in order to more effectively govern classified populations. 
According to Gregory Maddox, 
Just as colonial states externally defined areas as different colonies, they internally imposed a 
vision of spatial demarcation, dividing land into provinces, districts, chiefdoms, and tribal areas. 
Land use mirrored supposed ethnic divisions. Colonial officials tried to spatially segregate 
resource use, designating regions as “game reserves” and “forest reserves,” alienating some areas 
for immigrant use and pairing them with native reserves.
45
  
 
“Natural” spaces were delineated into exploitable economic units based upon readily available resources 
and their future economic potential – cash crop production, food staple cultivation, labor reserves, mineral 
extraction, and so forth.
46
 Historians, however, have shown that colonial rule did not attain validity and 
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authority simply by drawing lines on a map and signing treaties. Terrence Ranger, Eric Hobsbawm, and 
Benedict Anderson pioneered the argument that traditions were invented and formally instituted to give 
meaning, cohesion, and authority to imagined nations, colonies, and empires.
47
 Imperial flags, 
ceremonies, legislation, taxation, monetary economies, military force, forced labor practices, and the 
construction of administrative buildings were a few of the devices colonists employed to make their 
authority concrete in the daily lives and consciousness of the colonizers and colonized. Ranger argued 
that British officials used traditions from military regiments, great houses, and public schools in order to 
instill in Africans their “proper” place within a new colonial social order; Europeans ruled and Africans 
obeyed.
48
 Social spaces were also reconceptualized according to racial and gender hierarchies.
49
 Colonial 
legislation often dictated an individual’s employment, education, place of residence, and political rights 
according to their racial status. After World War I, the British increasingly organized “African” spaces 
according to ethnic identities.
50
 When confronted with ethnically-mixed societies (such as in southern 
Tanzania), the British created “tribes” and “chiefs.”  
 Technological artifacts were also critical to colonial space-shaping and shape-defining processes. 
Railways, steamships, roads, and airplanes were administrative, economic, and “civilizing” tools that 
Europeans employed to exploit colonial resources while strengthening colonial authority, economies, and 
racially-based social orders.
51
 Europeans used transportation technologies to direct and control the 
movement of colonial resources – whether loading cash crops into railway cars destined for steamships 
and imperial markets, 
 
or crowding migrant laborers into the back of lorries destined for mines or 
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plantations.
52
 As previously discussed, Alber and Gewald illustrated how motor vehicles extended and 
consolidated colonial authority, while reaffirming racial stereotypes between “superior” colonists and 
“inferior” Africans.53 Historians, however, have convincingly argued that imperial powers were unable to 
unequivocally construct and transform social and physical spaces according to their designs and desires. 
Although colonialism imposed new “spatial constraints” and “structural realities,”54 Howard contended 
that indigenous populations continually negotiated with each other and Europeans “over the meaning of 
places and the form and content of networks.”55 The sites chosen for colonial “development” projects, in 
particular, became embroiled in intense conflict and negotiation between local populations, colonial 
officials, and international contractors and business interests.
56
 Conceptions of identity, race, gender, and 
citizenship also remained fluid and ambiguous as the colonized and colonists negotiated their 
relationships and understandings of one another.
57
 Howard insisted that social markers of race and gender 
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were “constantly being produced through interaction and exchanges in places, through networks, and in 
dynamic regions.”58 In the case of the western Serengeti, Shetler examined how the British colonial state 
redefined local communities into imagined “tribes” as part of their effort to reconceptualize the region 
according to administrative units. When local communities passively resisted colonial attempts to 
transform the ecological landscape into “consolidated peasant farmsteads,” the British responded by 
reimagining western Serengeti peoples “as lawless and unruly renegades, uncivilized and backward 
natives, and, ultimately, cruel and indiscriminate ‘poachers.’”59 These stereotypes remained contested and 
impacted relationships between Western Serengeti peoples, the Tanzanian government, and international 
conservationist organizations to the current day. Shetler concluded that colonialism was one of multiple 
forces impacting the way in which individuals perceived and engaged with one another and the physical 
environment in the Western Serengeti. 
 In order to understand the historical processes that culminated in southern Tanzania’s 
marginalization and impoverishment, this dissertation explores how European, African, and Asian 
interactions and perceptions of the region changed during the course of the twentieth century, especially 
in the context of failed road construction projects and the expansion of motor vehicle transport. 
Borrowing from Howard, “region” is defined as a “dynamic zone of interaction.”60 Since humans partake 
in a multitude of interactions and networks, there are numerous criteria scholars could use to define 
southern Tanzania as a region. Defining southern Tanzania in terms of religious, kinship, or political 
interactions would produce varying regional parameters. This dissertation instead defines southern 
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Tanzania as a region based upon an analysis of long-distance trade and labor migration networks. This 
choice is not arbitrary. Howard contended that regions “are created and sustained through people’s 
mobility and exchanges.”61 This dissertation argues that trade and labor networks constantly and 
powerfully shaped the social, economic, and political landscape of southern Tanzania since the early 
second millennium C.E. For the purpose of this study, southern Tanzania’s regional parameters stretch 
south from Kilwa to the Ruvuma River, and west from the Indian Ocean to Songea District and Lake 
Malawi.
62
 The region shares two seasons – the rainy and dry season. The rains typically last from 
November to March, giving way to the dry season from April to October. Unpredictable and irregular 
rainfall is common throughout southern Tanzania, and the region’s vegetation, soils, and geological 
features are diverse. Moving westward from the red-laterized or “black cotton” soils of the coast (which 
supports an abundance of copra, coconuts, and mangroves), the land rises steeply into a series of plateaus. 
Ascending approximately 700 to 900 meters, the Makonde Plateau has an area of approximately 3,100 
km
2
 and consists of very dense vegetation, permeable sandy soils, and insufficient surface water. Despite 
the lack of a permanent water supply, the plateau accommodates seasonal millet, sorghum, and maize 
production, as well as an important famine-relief crop – cassava. The floodplains of the Ruvuma and 
Lukuledi Rivers (south and north of the plateau respectively) offer rich, well-watered soils. The Mwera or 
Rondo plateau rises north of the Lukuledi River, gradually giving way to the Machinga-Matumbi hills 
and the lightly wooded open country of Liwale to the north (and west of Kilwa). Heading west from the 
plateaus, the land flattens into undulating plains of wooded grasslands and increasingly dry, sandy soils. 
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Although numerous tributaries cut through the plains and support large- and small-game populations, the 
plains are sparsely populated by humans. Hilly country with increasingly rich soil reappears approaching 
Lake Malawi to the west. The geological features are very similar south of the Ruvuma River in northern 
Mozambique, in which the Mueda Plateau gives way to plains, wooded, and hilly country before reaching 
Lake Malawi. 
 When analyzing the socioeconomic changes that occurred in southern Tanzania during the 
twentieth century, it is imperative to examine the region as part of a larger borderland with northern 
Mozambique. Borderland scholars have repeatedly argued that the visual representation of borders as 
fixed lines on a map mask the reality that they are “changeable spatial units” that are influenced by 
interactions between and among local populaces, regional elites, and central states on both sides of the 
border.
63
 J.A. Mbembé and Steven Rendall argued that colonial borders in Africa reflected,  
[…] commercial, religious, and military realities, the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances 
that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the 
centuries preceding colonization proper.
64
  
 
While every border has its own history (some more ancient than others), each is strategically utilized by 
local people in ways unintended by their creators. Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel observed that 
borders became tools for revolutionaries and refugees to find protection under another sovereign. 
Borderland residents and traders, in comparison, traversed borders to access better health and education 
services, cheaper products, and lesser taxes.
65
 Baud and Schendel insisted that,  
No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps, how many customs officials are 
appointed, or how many watchtowers are built, people will ignore borders whenever it suits them. 
In doing so, they challenge the political status quo of which borders are the ultimate symbol.
66
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Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju offered similar conclusions regarding African borders in their edited 
volume, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. They argued that borders attempted 
to “corral sets of people” and control resources, yet borders created zones “of interaction rather than 
representing a genuine partition.”67 Eric Allina-Pisano concurred, arguing that colonial borders in Africa 
“were simultaneously a means by which colonial powers divided African people and territories; portals 
through which people, goods, and ideas might pass; and zones of opportunity for the ambitious and 
intrepid.”68 As people traversed international borders, they also crossed and transformed internal borders. 
Maddox insisted that ordinary Africans refused to be mere “cogs in a territorial and international division 
of resource exploitation with linkages controlled by a powerful core area.” They instead took advantage 
of and contested the “malleable and permeable” frontiers that existed throughout colonial Tanzania.69 In 
the case of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, state control over the border and trans-Ruvuma 
migrations was virtually non-existent for much of the twentieth century. Local populations exploited the 
unregulated and porous nature of the border to their advantage. With the exception of the First World War 
and Mozambique War of Independence, inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland regularly and freely 
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moved between colonial systems; evading oppressive colonial regimes and taking advantage of labor and 
trade markets. Southern Tanzanians often shared closer socioeconomic ties and a common identity with 
populations across the Ruvuma than with communities elsewhere in Tanzania. This dissertation evaluates 
the events occurring in northern Mozambique and the complex relations between the neighboring 
governments and residents in order to better understand how southern Tanzania’s socioeconomic 
landscape changed during and after the colonial era.    
 This dissertation ultimately examines the complex interactions between traders, producers, 
transporters, migrant laborers, private contractors, local leaders, and state officials as they constructed, 
negotiated, and transformed southern Tanzania’s trade and labor networks over the past three centuries. 
Their interactions were constantly mediated by technological and natural forces. The expansion of 
automotive transportation, in particular, produced ambiguous socioeconomic consequences as European, 
Asian, and African populations utilized the technology according to their own needs and objectives. 
Colonial officials employed motor vehicles with the intention of “civilizing” and “modernizing” southern 
Tanzania by improving administrative efficiency, introducing monetized import-export economies, and 
controlling the movement of raw material exports and human resources – namely African migrant 
laborers. Asian and African merchants, producers, and laborers, however, utilized automobiles to pursue 
socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland – actions that simultaneously 
supported and subverted colonial policies and authority. In every case, the region’s challenging climatic 
and soil conditions mediated the use of automobiles by inhibiting the construction of all-weather roads. In 
the end, this dissertation argues that the history of road transportation of southern Tanzania offers an 
avenue to gain new insights into how perceptions of southern Tanzania as an unprogressive, isolated, and 
impoverished region were created, impacted human interactions, and were challenged or embraced by 
local communities according to their needs. The dissertation also challenges the validity of negative 
stereotypes about southern Tanzania, illustrating the agency and innovation of local populations, who 
utilized their mobility to survive and thrive in a peripheral region. Finally, this dissertation advocates for a 
deeper understanding of southern Tanzania’s regional history so as to gradually strip away engrained 
24 
 
stereotypes about the region and enable current state officials, private companies, local leaders, and 
ordinary citizens to collaborate for the betterment of the region and nation.  
Overview of Sources 
 Researching and writing a regional history requires the synthesis of original research and 
secondary source materials. This dissertation is comprised of archival research conducted in Tanzania, 
Britain, and the United States over the course of three years. It also incorporates oral histories collected 
and translated with the help of my research assistant – Zuhura Mohamed – in Lindi, Masasi, and Mtwara 
town and outlying villages in 2015.
70
 This dissertation builds upon the work of many scholars who have 
studied the spaces and communities that have come to make up southern Tanzania, including [but not 
limited to]: J. Gus Liebenow, Terrence Ranger, Edward A. Alpers, Felicitas Becker, Chau P. Johnsen 
Kelly, Matthew Pawlowicz, John Albert Rauf Wembah-Rashid, Priya Lal, Husseina Dinani, Andrea 
Seligman, and the contributors of Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda’s The Making of a Periphery.71 In 
order to situate southern Tanzania in its proper historical context, this dissertation also transcends 
academic borders. Howard convincingly argued that regional histories must be part “of a multi-leveled 
analysis that includes the local and the macro-regional or global – with many scales in between.”72 One 
cannot understand trade and labor patterns in southern Tanzania without being mindful of events 
occurring elsewhere in East Africa, India, and Europe from the sixteenth century to the present day. 
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Despite perceptions of southern Tanzania as an isolated periphery since the 1920s, the region always 
influenced and was influenced by local, territorial/national, and international forces.
73
 This dissertation, 
therefore, synthesizes historical studies concerning the western Indian Ocean, India and the Indian 
diaspora, Mozambique, and the Portuguese, German, and British Empires. It also utilizes methodological 
approaches from the history of technology, borderland, development, African, and imperial 
historiographies. I do not claim mastery of each of these fields, but rather attempt and advocate a 
transnational and interdisciplinary approach to conducting regional histories.  
 I also recognize that by labelling and evaluating southern Tanzania as a region, I am participating 
in the space-shaping and space-defining process. Since my point of departure and underlying intention is 
to offer a history of southern Tanzania, my analysis is innately biased. This dissertation situates southern 
Tanzania at the center of a regional analysis. Its conclusion, therefore, may differ from those who place 
southern Tanzania in the periphery. The decision to concentrate on trade and labor networks also 
produced conclusions that may differ from regional analyzes focusing on political institutions, kinship 
networks, or religious affiliations across the south. Finally, my analysis of the region prior to 
independence is largely based upon archival materials written and maintained by European sources, 
including missionaries, early explorers, and colonial officials. As a consequence, much of the dissertation 
assesses how Europeans perceived and reconceived southern Tanzania as a borderland region through 
their interactions with local populations. The voices, memories, and opinions of Tanzanians from the 
townships of Lindi, Masasi, and Mtwara are interwoven into the analysis of the late colonial and 
postcolonial era. Interviews with former employees of the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. – 
including the General Manager, drivers, mechanics, carpenters, and passengers – as well as other private 
traders and drivers, offer valuable insights into the socioeconomic impact that the expansion of 
mechanized road transportation had in southern Tanzania before and after Tanzanian independence.  
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developments is inappropriate.” See Thomas Hüsken “The Neo-tribal Competitive Order in the Borderland of Egypt 
and Libya,” in Respacing Africa, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 169-205: 198. 
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Chapter Outlines  
 The first chapter examines ruptures and continuities in mobility patterns in southern Tanzania and 
northern Mozambique during the precolonial period. Prior to the imposition of European colonial rule in 
the 1880s, a dynamic web of overland and overseas trade networks connected South-and Central-East 
Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The inland trade networks gave shape to a macro-region – termed 
the Rufiji-Ruvuma region
74
 – that stretched east-west from the southern Swahili coast to Lake Malawi, 
and north-south from the Rufiji River to central Mozambique. Social, political, and cultural practices 
varied across the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, yet coastal and inland populations were participating in 
centuries-old trade networks when the Portuguese arrived in East Africa in the sixteenth century. 
Southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique formed a fluid and dynamic frontier region within the 
macro-region. The Ruvuma frontier consisted of a variety of ethnolinguistic groups, who migrated and 
interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. The natural environment continually 
influenced the creation, location, directionality, and composition of these trade networks, as well as the 
social relationships and structures that sustained them.  
 Beginning in the sixteenth century, mobility patterns in the Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region 
underwent a series of changes as East Africa became increasingly integrated into global capitalist 
markets. The Ruvuma frontier entered an unparalleled era of insecurity and instability during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as international demand for slaves and ivory escalated and 
Portuguese-Omani competition intensified along the East African coast. The small, dispersed 
communities of the Ruvuma region responded to intensified slave-raiding and devastating famines during 
the mid-nineteenth century by relocating to geographical strongholds and/or the  security offered by a 
growing number of Yao “sultans,” Ngoni “chiefs,” and self-made “big men” who appeared along two 
trade corridors that crisscrossed southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. These leaders utilized the 
instability created by the slave trade as an opportunity to expand their power and influence. They also 
entered into advantageous alliances with Indian merchants and European missionaries and explorers, who 
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 Term adapted from Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 18. 
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increasingly traded and settled in the interior.
75
 Indian merchant capitalists helped to integrate local, 
regional, and long-distance trade economies within the global capitalist market. European missionaries 
and explorers, meanwhile, reimagined the Ruvuma region as a potentially lucrative agricultural landscape 
of cash crop plantations and African peasant farms. Conflict and negotiation, exploitation and 
cooperation, adaptation and accommodation defined complex African-European-Asian relationships 
within the dynamic frontier during the nineteenth century. The first chapter concludes that the slave and 
ivory trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a space-destroying and space-creating process 
in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. While some areas were depopulated (voluntarily or 
forcefully), others witnessed the emergence of major trade centers and more centralized socioeconomic 
and political authority that attracted foreign interest, trade, and settlement. Mobility remained an essential 
strategy of survival and prosperity in the region throughout the precolonial era – providing both the means 
to evade environmental and social threats, while building social and economic networks. 
 The second chapter analyzes southern Tanzania’s transition into a peripheral borderland region as 
a consequence of German and Portuguese colonialism and the First World War. The creation of European 
colonies and designation of the Ruvuma River as a colonial border between Mozambique (Portuguese 
East Africa - PEA) and Tanzania (German East Africa - GEA) in the 1890s splintered the Rufiji-Ruvuma 
macro-region. Rather than serving as a frontier, southern GEA and northern PEA formed an unregulated 
and uncontrolled borderland between two colonial administrative and economic systems. Both the 
German colonial state and Nyassa Company administration lacked the resources to drastically alter the 
borderland landscape. Long-distance caravan routes remained operational under the overlapping authority 
of African “big men.” Indian merchants continued to function as indispensable financiers and middlemen. 
The violent German colonial campaigns to suppress the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905-07) and the Nyassa 
                                                          
75
 Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “Indian” to refer to people of South Asian descent. Although the 
South Asian population in Tanzania was diverse in terms of origin, language, religion, caste, and class, “Indian” or 
“Mhindi” were the main terms of reference and self-reference during much of the period this dissertation will 
examine. As James Brennan argued, the use of “alternative terms, ‘South Asian’ and ‘Asian,’ are far too artificial 
and inexact, respectively, to bear constant repetition.” For Brennan’s arguments in favor of using the term 
“Indian,” see Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012), 20. 
28 
 
Company’s “pacification” campaigns (1900-1910), however, undermined the region’s stability and 
economic prosperity.
 
 As a consequence of the unrest, the Portuguese largely abandoned their agricultural 
and infrastructure “development” projects for northern PEA and instead aimed to exploit local resources 
on the cheap. Across the border, colonial warfare bred destruction and opportunity. Local populations – 
particularly along the Kilwa trade corridor – contended with violence, famine, mass migrations, the 
encroachment of tsetse flies and wildlife, and drastic changes in local and regional power dynamics. 
Many of the “big men” of the Lindi trade corridor, in contrast, allied with the Germans and took 
advantage of the political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion vis-à-vis 
their rivals. Producers and traders along the Lindi trade corridor also profited from the political and 
economic decline of Kilwa and German efforts to reorient the southern economy around agricultural 
exportation. In contrast to their Portuguese counterparts, European plantation owners and businessmen in 
southern GEA remained convinced of the region’s economic potential and invested their own funds 
towards improving the transportation infrastructure. The incomplete railway and roads extending from 
Lindi town at the onset of World War I represented the ambivalent impact of colonial rule in the Ruvuma 
borderland in the early twentieth century.  
 German economic “development” schemes ceased with the onset of the First World War. The 
war produced an era of extraordinary destruction and instability throughout the Ruvuma borderland. In 
contrast to the previous decade of colonial warfare, the First World War produced massive population 
displacement, severely disrupted food production, and undermined local power structures on a much 
larger scale. Local leaders struggled to build advantageous alliances with the competing German, British, 
and Portuguese forces that flooded into their lands – each army demanding allegiance and keen to punish 
those who refused. These armies forced thousands of local men to fight as soldiers, haul supplies and 
weapons as carriers, and/or build roads to facilitate troop and supply movements. The Allies’ attempts to 
construct a new transportation landscape failed in the face of neglect and adverse climatic conditions. The 
Allies and Germans proved far more successful at destroying the region’s agricultural productivity by 
depriving it of valuable male labor, confiscating available crops, and destroying the unused crops in order 
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to deprive their adversaries of resources. Mobility no longer served as an effective survival strategy for 
local populations as they encountered famines throughout and beyond the borderland region. The 
abandoned and decrepit roads found throughout southern GEA and northern PEA reflected the fortunes of 
the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war – a region decimated and then neglected by colonial 
powers, who perceived it as an unprofitable, unhealthy, and isolated periphery that was incapable of 
“development.”  
The third chapter examines the Portuguese and British responses to wartime devastation and 
instability in the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era of the 1920s and 1930s. Whereas the Nyassa 
Company focused on short-term profits and exploited readily available resources, the new British 
administration governing the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika was torn between the conflicting aims of 
stabilizing and revitalizing the regional economy, while also exploiting local resources for the 
metropole’s benefit. With a limited budget and personnel, the British central administration in Dar es 
Salaam invested in the more prosperous cash crop producing regions along the Central and Tanga 
Railways. Despite the lack of external support, the undermanned and underfunded southern provincial 
administration aimed to transform the isolated, impoverished borderland into a prosperous exporting 
region of agricultural produce and migrant laborers. In order to achieve this objective, road construction 
and transportation rested at the heart of the colonial development plans in southern Tanganyika 
throughout the interwar era. British officers specifically targeted the Lindi-Songea main road as the 
transportation artery through which they would revitalize the southern economy and improve 
administrative efficiency. In the wake of the Great Depression, the southern administration found itself 
without the staff, finances, labor, and equipment needed to maintain over 380 miles of dirt and gravel 
road that washed out annually during the rains. The colonial state turned to the private sector for 
assistance and authorized two contractors – the Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. and L. Rousham 
Roberts – to assist the Public Works Department (PWD) in maintaining the main road. Neither the 
contractors nor the PWD succeeded in improving the main road to an all-weather standard, yet their 
efforts enabled the expansion of southern Tanganyika’s automotive transportation sector. Indian 
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wholesalers and retailers, in particular, used automobiles to reestablish and expand their trade network 
between the coast and interior districts. African producers and migrant laborers also appropriated motor 
vehicles to pursue advantageous labor and trade markets within and beyond the borderland region, 
regardless of the policies implemented by British and Portuguese authorities. The chapter concludes that 
the Lindi-Songea main road was an ambiguous symbol of colonial authority and impotence; private 
initiative and discrimination. The inadequacy of the roadways was a symptom, symbol, and justification 
for the region’s marginalization – limiting its economic growth and propagating stereotypes of its 
isolation, backwardness, and underdevelopment. Road transportation, however, became the life-line of the 
southern economy during the interwar era and offered some inhabitants opportunities to prosper.  
 The fourth chapter analyzes mounting conflict among and between British officials, private 
contractors, and local communities in southern Tanzania during and after the Second World War. The 
onset of the war signaled the introduction of a more interventionist British colonial state that aimed at 
better integrating the south’s trade and labor markets within the territorial and imperial economy. The 
colonial state, however, refused to allocate resources to improve southern Tanganyika’s infrastructure. 
Scrutiny of private contractors, instead, intensified and threatened to undermine the cooperative state-
civilian relationship that sustained and improved the southern infrastructure and economy during the 
interwar era. Following the war, southern Tanganyika entered the imperial spotlight for the first time. It 
became the central target of one of the largest development projects attempted in the British Empire, the 
East African Groundnut Scheme. Although numerous factors contributed to the failure of the Groundnut 
Scheme, the inability and/or unwillingness of colonial planners to recognize existing transportation and 
labor conditions in southern Tanganyika proved disastrous. The British state and development planners 
invested in the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port without devising strategies to recruit and 
sustain a permanent labor force and effectively tackle the adverse environmental conditions that had 
thwarted infrastructure projects for decades. They also disregarded the immense challenges of reorienting 
the southern economy around the railway when the region’s population was accustomed to road 
transportation. As contractors struggled to complete the railway and port, the roads rapidly deteriorated 
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due to a massive spike in vehicle traffic and the unwillingness of the central state and contractors to 
expend necessary funds on their upkeep and improvement. African laborers and entrepreneurs, 
meanwhile, took advantage of the competitive labor market and advantageous commercial markets 
created by the scheme. Local Indian entrepreneurs, like Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, 
also exploited the lack of transportation services to create a thriving cargo and passenger firm that grew to 
dominate the southern roadways. The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme and Southern Province Railway 
confirmed to outsiders that southern Tanganyika was incapable of “development.” In reality, the state 
failed because it ignored or overlooked local initiative and knowledge.  
 The fifth and final chapter examines significant transformations in southern Tanzania’s road 
transportation sector during the postcolonial era. The southern borderland returned to the national 
spotlight during the mid-to-late 1960s as it became embroiled in anti-colonial struggles in neighboring 
Mozambique and Zambia. The combat that occurred across the Ruvuma border as part of the 
Mozambique War of Independence gave southern Tanzania renewed strategic importance as the site 
where the new Tanzanian government would defend its sovereignty and fulfill its promise of supporting 
anti-colonialism. The Tanzanian government utilized wartime insecurities to build local support for the 
state, enforce greater control over regional and trans-Ruvuma migrations, and implement its socialist 
ujamaa agenda (particularly the relocation of scattered settlements into large, centralized villages 
conducting communal agriculture and serviced by state cooperatives). Indian firms and private 
transporters used their control over southern Tanzania’s transportation system to negotiate deteriorating 
Asian-African relations in the 1960s. By offering their vehicles in support of the state, the Indian 
population challenged popular anti-Asian nationalist discourse and validated their value, allegiance, and 
belonging to the new nation. The alliances created between the private transportation sector, state-
controlled cooperatives, and the Tanzanian government eventually collapsed in the early 1970s. The state 
stripped the Indian community of its decades-old control over the transportation, housing, wholesale, and 
retail markets. A new age of state-controlled transport began, but collapsed within fifteen years. The 
chapter concludes by examining how African drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania utilized their 
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technological knowledge and social networks to improve their socioeconomic status as “modern” men 
while negotiating the tumultuous economic decades of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The dissertation concludes with some reflections about the legacy of southern Tanzania’s gradual 
peripheralization, particularly in respect to recent local-state tensions regarding the off-shore, natural-gas 
concession in Mtwara and government promises of “development” in the south. Local protest in 2013 
regarding the government’s decision to construct a pipeline from the Mtwara concession to Dar es Salaam 
must be understood within the context of local and regional histories. Southern Tanzanians perceived the 
government’s decision as further evidence of their second-class citizenship within an impoverished and 
continually neglected region. Frustrations, however, have recently given way to tentative optimism 
among populations in Lindi and Mtwara. Many of the individuals interviewed for this dissertation 
perceived the long-awaited completion of an all-weather road between Lindi and Dar es Salaam, the 
expansion of numerous construction projects (including a new port at Lindi), and the prospective of new 
oil operations along the southern coast as evidence of the region’s growth and probability of future 
prosperity. The collapse of global oil prices in 2015-2016 threatens these visions of the future and leaves 
one concerned that southern Tanzanians may once again have to endure the disappointment of unfilled 
promises. This dissertation, however, concludes with the belief that southern Tanzanians will continue to 
utilize their mobility to successfully negotiate the challenges and opportunities available to them within 
and beyond the peripheral southern borderland.  
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Chapter 1  
Precolonial Mobility and Trade Networks in the Ruvuma Frontier   
 
 In 1963, Alison Smith offered the following assessment for the southern interior of precolonial 
East Africa:  
It was a pagan world: a world not of cities, connected with one another and with the other lands 
bounding the Indian Ocean by a sea-borne trade, but of self-sufficient villages, where even the 
largest centres of population, linked only by the porterage of human head or shoulder, hardly 
knew anything approaching an exchange economy.
1
  
 
Subsequent historians have vigorously challenged Smith’s assertion that the region comprising modern-
day southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique were stagnant and lacked regional or international 
commercial ties. Pekka Seppälla argued in 1998 that “Rather than being an isolated corner, southern 
Tanzania was historically a central point of entry for Arabs and Europeans. The history of encounters is as 
long and detailed as in any other part of Tanzania.”2 This chapter concurs with Seppälla’s claim, arguing 
that African populations residing in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique used their mobility to 
survive and thrive in the region’s diverse and challenging environments since the first millennium CE. 
Prior to the imposition of European colonial rule in the 1880s, a dynamic web of overland and overseas 
trade networks connected South- and Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The inland trade 
networks gave shape to a macro-region – termed the Rufiji-Ruvuma region3 – that stretched east-west 
from the southern Swahili coast to Lake Malawi, and north-south from the Rufiji River to central 
Mozambique. Although social, political, and cultural practices varied across the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, 
coastal and inland populations were participating in centuries-old trade networks when the Portuguese 
arrived on East African shores in the sixteenth century. Within the macro-region, southern Tanzania and 
northern Mozambique formed a fluid and dynamic frontier region where a variety of ethnolinguistic 
groups migrated and interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. Natural forces and 
                                                          
1
 Alison Smith, “The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-1884,” in History of East Africa, vol. 1, eds. Roland Oliver 
and Gervase Mathew (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 253-296: 253. 
2
 Pekka Seppälä, “Introduction,” The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in 
Southern Tanzania, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 7-37: 15. 
3
 Term adapted from Andrea Seligman, “Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East 
African – Indian Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E.” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014). 
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features continually influenced the creation, location, directionality, and composition of these trade 
networks, as well as the social relationships and structures that sustained them. Populations that resided 
within the challenging ecosystem of the frontier region geared their interactions with one another and 
their physical environment towards accommodation and flexibility.
4
 They chose to live in small-dispersed 
communities with flexible political and social systems that facilitated the construction of alliances and 
incorporation of various groups.
5
 Identity was also flexible within the “elastic landscape,”6 and mobility 
remained crucial for survival and prosperity. 
 Mobility patterns and overland trade networks in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region underwent a series of 
changes from the sixteenth century onward as East Africa became increasingly integrated into global 
capitalist markets rife with competing Arab, Asian, European, and African agendas. During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the Ruvuma frontier entered into an unparalleled era of insecurity and instability 
as international demands for slaves and ivory escalated, and the Omani Empire exerted its dominance 
along the East African coast in competition with the Portuguese.
7
 African and Indian traders in the 
Ruvuma frontier took advantage of their liminal position between two economic systems – Portuguese to 
the south and Omani to the north – in order to maximize profits. By the nineteenth century, two distinct 
yet overlapping trade corridors crisscrossed southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Political and 
economic power within these corridors gradually became centralized under African “sultanates” and “big 
men.” These local and regional leaders utilized the instability created by the slave trade as an opportunity 
to build ethnically-mixed followings and expand their power and influence. They also exploited alliances 
with Asian merchants and European missionaries and explorers, who increasingly traded and settled in 
the interior. Through their expeditions and interactions with local communities, Europeans reimagined the 
                                                          
4
 Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 2002), 
2. 
5
 Priya Lal, “Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975” 
(PhD diss., New York University, 2011), 170-71; and John Albert Rauf Wembah-Rashid, “Socio-Political 
Development and Economic Viability in a Rural Community: The Case of Nakarara Village, Mtwara Region 
Tanzania” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1983), 44.   
6
 Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 203. 
7
 Abdul Sheriff, Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the 
World Economy, 1770-1873 (London: James Curry 1987). 
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Ruvuma frontier as a potentially lucrative agricultural landscape of cash crop plantations and African 
peasant farms. In order to realize their ambitions, Europeans first aimed to end the slave trade and 
“civilize/modernize” local communities (who they defined in ethnic terms) under the leadership of pro-
Christian, pro-European leaders. Conflict and negotiation, exploitation and cooperation, adaptation and 
accommodation defined the complex relationships between local peoples, Europeans, and Asian 
intermediaries residing and moving across the dynamic frontier during the nineteenth century. The 
socioeconomic networks created between these local and foreign communities impacted the real and 
imagined landscape of the Ruvuma region. This chapter synthesizes archeological and historical 
secondary sources with primary accounts from Arab and European traders, missionaries, and officials in 
order to recreate the history of precolonial trade networks in southern Tanzania and northern 
Mozambique. It analyzes the ruptures and continuities in mobility patterns in response to environmental, 
social, and economic forces generated at the local, regional, and international level.   
Formation of the Rufiji-Ruvuma Macro-Region  
 Reconstructing precolonial trade networks in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique is a 
formidable task due to the lack of written records prior to the seventeenth century. Combining limited 
archeological data with historical linguistics, Andrea Seligman has produced one of the most thorough 
reconstructions of migration, settlement, and trade patterns of the Rufiji-Ruvuma language family in 
southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique from the first millennium to the seventeenth century.
8
 She 
contended that “Proto Rufiji Ruvuma communities” first settled on the Songea-Njombe plateau in 
southwestern Tanzania at the start of the first millennium CE.
9
 They employed mixed resource traditions 
that combined cultivation with hunting, trapping, fishing, wild resource collection (especially honey), 
                                                          
8
 Andrea Seligman, “Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East African – Indian 
Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E.” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014). 
9
 Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 83-84. The proto Rufiji Ruvuma peoples were Bantu-speakers. The Bantu languages 
are a sub-group of the Niger-Congo language family. According to contemporary archeologists and historical 
linguists, Bantu-speaking farmers likely began expanding from the territory between Cameroon and Nigeria 
sometime around 3000 BCE. The Bantu Expansion took place over a millennium and resulted in Bantu languages 
being spoken from modern-day Senegal to Tanzania and South Africa. Seligman argued that the proto Rufiji 
Ruvuma communities began migrating and settling around the southern East African lakes between 1500-500 BCE. 
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domestic small animal husbandry, and artisanal work.
10
 Climate changes combined with resource and 
population pressures gradually pushed the Proto Rufiji Ruvuma communities from the plateau around 300 
CE.
11
 The Rufiji-Ruvuma family gradually splintered into two distinct language groups – Rufiji and 
Ruvuma. The Rufiji communities migrated eastward, while the Ruvuma communities headed south into 
the wooded hills and river valleys along the Ruvuma River. The Rufiji communities splintered further as 
they engaged in a myriad of local exchange networks and two long-distance trade networks.
12
 East Rufiji 
communities engaged with the Swahili coast and western Indian Ocean, as well as their Ruvuma 
neighbors to the south and inland communities in the Southern Highlands.
13
 Central and Western Rufiji 
communities also traded with their southerly Ruvuma neighbors while maintaining numerous overlapping 
local trade networks. The Ruvuma language group, meanwhile, splintered into Yao and Makonde 
language communities.
14
 Despite increasing linguistic and cultural differentiation, the Yao and Makonde 
shared a mixed resource tradition. Hunting, fishing, and wild resource collection fostered local and long-
distance interactions between themselves, Makua speakers in central Mozambique, and Maravi 
communities near Lake Malawi.
15
  
                                                          
10
 Ibid., 90-104. Seligman theorized that the Rufiji Ruvuma communities lived in small-scale settlements with 
extended family members. The densely wooded area had adequate rainfall and soil to support the cultivation of 
well-known root-crops. 
11
 Ibid., 105. Seligman referenced a study by Paul Barker which concluded that a wet spell occurred around 300 CE, 
which would have made lowlands and riverine regions more attractive for settlement. The wet spell was followed 
by a return to drier conditions.   
12
 Ibid., 149-60.  
13
 Ibid., 161. According to Seligman, lexical evidence suggests that the East Rufiji communities preferred the 
southerly contact. 
14
 Ibid., 122. The Greater Makonde subdivided into Makonde and Machinga communities, while the Greater Yao 
splintered into Yao and Mwela speakers by the early second millennium. 
15
 Edward Alpers, Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 5. Although 
the Ruvuma River supported small canoe trade, it did not become a major artery of long-distance trade.  
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Figure 1.1 Distribution of Ethnolinguistic Communities in East-Central Africa
16
 
 
Edward Alpers and Andrea Seligman similarly noted that ironworking likely served as a source of early 
exchange between the Yao and their neighbors.
17
 Yohanna B. Abdallah (a local historian and Anglican 
priest writing in the early 1900s) credited the Wachisi – a Yao clan – with the expansion of iron 
production and exchange in Central-East Africa. They earned acclaim as wealthy blacksmiths, who 
traveled extensively selling their iron hoes and tools: 
These Wachisi went all over the country peddling their hoes. In the territories of the Amachinga, 
the Wambemba, Amasaninga, the Achingoli across the Rovuma, and the Wamwela, of the 
Wanjese, the Amakale, Wamkula, Amalambo and the Amagoche. There was no country which 
the Wachisis did not visit.
18
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 Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, 9. 
17
 Ibid., 10-17 and 23. Alpers argued that an unequal distribution of salt and iron ore deposits drew the Macua into 
trade relations with salt-sufficient coastal communities and ironworking Yao communities further in the interior. 
Salt deficiencies similarly induced Yao communities to enter into long-distance exchange with the coast and 
Mang’anja (Maravi) communities to the west in the fertile region of the Shire Valley. Alpers’ description of the 
Makua and Maravi speakers’ reliance on cultivation, hunting, fishing, and trading indicated that they employed a 
mixed livelihood tradition similar to neighboring Ruvuma speakers. 
18
 Yohanna B. Abdallah’s passage from The Yaos, Chiikala cha Wayao was quoted in Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 
126. Abdallah detailed the awe and reverence that communities showed to a Yao traveler: “[…] he who knew other 
countries was always listened to with respect, the people hanging on his words delighted, all of them gazing at 
him, sometimes with awe, saying, 'Good lord! you are a wonder! Eh! but you have travelled!' And the people 
would believe anything he told them.” Alpers argued that Abdallah’s father was a Makua from Newala who 
claimed to be a Yao because of the prestige it offered. Abdallah lived and worked in Ugangu – a Yao area of 
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Trade in ironware brought the Yao into wider exchange networks through which they could barter 
tobacco, hoes, and hunting products for salt, cloth, copper, and beads.
19
 Seligman concluded that elite 
rulers and small-scale resource specialists from across Central-East Africa innovated and participated in a 
multitude of east- and westward-oriented commercial networks in the early to mid-second millennium 
(1200s-1500s).
20
 When the Portuguese arrived in East Africa during the sixteenth century, they observed 
material evidence (clothing, jewelry, tools, and decorations) of “several generations of exchange between 
local Swahili, Yao, and other communities.”21 
 The long-distance trade networks crisscrossing Central-East Africa gave shape to the Rufiji-
Ruvuma macro-region. The edges of the macro-region blurred to the east along the southern Swahili coast 
(stretching from Kilwa to Cape Delgado); south into Makua-speaking territories; north to the Rufiji River; 
and west-southwest in Lake Malawi. Southern Tanzanian and northern Mozambique rested at the center 
of the macro-region, forming a fluid and dynamic frontier where a variety of ethnolinguistic groups 
migrated and interacted. Mwela and Yao speakers populated much of the inland area from today’s Lindi 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mozambique. For the original passage and Alper’s biographical essay on Abdallah, see Yohanna B. Abdallah, The 
Yaos, Chiikala cha Wayao, ed. and trans. Meredith Sanderson, second edition (London: Cass, 1973). For further 
discussion regarding the Wachisi (or Cisi), see Edward A. Alpers, “Trade, State, and Society among the Yao in the 
Nineteenth Century,” The Journal of African History 10, no. 3 (1969): 405-420.  
19
 Archeological and linguistic evidence suggests that pottery was also a significant source of early exchange among 
communities near Lake Malawi, the early Swahili coast, and central Mozambique during the first millennium. 
Matthew Pawlowicz compared the ceramic traditions at the coastal town of Mikindani (southern Tanzania) with 
those found near Lake Malawi. Mikindani’s ceramics initially mirrored ceramic characteristics found in coastal 
towns to the north and the south. By the second millennium, however, Mikindani’s ceramic traditions reflected 
those produced in the interior of northern Mozambique and the northern shores of Lake Malawi. Pawlowicz 
theorized that competition with the island-port of Kilwa Kisiwani and/or “more attractive interior alternatives” 
influenced Mikindani residents and merchants to shift their relations away from the Swahili coast and towards 
interior networks. Seligman found lexical evidence concerning pottery graphite decoration that substantiated 
Pawlowicz’s conclusion that trade and cultural links existed between the coast, interior, and the region around 
Lake Malawi (Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 109-120). The chronicles of Mikindani and Lindi provided further 
evidence of important relationships between the Swahili coast and non-Swahili interior – specifically with Makua 
and Makonde populations. Whereas Arabs or Shiraz appeared prominently in the historical chronicles for Kilwa, 
African ethnic groups played an enduring role in the settlement histories of Lindi and Mikindani. See Matthew 
Pawlowicz, "Finding Their Place in the Swahili World: An Archaeological Exploration of the Southern Tanzanian 
Coast" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2011); and Matthew Pawlowicz and Adria LaViolette, “Swahili Historical 
Chronicles from an Archaeological Perspective: Bridging History and Archaeology, and Coast and Hinterland, in 
Southern Tanzania,” in The Death of Prehistory, eds. Peter R. Schmidt and Stephen A. Mrozowski (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
20
 Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 136-37. 
21
 Ibid., 137. 
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District in southeast Tanzania heading southwest towards the northern regions of Mozambique and Lake 
Malawi. Makonde speakers, meanwhile, lived in the highland plateaus resting north and south of the 
mouth of the Ruvuma River.
22 According to Seligman, each “speech community, in turn, was divided into 
various mostly decentralized communities of smaller settlements.”23 Matrilineal-based political and social 
structures typically defined these communities, which designed their rites, institutions, and ceremonies 
towards the incorporation of diverse populations rather than the formation of exclusive, distinct ethnic 
identities.
24 Large kingdoms and trade centers did not develop in the Ruvuma frontier partially because of 
the region’s adverse environmental conditions. The lack of surface water beyond the Ruvuma River and 
its tributaries and the unpredictable and erratic nature of rainfall in the region resulted in recurrent 
droughts and famines. Local communities responded by gearing their interactions with the physical 
environment “towards flexibility and survival rather than intensive exploitation, and veering between 
sedentarism and migration.”25 Mobility was an essential survival strategy for inhabitants of the Ruvuma 
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frontier. It facilitated trade and social interactions, as well as enabling populations to relocate in response 
to famines, droughts, infertile soil, population pressure, warfare, raiding, and undesirable authority. 
Mobility continued to serve as an important strategy as volatile overseas markets penetrated the interior of 
the Rufiji-Ruvuma region from the sixteenth century onward.  
Overseas Influences on the Southern Swahili Coast and Rufiji-Ruvuma Interior   
 
 Indian Ocean monsoon winds and ocean currents drew East Africa into maritime exchange with 
populations from across the western Indian Ocean since the first century CE.
26
 From November to March, 
northeasterly monsoon winds blew into the East African coast from the Arabian Peninsula. The winds 
shifted to the south-southeast by late March or April until October, taking ships to Arabia, the Persian 
Gulf, and western India. 
  
Figure 1.2 Indian Ocean Trade Routes
27  
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Resource scarcities in the southern coast of Yemen and Oman initially drove seaborne contact between 
East Africa, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf.
28
 According to Randall L. Pouwels, the Arab coastal ports 
depended “for many centuries on African cereals to supplement their diets; timber to build their homes; 
and slaves to provide labor, armed protection, and various domestic ‘services.’”29 By the ninth century, a 
“fully articulated commercial system” existed in the western Indian Ocean wherein East African ivory, 
timber, grains, and other goods were exchanged for Arab, Indian, and Chinese pottery, glassware, glass 
beads, ironware, jewelry, and indigo-dyed cotton goods.
30
 Gold exports drew the southern Swahili coast – 
particularly Kilwa Kisiwani in southern Tanzania – more fully into the maritime trade networks.31 Kilwa 
rested at the southern limits of the range that merchant ships could sail to and from Arabia during one 
monsoon season. Merchants, therefore, used Kilwa Kisiwani as an entrepôt to access markets at 
Mozambique Island, Angoche, Sofala, and Madagascar.
32
 The appearance of stone architecture in the late 
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twelve century indicated Kilwa Kisiwani’s prosperity and hegemonic position over the southerly coastal 
network that linked Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia, Sofala, the Comoro Islands, and Madagascar.
33
 
 
Figure 1.3 Depiction of the City of Kilwa Kisiwani (1572) 
 
Kilwa Kisiwani arose as one of the most powerful and wealthy commercial centers along the entire East 
African coast after it seized control of Sofala gold exports from Mogadishu in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries.
34
 Kilwa’s engagement with overland trade networks in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, in 
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contrast, was minimal. Although interior African communities supplied food staples to Kilwa, the 
entrepôt remained “outwardly directed” until the Portuguese incursion in the sixteenth century.35  
 The Portuguese inadvertently drew the southern Swahili coast and overland trade networks into 
closer union. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese employed their naval power to gain control 
over the Indian Ocean sea lanes and monopolize trade in Persian silver, East African gold, and Asian 
spices.
36
 Portuguese forces strove to drive out all rival shippers (Arab, Indian, and European), displace the 
ruling elite in coastal cities, and profit from custom duties and monopolies. They successfully attacked 
and occupied important commercial centers and strategic ports, including: Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa, 
Brava, Shihr, Muscat, Ormuz, and Goa.
37
 They founded the capital of the Estado da India (State of India), 
high court of appeals, Board of Trade, and Board of Conscience (for ecclesiastical matters) in Goa during 
the 1530s.
38
 The Captaincy of Sofala and Mozambique was established in East Africa, and it quickly 
became one of the most prestigious and valuable captaincies in the Indian Ocean.
39
 The authority of the 
Portuguese in the western Indian Ocean and East Africa, however, was neither omnipotent nor 
omnipresent. Erik Gilbert contended that the Portuguese did not “fundamentally transform the nature and 
patterns of western Indian Ocean trade,” but instead “superimposed themselves on a pre-existing trade 
system without changing it very much.”40 Portuguese administrators, private traders, and military 
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personnel stationed in East Africa were forced to negotiate with local leaders and communities.
41
 In 
Kilwa, for example, the Portuguese negotiated with the leading merchant families over issues of tax 
collection, trade licenses, price setting, and general commercial control in the sixteenth century.
42
 
Although these families regained political authority over Kilwa seven years after the port’s razing in 
1501, they struggled to rebuild their maritime trade economy as the Portuguese gained control over the 
gold trade in the 1530s.
43
 Coastal inhabitants responded by reorienting and/or intensifying their trade 
activities with the interior of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region.
44
 According to Alpers, contact between Yao 
caravan traders and Kilwa merchants grew gradually “from a limited regional trade in hides, ironware, 
and agricultural products […] to a thriving, well-organized trade in ivory by the end of the seventeenth 
century.”45 Portuguese authority and interference in the overland trade networks were minimal throughout 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
46
 In contrast to the gold fields along the Zambezi River, southern 
Tanzania and northern Mozambique lacked commodities that the Portuguese wanted to exploit. The 
Portuguese residing along the coast and in isolated forts in the interior instead depended upon local 
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communities to attain foodstuffs and commodity goods, like beeswax.
47
 African communities 
incorporated the Portuguese as new participants in existing local, regional, and long-distance exchange 
networks that remained eastwardly and westerly oriented.
48
 According to Seligman, “the initial centuries 
of Portuguese contact were on the whole an advantageous, not disruptive, period” for African populations 
in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region.
49
  
Changing Complexion of Trade (17
th
-19
th
 Century) 
 Ties between the Rufiji-Ruvuma interior, coast, and overseas markets intensified as Portuguese 
authority in the Indian Ocean waned and international demand for slaves and ivory heightened during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Dutch and English repeatedly attacked the Portuguese in the 
Mozambique Channel during the 1610s-1620s before signing a peace and reestablishing good commercial 
relations in the 1640s.
50
 During the following decade, the Ya’rubi Imams of Oman expelled the 
Portuguese from Muscat.
51
 Omani forces then allied with coastal populations in expelling the Portuguese 
from Kilwa and Fort Jesus, Mombasa by 1698. A turbulent period followed along the East African coast 
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as the rulers and merchants of Kilwa, Oman, and Portugal competed for authority over the coast and its 
commerce.
52
 Yao traders in the interior of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region responded to the unrest by 
redirecting their caravan routes south to Mozambique Island where merchants from Diu continued to 
regularly import Indian cloth.
53
 Approximately 400 to 500 bars of ivory arrived annually to Mozambique 
Island by the 1750s – to the great benefit of the Portuguese economy.54 The orientation of Yao trade 
routes to Mozambique was short-lived. Sultan Said ibn-Ahmed of Oman wanted to profit from the 
growing demand for East African slaves from the Persian Gulf and French sugar plantations on the 
Mascarene Islands (east of Madagascar).
55
 Zanzibar offered an ideal geographical position for the Omani 
to control maritime trade in slaves, ivory, and other commodities between the interior of East Africa and 
markets in Madagascar, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, India, and further abroad.
56
 Merchants could access 
the island and return to their home ports within one monsoon season. Zanzibar also offered a safe harbor 
capable of stockpiling goods and providing reliable, safe water.
57 Zanzibar rapidly arose as the major 
entrepôt within expanding global trade networks that included formal trade relations with the United 
States (1833), Britain (1839), and France (1844).
58
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Figure 1.4 18
th
 Century Trade Routes
59
 
 
French adventurer Jean-Vincent Morice observed in 1776 that merchants from Kilwa, Mafia, Mombasa, 
Pate, and the other coastal ports arrived in Zanzibar to exchange ivory tusks, slaves, and provisions 
procured from the mainland for foreign cargo imported on Indian ships.
60
 British Captain T. Smee 
reported in 1811 that Zanzibar was exporting between 6,000 and 8,000 slaves annually to Muscat, India, 
and the Mascarene Islands.
61
 Ivory, however, was the top export commodity during the nineteenth 
century. Europeans, Arabs, and Asians desired the “soft” ivory of East Africa that could be made into 
wedding bangles, piano keys, and billiard balls. Between 1820 and 1840, the price for Zanzibar-exported 
ivory rose six fold.
62
 Ivory exports increased from 242,975 lbs. to 488,600 lbs. between 1856 and 1859.
63
 
Zanzibar supplied approximately 75% of the world’s total ivory market by 1891.64 In exchange for East 
African raw materials, industrial goods flooded Zanzibar and the interior. Hides and oil seeds were 
imported from Somalia, while Arabs imported dried fish, salt, ghee, Muscat cloth, mats, livestock, coffee, 
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dates, shark oil, and passengers.
65
 Indian merchants were regularly importing a myriad of trade goods, 
including; cloth, glass beads, copper and metal wares, furniture, salt, rice, and onions.
66
 Jeremy Prestholdt 
argued that East African consumers drove the international market, dictating which goods foreigners 
imported in exchange for ivory and slaves. Europeans relied upon agents in Zanzibar to know the specific 
style, size, and color of beads, brass-wire, and cloth desired by communities in the interior:   
Red beads, for instance, were the only kind salable in Unyamwezi, whereas black beads were 
currency in Ugogo, though worthless everywhere else. ‘Egg’ beads were valuable in Ujiji and 
Uguha, but refused elsewhere. White beads were popular in Ufipa and parts of Usagara and 
Ugogo, but disliked in Uzigua and Ukonongo. The bright yellow samuli (Swahili: “ghee”) was in 
demand among Chagga and Maasai consumers, but found no market further south.
67
 
 
By the late-1840s, unbleached cottons from America (called merekani) superseded indigos from Kutch as 
the most commonly imported cloth in East Africa.
68
 When the American Civil War disrupted trade, Indian 
firms in Bombay flooded the East African market with knockoff cotton products and other consumer 
goods.
69 In addition to textiles and beads, Europeans also exported obsolete muskets and breech-loaders.70  
These weapons became important tools in the process of political centralization that occurred across the 
Ruvuma frontier – a process which will be discussed later in the chapter. Zanzibar ultimately rested at the 
center of East Africa’s integration within the expanding global capitalist economic system in the 
nineteenth century. It acted as a “conveyor belt,” supplying the industrialized, capitalist markets of the 
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west with raw materials and luxury goods while consuming and distributing those nations’ manufactured 
goods to the Rufiji-Ruvuma region and broader East African interior.
71
   
The Southern Trade Corridors 
 
The physical, socioeconomic, and political landscape of the Ruvuma frontier underwent 
significant changes due to the instability and opportunities created by the penetration of international 
capitalist markets in the nineteenth century – markets driven by demands for slaves and ivory and 
underwritten with Indian capital and consumer goods. The Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region fractured as the 
Portuguese and Sultan of Zanzibar erected competing zones of political and economic authority in East 
Africa. The Ruvuma frontier became a frontier borderland separating Portuguese and Omani sovereignty. 
According to Malyn Newitt, Cape Delgado in northern Mozambique became “a geographical point at 
which real political, cultural and economic interests divided” between Portuguese and Portuguese Indians 
to the south and Omani Arabs and Indians to the north. Although British missionaries and explorers 
recognized the Ruvuma River as the demarcation between Portuguese and Omani hegemony, their 
authority hardly penetrated the interior. African and Asian traders in the Ruvuma frontier instead took 
advantage of their liminal position between two economic systems and reoriented their trade routes in 
order to exploit the most lucrative markets available (just as they had during the preceding centuries). 
Instability in the Ruvuma frontier intensified, however, as Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani (southern 
Tanzania) arose as major slave ports during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Europeans estimated 
that the number of slaves exported from Kilwa Kivinje fluctuated between 10,000 and 20,000 per year 
during the mid-nineteenth century.
72
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Table 1.1 “Slaves Exported from Kilwa Kivinje, 1862-1896”73 
Year Number of Slaves 
1862-63 18,500 
1863-64 17,500 
1864-65 16,821 
1865-66 22,344 
1866-67 22,038 
1867-68 N/A 
1868-69 14,944 (ending Aug 1869) 
Total 112,147 
 
The small, decentralized communities residing in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique were 
particularly susceptible to attacks by slave raiders. Whereas the majority of slaves initially originated 
from the coastal hinterland south of the Kilwa, a growing number came from the Lake Malawi area by 
mid-century.
74
 By the early 1880s, an estimated 20,000 slaves were brought to the coast from the Lake 
Malawi area per annum. Long-distance caravans with 500 to 2,000 slaves were commonly seen.
75
 In 
addition to the raids (and perhaps as a consequence of them), populations in the Ruvuma frontier faced a 
series of droughts and famines during the mid-nineteenth century. J. Gus Liebenow shared Makonde 
accounts of the devastating impacts of warfare and famine in the region: 
[…] dead bodies outnumbered the living and that there were few persons left to bury the dead. 
The desperate struggle for food found the surviving Makonde fighting one another, and the 
additional slaughter brought about another exodus across the Ruvuma into the Ndonde area of 
Masasi District. Both the famine and the fratricidal warfare were referred to as Mapende, which 
means ‘that which has no reason.’76 
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Makonde, Makua, and Yao populations partook in a series of northerly migrations to escape the famine 
conditions, warfare, slave raiding, and Portuguese encroachment occurring south of the Ruvuma River.
77
 
Some migrants settled along the Ruvuma and Lukuledi river valleys. Masasi attracted many migrants due 
to its prosperous tradition of iron-working and salt-making.
78
 Resting along the Lindi-Lake Malawi trade 
route, residents of Masasi also made a living by supplying passing caravans with provisions.
79
 According 
to Lorne Larson, the devastation and population displacement caused by slave raiding was so severe that 
caravans from Lindi and Kilwa “were forced to lay enough provisions at Masasi to sustain them for a 
westward journey lasting 14-17 days through a depopulated zone.”80 Since the river valleys and plains of 
southern Tanzania were susceptible to raiding, a large number of people chose to relocate to the 
geographical stronghold of the Makonde Plateau. The plateau’s steep escarpment and dense thickets 
provided protection to scattered homesteads.
81
 Joseph Thomson described the immense difficulties of 
travelling through the plateau’s thickets in 1882: 
The labour of pushing through such a country with a loaded caravan is simply enormous, and it is 
one of the most painful experiences of the native porter, who has to tramp along with bent back 
under a load of from 60 to 70 lbs. The pathways are so many low tunnels through the dense 
thicket, where one is ever in danger of being tripped by trailing roots and creepers, or caught in 
the face by others at a higher level; and, to make matters worse, the road is studded with the sharp 
stumps of cut bushes, which wound and lame the feet of the men sadly.
82
 
 
The protection offered by such thickets and the ability to grow cassava (a famine-relief crop) outweighed 
the obvious drawback of living atop the plateau – a lack of surface water.83 Regular cereal surpluses 
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enabled the plateau populace to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with their neighbors and 
populations in the plains below.
84
  
 While slave raiding displaced populations, it also created opportunities for political centralization. 
The first to profit economically and politically from the slave trade were the Yao “sultanates” near Lake 
Malawi.
85
 Most of these sultans – including Mataka, Makanjila, Mponda, Mtalika, Macemba, Kawinga, 
Jalasi, and Matipwiri – did not arise from pre-existing dynasties.86 They instead established and 
maintained their authority by building large followings and extensive alliances. Both processes were 
assisted by the incorporation and selling of slaves. While Yao sultans gained immediate profits from 
selling slaves, they improved the likelihood of perpetrating and defending against future raiding and 
warfare if they incorporated slaves. Slaves also provided labor that improved agricultural subsistence and 
surplus production for local consumption and trade. Women were particularly valuable as they enhanced 
a society’s (re)productive capabilities in terms of childbirth, crop cultivation, and marriage alliances.87 As 
the sultan’s followers produced and procured more commodities (including slaves, ivory, and agricultural 
produce), he could enter into social and military alliances with neighboring leaders. The sultan could also 
engage in long-distance trade economies. The acquisition and distribution of foreign trade goods (cloth, 
beads, brass wire, etc.) enabled the sultan to maintain and strengthen his following.
88
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By the nineteenth century, two distinct yet overlapping trade networks crisscrossed southern 
Tanzania and northern Mozambique.
89
 One connected Kilwa with Songea, while the second linked Lindi 
and Mikindani to Lake Malawi in northern Mozambique.
90
 Yao dominance over these long-distance trade 
networks was challenged by Ngoni raiders in the mid-nineteenth century. The Ngoni migrated from South 
Africa in response to the military successes of Chaka during the Zulu Wars.
91
 They raided settlements 
throughout the interior and coast of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. The number of raids 
near coastal towns increased as the Ngoni established their bases of power in the Songea area in the 
1870s.
92
 Mshope, for example, sent a raiding party of approximately three thousand warriors to the costal 
hinterland of Mikindani in 1894. The party returned to Ungoni with ivory as tribute and two thousand 
captives – mainly women and children – from along the Ruvuma River.93 Similarly to the Yao, slave 
raiding strengthened the Ngoni’s military power and territorial control.94 Yao sultanates responded to 
Ngoni incursions by shifting their operations towards the ports of Lindi, Mikindani, Ibo, and 
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Mozambique.
95
 Felicitas Becker contended that by the end of the century, the Yao and Ngoni had 
unofficially divided authority over two trade corridors traversing the Ruvuma frontier. Ngoni chiefdoms 
dominated the Kilwa-Songea corridor, while the Yao sultans controlled the Lindi-Lake Malawi corridor.
96
  
 Although the two trade corridors were not exclusively Ngoni- and Yao-controlled (some Ngoni 
traded in Lindi and some Yao traded in Kilwa), Becker argued that an important distinction existed 
between them. The Yao-dominated corridor “incorporated several hubs within the southeast, where strong 
local rulers preyed on, taxed, supplied, redirected and traded with caravans.”97 Becker labelled these local 
rulers as “big men.” Similar to the Yao sultans, a big man’s power was based upon his military successes, 
trade links, patronage, and diplomacy, rather than his kinship status or dynastic authority. His success also 
depended upon his proximity to major caravan routes and fertile environments. Matola I, for instance, 
migrated with his followers across the Ruvuma in the 1860s. He settled under the authority of a Makua 
headman – Mwawa – along the edge of the Makonde plateau escarpment. Matola I established a 
widespread reputation as a great hunter and warrior, who successfully perpetrated and defended against 
slave raids. Control of people, guns, and prestige objects enabled Matola to build a series of trade, 
military, and political alliances. These relationships were often bound through marriage ties and offerings 
of female slave wives as gifts.
98
 “Big men” like Matola employed various strategies to obtain and 
maintain their followers – mixing “slave trading and harbouring escaped slaves, raiding and diplomacy, 
extortion and intimidation, as well as patronage and the ceremonial display of power and wealth.”99 They 
also employed flexible social structures that aimed at incorporating rather than excluding people. They 
built ethnically-mixed followings, networks, and alliances rather than creating boundaries and borders.
100
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In the end, mobility continued to serve as a critical strategy for human survival and prosperity during this 
era of increased volatility – allowing people to relocate from vulnerable, war-torn areas and find security 
in geographical strongholds and/or under the protection of strong leaders. 
Reimaging and Negotiating the Frontier Landscape: European Exploration of Southern Tanzania 
and Northern Mozambique 
 
 As Ngoni chiefs, Yao sultans, and “big men” reshaped the political and economic landscape of 
the Ruvuma frontier during the nineteenth century, the British exerted their influence over economic and 
political matters in East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The British state increased its influence in 
the Indian Ocean in the mid-eighteen century by asserting its authority over the East India Company, 
which had established itself as an “early modern government” in India and a major maritime trading 
power.
101
 Following the Indian Rebellion (Mutiny) of 1857, the British Crown nationalized the Company 
and assumed authority over its Indian possessions, administration, and armed forces. The new British 
government in India strove to maintain close diplomatic and commercial relations with the Persian Gulf, 
particularly with the Omani Sultanate.
102
 According to Abdul Sheriff, British influence in the Omani 
Empire intensified during the final years of Sultan Said’s rule (1840s-1856). British interests and trade 
relations with Zanzibar and East Africa grew as Said strove to transform Zanzibar into a premier entrepôt 
in the western Indian Ocean and increase its integration with global markets. The Sultan increasingly 
depended upon Britain because Omani dynastic structures proved insufficient to sustain imperial cohesion 
from Muscat to Zanzibar. The British Consul’s decision to support Majid’s succession as ruler of 
Zanzibar following Zaid’s death in 1856 and Zanzibar’s partition from the Omani kingdom helped to 
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solidify Britain’s influence over the Busaidi dynasty.103 Although British relations temporarily soured 
with the ascension of Sultan Barghash in 1870, slave trade treaties continued to provide a “convenient 
path for the penetration of British influence and power into East Africa under a humanitarian guise.”104 
Britain expanded its authority in Zanzibar with a new slave trade treaty in 1873 wherein the Sultan agreed 
to abolish the slave trade, close all slave markets, protect liberated slaves, and prohibit Indians from 
possessing slaves.
105
  
 As the British consuls jockeyed for political and economic power in Zanzibar, missionaries and 
explorers directed their attention to the mainland and investigated the largely unknown Rufiji-Ruvuma 
region. Gaspar Bocarro’s expedition to Kilwa in 1616 was one of the few conducted in northern 
Mozambique and southern Tanzania prior to the 1860s.
106
 A growing number of Europeans conducted 
expeditions during the second half of the nineteenth century in an effort to better understand the slave 
trade, assess the region’s economic potential, and identify potential trade routes to Central Africa. The 
famous explorer David Livingstone and botanist John Kirk conducted one of the first expeditions up the 
Ruvuma River in March 1861.
107
 They wanted to determine if the river served as an outlet for Lake 
Malawi (then called Nyasa).
108
 The British also sought an alternative river route to Central Africa after the 
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Portuguese restricted access along the long-established Zambezi River route.
109
 The expedition only 
travelled thirty miles before turning around because the water level was too low for their steamer, the 
Pioneer.
110
  
 
Figure 1.5 Livingstone’s Journeys up the Rovuma
111
 
 
Despite the difficulties, Livingstone and Kirk believed that the Ruvuma was a good avenue for 
transporting local produce and likely the best entrance to East Africa.
112
 Both men returned to the river in 
September 1862.
113
 Livingstone not only hoped to locate the river’s headwaters in Lake Malawi, but also 
determine the feasibility of establishing a missionary community along the river to help stop the slave 
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trade.
114
 Navigation was extremely difficult from the onset as the water levels had decreased considerably 
in the dry season. Livingstone described how in many places the Ruvuma “divided into two or three 
channels, there was not water enough in any of them for a boat drawing three feet, so we had to drag ours 
over the shoals.”115 It took the expedition a month to travel 156 miles. Navigation was impossible once 
they reached the upper cataracts – still a three days march from the lake.116 Reviews of the river’s 
potential were mixed. Livingstone described the Ruvuma as a fertile and potentially profitable landscape: 
All we saw of the land seemed fertile and with the exception alluded to the inhabitants were 
friendly and industrious. Food was abundant but a sense of insecurity was apparent for while the 
people had villages on land they preferred to live on sand banks while the river was low. Large 
quantities of grain were stored away in the woods but they seemed less anxious about that than 
about themselves. The oil yielding seed Sesame which is largely exported from Mozambique to 
France is produced in large quantities and a great deal of honey is secured by hives placed on 
trees. Cotton is cultivated but we did not see much. Gum copal is found and is probably collected 
for the Zanzibar market. In addition to these articles of trade the Rovuma is famous for ebony. 
There it attains a size seldom seen in commerce. A wood called on the Zambesi ‘Pangire’ is well 
adapted for ship building and many other woods quiet new to us would probably be valuable in 
trade.
117
  
 
Livingstone hoped that lucrative trade could be developed along the river.
118
 Kirk, in contrast, offered a 
bleak picture of the landscape with entire sections devoid of human inhabitants due to the slave trade. 
Kirk privately called the expedition a “great blunder,”119 and publicly concluded that “the Rovuma is of 
no value for trade with the interior.”120 
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 Livingstone’s assessments of southern Tanzania were more critical when he returned four years 
later. His expedition departed from Mikindani in 1866 and travelled through the Lindi trade corridor – 
following the Ruvuma River and passing through Mataka’s town of Moémbe before reaching Lake 
Malawi. In contrast to a “three weeks’ easy sail up the Zambesi and Shiré [Rivers],” the journey to 
Mataka’s town took “four weary months.”121 Livingstone detailed the horrendous conditions of travelling 
overland through the region, which was overcome by famine and slave raiding. His expedition constantly 
struggled from a lack of food. They passed rivulets that were “mere mountain torrents filled with sand” 
and dead bodies of those who had apparently starved to death.
122
 Livingstone also reported the discovery 
of a number of slaves who were “abandoned by their master from want of food; they were too weak to be 
able to speak or say where they had come from; some were quite young.”123 He questioned local 
populations as to why areas spanning hundreds of miles were depopulated. Their responses included slave 
wars and famine.
124
 James Frederick Elton provided a similarly bleak assessment of the southern Swahili 
coast and Kilwa trade corridor. He encountered numerous slave caravans while traveling south from Dar 
es Salaam to Lindi in 1873-74. He estimated passing 1,280 slaves during the course of one week.
125 
Elton 
doubted whether the slave trade could be stopped when the Sultan’s authority remained so weak and the 
prices per slave so high – averaging between 30-40 dollars per person.126  
The plain truth is, and there can be no disputing facts, that a brisker slave-trade has seldom been 
known than the one carried on from Kilwa via the Kisiju road by the scoundrels who hold it in 
their power, and who will continue to use it until put down by a strong hand; Burghash’s orders 
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being totally disregarded, except absolutely on the sea-coast villages and towns, and even there 
only respected when they do not run counter to local and private interests.
127
 
 
Kilwa itself was referred to as the ‘Places of Skulls,’ while the country behind it was “a desert for a 
week’s journey; and at every step some new experience of the desolation of the slave-trade is 
apparent.”128 Indian communities in Kilwa reported to the British Consul of Zanzibar that areas within ten 
or twelve days’ journey from the coast were entirely uninhabited. The Consul also shared the account of 
an Arab returning from Lake Malawi:  
‘he travelled for seventeen days through a country covered with ruined towns and villages which 
a few years ago were inhabited by the Mijana and Mijan tribes and where now no living soul is to 
be seen’.129 
 
 Despite the devastation, Europeans also observed the material gains that Africans obtained from 
trade between the interior and coast. Kirk noted that some Makua on the north side of the Ruvuma traded 
in Ibo and Mozambique. The little fabric owned by the Makonde along the Ruvuma River was entirely of 
foreign manufacturing.
130
 Livingstone passed people along the Ruvuma in 1865 that were “so well 
supplied with white calico by the slave-trade from Kilwa that it is quite a drug in the market: we can not 
get food for it.”131 Livingstone encountered another large population a week later that was “so well 
supplied with calico (Merikano) that they would not look at ours. The market was in fact glutted by 
slavers from (Quiloa) Kilwa.”132 He also observed that the mixed population of Makua and Yao living 
along the Ruvuma River wore inland combs, arm-coils of thick brass wire, and “fine” blue and black 
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beads that were “in fashion.”133 South of the Ruvuma, Elton encountered a chief who carried a “red cotton 
umbrella of Hindu manufacture, the grotesque caricature of the Prime Minister in Offenbach’s ‘Grande 
Duchesse.’”134 
 Although Livingstone, Kirk, and Elton’s accounts of the devastation caused by slave raiding 
deterred capitalist investors in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, their reports helped to 
validate British claims that their military, political, and moral intervention was needed in East Africa. The 
accounts also attracted missionaries to the Ruvuma frontier with the aim of eradicating the slave trade. 
Two years after Bishop Steere travelled from Lindi to Mataka’s village of Mwembe in 1875, the 
Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) established a mission station and village of released 
slaves at Masasi. Chauncy Maples conducted multiple excursions throughout southern Tanzania and 
northern Mozambique to determine the viability of establishing a line of UMCA mission stations from 
Masasi to Lake Malawi.
135
 Maples also strove to establish and maintain cooperative relationships with the 
“big men” of the Lindi trade corridor. These alliances would offer protection for UMCA settlements and 
hopefully propagate Christianity and the cessation of slave trading. While Maples conducted his 
expeditions, Joseph Thompson and H.E. O’Neill explored the Ruvuma frontier further. The Sultan of 
Zanzibar commissioned Thompson to conduct a geological survey of the Ruvuma Valley and surrounding 
districts to determine the potential value of coal reportedly found along the Ruvuma.
136
 Traveling from 
Mikindani through the Makonde Plateau with sixty men, he reported that the coal was insufficient in 
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quality and quantity for commercial exploitation.
137
 Two years later, H.M. Consul O’Neill traversed 
northern Mozambique to determine whether slave trading was occurring from Lake Malawi to the coast 
(particularly to Tunghi Bay, just south of Cape Delgado). He observed that the Makanwara and Maviti 
slave raiders depopulated entire districts: “entire tribes cut up and dispersed; vast areas of country 
devastated; in short, murder, famine, and slavery are the direct results of their predatory habits.”138 Of the 
European explorers, O’Neill distinguished himself for penetrating the Mueda Plateau. 
 
Figure 1.6 “Map of the Rovuma River and the Region to the South, illustrating the journeys of Mr. Joseph 
Thomson and the Rev. Chauncy Maples, M.A.” 1880.
139
 
                                                          
137
 Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 70.  French Engineer M D’Angelvy reached a 
different conclusion when he conducted a similar survey in 1884. See “Introduction” in Karl Weule, Native Life in 
East Africa: The Result of an Ethnological Research Expedition, trans. Alice Werner (London: Sire Isaac Pitman & 
Sons, Ltd., 1909), xvi. 
138
 H. E. O'Neill, "Journey in the District West of Cape Delgado Bay, Sept.-Oct. 1882,” Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series 5, no. 7 (July 1883): 393-404, 397-98. 
139
 “Map of the Rovuma River and the Region to the South, illustrating the journeys of Mr. Joseph Thomson and 
the Rev. Chauncy Maples, M.A., (1880)” in “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa.” 
63 
 
 
 The expeditions conducted by Maples, Thomson, and O’Neill and the reports issued by other 
European settlers and missionaries shaped European perceptions – real and imagined – of southern 
Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Their geographic, geologic, and botanic maps of the frontier region 
created a foundation from which European colonial powers would demarcate imperial boundaries. These 
maps could also be utilized to delineate “natural” spaces into exploitable economic units based upon 
readily available resources and their future economic potential – cash crop production, food staple 
cultivation, labor reserves, mineral extraction, and so forth. The European missionaries and explorers also 
reconceptualized social spaces in the Ruvuma frontier by promoting racial hierarchies (with Europeans at 
the pinnacle) and inventing ethnic identities that classified complex African communities into overtly 
simplistic categories. The character traits that Europeans attributed to the different ethnic groups, 
however, varied considerably based upon an individual’s interactions with local leaders and communities. 
Thomson and Maples, for example, offered different assessments of the Wayao when comparing them to 
the Wamakua. Maples argued that the Wamakua exhibited moral superiority, honesty, and better 
domesticity in comparison to the habitually lying Wayao. Maples trusted Makua chiefs, but found the 
Yao to be “shifty, sly, and deceitful.”140 Although Thomson agreed that the Wamakua occupied “the first 
position in industry, intelligence, and business capacity,” 141 he offered his most complimentary 
assessment to the Wayao for their energy, intelligence, and business savvy: 
The Wahyao are perhaps without exception the most industrious and energetic people to be found 
in East Africa […] Nearly all my best men, with Chuma at their head, are Wahyao, and the 
experience of many other travellers has been the same. Physically they are superior to any of the 
other Rovuma tribes. […] Their most promising trait is their eagerness to trade and their love of 
visiting the coast. Their business capabilities are very high, and they may be said to be to Nyassa 
what the Wanyamwesi are to Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. Unfortunately, however, their 
country is not blessed with any natural wealth, so that they have to depend entirely upon ivory 
and slaves, which they gather from the greater part of the Nyassa region. Indeed, this desire to 
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trade has made them the greatest slave producers we now have in the Nyassa and Rovuma 
districts.
142
 
 
Thomson declared the Wamakonde, in contrast, as “about as ugly a set of people as are to be found in 
East Africa, and certainly occupy a very low grade.”143 O’Neill instead argued that the Wamakonde of 
northern Mozambique were hospitable, generous, and “a particularly simple-minded, harmless folk.”144 
Harry G. West argued that O’Neill attempted to transform the image of the Makonde from the regional 
villains to victims, who needed British protection and stewardship. British “statesmen, entrepreneurs, and 
churchmen” used O’Neill’s accounts as proof that the Portuguese were unable and/or unwilling to 
eliminate the slave trade and guarantee the protection of local communities.
145
  
 Despite Thomson, Maples, and O’Neill’s efforts to categorize and interact with local 
communities according to fixed ethnic identities, the men were forced to recognize that identity and 
power was fluid in the Ruvuma frontier. Maples abandoned his idea for Matola I to create and lead a pure 
Yao confederation once it became clear that most of Matola’s followers were Makua and Makonde.146 
While the sultans and “big men” of the Ruvuma frontier continued to employ flexible and incorporative 
social systems to build and maintain their followings, they also sought to integrate the new European 
actors into existing power structures and relations. Local and regional leaders exploited alliances with 
Europeans to expand their power and influence vis-à-vis their rivals. Matola I, for example, requested that 
Maples establish a mission station and school under his patronage in order for Matola to strengthen his 
position over his ritual superior, Mwawa. Matola’s power grew further as the missionaries relied upon 
him to establish and settle diplomatic negotiations between the peoples of Masasi, Newala, and Ngoni-
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speaking raiders.
147
 At the same time that Matola positioned himself as a useful ally for the British 
missionaries, his rival (Machemba) also reached out to the UMCA.
148
 Although the Europeans failed to 
impose their imagined ethnic identities upon local communities during the precolonial era, the 
negotiations and alliances they entered into with African leaders influenced the power landscape of 
southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique – giving validity to some African leaders while 
undermining the authority of others.  
Negotiating the Economic Landscape of the Ruvuma Frontier – Indian Intermediaries  
 As Europeans worked to establish alliances with local power brokers, they debated the economic 
value and future of the Ruvuma frontier region. Like Livingstone, Kirk, and Elton before them, Maples, 
O’Neill, and Thomson offered mixed conclusions. Some likened southern Tanzania and northern 
Mozambique “to an Arctic region newly emerged from beneath a glacier; while the other condemned it as 
bare and uninteresting, monotonous, and dreary.”149 Although Thomson observed “immense tracts of 
country laid waste,” he also detailed the “extremely fertile” soil found on the Makonde Plateau.150 Maples 
also observed the rich soil fertility at Masasi where cassava, sorghum, sesame, rice, and newly-introduced 
fruit trees excelled.
151 Kirk believed that the region’s riches lay in india-rubber, reporting that Mikindani 
exported 40,000 frasil (35 lbs. each) of rubber in one season.
152
 Kirk and Maples – two champions of the 
anti-slavery movement – concluded that Europeans could profit from the rich soils and plentiful 
cultivatable lands along the coast and Ruvuma if the slave trade ended. To stop the trade, Europeans 
needed to increase their commercial participation in East Africa and replace the Arab slave traders. 
According to Maples, the local “big men” were willingly to abandon the slave trade for ivory, copal, and 
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rubber trade “if such things were asked for.”153 The British had to intervene directly in the borderland 
region of the Ruvuma River, otherwise slave traders would continue to “play fast and loose between the 
territories of Zanzibar and Portugal.”154 
 In order to exploit the agricultural potential of the Ruvuma frontier, Europeans would also have to 
enter into commercial alliances with the Indian intermediaries who had dominated trade between the 
interior, coast, and international markets since the seventeenth century.
155
 Prior to the Portuguese 
incursions, Muslim elites and trading families supplied the bulk of the credit that underwrote East 
African-Indian Ocean maritime trade networks. The long delays between shipments (due to the monsoon 
season) and the high risk of loss from storms or hostile encounters with pirates and enemies made credit 
essential to maritime trade. Portuguese disruption of Arab dominance in the Indian Ocean presented an 
opportunity for Indian entrepreneurs to invest the large amounts of capital they accumulated under the 
Mughal Empire in commercial enterprises along the Indian coast and abroad.
156
 When looking to East 
Africa, Indian creditors and merchants targeted the risky yet lucrative ivory markets of Mozambique.
157
 
Lacking financial resources, the Portuguese permitted Indian investments in order to sustain commercial 
networks and supply trade factories along the coast and up the Zambezi River.
158
 The Surat merchant 
Abdul Ghafur reportedly maintained a trading fleet of twenty ships (three to eight hundred tons each) that 
conducted the same quantity of trade as the entire English East India Company at the end of the 
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seventeenth century.
159
 Indian engagement in and control over the Mozambican ivory trade intensified 
after the Banyan Company of Mazanes received a tax-free trade monopoly between Mozambique Island 
and the Indian port of Diu in 1686.
160
 Major Indian trading houses from Cambay ports sent agents and 
independent associates to reside along the East African coast. These men – generically referred to as 
Banyans – imported goods not monopolized by the Junta do Comércio (Board of Commerce), financed 
Portuguese trading enterprises, and established rival trade networks.
161
 Portuguese settlers and traders 
increasingly depended upon Indian creditors for the cloth and beads needed to conduct business with 
African ivory traders.
162
 The Portuguese, however, struggled to compete with rival Indian merchants and 
trading houses, which offered better prices and had stronger commercial networks in the interior thanks to 
their African and “mulatto” agents. According to Edward Alpers, Indian merchants used “considerably 
more acumen in their personal, as well as commercial, relations with them [African traders] than did the 
Portuguese.”163 The gradual formation of Indian commercial monopolies fueled resentment among 
Portuguese settlers and officials. Multiple attempts were made to strip Indians of their economic power in 
Mozambique during the eighteenth century, but the policies were ineffective and had disastrous 
consequences for the colonial economy.
164
 For example, the Governor-General of Mozambique (Fr. José 
de Vasconcelos de Almeida) passed measures preventing Banyans from trading on the mainland with 
Wayao. Indian traders responded by not ordering cloth from Diu in 1780-81, which resulted in the 
Portuguese losing approximately 35,000 cruzados in revenue from import duties.
165
 The Portuguese’s 
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decision to increase import taxes for Indian cloth and raise the “official” price for Mozambican ivory 
further crippled Mozambique’s markets in the 1780s.166  
 Omani-controlled Zanzibar, in contrast, offered a lucrative market in which Indians were actively 
encouraged to participate. Omani leadership posted Indians as customs officials in Zanzibar and along the 
Mrima coast, while other Indian immigrants found positions as private traders, artisans, and 
moneylenders.
167
 The Indian population in Zanzibar reached seven to eight thousand in the early 1870s as 
a result of Zanzibar’s prosperous trade economy and the incentives offered by the Sultan, including; 
religious tolerance, a minimum 5% duty on imports, land ownership, and equal privilege with Arab 
traders.
168
 Four-fifths of Zanzibar’s entire trade passed through Indian hands [primarily from Kutch or 
Bombay] by 1863 despite their lack of political power.
169
 The Indian commercial community in Zanzibar 
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also financed caravan expeditions and plantation enterprises on the mainland, as well as serving as 
middlemen for American and European importers, exporters, and shippers.
170
 Europeans not only 
observed the economic power of Indian communities in Zanzibar, but also in small- and large-scale 
coastal trade centers stretching hundreds of miles from Dar es Salaam to Mozambique Island. Sir Bartle 
Frere reported in 1873, 
[…] it is hardly an exaggeration to say that all trade passes through Indian hands; African, Arab 
and European, all use an Indian agent or Banian to manage the details of buying and selling, and 
without the intervention of an Indian, either as capitalist or petty trader, very little business is 
done. They occupy every place where there is any trade …171 
 
Frere continued by stating that along the African coastline, “the Indian trader is, if not the monopolist, the 
most influential, permanent, and all-pervading element of the commercial community.”172 Eight years 
later, H.E. O’Neill observed that agents of Indian houses in Mozambique and Ibo had established 
innumerable points of collection for African exports, including oil-seeds, india rubber, ivory, and copra. 
Whereas wholesale European merchants operated at the major trade centers, the Banyans were “found in 
every accessible port and river of the coast, bartering European manufactures for native produce, and 
thus, by searching out new markets and creating trade, stimulating the industry of the native Makua.”173 
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The numerous Indian communities that James Frederick Elton visited from Dar es Salaam to Lindi (1873-
74) were involved in the trade of copal, rubber, and agricultural produce.
174
 Elton offered the following 
observation of African-Asian negotiations and transactions near the Rufiji River:  
The trading generally takes place at night in the house of the Indians (whose principal business is 
in copal), and should no bargain be arrived at, the Washenzi leave before daylight, sleep in the 
woods, and return again at dusk to resume negotiations. As the gum is brought in, it is an 
admixture of the tree-copal (Chakazi), and the true (so called fossil) copal, and, I fancy, is still 
further doctored on its way before reaching European merchants.
 175
   
 
Further down the coast at Kitmangao, Elton encountered a “purely Indian town on the coast” that was the 
principal copal-trading station in the Kwalé District.
176
 Elton observed that the Banyans “appear quite at 
home in their settlement; they have built an enclosure and planted a garden round a covered and raised 
terrace, on which they meet for meals, which, with inner sheds, forms at once a fort and a pleasant 
lounge”.177 Elton insisted that copal constituted the “most lucrative commerce of the Indian settlers at the 
small trading ports” in the Rufiji delta.178 According to Thaddeus Sunseri, the Indian trading diaspora was 
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attracted to the Rufiji River area due to the large quantities of and steady market for forest products, 
including wild rubber, timber, copal, wax, and honey.
179
 In addition to bartering for copal, sesame, and 
grains, Indians in proximity to the Rufiji River delta also engaged in grain speculation and exported 
cowries and plantation produce.
180
 Indian populations in the ports of Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani profited 
from their incorporation within global markets through Zanzibar and trade in rubber, arms, forest 
produce, rice, grain, and other crops during the 1870s.
181
 Maples reported in 1880 that Banyan merchants 
in Lindi purchased rubber from Africans in exchange for foodstuff. Two years later, Joseph Tomson 
observed a “considerable colony of Banyans and Hindi” residing and trading in Mikindani.182 Thomson 
also detailed Mikindani’s transformation between Livingstone’s visit and his own sixteen years later. 
Whereas the town had no cattle, few houses, and small trade in gum copal and orchilla weed in 1866, 
Thomson observed in 1882:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Zanzibar. Systematic trade was found at eleven stations in the Kwale District. Regular supply of copal, however, 
was not guaranteed during the dry season. Elton explained: “[…] no pressure can induce an increase when enough 
gum has been bartered to satisfy the present demand so the petty Chiefs. Neither do the Indians venture to send 
out parties of their own, each village and each working is represented by a headman or ‘Jumbe,’ and the natives 
are only too ready to unite against the slightest encroachment on their monopoly[…].”The labor was also not 
organized. Nonetheless, Elton observed copal traders on the path daily, “each party led by a few men armed with 
old muskets and bows and arrows, and consisting of women and lads, carrying baskets.” 
179
 Thaddeus Sunseri, “The War of the Hunters: Maji Maji and the Decline of the Ivory Trade,” in Maji Maji: Lifting 
the Fog of War, eds. Jim Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010): 117-148, 127. 
180
 Elton, Travels and Researches, 94. 
181
 Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 107-108; and Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 129-31. 
Lindi exported 500 to 830 tons of rubber in 1879. Kilwa and Mungao also exported 1,000 tons. The expansion of 
“legitimate” commerce in East Africa occurred elsewhere in the continent during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In response to the Industrial Revolution and the gradual collapse of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, 
European and American demands on West African export markets shifted from slaves towards palm oil, palm 
kernels, groundnuts, latex, and food products (as well as gold and ivory). For accounts about the economic 
transition and its consequences in Africa and the “west”, see Donald R. Wright, The World and a Very Small Place 
in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, The Gambia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004);  John Thornton, Africa 
and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 2
nd
 ed. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); J.F. Ade Ajayi, ed., General History of Africa, VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1989); Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-
1830 (Madison, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Walter Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa 
(Washington D.C: Howard University Press, 1981); Basil Davidson, Black Mother: Africa and the Atlantic Slave 
Trade, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 1800-
1960: An Introduction to the Modern Economic History of Africa South of the Sahara (London: J.M. Dent, 1976); and 
Philip D. Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the era of the slave trade (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1975).       
182
 Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 339; and Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River 
Rovuma, East Africa,” 67. Africans collected rubber in forests 20 miles from Lindi town and sold it in response to 
food shortages. 
72 
 
[…] trade has increased exceedingly, almost the entire produce of the Rovuma region finding its 
way there – gum copal, rubber, millet, rice, and other grains being the chief articles, though the 
trade in ivory and slaves from the Makua and Wahyao districts is by no means unimportant. 
South of Bagamoyo, Mikindany will now rank in importance next after Kilwa and Lindy 
[Lindi].
183
 
 
When investigating smaller ports in northern Mozambique, O’Neill observed that a growing number of 
Battias and Banyans were replacing the dwindling Arab trade communities.
184
 Trade in amendoim, 
calumba, wax, and rubber at the small port of Simuku were all “brought in and stored in the houses of the 
few Indian traders who have stationed themselves there, and by whom this trade is solely conducted.”185  
O’Neill concluded that for more than a century, “Banyans, Battias, and other castes of India have settled, 
for trading purposes, in almost every nook and cranny of the coast.”186 Indian trade activities and 
residency were not limited to the coast. Elton encountered a Banyan colony that actively participated in 
the export of local commodities (including timber, coffee, grains, and india-rubber) while travelling 
through “Makuani” in Mozambique in 1876. One of the merchants, originally from Cutch, had traded 
along the Mkubwa River for fourteen years and was “undoubtedly possessed of a great deal of local 
influence.”187 Livingstone questioned a Makonde man along the Ruvuma if he had seen Englishmen 
before. The man replied that he had heard of the English, but actually “seen Banians.”188 
 Like the Portuguese before them, the early British explorers and missionaries often held 
unfavorable views of Indian merchants, petty traders, and financiers despite their integral role within East 
African trade economies. In contrast to the Portuguese, the British tried to manipulate (rather than 
eradicate) the economic power and political influence of Indian merchants and financiers in order to 
amplify Britain’s power in East Africa. Abdul Sheriff described how the British Consul and Political 
Agent, Atkins Hamerton, began a campaign in the 1840s to gain legal jurisdiction over all Indians in 
Zanzibar (immigrants and native born) and change their legal status to British subjects. The undertaking 
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was challenging, especially in the case of the Kutch populace because Kutch was not under the 
jurisdiction of the English Crown in India.
189
 Over the course of three decades, Hamerton’s successors 
gradually legitimized British judicial authority over the Indian population in Zanzibar by bringing Indian 
slave-owners to trial and punishing them under anti-slavery legislation. By the 1870s, the British consuls 
clearly exerted authority over the most economically powerful merchant class in Zanzibar, and therefore 
gained influence over the Omani state.
190
  
 While the British increasingly enforced their authority over Indian communities in Zanzibar, their 
influence was limited among Indians conducting trade along the mainland coastline and the interior. 
Europeans instead depended upon these Indian traders and investors to provide the capital and consumer 
goods that drove commercial networks between the interior, coast, and international markets. Their 
inability to control the Indian population on the mainland perhaps underscored the negative perceptions 
that the British held towards Indians in the nineteenth century. The British homogenized the diverse 
Indian communities of East Africa and categorized them as “non-natives” – a group who ranked higher in 
intelligence and acumen than the African “natives,” yet whose supposed propensity towards greed and 
cunning often made them morally repulsive in the eyes of many Britons. Maples criticized Banyan 
merchants in Lindi for undercutting African profits when buying rubber – offering two dollars-worth of 
rice or sorghum when the real value was seven or eight dollars.
191
  Some Britons shared the contempt that 
a Portuguese Governor-General in Mozambique expressed when describing Banyan traders – “‘they are 
selfish, false, and cunning, given to lying and usury; that they know not how to keep a contract, and that it 
is a part of their religious creed to deceive and rob a Christian.’”192 When Elton compared a Portuguese 
official, Arab woman, and Bayan trader in the Indian Quarter of Mozambique, the latter received the most 
unfavorable portrayal:   
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[…] an unhealthy-coloured yellow face, and long, lank, black moustache, caste marks on his 
forehead, and gold-twisted turban on his head, loose and silken as regards his coat, with folds of 
fine muslin waving about his nether limbs, and a pink calico umbrella of immense and skeleton-
like proportions in his hand; crafty, money-making, cunning, intensely polite, his soul bound only 
to his body by the one laudable and religious anxiety of its helping him to turn over his coin to 
better advantage.”193 
 
Elton offered similarly uncomplimentary descriptions of Indians in Zanzibar – “fat Indian kine, eager 
traders and money-changers” and “hooked nosed” Banyans shrilly singing as part of religious 
processions.
194
 Europeans also frequently commented on Indian clothing and material possessions when 
critiquing Indian character. Scarlet and gold turbans, fine linen, pure white muslin, and large cotton and 
calico umbrellas were, for the British, not merely symbols of Indian prosperity, but also their insatiable 
greed.
195
 Elton’s criticism of Indians (perhaps influenced by his participation in repressing the Indian 
Mutiny) was meditated by his appreciation for the financial difficulties they faced as intermediaries along 
the Omani-controlled coast: 
The Indian trader on the Mrima has many extortions to fight against and heavy duties to pay, 
neither can his life be a very pleasant one, spent, as it is, in one continual succession of haggling 
and quarrelling with the natives, in competition with his neighbours, and a monotonous round of 
coast fever. The local Jumbe extracts a ground rent from him, and he is fortunate, if only one 
claimant to territorial dues appears on the scene! The Jumbe is followed by the Jemadar, who 
levies an arbitrary percentage on his supposed profits, and besides estimates the amount himself 
in order to save discussion. The Custom House then abstracts 20 frasilahs from every 100 
frasilahs of copal shipped as the Government duty, and, in addition, charge him on expenses, 
storage, and delay. Add to all this, freight and interest on money, and a considerable addition is 
made to cost price.
196
 
 
The Indians residing and trading along the southern Swahili coast and in the Ruvuma frontier were largely 
defenseless against economic exploitation. They were technically British “non-native subjects” residing in 
a foreign territory controlled by a foreign sovereign, who in turn exerted little authority over a host of 
                                                          
193
 Elton, Travels and Researches, 30.  
194
 Ibid., 36 and 52. It is interesting to note that in July 1874 Elton served as the Protector of Immigrants in Natal 
while recovering from an illness. Elton’s language fluency made him an excellent candidate for the position. For the 
next three months, Elton was responsible for ensuring that every arrangement was made for the reception of 
Indian immigrants from Calcutta. See Elton, Travels and Researches, 118. 
195
 Ibid., 68.  
196
 Elton, “The African Gum Copal,” 44-45. Elton estimated that copal in Kwale fetched three to 5 ¼ dollars per 
frasilah. The price varied according to the season, number of workers, demand, etc. Merchants at Zanzibar bought 
the copal at seven to eight dollars. Despite the price differentiation, Elton reported that the copal trade offered 
large gains to all concerned during the 1870s.  
75 
 
African power-brokers, who dictated trade at the local level. While Elton recognized the steep financial 
price Indian communities paid for conducting trade in East Africa as “outsiders,” he and other Britons 
continued to condemn Indians for their allegedly unscrupulous practices, particularly their support of the 
slave trade. H.M. Assistant Political Agent at Zanzibar (Frederick Holmwood), for example, expressed his 
disdain for Indian merchants from Kutch and Bombay who supplied the capital that funded the slave 
caravans.
197
  
 Despite European animosity, Indian communities successfully negotiated the opportunities and 
limitations that their intermediary position offered within the East African commercial economy. They 
exploited their status as British subjects when advantageous, but more commonly ignored proclamations 
by the British, Omani, and Portuguese. They instead continued to trade profitably with their local and 
regional contacts. Horace Waller complained about the “duplicity” of Indians, who were “anxious enough 
to ‘run’ with the Arab slave dealer when dollars are tolerably safe, and forward enough to ‘hunt’ with the 
representatives of our Flag, and claim a British subject’s rights if it serves their purpose.”198 Indians 
ultimately served as linchpins within the expanding trade networks that linked the East Africa interior, 
coast, and overseas markets. Indian capital and commodities underwrote the slave and ivory trade that 
redefined the socioeconomic and political landscape of northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania. The 
Indian merchant class inadvertently fueled the political centralization that occurred along the trade 
corridors in the Ruvuma frontier, as well as providing the British an avenue to build their political 
influence in East Africa. Indian merchants and financiers continued to impact the socioeconomic 
landscape of the Ruvuma frontier and African-European relations within it as the nineteenth century gave 
way to European colonialism in the twentieth century.   
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Conclusion 
 The final two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a calming of European rivalries in 
Africa as the major western powers divided up the continent according to artificial colonial borders. In 
East Africa, Zanzibar became a British Protectorate, while the Ruvuma River became an imperial border 
demarcating German East Africa to the north and Portuguese East Africa to the south. Based upon the 
reports issued by missionaries, explorers, and diplomats, Europeans incorrectly assumed that the Ruvuma 
region was populated by poor, helpless subsistence cultivators, who had either been cut off from the 
world and unchanged by time or ravaged by the atrocities of the slave trade. The new colonial 
governments and private investors aimed to transform and “develop” the landscape of the Ruvuma 
borderland. The slave and ivory trade economy would be replaced by a thriving plantation-based, cash 
crop economy. The existing long-distance trade networks would initially be utilized to transport 
agricultural produce, minerals, and migrant laborers to the coastal ports and cash crop plantations. A 
“modern” transportation infrastructure of railways and roads would eventually replace these routes and 
connect all the major trade and administrative centers between the coast and interior. Local “big men” and 
“sultans” would ensure the success of this economy and enforce law and order by serving as colonial 
administrators. Those leaders who refused to submit to colonial authority would be eliminated and 
replaced. Indian merchants and financiers would continue to supply the capital and commodity goods 
needed to integrate local, regional, and long-distance trade economies within a monetized colonial 
economy and global markets. 
 Making these “development” visions a reality, however, would prove exceptionally difficult in 
the Ruvuma borderland of northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA) and southern German East Africa 
(GEA). Neither the Portuguese nor the Germans had the manpower, finances, and resources to impose 
their will upon a highly mobile, multiethnic populace accustomed to its autonomy. African populations in 
the Rufiji-Ruvuma region and Ruvuma frontier had relied upon their mobility to survive and thrive in the 
diverse and challenging environments of the region since at least the first millennium CE. 
Multidirectional trade networks provided the basis from which the culturally, politically, socially, and 
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linguistically diverse societies of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region created mutually advantageous alliances with 
one another and populations from across Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. Inhabitants of 
the Ruvuma frontier, in particular, utilized their mobility to adapt to resource scarcities, population 
pressure, warfare and raiding, undesirable authority, and new trade markets. As the precolonial era gave 
way to the colonial era, the Ruvuma borderland remained a dynamic frontier where local leaders, traders, 
and ordinary individuals exploited competing colonial systems; taking advantaging of markets and 
utilizing alliances with Europeans to consolidate and extend their authority within existing political and 
economic power structures. Local inhabitants and communities adapted centuries-old mobility patterns in 
order to exploit the instability and opportunities created by colonialism. Conflict, negotiation, 
exploitation, cooperation, adaptation, and accommodation continued to define African-Asian-European 
relations in the Ruvuma borderland during the first decades of colonial rule.  
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Chapter 2  
Destruction and Construction: European Colonialism and the First World War in the Ruvuma 
Borderland (1880s-1918) 
 
 The creation of the Ruvuma borderland was partially spurred by the actions of a young German 
adventurer, Carl Peters. Peters entered into a number of suspect “treaties” with African leaders in the East 
African interior in 1884.
1
 German Imperial Chancellor, Otto von Bismark, officially endorsed Peters’ 
treaties and granted the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East African Company or DOAG) 
imperial protection over the territorial possessions in February 1885.
2
 Several bilateral treaties between 
British, German, Portuguese, and Belgian diplomats during the 1880s and 1890s established the colonial 
borders of East Africa.
3
 By December 1886, the Germans and Portuguese decided upon the Ruvuma 
River as the border between their colonial possessions: Deutsch Ostafrika or German East Africa (GEA) 
to the north and Portuguese East Africa (PEA) to the south.
4
 Colonial authorities and private investors 
aimed to exploit the natural resources of the Ruvuma borderland and transform it into a lucrative, cash 
crop producing region. The construction of engineered roads and railways were crucial for the successful 
implementation of European “development” designs. Insufficient manpower and funds, however, 
inhibited European plans and forced settlers and district officers to negotiate with local leaders and Indian 
traders, who continued to dominate the region’s social, political, and economic landscape. Despite the 
imposition of colonial rule, the borderland remained a dynamic and porous frontier where local 
inhabitants freely moved between colonial systems; evading oppressive colonial regimes and exploiting 
advantageous labor and trade markets. A series of rebellions and military “pacification” campaigns on 
both sides of the Ruvuma River during the first decades of the twentieth century produced intense 
instability in the borderland region. As a consequence of the unrest, the Portuguese largely abandoned 
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their agricultural and infrastructure “development” projects and instead aimed to exploit local resources 
on the cheap. European plantation owners and businessmen in southern GEA, in contrast, remained 
convinced of the region’s economic potential and invested their own funds towards improving the 
transportation infrastructure. The half-finished roadways and railway extending from the town of Lindi at 
the onset of World War I represented the ambiguous impact of colonialism in the Ruvuma borderland 
during the first three decades of colonial rule.  
 The First World War ended German economic “development” schemes in the borderland region 
and resulted in an era of extraordinary destruction and instability. After serving as a smuggling zone 
during the first two years of the war, the Ruvuma region became the frontline for armed conflict between 
the Germans and Allied forces. Migration once again proved an invaluable survival strategy for local 
populations trying to escape violence, scorched earth tactics, bombardments, forced conscription, famine, 
starvation, and disease. The presence of large armies in the borderland, however, inhibited mobility and 
thousands of local civilians and conscripted soldiers died during and after the war. As modern weaponry 
scarred the physical landscape of the borderland, Allied forces attempted to construct a new landscape of 
motorable roads and an extended railway. They built the infrastructure projects out of necessity in order 
to facilitate the movement of troops, arms, and supplies in pursuit of the fleeing German forces. The roads 
quickly deteriorated in the face of neglect and adverse climatic conditions. The abandoned and decrepit 
roads reflected the fortunes of the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war – a region decimated 
and forgotten by colonial powers, who perceived it as an unprofitable, disease-ridden, and isolated 
periphery that was incapable and/or unworthy of “development.”  
German and Portuguese Colonial Rule in the Ruvuma Borderland (1880s-1905) 
 As the German and Portuguese governments settled upon the Ruvuma as the demarcating line 
between their colonial possessions in East Africa, they employed private companies to govern the new 
territories. The arrival of DOAG agents in Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani in August 1888 signaled the 
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beginning of German colonialism in southern GEA.
5
 The initial takeover was peaceful as the DOAG 
agents found that many of the local leaders (liwalis) had already left to Zanzibar.
6
 A violent uprising, 
however, occurred along the Swahili coast later in the year – referred to as the “Arab revolt.”7 Lindi and 
Mikindani negotiated peace in 1890 following a series of German victories along the northern coast. The 
Germans reclaimed Kilwa in May 1890 after a three day bombardment.
8
 Following the “Arab revolt,” 
administrative control of GEA passed from the DOAG to the Kaiserliche Gouvernement (German 
imperial government) in January 1891. The imperial government conducted lengthy campaigns of 
conquest throughout GEA, including those against Ngoni chiefs in Songea.
9
 Private corporate rule lasted 
decades longer across the Ruvuma River in northern PEA. The bankrupt Portuguese government awarded 
a Portuguese-owned and British-financed company – Companhia do Nyassa or Nyassa Company – a 
thirty-five year charter to pacify and administer the northern district of PEA.
10
 In return, the Nyassa 
Company received a monopoly over tax collection and exclusive rights for any profits produced in the 
region.  
 Neither the German imperial government nor the Nyassa Company administration instituted 
uniform colonial doctrines and policies; rather, district officers and commissioners (Bezirksamtmann, 
Chefes do Concelho, and Chefe do Posto) adjusted their governance to accommodate local conditions. 
These colonial agents “held widely varying opinions as to what the actual goal of their actions was and 
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how they should try to reach it.”11 The German administration and Nyassa Company, however, shared the 
underlying objective of exploiting the mineral resources found in the Ruvuma borderland and 
transforming the region into a thriving agricultural landscape of cash crop plantations. The Nyassa 
Company intended to establish sugar plantations along the coast, coffee plantations in the uplands near 
Lake Malawi, and exploit the mineral deposits found throughout the interior.
12
 The German colonial state 
similarly aimed to exploit southern GEA’s supply of rubber, copal, and minerals. While conducting an 
expedition through southern GEA from 1897 to 1900, Friedrich Fülleborn reported that overexploitation 
had virtually extinguished the vine stock of rubber along the Mwera and Makonde Plateaus by 1900. 
Copal, however, remained abundant. A total of 55,585 lbs. of copal was shipped from the Lindi District at 
a value of 25,871 Rupees (Rps).
13
 The district’s hinterland also produced large quantities of wax, precious 
stones, coal, and garnet.
14
 The German colonial state prioritized a “plantation imperative” in the colony, 
which stressed the mass production of cotton using scientific methods and large-scale mechanized 
techniques.
15
 The Germans concentrated their efforts to create cotton plantations in the hinterland of 
Kilwa and the Rufiji delta. Kilwa port and the Kilwa trade corridor, however, steadily declined in 
economic importance and political stability under German colonial rule. German retaliation against 
Kilwa’s coastal elite during the “Arab revolt” and campaigns against the Ngoni in Songea disrupted trade 
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and power relations that had underscored Kilwa’s prosperity and power.16 The collapse of the slave and 
ivory trade further undermined patronage networks that sustained many of the “traditional” leaders. 
Kilwa’s elites adapted to the changing economy by participating in the lucrative rubber trade.17 Conflict 
mounted, however, as coastal elites and Germans expanded their trade and plantation enterprises into the 
interior and infringed upon the authority and profits of local leaders.
18
 Felicitas Becker argued that as the 
power landscape in the Kilwa trade corridor became increasingly tumultuous, “a vast array of people, 
from military strongmen to petty traders, struggled to carve out, seize or rebuild opportunities.”19 The 
climate of instability coincided with mounting animosity towards colonial rule. Rising tax rates, 
compulsory labor, and the cruelty shown by some German administrators and settlers bred resentment 
among local communities.
20
   
 The Lindi trade corridor and Lindi port, in contrast, profited from the expansion of the colonial 
plantation economy and from alliances between African “big men” and the German administration. In 
contrast to Kilwa, Lindi’s fertile hinterland offered space for ex-slave traders and owners, Arabs, Indians, 
and Europeans to establish plantations – especially cotton, sisal, and oil-rich crops like sesame and 
groundnuts.
21
 In addition to cash crops, Lindi District excelled at the production and export of food crops. 
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slaves. Many slaves gained their freedom by running away, purchasing their freedom, and working as porters, 
urban laborers, and railway or plantation workers on European-owned estates. Third-party ransoming was also 
practiced. For more on the “slow death” of slavery in GEA, see Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 
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By the 1890s, Lindi District rapidly became known as the breadbasket of the colony (Kornkammer der 
Kolonie).
22
 The district exported six million pounds of sorghum in 1890, nearly a half-million pounds of 
peanuts in 1900/01 (valued at 20,000 Rps.), and nearly a million pounds of sesame (valued at more than 
60,000 Rps.) in 1900/01.
23
 Lindi port also exported 4,782,064 lbs. of millet and 209,682 lbs. of maize in 
the 1902/03 season. Mikindani exported an additional 483,572 lbs. of millet and 143,119 lbs. of maize in 
the same year.
24
 While most of the export produce was sent to other parts of the GEA coast, a 
considerable portion was shipped abroad.
25
 The commercial sector in Lindi town correspondingly grew. 
In addition to the DOAG, the Lindi register included 59 Indian, 14 Arabic, and 4 Swahili companies by 
1899. There was a European-run Trade & Planters Society in Lindi (Lindi Handels & 
Pflanzungagesellschaft) and an Indian commercial sector in the town  (called Inderstrasse), which 
resembled those in Mombasa, Tanga, and Dar es Salaam.
26
 When Fülleborn visited Lindi in 1898, the 
town boasted evening lantern lighting, clean streets, and a small zoo that included monkeys, antelopes, 
birds of prey, a porcupine, and more.
27
 A small team of German administrators kept busy each day with 
customs and administrative transactions, drilling Africans soldiers, supervising construction work, and 
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offering medical treatment at the state-run clinic. Evenings were spent with sunset walks, visiting the 
Arab baths, or drinking alcohol at the “Greeks.”28 Lindi town was named the administrative headquarters 
of the south in 1899. Kilwa’s decline and Lindi’s ascension as the major economic and political capital in 
the south served as evidence that German efforts to reorient the borderland’s economy from slave and 
ivory trading towards large-scale agricultural production and exportation were showing signs of success 
at the end of the twentieth century.
29
  
 In order to fully exploit the resources of the Ruvuma borderland’s interior and transform its 
landscape according to a plantation-based economy, both the Germans and Portuguese sought to improve 
and “modernize” the region’s transportation infrastructure with engineered roads and railways. The 
existing caravan routes that traversed the borderland were,   
[…] at their best no more than single-file trails through long grass or bush which had to be 
broken afresh each season, often nothing beyond the experience of the guide from one village or 
one landmark to another, they vary their course from season to season, from year to year.
30
 
 
The British merchant, Sir William Mackinnon, led the first attempt to construct a broad-cleared road from 
Dar es Salaam to Lake Malawi in 1876.
31
  The project was abandoned five years and 73 miles later due to 
harsh working conditions and the prevalence of tsetse flies (which spread sleeping sickness among 
humans and killed livestock by transmitting trypanosomiasis). Despite the failure, Europeans believed 
that the road had a “civilizing” influence on the local population and stimulated agricultural production in 
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adjacent lands.
32
 James F. Elton praised the supposedly philanthropic enterprise for encouraging “others 
to come forward to aid in opening up this vast continent in which they have so practically interested 
themselves.”33 More road development projects followed, including those along the southern trade 
corridors. The Sultan of Zanzibar allegedly planned to construct “‘a road to the coast’” through the 
Ruvuma borderland.
34
 Chauncy Maples also advocated to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 
London the construction of a permanent road from Lindi to Lake Malawi via the Lukuledi Valley and 
Masasi:  
It is our belief that, making allowances for a detour in order to avoid hills, a tolerably level road 
might be made connecting Lindi with the lake at Losewa, whose length need not exceed 400 
miles, and which should follow the line of population and strike directly through the country 
where to this day the slave trade is briskly carried on: it would cross the Rovuma near Majeje, 
and at the point where the main caravan route from the lake to Kilwa strikes it, and thence 
through the country where the great Yao tribe has its centre to the shores of the lake.
35
 
 
Reverend Randolph of the RGS applauded Maples suggestion, arguing that a permanent road to Masasi 
would assist local missionaries and offer “the very best means of opening up the country.”36 Following 
their acquisition of GEA, the German colonial government expressed interests in replacing the single-file, 
caravan footpaths in the southern region with permanent roads for wagon and automobile traffic.
37
 The 
government, however, debated whether road construction was economically viable considering that they 
would need to level steep gradients, bridge numerous watercourses, and annually remove the shrubbery 
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that quickly invaded all pathways.
38
 The government ultimately prioritized railway construction over 
roadworks. Across the African continent, European colonial powers and private investors envisioned 
railways as the most effective mode of transport for opening the African interior for colonial rule and 
economic “development” – namely the efficient and cheap export of bulk goods to the coast and overseas 
markets.
39
 The Germans began constructing the Tanga Line in 1893. The government also made plans to 
construct a central line from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma and a southern line from Kilwa to Lake Malawi.
40
 
Across the Ruvuma border, the Nyassa Company planned to construct a rival rail through northern PEA 
to Lake Malawi to open the interior for coffee and sugar plantations and the mining of gold, silver, iron, 
and coal deposits.
41
    
 Both the Nyassa Company and German administrations struggled to realize their visions for the 
future of the Ruvuma borderland. Neither administration possessed the necessary finances and manpower 
to exert their authority, exploit local resources, construct a new infrastructure, and alter indigenous 
economic and mobility patterns. The number of the German civilian officials in GEA declined from 241 
to 198 men between 1899 and 1904, while the number of German military officers rose from a meager 
162 to 218 between 1896 and 1905.
42
 Juhani Koponen argued that the number of German officials and 
officers remained minimal because of their cost: “white manpower was by far the costliest ingredient of 
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the colonial state, and the scantiness of the resources which were put at its disposal called for the utmost 
economizing.”43  
 
Figure 2.1 District Headquarters and Sub-District Offices in Southern GEA
44
 
Only a small fraction of the 5,279,255 Marks of state expenditures granted to GEA in 1890/91 was 
earmarked for development activities across the territory.
45
 The financial and manpower situation was 
worse across the Ruvuma border. The Nyassa Company’s concessionary could hardly obtain the £10,000 
required to activate its charter and initiate “development.”46 The group of bankrupt merchants running the 
company’s board prioritized speculative stock manipulation rather than investing directly in the 
concession.
47
 With only a few custom posts in the interior, the company collected a mere £776 in hut 
taxes over an area of 80,000 sq. miles in 1898.
48
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Figure 2.2 “Nyasa Under Company Rule”
49
 
 
 Most of the African populations in southern GEA and northern PEA were not incorporated within 
the colonial state, and instead continued to participate in agricultural production and trade networks that 
crisscrossed the unregulated Ruvuma border.
50
 The southern German administration encouraged trans-
Ruvuma migration by PEA itinerant traders, laborers, and permanent settlers because the colonial 
economy depended upon African producers, laborers, and consumers. The German administration, for 
example, was pleased to see a rise in Wayao migrants from PEA (including the powerful Yao “sultan” 
Mataka and his estimated one thousand followers) following German campaigns against the Ngoni.
51
 
Although border residents were increasingly attracted to labor and trade markets offered in southern 
GEA, the German administration exerted limited authority over either.
52
 The colonial administration 
employed a variety of strategies to create a permanent wage-earning labor force in southern GEA to 
rectify chronic labor shortages that threatened to undermine the “plantation imperative.”53 The state 
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introduced a three rupee hut tax in 1898 to stimulate wage employment. The state also implemented 
Gesinde regulations (similar to the British master-and-servants ordinances), which introduced labor 
contracts and criminalized contract breaches and desertion. Those who failed to pay their taxes or refused 
to work for wages were forced to work on the plantations and/or corvée projects, such as road 
construction.
54
 The state’s gradualist emancipation policy permitted the continued use of slaves on coastal 
plantations.
55
 Despite the state’s efforts, labor demand exceeded supply.56 Thaddeus Sunseri argued that 
local peasants and long-distance migrants leveraged labor shortages to demand better wages and working 
conditions on European plantations in the hinterland of Kilwa and Lindi prior to 1905.
57
 The region’s 
long-distance trade economy, meanwhile, continued to be controlled by local “big men” and Indian 
merchants operating on both sides of the Ruvuma border. Much of the rubber, ivory, and tobacco 
exported from Lindi and Mikindani ports was produced in and transported from PEA by Africans.
58
 The 
handful of European traders and DOAG agents who dealt in crude rubber, beeswax, and other African 
commodities at the onset of German colonialism struggled to compete with Indian merchants and their 
well-developed trade and credit networks.
59
 The German administration was so out-of-touch with the 
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regional trade networks that the first German commander in Lindi depended upon an informant in the 
Lindi business community to simply know when caravans arrived near the town.
60
 
  The southern German administration responded to their ineptitude at controlling regional labor 
and trade markets by adopting attitudes of “entreaty, extortion, and manipulation” when engaging with 
African “big men” and Indian traders.61 The powerful “big men” of the Lindi corridor, in turn, exploited 
alliances with German authorities in order to consolidate and extend their power vis-à-vis their rivals. 
German officers interfered minimally with the authority of these local rulers, as long they maintained 
peace, commerce, and the illusion of German rule – such as displaying the German flag.62 There was little 
German administrators could initially do when African leaders disobeyed colonial authority. Machemba, 
for instance, ruled autonomously for eight years in the hinterland of Mikindani and became known as one 
of the “most formidable and persistent opponents of the original imposition of German rule”.63 A large 
German campaign in 1899 finally drove Machemba and his followers into PEA. Machemba, however, 
continued to disrupt German trade by causing unrest on the Mueda Plateau.
64
 He also conducted a lengthy 
campaign of resistance against Portuguese rule.
65
 The imposition of colonial taxation, corvée labor, and 
plantation economics impacted communities in the Ruvuma borderland unevenly during the final decades 
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of the nineteenth century. Many communities in the interior were not incorporated under colonial 
authority, and instead exploited their liminal position between two colonial economic and political 
systems to their advantage. 
Rebellion and Colonial “Pacification” Campaigns  
 The relatively stable conditions in southern GEA and northern PEA during the 1890s gave way to 
a wave of violence in the first decades of the 1900s.
 
The first major disturbance in the Ruvuma borderland 
began in southeastern GEA on July 28, 1905. On that date, the Maji Maji uprising began with African 
rebels attacking Kibata and nearby cotton plantations. More rebel violence followed in August – from the 
burning of the Liwale boma and killing of its garrison; to the annihilation of a small Schutztruppe 
detachment on its way from Songea to Liwale; and the destruction of the Benedictine Mission station at 
Lukuledi and UMCA mission station at Masasi.
66
  
 
Figure 2.3 Area of the Maji Maji Rebellion
67
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Although the uprising and guerilla warfare continued until 1907, the rebellion had largely ended along the 
southeastern coast by 1906. When visiting Lindi town in July 1906, German geographer and ethnologist, 
Dr. Karl Weule, observed that two groups predominated on the town’s streets – African rebels in chain-
gangs and the askari (African soldiers) guarding them.
68
 As Weule ventured into the interior, he 
witnessed the destructive impact of German “pacification” efforts against the rebellion. The Wamwera in 
Lindi District survived in deplorable conditions without shelter after troops leveled their villages to 
ground. The women and children who came out of hiding were emaciated, filthy, and suffering from skin-
diseases.
69
 People left the main caravan routes during and after the rebellion in order to avoid retribution 
and forced conscription by the colonial state. They also sought to avoid porters and askari who plundered 
food supplies throughout the southern districts.
70
 According to Weule, 
Every caravan of inland natives on their way to the coast, whether to sell their supplies of wax, 
tobacco or what not, or to engage themselves as labourers to some European, considered that they 
had a natural right to expect food and drink from the villagers along their route. Even the caravan 
of a white man is apt to make the same sort of demands on the villagers. […The villager] 
therefore prefers to pull down his huts and build new ones in the bush at a distance from the main 
road, where they can only be reached by narrow side paths.
71
 
 
Labor recruiters also pillaged villages. A recruiter named Wisliceny ordered his 200 recruits, porters, and 
askari to raid the villages they passed from Songea to Lindi for food in 1909. Thaddeus Sunseri recounted 
the story, 
They emptied all grain storage bins in half dozen villages, dug potatoes and cassava out of the 
fields, and plundered stores of rice, beans, and blankets. The villager Kalindo testified that 
Wisliceny’s men stole four pishi (about 24 lbs.) of salt. When another villager fought a porter 
who was pillaging his millet field, Wisliceny had him beaten twenty-five times and confiscated 
all his possessions.
72
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To the west, nearly a hundred Ngoni “aristocrats” were hung, effectively destroying the “Ngoni military 
society.”73 With the power structures and patronage networks of the Kilwa corridor in shambles, many 
traders and plantation owners suffered financial ruin as their goods and crops were destroyed and looted.
74
 
Coastal elites struggled to rebuild Kilwa’s economy after the uprising. Efforts to restore the rubber trade 
failed as plantation-produced rubber from Southeast Asia came to dominate the international market in 
1912.
75
 Kilwa also lost access to the profitable forest produce in its hinterland after the German 
administration established a series of forest and wildlife reserves. These reserves limited access to the 
centuries-old Kilwa-Songea caravan routes as well.
76
 Although the rebellion disrupted trade through the 
Lindi corridor, many of the “big men” were spared German reprisals because they allied with the 
Germans at the onset of the rebellion. These “big men” positioned themselves to take advantage of the 
political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion vis-à-vis rival leaders who 
chose to support the rebellion and lost.
77
 
 Many individuals and communities fled across the Ruvuma in response to the Maji Maji uprising, 
but prospects were hardly better in northern PEA. The reorganization of the Nyassa Company and an 
infusion of British and South African mining capital in 1908 enabled the company to conduct widespread 
occupation operations.
78
 The campaigns were met by determined resistance from African “big men” and 
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chiefs, including Machemba and Mataka. Machemba’s forces defeated 400 men sent by the Nyassa 
Company in 1907. The British consulate in Beira concluded that Machemba and his people were in “full 
and undisputed possession [of the territory]” and the “influence of the governing Company is wholly 
unfelt.”79 Mataka also repelled a number of company incursions and led successful raids in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Mataka was finally defeated in 1912, and was forced to flee across the 
Ruvuma into Tunduru District with his followers.
80
 Only the Makonde plateau remained outside the 
company’s control by 1918.81  
Aftermath of the Colonial Military Campaigns – Instability and Opportunities 
 The violent campaigns conducted on both sides of the Ruvuma undermined the stability and 
economic growth of the borderland region. Local populations contended with violence, famine, plagues of 
wild pigs and vermin, encroachment of tsetse flies and wildlife, and significant changes in local and 
regional power dynamics.
82
 African communities depended upon their mobility to escape the increasingly 
oppressive colonial regimes and adverse environmental conditions that threatened their lives and 
livelihoods. Many responded to the violence and instability by migrating to more secure areas of the 
borderland or immigrating out of the region. Weule observed countless migrations and new settlement in 
southern GEA in 1906, 
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[…] the immigration of foreign (though still African) elements takes place, here in the south, 
quietly and almost imperceptibly – a band, a horde, a group of families, sometimes, but not 
always, under the command of a chief, appears one fine day, hoes a piece of land at a suitable 
place in the pori, builds a few airy huts, and the immigration is complete.
83
 
 
According to John Iliffe, twelve per cent of Dar es Salaam’s population originated from southern GEA by 
1905 and over 6,000 Africans in the south annually left for the coast by 1910.
84
 As local populations 
relocated within and beyond the borderland region, the colonial governments reevaluated their 
development plans for the region in the aftermath of their “pacification” campaigns. The Nyassa 
Company chose to abandon its original agricultural development schemes, believing that plantations 
could not remain solvent and pay for military occupation over such a vast and inaccessible territory: 
In this case, the cost of conquest was too high and the likely returns from agriculture too low and 
too uncertain for the vision of economic development to persist.
85
  
 
The company instead reconceived northern PEA as a labor reservoir for South African mines, and entered 
into a lucrative labor recruitment agreement with Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA).
86
 
Contracts were also given to private firms to exploit local resources, including the Nyassa Rubber 
Company.
87
 Most of these enterprises, however, failed. The lucrative contract with the WNLA also 
collapsed in May 1913 after labor recruiting for South African mines was prohibited above 22°S.
88
 
Thereafter, Nyassa Company’s revenues became almost exclusively tied to the collection of hut taxes. 
Company officers and police (Portuguese and African) committed innumerable abuses in their efforts to 
collect sufficient revenues for the company and generate individual profits by forcing local Africans to 
work on their private plantations. The British reported cases of beatings, murder, rape, and robbery as 
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early as 1901.
89
 Bishop J.E. Hine, for example, reported that Portuguese and African soldiers acted 
without impunity along the eastern coast of Lake Malawi:  
They carry off the people’s fowls and goats, raid villages, burn houses, compel whole villages to 
work like slaves, just at the time of year when it is imperative that they should be hoeing and 
planting their gardens, else there will be a famine. They insult the Chiefs, they insult the women 
(grossly I hear – but I have not yet got clear enough evidence on this point to make it public): but 
the Portuguese, José &c., seemed to look upon it as a matter of course that the women of the 
village should be at the service of the lusts and brutality of these coast men whom he is supposed 
to command.
90
 
 
Corruption and violence were especially common among company officers in distant outposts following 
the pacification campaigns. A medical officer of the WNLA and subsequent British Vice-Consul of Porto 
Amelia, Dr. Bostock, filed reports accusing officers of collecting excessive taxes for personal benefit and 
forcing African men and women to work on the officers’ plantations without pay and adequate food.91 Dr. 
Bostock argued that the hut tax generated a renewable supply of free labor from defenseless women: 
The method of collection is extremely simple. At tax collection time, (particularly if labour is 
required on the plantation of the Chefe do Posto), armed soldiers are sent out in all directions, to 
arrest every woman on whom they can lay hands. The women are brought in as prisoners, they 
work on the Chefe’s plantation all day, and are locked up all night, while frequently they are 
underfed. Here the women remain until their fathers or husbands bring in the money to pay the 
hut tax, or until less labour is required on the plantation. They are in fact temporary slaves. […] 
But in general, there is plenty of labour available, and new gangs are impressed every few days or 
weeks.
92
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Some of the imprisoned women could not be rescued because their husbands were working in mines 
abroad. A Nyassa Consolidated employee in the interior, named Cazes, reported that women often 
worked without pay, food, or tools on the sub-district commissioners’ plantations:  
[…] women are dying at a rate of 1,2,3,4 or 5 every day; that their bodies are thrown out on the 
veld without burial, and are eaten by lions; that on one occasion a dog carried a head back to the 
Boma, and continued to eat it sitting among the other prisoners […].93 
 
Company superiors rarely investigated incidents brought to their attention. Guilty European officers were 
typically “punished” with retirement and a free passage back to Lisbon.94 Dr. Bostock suspected that 
company officials and shareholders in Lisbon and London covered up “scandals” to assure the 
continuation of the Nyassa Company charter.
95
 In an effort to maximize profits and minimize costs, the 
Nyassa Company chose to ignore its charter following their “pacification” campaigns. It made little-to-no 
effort to construct new transportation infrastructure, build hospitals, and improve education, health, and 
social services.
96
   
 The situation across the Ruvuma border in southern GEA was noticeably different. An influx of 
Europeans came to southeastern GEA (particularly Lindi District) in the aftermath of the Maji Maji 
uprising. When Weule returned to Lindi at the conclusion of his expedition (November 1906), he found 
that the town was booming. An influx of capital and new arrivals from Germany were “setting about their 
economic exploitation,” specifically the creation of new plantations.97 Although the “plantation 
imperative” ended as a state policy in the wake of the uprising and Dernburg Reforms, the period after 
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1906 was “the high tide of plantation development as the number of small-scale settlers and large 
corporate plantations [throughout GEA] tripled in number by 1910.”98 Most settlers gravitated to the 
Usambara highlands and along the Central Railway, yet a number of Europeans established plantations in 
the Lukuledi Valley in the southeast.
99
 W. Werneyer and Paul Kaiser, for example, established cotton and 
rubber plantations up the Lukuledi in 1907. The Greek brothers and former Egyptian cotton growers – 
Kritikos – established a successful plantation in Muinguro in 1910. Reinhold Körner also owned a 
number of plantations – the largest at Narunyu. Other Europeans were preparing to invest in Lindi’s 
hinterland in the 1910s, including the leader of the Lindi Trade & Planters Society (Mr. Kindt), who 
intended to open a 1,500 ha planation in the upper Mahumbika Valley for rubber and foodstuff 
production. The food crops were expected to alleviate food shortages experienced in the south due to a 
drop in agricultural production during the rebellion (and as consequence of the crop destruction inflicted 
by German scorched earth tactics).
100
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Table 2.1 Notable European Plantations in the Lukuledi Valley
101
 
 Owner 
Plantation Location 
Founding Year 
Type of  
Goods 
Shipping 
tons per 
year 
Distance from 
Lindi 
(km) 
Handling and Total 
Freight Fee (per year) 
 
1 Gebrüder Kritikos 
Muinguro 
1910 
Cotton, 
Rubber, & 
General Cargo 
50 Waterway 500 Rupees 
2 A. Kleinschmidt 
Mtwere 
1912 
Cotton & 
General Cargo 
235 8 km train & 
waterway 
3,200 Rupees 
3 R. Körner 
Narunyu-Kiherutal 
“” 1100 20 km train & 
waterway 
20,000 Rupees 
4 Reinhard Stauss 
Mkwaya 
1910 
Cotton, 
Rubber, & 
General Cargo 
355 10 km train and 
waterway 
5,000 Rupees 
5 W. Werneyer 
Mtua 
1907 
“” 400 32 km train and 
waterway 
10,000 Rupees 
6 Paul Kaiser 
Mtama 
1907 
“” ca 133 32 km train and 
waterway 
3,000 Rupees 
 
 
 These plantation owners increasingly depended upon incentives, rather than forced labor practices 
and state assistances, to procure sufficient laborers to work their lands. The first comprehensive labor 
ordinance passed by the German colonial state in 1909 embraced a free-labor policy and permitted 
freedom of movement – freizügigkeit – for African laborers.102 Although some instances of forced labor 
persisted, in most cases plantations enticed local and migrant laborers with “high wages, recruitment 
bonuses, food rations, and amenable plantation living conditions.”103 Border residents and migrant 
laborers perceived wage-employment on coastal plantations as a valuable supplement to household 
production and subsistence farming. Thaddeus Sunseri argued that many Africans who resided near 
plantations worked on them seasonally according to the needs of their households. He contended that a 
“thirty-day work contract might be worked off gradually over half a year or longer, making it clear that 
local labor was discretionary.”104 Herr Wendt reported that many Africans residing on the south bank of 
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the Ruvuma worked on the German plantations during the day and returned home at night to exploit the 
higher wages offered in GEA; ten to twelve rupees a month versus four rupees in northern PEA.
105
 
Migrant laborers from the interior districts of GEA and PEA also worked seasonally, often restricting 
their employment to three months so that they could return home to help with their family farms.
106
 Since 
labor demands continued to outstrip supplies, local and migrant laborers had an immense amount of 
leverage to choose their employer, negotiate wages and contract terms (or work without one), and desert 
if they were dissatisfied with their employment.
107
 Sunseri concluded that European planters and the 
colonial state lacked “control of the laboring environment in the last few years of German rule” and were 
instead held “hostage to high wages, the fear of worker desertion, or even another uprising”.108 As in the 
century preceding, African populations relied upon their mobility to navigate the dangers and possibilities 
of the Ruvuma borderland.  
 While African laborers exerted immense influence over the labor market in southern GEA in the 
post-rebellion era, the regional economy remained firmly in the hands of the Indian commercial 
community. Indian traders took advantage of the protection offered by the German military presence in 
the interior to expand their business enterprises into remote villages.
109
 Kurt Pfund observed Arab and 
Indian traders bartering goods, extending credit, and retrieving debts from villagers in the interior during 
the harvest season in 1912:  
They remain in the villages, usually as guests of the jumbe and at his expense, until they are paid 
in rubber (since cash is obviously not available). And afterwards they provide new goods on 
extended credit. In this way almost all the jumbes are indebted to Arabs and Indians for large 
amounts, trapped by the imprudence of their people.
110
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One of the reasons that Indian traders succeeded at driving out rival Arab traders and establishing 
networks of dukas (shops) at the terminuses of interior trade routes was their employment of local African 
agents. Martha Spencer Honey described how upcountry Indian merchants employed upwards of fifty 
African petty traders. The Indian merchants gave petty traders goods on credit in order to conduct trade 
for local produce. Indian merchants would pay for the produce procured from their African associates 
with imported commodities rather than cash (kerosene, matches, umbrellas, etc.).
111
 According to Juhani 
Koponen, the duka became the nexus of the colonial economy – “the place where the Africans could buy 
cloths and other popular imported goods and where they could sell their agricultural and animal 
husbandry products to be relayed further on.”112 Despite the strong prejudice that German commercial 
houses (including DOAG, Hansing, and O’Swald) shared against Indians, they employed Indian 
merchants and petty traders to take advantage of their commercial networks.
113
 With the support of its 
Indian employees, the DOAG came to dominate the credit system in Lindi District after the rebellion.
114
 
When the Indian commercial community came under attack by the Governor’s Council in 1906 and 
Secretary of Colonial Affairs (Bernard Dernburg) in 1908, German firms came to their defense and 
argued that Indian traders performed an indispensable middleman role in the colonial economy.
115
 Indians 
in GEA stimulated peasant production and the monetization of the economy by offering a steady supply 
of desirable goods at their dukas.
116
 Indian traders were allegedly more successful than their European 
counterparts because of their ability to “set up his duka in the smallest and remotest places and survive 
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there with a modest rate of turnover.”117 Governor Rechenberg also came to the defense of large- and 
small-scale Indian shop owners and merchants, arguing that African-European commercial relations 
depended upon Indian intermediaries. The status of Europeans within the colonial social hierarchy would 
be threatened if they participated in petty trade with Africans. Indians, in contrast, could engage with 
Africans on equal footing since both shared the same rights as “natives.”118 The anti-Indian reforms were 
ultimately dropped.  Indian traders and their dukas continued to integrate local, regional, and long-
distance trade economies within the monetized colonial economy. 
 By the 1910s, the future of northern PEA and southern GEA seemed to be headed on different 
trajectories. The Nyassa Company exerted minimal authority over its European and African officials, who 
exploited the local populace and resources, rather than attempting to improve the region’s health, 
education, infrastructure, and welfare services.
119
 The German central administration also exerted 
minimal authority over the European settlers and German administrators in the south, who aimed to 
exploit local resources. Europeans in southern GEA, however, remained committed to transforming the 
region into a lucrative agricultural landscape of European cash crop plantations and African peasant 
farms. In order to fulfill this vision and capitalize on the economic growth evident in Lindi, the European 
community applied political pressure and personal funds to construct a “modern” transportation 
infrastructure of engineered roads and railways that linked the interior to the coast. European settlers were 
increasingly dissatisfied with head porterage as an inefficient and expensive mode of transportation. They 
found that wage increases, “encouragement,” and coercion were all ineffective methods at procuring 
sufficient porters to carry large, bulky loads to the coast.
 120
  The poor quality of roads inhibited the use of 
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hand- or pushcarts as an alternative. Carts travelling from Lindi to Masasi, for instance, quickly became 
bogged down in the road’s sandy soil during the dry season.121 Inadequate roads also inhibited the 
expansion of motor vehicle traffic. The first road specifically designed for motor vehicles was not 
constructed until 1909/10 in West Usambara, and only 26 motor vehicles existed in GEA at the beginning 
of 1914.
122
 The rebellion and a lack of government funding put plans for a southern railway on hold.
123
 
Exorbitant transportation rates in southern GEA caused one plantation owner (Kaiser) to give up his 
cotton and refuse to purchase peasant-produced cotton in 1911.
124
 Another European plantation owner 
(Werneyer) threatened to discontinue his thriving cotton plantation if the state failed to rectify the 
transportation situation.
125
 European settlers and the southern German administration argued that without 
a railway or all-weather roads for motor vehicles, the southern region would fail to fulfill its rich 
potential.
126
  
  The Maji Maji uprising offered the first opportunity for the southern German administration to 
conduct a wide-scale, inexpensive, road infrastructure development program. Following the uprising, the 
government aimed to improve the roads between “every place of the slightest importance with all other 
settlements” in order to improve administrative efficiency and the military’s mobility.127 The 
administration kept costs low by forcing rebel participants and their alleged supporters to complete the 
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roadwork as their punishment. Weule noted that roads “were in perfect order” in those places that took 
“an active part in the rebellion”128 Those communities that remained neutral or supported the Germans, 
however, were also forced to participate in roadwork as part of a tax reform in 1905 that declared road 
construction and maintenance to be a common responsibility.
129
 Local authorities were responsible for 
collecting sufficient laborers to conduct the roadwork.
130
 The Makonde reportedly maintained an 
excellent road from Newala to Nchichira because of the sustained pressure from the German 
administration in Lindi, rather than personal interests.
131
 Weule reported that his easiest march occurred 
along that road,  
Had I not bestridden my well-tried old mule, I could have wished for a bicycle; even a motor 
could have been driven quite comfortably along this road. No steep hills and no deeply eroded 
gorges, but a plain with a gentle and almost imperceptible eastward slope, covered throughout 
with dense bush, in which the industrious Makonde have here and there cleared their little patches 
for cultivation, and through which run broad, well-kept roads, sometimes perfectly straight for a 
kilometer at a time.
132
 
 
The southern administration also focused on improving roads with economic value, such as the one 
approaching Lindi town. When Weule entered Lindi in November 1906, he found the road to be a 
“masterpiece of engineering: it only wants a few motor cars to be a perfect picture of twentieth-century 
civilization.”133 A lack of funds and equipment, however, limited the capabilities of the southern 
administration and local leaders to improve the regional road infrastructure. The Lindi District Officer, for 
example, found the condition of the Lindi road unacceptable beyond 6 km of the town in 1911.  The 
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construction of a permanent, hard surfaced (metaled) roadway from Lindi to Masasi (140 km) was not 
possible without investments from the central administration in Dar es Salaam.
134
  
 
Figure 2.4 Proposed Route for the Lindi-Masasi Road, March 1911
135
 
 
The District Officer argued that the estimated road construction cost of 700,000 Marks was worthwhile in 
economic and political terms. The road would cross through land already under European and African 
cotton production, and would permit existing European plantations in the Lukuledi Valley to expand their 
operations without fearing heavy transport costs. Capital was available for the opening of new cotton 
plantations west of Mtua as soon as the transport costs dropped. The roadway would also make the mass 
production of peanuts, sesame, mtama (sorghum), and maize profitable. Wood stocks at Litipo, Chitowa, 
Nagapemba, Liwengula, and Rondo would become accessible with a road connection to the coast. The 
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District Officer also argued that the road would integrate an estimated 27,000 huts along the northern part 
of the Makonde Plateau within the colonial economy – both in terms of selling their produce and tax 
collection. He calculated that the 50,000 huts directly affected by the road would produce 2.5 million Rps. 
worth of trade along the roadway. The road would also attract the growing population west of Masasi 
(many of whom came from PEA) and large-scale traffic from across the Ruvuma.
136
 The District Officer 
concluded that with government funding, the Lindi-Masasi road would generate innumerable benefits for 
the southern region and colony in general.
137
   
 The District Officer’s preference for a metaled road for motor vehicles was not shared by the 
European settlers in Lindi District.
138
 Plantation owners instead made numerous petitions for the 
construction of a government-financed, narrow-gauged railway through the Lukuledi Valley. Three rail 
options were initially proposed in lieu of the abandoned major railway project. The cheapest option was a 
manually operated monorail. The cars would have been operated by one or more men and could have 
carried up to 1,000 kg.  
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Figure 2.5 Manually Operated Monorail Proposed for the Lukuledi Valley
139
 
 
The second option was a manually operated, two-track rail with a narrow gauge of 500-600 mm. 
Although the cars had the same carrying capacity, the operator would not have to worry about 
maintaining the car’s balance. European planters strongly advocated the third option – a manually-
operated, narrow-gauged rail that could be adapted for a locomotive engine in the future. A 600 mm 
gauge would again be used, but the rails would have a higher profile to allow for heavier engine 
weight.
140
 From 1911 to 1913, Werneyer and Körner repeatedly petitioned the Lindi District Office and 
central administration for funding to construct the narrow-gauged railway. The planters’ arguments in 
support of the rail echoed those expressed by the District Officer for the Lindi-Masasi road: without 
improved infrastructure, local peasant farms and settler plantations could not be profitable or expand.
141
 
In 1912, the Lindi District Office threw his support behind the narrow-gauged railway plan, arguing that 
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an estimated 3,000 tons of sorghum, maize, sesame, beans, iron, salt, additional raw materials, and 
imported goods would be transported along the railway, as well as 60 European and 1,000 African 
passengers (one way).
142
 Plantation owners argued that construction of the rail line was urgently needed 
not only for their interests and local peasant producers, but also to combat the actions of the Portuguese 
across the border.
143
 The Nyassa Company commissioned a survey for a rival rail line from Port Amelia 
to Lake Malawi and landlocked British Nyasaland in 1913. With the backing of British capital, 
construction of the railway was set to begin following completion of the survey.
144
 The Germans feared 
that a railway in northern PEA could draw laborers and trade away from GEA and its southerly ports.  
 Neither the German government nor the Nyassa Company had the money to make a long-distance 
railway a reality in the Ruvuma borderland. The colonial state in Dar es Salaam doubted the profitability 
of investing in an apparently unruly region devastated by an uprising and military reprisals. The petitions 
issued by the Lindi District Office and European plantation owners fell on deaf ears as the colonial 
government concentrated its limited resources on completing the Tanga and Central Railway Lines in 
order to better exploit the more lucrative, cash crop producing regions.
145
 In February 1913, Governor 
Schnee announced that no revenues would be allocated for the planned light rail in southern GEA.
146
 One 
plantation owner decided to take matters in his own hands. Körner offered to help fund and oversee the 
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construction and maintenance of a narrow-gauge railway to Mtua.
147
 The Imperial Government and 
Treasury, Lindi District Office, Colonial Economic Committee, DOAG, and Körner conducted 
negotiations throughout 1913 over Körner’s contract, track procurement and placement, passenger and 
freight rates, distribution of government and private financing, interest rates, and amortization.
148
 A 17km 
manually-operated, 600 mm, narrow-gauge track ran up Lindi creek by 1914.
149
  
 
Figure 2.6 Map of Narrow-Gauged Railway and Location of European Plantations
150  
 
 When considering the distances from Lindi to Masasi (140 km) and Lindi to Songea (600 km), 
the 17 km railway in the Lukuledi Valley hardly made an impact on the broader economy and mobility 
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patterns in the Ruvuma borderland region. Carriers remained the principal mode of transport as the 
borderland became a warzone during the First World War. The incomplete railways and roads on both 
sides of the Ruvuma reflected the ambiguous impact that colonialism had on the borderland region from 
the 1880s to the 1910s. Lindi’s ascension over Kilwa reflected a shift in the region’s economy from the 
precolonial slave and ivory trade towards a monetized, agriculture-based, colonial economy. The fortunes 
of the southern coast, however, had undergone similar fluctuations over the centuries as new markets 
came and went – first gold and then slaves, ivory, rubber, and cash crops. Indians continued to supply the 
capital and commodity goods that underscored colonial economies, just as they had for the slave and 
ivory trade during the previous century. The new colonial economy also did not radically alter centuries-
old mobility patterns; rather, Africans adapted mobility patterns to exploit new opportunities. Porters 
continued to arrive at the coast, transporting crops and raw materials instead of ivory and slaves. The 
caravan routes were also adapted to accommodate a growing number of migrant laborers seeking wage-
employment at plantations along the southern coast and to the north along the Tanga and Central Railway 
Lines. The European colonial impact on the borderland’s political landscape was also ambiguous. The 
Portuguese and Germans used their military strength to penetrate further into the interior and displace old 
power structures more thoroughly during the early 20
th
 century than in preceding centuries. Colonial 
authority, however, was felt unevenly throughout the borderland. Some communities were left untouched, 
such as the Makonde along the Mueda Plateau of northern PEA. In most cases, the understaffed and 
overworked colonial officers depended upon African allies to enforce colonial legislation, taxation, and 
forced labor policies. Some leaders (such as the “big men” of the Lindi trade corridor) consolidated and 
extended their authority by entering into alliance with colonial authorities. These alliances mirrored those 
conducted between local leaders, chiefs, sultans, and foreign interlopers centuries before. Volatility 
continued to define the political landscape of the borderland. Leaders rose and fell as populations moved 
from one place to another in response to raiding, warfare, famine, drought, population pressure, alliances, 
and economic opportunities. The borderland populace utilized their mobility to evade, resist, and/or 
exploit the colonial systems on either side of the Ruvuma.  
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 The difficulties that European settlers experienced with constructing the railway in southern GEA 
underscored the fact that transforming the borderland’s landscape would require immense amounts of 
capital, manpower, patience, and cooperation from a host of players – the colonial state, local leaders and 
communities, and Indian intermediaries. Europeans could not simply use new technologies of mobility to 
impose their visions of a lucrative, “modernized,” and “civilized” region upon southern GEA and 
northern PEA. Adaptation, negotiation, conflict, and accommodation continued to be the hallmarks of life 
in the Ruvuma borderland region during the twentieth century, just as they had been for the Rufiji-
Ruvuma language communities in the first millennium.  
World War I in East Africa 
 
“No part of Africa suffered more severely from the ravages of the Great War than the Tanganyika 
Territory. Fighting took place more or less continuously over the greater part of the territory for over 
four years, and the loss of life, especially among the native population, and the destruction and decay of 
property were severe.”151 
 
German attempts to (re)build southern GEA after the Maji Maji rebellion came to an abrupt halt with 
the onset of the First World War. War was not a foregone conclusion in East Africa when conflict erupted 
in Europe. European rivalries in the continent had largely subsided since the 1880s, and the colonies had 
the option to remain neutral according to the Berlin Act of 1885. Strategic naval concerns, however, 
quickly drew East Africa into the war.
152
 The British targeted GEA ports and naval vessels – particularly 
the German cruiser SMS Königsberg – in order to defend vital shipping and troop convoys moving 
through the Indian Ocean from Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Suez Canal.
153
 British forces in 
surrounding Uganda, East Africa Protectorate (Kenya), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland allied with 
forces from the Belgian Congo against the German Schutztruppe and their commander-in-chief, Colonel 
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(later General) Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck.
154
 The East African campaign began in November 1914 
and concluded two weeks after the armistice in Paris.
155
 In comparison to the large-scale battles and 
trench warfare on the Western Front, combat in East Africa involved smaller skirmishes and guerrilla 
warfare. Lettow-Vorbeck’s mobile company columns moved independently through the bush and 
obtained supplies from local communities.
156
 Scorched earth tactics, modern weaponry, and the forceful 
conscription of the African male population by German and Allied forces devastated the physical, social, 
and economic landscape of the Ruvuma borderland. The presence of armies on both sides of the border 
inhibited local people’s mobility – depriving many of a crucial survival strategy. Thousands of civilians 
died due to conflict, famine, starvation, and disease during and after the war. In the wake of the 
destruction, Allied forces attempt to create a new infrastructure of motorable roads to improve the 
mobility of troop and supply lines in pursuit of the retreating German forces. Their inability to construct 
and maintain an all-weather road network inhibited the Allied war effort, prolonged the war’s duration, 
and contributed to the death of hundreds to thousands of porters, who were forced to shoulder the 
workload of the motor vehicle units.  
A Smuggling Zone: Early War Years in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1916) 
 
 The Ruvuma borderland saw limited military action during the first two years of the war.
157
 South 
of the Ruvuma, Portuguese troops were extremely limited in number and equipment.
158
 Under a status of 
quasi-neutrality, the Portuguese sent 1,500 troops from Lisbon to Porto Amelia on November 1, 1914 to 
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strengthen border defenses.
159
 The Nyassa Company, however, failed to reconstruct port facilities after a 
cyclone struck earlier in the year. With inadequate medical and food supplies, housing, and sanitation, the 
Portuguese troops quickly succumbed to illness.
160
 Over 20% of the First Expeditionary Force became 
causalities due to illness six months after their landing.
161
 Replacements sent in November 1915 fared no 
better. When General José Cesar Ferreira Gil arrived in June 1916, he found 75% of the 1915 expedition 
force incapacitated by disease.
162
 An elephant hunter by the name of Arimuthu Naicker reported to the 
British Vice Consul at Porto Amelia in December 1915 that the border lay “absolutely unprotected either 
by our [British] Intelligence Department or by the Portuguese authorities.”163 The Ruvuma border was 
also unmanned on the German side. Lettow-Vorbeck had little respect for Portuguese military 
capabilities. A single company was stationed at the Lindi garrison, while the southwestern region between 
Mahenge and Songea was virtually empty of Schutztruppe.
164
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Figure 2.7 “Port Amelia in Portuguese Nyasaland. Photo taken from troop ship in harbour.”
165
 
 
 The Germans exploited the porous nature of the Ruvuma borderland and used it as a smuggling 
zone from 1914 to 1916. Prior to the war, William Philippi & Company and the Deutsche Ostafrika-Linie 
monopolized steamship traffic along the PEA coast. When the war began, these German firms took 
advantage of Portugal’s neutrality to unload mail, personnel, and supplies for the German war effort at 
Portuguese ports. The firms not only smuggled a “great deal” of food and supplies across the border, but 
also provided military intelligence.
166
 Portuguese shipping firms were also complicit in the smuggling 
operations. The Empreza Nacional de Navegação, for instance, transported Germans under false papers to 
the border. In at least once instance, a German agent contracted an Empreza Nacional de Navegação 
vessel to deliver medical supplies, leather, boots, socks, and other equipment to PEA for the German war 
effort.
167
 Once unloaded, local merchants and employees of the Nyassa Company helped move the 
information and goods across the Ruvuma border.
168
 The British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot 
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Carnegie, reported that as “long as German  officers and agents have a free hand in the northern part of 
the Portuguese colony, it renders the blockade of German East Africa practically a dead letter.”169 By 
mid-1915, the Portuguese Government in Lisbon, the Governor General in Lourenço Marques, and the 
Minister of Colonies had ordered Portuguese forces to stop the flow of information and contraband into 
southern GEA. Northern PEA, however, was not under Lisbon’s control. Nyassa Company governed the 
region, and a group of Germans had purchased controlling interest of the company’s parent company 
(Nyassa Consolidated Ltd.) a couple of months before the outbreak of the war.
170
 The British government 
pressed the Portuguese government to cancel the charter and thus eliminate German influence in northern 
PEA. When the Portuguese failed to adopt the proposal, the British sequestrated the German shares of the 
company.
171
 The British also restricted English firms, such as Lewis and Roswell, from conducting import 
trade along the northern PEA coastline. The Foreign Office explained that there was “no guarantee that 
anything imported into Palma or Porto Amelia at the present moment will not be used to supply the 
German forces across the frontier, thus stultifying our blockade of German East Africa.”172 The British 
government would not encourage British traders to operate in the region until “the officials of the 
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Companhia do Nyassa [Nyassa Company] were determined to stop all supplies to the German colony and 
were maintaining a more effective control over traffic across the frontier”.173  
 The British eventually pushed the Portuguese to seize the German vessels in their neutral ports 
(February 1916) and declare war on Germany (March 9, 1916). The Portuguese aligned themselves with 
the Allied forces in order to secure the future of their colonial possession against South African ambitions 
of land aggrandizement.
174
 The Portuguese, however, failed to control the Ruvuma border and movement 
across it. In addition to the illicit trade, local populations continued to cross into GEA to escape the 
repressive rule of Nyassa Company officers. Naicker offered a disturbing report of the abuses, destitution, 
and starvation African populations experienced in the northern districts of Lugenda, Ruvuma, and Medo 
in 1915: 
[…] it seems so bad that the natives are selling children in German East Africa for little bits of grain, 
others again catching unprotected women and children and selling them for grain on the German side, 
others again waiting on the border for those that return from German territory and murder them for 
the little bit of grain they carry, in most cases not more than a couple lbs.
175
  
 
According to Naicker, the government did not assist the local populace, but continued to collect taxes and 
catch all able-bodied men for plantation labor.
176
 The inability of the Portuguese to close their northern 
border was matched by the British Navy’s failure to secure the southern GEA ports. In March 1916, the 
German vessel, Marie, unloaded 1,500 tons of cargo at Sudi Bay (between Lindi and Mikindani). It took 
African carriers eight days and nights to unload everything. Although the British Navy eventually spotted 
and bombarded the Marie, the ship escaped to the neutral Dutch port of Batavia in Java. This operation 
proved more costly to the Allies war effort than the smuggling operations conducted across the Ruvuma 
as the Germans became equipped with, 
[…] four of the most modern 10.5cm howitzers, two 7.5cm mountain guns, 2,000 modern rifles, 
three million rounds of ammunition, and some 50,000 porter loads prepacked with medicine, 
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uniforms, food and equipment of every conceivable description (including 200kgs of precious 
quinine).
177
 
 
The Allies eventually captured the southern ports of Kilwa, Lindi, Sudi, and Mikindani by the end of 
September 1916, but the damage was already done. 
From Smuggling to the Frontlines 
 
 The Ruvuma borderland gradually transitioned from a smuggling zone to the forefront of the war 
by autumn of 1916. The Allies southern advance to the Rufiji River inspired the Portuguese to conduct a 
series of offensives across the Ruvuma from April to October 1916.
178
 A force of 400 men reclaimed the 
Kionga Triangle (along the mouth of the Ruvuma) against a few German border guards in April 1916.
179
 
Portuguese attempts to occupy the northern bank of the Ruvuma during the following month, however, 
ended in failure with the Germans capturing two gunboats and killing thirty-three men.
180
 In October 
1916, a Portuguese force of 1,500 re-crossed the border and successfully occupied Newala. Local 
Makonde assisted their efforts by providing intelligence, serving as guides, and attacking German forces. 
The Portuguese success was short-lived. Lettow-Vorbeck dispatched four Schutztruppe companies to 
regain the food-growing area, eliminate the Portuguese threat, and crush the Makonde “rebellion.”181 The 
German force of 520 rifles defeated the Portuguese by depriving them of water and unleashing almost 
continuous bombardments. The Portuguese retreated under the cover of darkness on 28 November, and 
the Germans proceeded to reoccupy all the posts north of the Ruvuma.
182
 The Allied efforts north along 
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the Rufiji River, east from Kilwa, and west in Mahenge ground to a halt with the onset of the rainy 
season.
183
 Troop buildup and port improvements occurred at Kilwa and Lindi (the new base of operations) 
as the Allies waited to renew their offensive in June 1917.
184
 Military forces from Britain, India, South 
Africa, East Africa Protectorate, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the 
Belgian Congo, and Portuguese East Africa all converged onto southern GEA. They sought to prevent a 
German retreat into PEA and to end the war as quickly as possible so that crucial manpower, supplies, 
and shipping could be redirected to the European Front.
185
 
  
Figure 2.8 “German East African Campaign. Dar-es-Salaam. Indian troops embarking for Kilwa, October 1917.”
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100,000 rounds of ammunition, rifles, medical supplies, and provisions (Paice, 273).The new headquarters at 
Mocimboa da Rovuma was destroyed and the Ngomano station was abandoned. 
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Figure 2.9 The Allies Advance into GEA, 1917
187
 
 
Neither objective was met. Over the next six months, Allied forces slowly drove the Schutztruppe west up 
the Lukuledi Valley, southeast and east from Mahenge and Songea, and south from Kilwa and Liwale. 
Some of the bloodiest battles of the entire East African campaign were fought in southern GEA, 
particularly the Battle of Mahiwa.
188
 Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces escaped encirclement on the Makonde 
Plateau by heading south to the Ruvuma. The Schutztruppe inflicted another humiliating defeat upon the 
Portuguese forces at Ngomano on November 25, 1917 before spreading out across northern PEA.
189
 A 
reduced Allied force desperately tried to corral the German forces, which proceeded to raid posts 
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throughout PEA for the next ten months.
190
 After threatening Quelimane in July 1918, the Germans 
returned north, re-crossed the Ruvuma River, and headed west into Northern Rhodesia. Lettow-Vorbeck 
and his forces finally surrendered on November 25, 1918.
191
 
 
Figure 2.10 “German East Africa. Battle of Mahiwa. The Kashmir Mountain Battery in action at Nyangao against 
Mahiwa, 16th - 19th October 1917.”
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A War Against Nature  
 
 While fighting in the Ruvuma borderland, the Allies and Germans encountered a landscape 
devoid of all-weather roads and prevalent with tsetse flies, both of which inhibited troop and supply 
movement by motor vehicles or pack animals. As a result, the German and Allied forces depended upon 
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human porterage to move their food, ammunition, weaponry, and baggage. Although the use of porters 
dated back to the beginning of the war, the Allied Commander – General Jan Smuts – made porterage the 
“bedrock of his transport system” following the Allied advance of March-May 1916.193 Over a million 
Africans worked for the British as porters during the course of the war (most without a choice), and an 
unknown number worked for the Germans and Portuguese.
194
 Death rates were extremely high among the 
carriers. In the aftermath of the Battle of Mahiwa, Linforce headquarters demanded an explanation for the 
high mortality rate among Allied carriers. The Senior Medical Officer suspected that the “exhausting 
conditions,” overexposure, and inadequate rations increased the carriers’ vulnerability to diseases.195 In 
the end, an estimated 100,000 carriers died due to starvation, exhaustion, exposure, disease, and in 
conflict during the course of the war in East Africa.
196
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Figure 2.11 “Section of Field Ambulance on the march en route for Mahiwa, October 1917. Nigerian Brigade.”
197
 
 
 Without adequate supply lines, the Allies and Schutztruppe military forces stationed in the 
Ruvuma borderland struggled to combat disease, starvation, and dehydration in some of the most difficult 
terrain of the campaign. The war in the Ruvuma borderland was as much two armies battling a hostile 
environment as it was a military conflict. In some areas, the bush was so heavy that large columns of 
troops passed within a mile of each other without knowing.
198
 The Nigerian Brigade reported the 
difficulties of marching along the Kilwa front: 
Reached NARUMBEGO 13.30 hours but distance only about 8 miles and guide apparently 
mistook road. Very trying march and 5 Europeans fell out. Country mountainous with thick bush 
and grass making it necessary [to] proceed with caution.”199  
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Caution was necessary as enemy forces utilized the bush to set ambushes and reinforce defensive 
positions. The bush also rendered modern weaponry ineffective. Spotters for heavy artillery and airplane 
bombardiers struggled to identify enemy targets and determine where the weapons exploded.
200
  
                                 
Figure 2.12 “German East African Campaign, Armoured       Figure 2.13 “5" howitzer firing at Chiramaka, near  
 cars, Ndanda, January 1918”
201
                           Mtama, in action on Lindi Line in October 1917.”
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Figure 2.14 “Voisin two-seater biplane used by 1st Squadron RNAS in German East Africa. Mtua Lindi Line, 
November 1917.”
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Disease proved more effective at generating casualties than modern weaponry. Malaria, dysentery, and 
pneumonia decimated all ranks. Three-quarters of the Portuguese force was sick by July 1916.
204
 As 
quickly as the HMHS Gascon, Ebani, Neuralia, and Dangola evacuated Allied troops from Kilwa and 
Lindi during the rainy season of 1917, hundreds more filled the hospitals.
205
 Half of the 25
th
 Royal 
Fusiliers in Lindi were in the hospital in June 1917.
206
 The high number of ill troops and carriers was a 
significant reason why the Allies repeatedly delayed their advances in southern GEA.
207
 The Schutztruppe 
also suffered from illnesses, though their medical resources per capita were more plentiful and nearer at 
hand then their adversaries up to mid-1917.
208
 Illness and scarcity of supplies ultimately compelled the 
Germans to reduce their fighting force before entering PEA in November 1917. They left over 700 
Europeans and 2,000 askari behind to be captured.
209
 The remaining Schutztruppe force, its carriers, and 
followers suffered over the next ten months from severe weight loss, influenza, pneumonia, and 
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malaria.
210
 The health of Allied forces south of the Ruvuma was not much better. European and African 
troops and carriers battled malaria, pneumonia, anemia, and acute diarrhea caused by parasites.
211
 
 
Figure 2.15 “Making bush stretchers for wounded at Nyangao. Nigerian Brigade.”
212
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 “Wounded ready to be moved from Nyangao, after the Battle of Mahiwa; October 15th-19th 1917. 
Nigerian Brigade”
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 In addition to the difficult physical terrain and diseased environment, the German and Allied 
forces also contended with water and food scarcity throughout the Ruvuma borderland. Access to food 
and water dictated troop movements. One of the reasons that nearly half of the German and Allied forces 
fought up the fertile Lukuledi Valley from Mingoyo to Ndanda was the ample supply of water. British 
intelligence officers and technical troops (or engineers) worked much harder to locate, construct, and 
sustain water holes along the Kilwa front from the Mbemkuru River to the Lukuledi River. In some cases, 
African carriers transported water to forward areas. The 61
st
 (King’s George’s Own) Pioneers, for 
instance, forced approximately forty African stretcher bearers to carry water tins twenty-three miles 
between the Ruponda and Lukuledi posts.
214
 Some of the fiercest battles were fought in defense of water 
sources. The Schutztruppe, for example, vigorously defended their position at Narungombe because it was 
the last source of water to sustain a large force above the Mbemkuru River.
215
 During engagements, 
enemy forces also sought to deprive one another from water sources by covering them with heavy 
machine gun fire. Troops and carriers of the Nigerian Brigade suffered a large number of causalities at the 
Battle of Mahiwa trying to obtain water while surrounded by enemy forces.
216
  
 Both sides also vigorously defended and tried to deny food to their adversary. Before the onset of 
the southern campaign, German forces established a network of supply dumps in southern GEA (the 
largest at Ndanda and Masasi).
217
 German officers in Lindi and Kilwa oversaw the storage of an estimated 
470,000 kg of foodstuffs for troop usage by January 1917.
218
 The German supply system, however, 
primarily depended upon the looting of local villages and shambas. According to Ross Anderson, Lettow-
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Vorbeck “was quite ruthless in devastating districts for food, both for his own supplies as well as denying 
his pursuers sustenance. He was quite prepared to leave a district absolutely destitute regardless of the 
consequences for the African population.”219 As the Germans retreated south, they employed scorched 
earth tactics to force the Allies to depend upon their over-stretched supply lines.
220
 For example, the 
Germans burned four tons of food at Luchemi as they retreated from the Makonde Plateau in mid-
November 1917.
221
 The Schutztruppe were not alone in their ruthlessness. Two Allied commanders-in-
chief advocated scorched earth policies in the Ruvuma borderland. General Smuts pressed the Portuguese 
in January 1917 to clear all food in the area 80 km south of the Ruvuma and prevent locals from planting 
any crops in January and February so that retreating German forces would have to surrender or starve. 
The Portuguese were unable to fulfill the request.
222
 Smuts’ successor, General van Deventer, similarly 
called for the creation of a foodless barrier along the Ruvuma River. Despite the Colonial Office’s strong 
opposition, the general received sanctions for the operation. Once again, the scale of the plan made it 
impractical for the Allied forces to undertake.
223
 Still, British Intelligence Officers operating in northern 
PEA were ordered to purchase or destroy all stores found on their patrols from Ngomano to Medo: 
[…] get into touch with the natives en route and make sure that no possible sources of food 
supplies exist which could be of use to the enemy. If you discover any such stores you should 
destroy such as you couldn’t carry away or which you couldn’t induce the natives to remove and 
give them compensation in cash or cloth, your action in each case will of course depend largely 
on the attitude of the natives themselves. You should tell them all, that we intend to retain G.E.A. 
and that the war in Europe is likely to last for a long time.
224
 
 
The food situation in the Ruvuma borderland also became critical because the Germans and Allies 
forcefully conscripted local able-bodied men as carriers. Agricultural production declined as displaced 
communities (consisting largely of women, children, and the elderly) struggled to complete the necessary 
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manual labor amid wartime violence and instability, while also defending against pests and encroaching 
wildlife.    
Wartime Construction amid the Destruction: Building a New Infrastructure in the Borderland 
 
 In the wake of countless artillery shells, fires, and raids that struck the Ruvuma borderland, the 
Allies attempted to construct a new infrastructure landscape to rectify the supply and troop mobility 
issues that undermined the war effort. In addition to water holes and telegraph lines, the Allies created a 
massive network of roads across southern GEA and northern PEA.
225
 The first large-scale road 
construction effort occurred in 1915 south of the Ruvuma. Before being recalled to Lisbon, the 
Portuguese First Expeditionary Force constructed a 300 km road and telegraph link from Porto Amelia, 
across the Mueda Plateau, to Moçimboa do Rovuma.
226
 Little additional road construction occurred in 
northern PEA until British-led forces crossed the Ruvuma in pursuit of Lettow-Vorbeck in 1918. The 
British treated construction and improvement of roads in southern GEA as a top priority throughout the 
campaign in 1917. The pursuit of German forces often dictated where and when the Allied forces cut and 
cleared roads. The East African Pioneers worked over twelve hour days, cutting an average of four to five 
miles daily from Mnero to Ruponda, Nachingwea, and Lukuledi in pursuit of the Schutztruppe along the 
Kilwa front.
227
 Three companies of the 61
st
 (King’s George’s Own) Pioneers also cut and corduroyed 
roads from Ruponda to Masasi, and constructed bridges over the Mbemkuru, Mahiwa, and Lukuledi 
rivers.
228
 Technical detachments were not alone in their efforts; rather, African soldiers and carriers 
assigned to fighting units were frequently reassigned to construct and improve roadways as they marched 
through southern GEA.
229
 During the Schutztruppe’s retreat across the Makonde Plateau, all available 
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pioneers, fighting units, and carriers were redeployed for road work on the plateau.
230
 Major R. 
Tomlinson of Linforce reported that “when not engaged with the enemy or on the march the troops were 
at work on the roads upon which an immense amount of labour has been expended.”231   
  
Figure 2.17 Southeastern Portion of “Military Road Map, August 1917”
232
 
 
 In addition to quickly cutting and clearing roads in pursuit of German troops, the Allies’ supply 
needs dictated their infrastructure programs. Unlike their adversary, the Allied forces were too large to 
live off the land.
233
 They needed a transportation network to move imported provisions, ammunitions, and 
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medical supplies to the frontline. To the southwest, South African engineers organized the construction of 
nearly 1,500 miles of motor roads from Madibira to Malangali, Lupembe, Songea, and Tandala by early 
1917 using conscripted labor. Motor vehicle and porters carried forward goods that originated from 
Durban and Cape Town, South Africa.
234
 Along the Kilwa front, the East African Pioneer Company and 
61
st
 (King’s George’s Own) Pioneers constructed hundreds of miles of earth roads for the motor transport 
units advancing to the Lukuledi River.
235
  
 
Figure 2.18 “Bridges built by No.1 section, 2
nd
 Road Corps, and constructed almost without nails or dogs. They 
were so built to take the heaviest loads. Nakin River, on the Kilwa Line. October 1917.”
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of 1916, General Smuts permitted widespread looting of food. According to Paice, the food situation was so 
desperate that Nigerian troops ate roots, corpses of dead animals, bush rat pie, and monkey brains. During the 
southern campaign, the Nigerian Brigade received orders from General Beves that the column was “to live on 
country as far as possible” as they conducted a four days march south to Mahiwa with only one day’s supply of 
rations on hand. It appears that the column did not have to exercise the order as supplies were brought forward 
two days later. When the 1
st
 Service Battalion Nigerian Regiment left Santorium for Mahiwa on 16 October, they 
had a “train of over 3,000 non-combatants” (including prisoners) carrying all supplies, reserve SAA, baggage for the 
whole column, cable, signals, gun ammunition, and stokes guns reserve shells. See BNA WO 95/5325, Nigerian 
Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), 9 October 1917; and Paice, World War I, 301. 
234
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Figure 2.19 “Motor Park, Ndanda, January 1918. All kinds of motor cars were used, but the Ford cars managed to 
get through where no heavier make of car could possibly stand the road for even one journey. In East Africa the 
Ford was nicknamed the "Jigger" after the jigger flea, for, like the insect, it could get anywhere.”
237
 
 
As the Kilwa and Lindi fronts converged at Mtama (along the Lukuledi River) and the Germans 
concentrated their forces on the Makonde Plateau, the Allies redoubled their efforts to maintain and 
improve two essential transportation arteries in the southeast – the Lindi railway and Lindi-Masasi main 
road. Fighting occurred along the entirety of the narrow gauge railway (or tramway) from its railhead at 
Mingoyo (at Lindi Creek) to Mtua. The Germans initially utilized the tramway to evacuate their heavy 
artillery further into the interior.
238
 Once the Allies secured the railhead, they deployed labor to enlarge 
the landing site at Mingoyo, acquire new trolleys, and extend the rail line.
239
 By the end of 1917, the 
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tramline had only been extended 9 km to Mtama.
240
 The Allies were therefore forced to transport the bulk 
of their supplies along the Lindi-Masasi main road. Masasi served as the supply and communication 
center – linking Songea to the west, Lindi to the east, and Newala to the south. As the Germans escaped 
into PEA, all available men worked to improve the main road and construct an extension to Ngomano on 
the Ruvuma River in preparation for an offensive.
241
 By the end of 1917, all troops, provisions, medical 
supplies, and ammunition were shipped from Lindi to Mingoyo, railed to Mtama, caravanned or driven 
approximately 120 miles to the Ruvuma River, and forwarded into PEA by porters and pack donkeys.
242
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Photographs of the Lindi Supply Line 
 (Lindi-Mingoyo-Ndanda-Masasi-Ngomano-Portuguese East Africa) 
 
Figure 2.20 “Drafts of Nigerians for the Nigerian Brigade disembarking at Lindi. December 1917.”
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Figure 2.21 “IWT up Lindi Creek delivering supplies at Mingoyo.”
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Figure 2.22 “Barges and small steamers were brought up to this wharf at Mingoyo, at the top of Lindi Creek, and 
put on the trains; from trains to cars; from cars to porters. Very heavy fighting took place between Mingoyo and 
Ndanda, from June to August 1917.”
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Figure 2.23 “Supply train, Mtama, January 1918.”
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Figure 2.24 “Nigerian troops on the march on Lindi Line.”
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Figure 2.25 “Ford Convoy with ammunition at Moambika (The Loop); Lindi Line GEA, about October 1917.”
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Figure 2.26 “Motor Transport Repairing Shop. One of many placed at various points along the lines of 
communication. Ndanda, January 1918.”
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Figure 2.27 “Portuguese East Africa. Nigerians crossing Rovuma River, two miles from Ngomano, December 
1917. The 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Nigerian Regiments crossed in the first week of December.”
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Figure 2.28 “No. 10 Workshop Unit moving forward on Line of Communication in Portuguese Nyasaland - about 
to trek a small part of their journey through a swamp, transport other than porters being impossible.”
251
 
 
 The new landscape of roads crisscrossing southern GEA largely vanished after the rainy season of 
1918. Most of the roads had been constructed out of necessity rather than for future use. Troops hastily 
cut roads without consideration of proper alignment and drainage. When faced with difficult terrain, the 
Allies typically employed quick-fixes to make the roads passable for the short-term. Technical troops, for 
example, ordered thick bundles of grass to be laid over roads of sandy soils.
252
 The method proved “very 
satisfactory” at binding the soil and allowing for the passage of motor vehicles, howitzers, and field 
batteries. New bundles of grass, however, had to be continually reapplied to prevent deep tire ruts from 
forming.
253
  The technique ultimately required an “enormous” amount of African labour in order to keep 
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the roads passable.
 254
 Large amounts of labor were also expended to corduroy sections of black cotton 
soil found in low-lying areas throughout southeastern GEA. Black cotton soil flooded when the rains set 
in and rendered motor vehicle transport impossible. Considering the amount of manpower and resources 
necessary to construct and maintain roads, it is a small wonder why Allied forces made little or no efforts 
to maintain or improve road surfaces once troops advanced from an area. Poor road conditions, however, 
resulted in frequent vehicle breakdowns and high attrition rates among drivers, both of which undermined 
the Allies’ supply lines.255   
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Figure 2.29 “An RASC Motor Repair Shop, near Lindi. Owing to the nature of the ground to be traversed, the 
percentage of breakdowns was very high.”
256
 
 
 The Allies’ failure to construct a permanent infrastructure network in southern GEA ultimately 
hampered their efforts to conduct a large offensive across the Ruvuma River during the spring of 1918 
and bring the war to an end. Major Tomlinson at Linforce headquarters explained that an offensive 
required large supply reserves to be accumulated at the forward stations along the Ruvuma. Such a 
buildup had not happened before the rains; rather, all troops stationed from Ndanda to the border were on 
half rations.
257
 Officials blamed the dire supply situation on the railway, which proved incapable of 
meeting “the excessive demands made upon it.”258 Bad weather, defective roads, petrol shortages, and a 
temporary shortage of motor cars and drivers also prevented the accumulation of supplies at forward 
positions. In order to feed the Allied forces at Tunduru and along the Ruvuma without food reserves, the 
Allies would need to transport 330,000 pounds daily – or a total of 660 cars. The roads could not sustain 
such heavy vehicle traffic in the rains, and pack animals died far too rapidly from trypanosomiasis and 
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other diseases. The only option left was porterage. In order for the Ruvuma River force to attain the 
required 51,000 lbs. of food daily, an estimated 30,000 porters were needed to transport supplies from 
Mingoyo to the Ruvuma.
259
 An addition 75,000 carriers were required for the advance through northern 
PEA.
260
 Tomlinson concluded that such a scheme was impossible “owing to the heavy consumption of 
food by porters: the greater the distance to be traversed the less amount of food can be carried forward to 
the operating troops as the requirements of the porters along the whole route have to be met.”261 The 
overland offensive was cancelled and most of the Allied forces were either shipped south to Porto Amelia 
or back home to India, South Africa, and West Africa.
262
 As the war shifted south through central PEA, 
the Allies retained a minimal force in southern GEA. The remaining East African Pioneers were tasked 
with maintaining and improving the main road from Lindi to Songea during the wet season of 1918 
(January to April): widening, corduroying, metaling small stretches, improving drainage, and erecting 
numerous bridges and culverts.
263
 When the rains subsided in June 1918, No. 2 Company spent two 
weeks repairing the road and bridges from Ngomano to Lindi.
264
 The same company then spent the 
entirety of August, September, and October improving the main road from Tunduru.
265
 Across the 
Ruvuma border, Allied forces also extended the motor road from Medo to Nampula to permit the 
transport of troops and supplies by vehicles (rather than ships) to the Moçambique front.
266
 None of these 
roads were made of permanent bituminous materials and most became impassable with the next year’s 
rains.  
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Figure 2.30 “All bridges were constructed with very few nails, dogs, etc. Supports were fixed in a position by the 
weight that was laid on afterwards. Near Ndanda. January 1918. Second Road Corps.”
267
 
 
Legacy of the War and Conclusion 
 
 The First World War in the Ruvuma borderland was a time of construction and destruction, with 
the balance weighing overwhelmingly in favor of the latter. The Allies constructed hundreds of miles of 
infrastructure throughout southern GEA and northern PEA from 1917 to 1918.  Thousands of European, 
Indian, and African troops and carriers worked unknown hours constructing networks of roads that 
connected the major coastal ports to one another, the interior, and across the Ruvuma border. In theory, 
the British administration that took authority over GEA (thereafter Tanganyika) should have had easy 
access to all the major centers in the south. In reality, the Allies constructed the transportation 
infrastructure haphazardly and according to short-term, military needs rather than economically-based, 
development visions for the borderland. Whereas German settlers and District Officers prior to the war 
designed and built roads and railways to improve administrative efficiency and advance commercial ties 
between the interior and coast, the Allies cut and cleared roads with the sole objective of more efficiently 
moving troops and supplies in pursuit of German forces. Without continual maintenance from a large 
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labor force, the roads rapidly deteriorated into broad paths that were somewhat graded and cleared of 
bush. The poorly constructed culverts and timber bridges washed away with the rains.  
 
Figure 2.31 “Bridge and road made by 2
nd
 Road Corps, near Ndanda. December 1917.”
268
 
 
 The destruction and dilapidation of the roadways echoed the general devastation and massive loss 
of life that occurred in the Ruvuma borderland. The fertile Lukuledi River Valley experienced four 
months of almost continuous fighting and heavy artillery bombardments. The Makonde Plateau suffered 
from punitive German raids and scorched earth tactics. To the west, German forces raided the area from 
Songea to Mwembe (along the Lugenda Valley in northern PEA) at least four times by the end of the war. 
When the Germans returned through the area in September 1918, there was practically nothing left to 
plunder.
269
 The forcible conscription of the male population as carriers for both armies prevented the 
sowing of crops throughout the borderland.
270
 The prevalence of troops, armed conflict, and forced 
conscription hindered the mobility of local communities, thus depriving them of an integral and centuries-
old strategy of survival. An untold number of people died of starvation and thousands succumbed to 
diseases, including the Spanish influenza pandemic, which killed an estimated 50,000-80,000 people in 
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Tanganyika between 1918 and 1920.
271
 A report from Masasi declared that “every hut possessed its 
sufferers.”272 Impoverishment defined the Ruvuma borderland, as people wore bark cloth and refugees 
overwhelmed Lindi town and its vicinities.
273
  
 The war ultimately shattered European ambitions of creating a thriving agricultural landscape in 
the Ruvuma borderland and instead solidified the region’s peripheralization within Tanganyika and PEA, 
the British and Portuguese Empires, and international markets. The Ruvuma borderland was no longer a 
central point of long-distance trade networks, nor was it considered a land of agricultural promise for 
European settlers. Wartime experiences instead propagated perceptions that the borderland was an 
unhealthy, unprofitable, and unstable region. There were seemingly no financial incentives for the British 
and Portuguese to invest in the borderland, so they neglected it during the interwar era of the 1920s and 
1930s. The region’s inadequate transportation infrastructure became a symptom, justification, and symbol 
for its economic peripheralization and physical isolation. The roads also served as a vivid reminder of the 
brutality of colonial rule, especially for those who were forced to construct them, carry goods across 
them, and/or march as soldiers along them. The socioeconomic and political instability found throughout 
the Ruvuma borderland after the war, however, bred opportunity for local leaders and economic 
entrepreneurs who were willing to exploit the weaknesses of the colonial states on both sides of the 
border for their own advantage. The ability to move and adapt remained the keys to survival and 
prosperity in the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era, as it had for centuries before. 
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Chapter 3 
Governing a Lonely Station: The Interwar Era in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1945) 
 
 When the British Empire took responsibility for the newly Mandated Territory of Tanganyika 
following the First World War, it constituted the “largest, most populous, and most varied territory” under 
British authority in East Africa.
1
 Encompassing an area a third the size of British India, Tanganyika had 
an estimated population of 2,447 Europeans, 15,000 Asians, and over four million Africans in 1921.
2
  
 
Figure 3.1 Edward Humphrey Manisty Leggett, “Sketch Map of the Tanganyika Territory,” 1922.
3
 
 
The new administration struggled to revitalize the territory, which had been devastated by scorched earth 
tactics, modern weaponry, forced conscription, famine, starvation, and disease during the war. Postwar 
instability was particularly intense in the war-torn Ruvuma borderland of southern Tanganyika and 
northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA). With a limited budget and personnel, the British central 
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administration in Dar es Salaam invested in regions that seemed to promise the quickest and most 
profitable returns, specifically the cash crop producing regions along the Central and Tanga Railways. 
Southern Tanganyika, in contrast, lacked high value crops and had an infrastructure of deteriorating, ill-
designed dirt roads. As a result, the colonial state in Dar es Salaam and London neglected the region 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. They only looked to the peripheral borderland when it became 
embroiled in international disputes with the Portuguese and Nyassa Company across the border or internal 
scandals as during the Tunduru famine incident in 1930/31. Officers stationed to southern Tanganyika, 
however, saw economic potential in the region and hoped that the “Cinderella province may yet achieve 
her destiny and arouse the envy of her ugly sisters.”4 Similar to their German predecessors, the southern 
provincial administration envisioned a landscape of concentrated African settlements engaged in cash and 
food crop cultivation and export. Rural communities would be integrated into the colonial state and 
economy through a network of intra- and interregional roads. Throughout the interwar era, road 
construction and transportation rested at the heart of colonial development plans for the Southern 
Province. British officers specifically targeted the Lindi-Songea main road as the transportation artery 
through which they would transform the Southern Province from an isolated, unprofitable borderland to 
one of the most lucrative exporting regions of agricultural produce and migrant laborers in the Territory.  
 Inadequate funds, equipment, technical staff, and laborers undermined these hopes for southern 
Tanganyika during the interwar era. In the wake of the Great Depression, the colonial state was forced to 
turn to the private sector for assistance with its infrastructure plans. Private road construction and 
maintenance contractors failed to improve the main road to an all-weather standard, yet their efforts 
helped to stimulate a growing motor vehicle transportation sector in the south. Indian wholesalers and 
merchants took advantage of the speed and flexibility that automobiles offered to reestablish and expand 
their trade networks between the coast, interior towns, and rural communities. African producers and 
migrant laborers, meanwhile, appropriated motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within 
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and beyond the Ruvuma borderland region. The interwar years marked southern Tanganyika’s growing 
impoverishment and isolation for the larger Territory, British Empire, and global markets, yet it was also 
a time of opportunity for local communities, traders, and private firms, who exploited a new mode of 
mobility to their advantage.   
Postwar Instability in the Borderland – Northern Portuguese East Africa in the 1920s 
 
 Local communities residing in the Ruvuma borderland depended upon their mobility to navigate 
the instability that defined the region in the aftermath of the First World War. While populations on both 
sides of the Ruvuma contended with the effects of wartime devastation (destruction of homes and land, 
population displacement, political upheavals, and mass loss of life), populations living in northern 
Portuguese East Africa (PEA) encountered increasingly violent and exploitative colonial rule under the 
Nyassa Company.
5
 British officers first reported cases of Portuguese “atrocities” and the “wholesale 
murder of hapless natives” by Portuguese district officers and their African askari (soldiers) during the 
war in 1917.
6
 While stationed along the Ruvuma border, Captain Burke (South African Special Service 
Company) was approached several times by chiefs who asked permission to relocate their people into the 
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British territory. These chiefs explained that African police entered villages, raped and abducted the 
women, and confiscated anything they wanted.
7
 If anyone resisted or a policeman was injured, the 
Portuguese would hunt the guilty parties “like wild beasts.”8 The British Administrative Political Officer 
in Lindi – Sd. G.St.J. Orde-Browne – collected statements by refugees who witnessed and/or partook in 
similar atrocities after the war in northern PEA. A former policeman, Musa bin Ahmadi of Kionga, 
claimed that anyone who refused to pay taxes was captured and sent to the Portuguese boma (district 
headquarters or fort).
9
 Once at the station, the tax defaulter was flogged with a hide whip or had their 
hands beaten with a baramatola.
10
 While women suffered the same punishment as men, European officers 
and African police detained those that they considered attractive as long “as they are found pleasing.”11 
Jumbe Mperembe bin Nambiu contended that the violence was not only conducted at the Portuguese 
bomas.
12
 He accused askari of brutally beating and murdering his brother in their village on the pretext 
that he failed to pay taxes. Jumbe Mperembe estimated that the askari killed 160 of his people by 
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bayonets, rifle butts, or axes. The treatment towards women was “worse than the men.” They were 
reportedly abducted, raped, mutilated, impaled, and/or burned to death.
13
  
 One explanation offered for the violence and extortion occurring in northern PEA was that the 
askari and police were underpaid. According to Musa bin Ahmadi, an ordinary policeman in northern 
PEA earned 7/25 Rps. per month of which two were automatically deducted for uniform payments. Musa 
bin Ahmadi contended that the wages were “not nearly enough for a man to live on, and to buy clothes for 
his wife: so we all relied on money paid by people who were arrested: and many policemen used to steal 
food or other things from the country people: it was the only way in which we could live.”14 The 
existence of independent communities of ex-soldiers and deserters in northern PEA added to the region’s 
instability. These men allegedly lived “a freelance existence in a series of miniature native republics.”15 
The ex-soldiers were welcomed by locals because their rifles provided meat and protection against 
Portuguese exploitation. The askari and police sent to collect taxes often found themselves in a dangerous 
position. They could be attacked by locals for collecting taxes and/or beaten by district officers for failing 
to bring back enough money.
16
 Discarded ammunitions and arms from the East African campaign, easily 
found throughout northern PEA, fueled the violence.
17
 While some communities fought against the abuses 
of Nyassa Company rule, many migrated into southern Tanganyika. Nyassa Company officers and police 
responded by pursuing the migrants across the border and conducting raids in Tanganyika. Orde-Browne 
and the Assistant Political Officer of Masasi investigated the raids and concluded that the Portuguese 
forces, 
[…] endeavour to catch all parties making for the Rovuma, directing their efforts at the women in 
particular, in accordance with their custom; and if a party succeeds in getting over the border, 
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there is of course a great tendency for the pursuers to follow up. They then try to collect people 
on our side of the boundary, and carry on their usual food raids, with, naturally, serious results.
18
 
 
British-Portuguese tensions escalated as the Portuguese detained Tanganyika residents who attended to 
their farms in northern PEA, especially in the Kionga District (at the mouth of the Ruvuma River). Prior 
to the war, several Arab and Swahili men owned farms and plantations south of the Ruvuma while living 
on the north bank. After the war, the Portuguese introduced regulations forcing every property owner to 
live on his land. Those men who continued to crisscross the border were liable to lose their fields and 
incur “various penalties even indefinite periods in jail in default of payment of exorbitant fines.”19 The 
handful of British officers stationed in the south feared that if armed Portuguese incursions and 
unwarranted detentions continued, local populaces in Tanganyika would retaliate, causing further disorder 
in the borderland and a potential international incident between England and Portugal.
20 
 The British administration in Dar es Salaam responded to the growing crisis by ordering Orde-
Browne to take “whatever steps he considers expedient to protect the natives of his district from attacks of 
this nature and to resist, if necessary by force, any further incursions of armed parties in his district.”21 
The British government in London, meanwhile, pressured the Portuguese government to conduct a formal 
investigation into the alleged atrocities, dispense punishments, and implement measures to stop future 
violence in the Nyassa concession.
22
 When the Portuguese were slow to respond, the British threatened to 
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make the allegations public in the House of Commons and use the reports against the Portuguese at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Earl Curzon of Kedlestone warned the Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires in April 
1919: 
These atrocities, I said, were of so hideous a character that, if they were published and made the 
subject of a debate in the House of Commons, people would almost wonder whether such 
incidents were not too high a price to pay for the Portuguese Alliance; and should they come, as 
was not impossible, before the Peace Conference in Paris, the account of them might react most 
unfavourably upon the claims of Portugal to retain her share in the administration of African 
territories and populations.
23
 
 
The Portuguese government responded the following month by appointing the Judge of the Court of 
Appeal in Lisbon (Monsieur Dr. Botelho da Costa) to preside over an official inquiry.
24
 The Portuguese, 
however, allegedly utilized the inquiry to build a defense for the Portuguese officers and collect damning 
evidence against British forces during the war.
25
 The British quietly dropped the matter after reams of 
Colonial Office reports regarding the atrocities and the names of the offenders went missing.
26
 The British 
government, thereafter, directed its petitions to the new English firm controlling the Nyassa concession.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the British government seized the controlling shares of Nyassa 
Company’s parent firm, Nyassa Consolidated Ltd., from a group of Germans during the war.27 The British 
government convinced Lord Kylsant (Sir Owen C. Philipps) of Union Castle Mail Steamship Company to 
purchase 52% of the company’s share capital from the Receiver of Enemy Properties Department.28 When 
allegations of abuses by Nyassa Company officials publicly resurfaced in the House of Commons in 
1922, the Foreign Office was unwilling to make representations to the Portuguese government since there 
was “no locus standi” for such “unwarrantable interference.”29 The Foreign Office instead pressed Lord 
Kylsant to exert his influence to ensure the guilty were punished and steps were taken to prevent future 
abuses. Lord Kylsant’s response did little to instill confidence that such measures would occur: 
The matter was brought before the Board of the Nyassa Consolidated, Limited, on 29
th
 May, 
when it was decided to ask the London Board of the Companhia do Nyassa to make strong 
representations to the Lisbon Board and to request that the culprit be discharged from the service 
of the Company and rigorously prosecuted.
30
 
 
 With no oversight and intervention from the Portuguese or British governments, the old abuses of 
the Nyassa Company continued with impunity throughout the 1920s.
31
 The British Consulate-General in 
PEA, Joseph Pyke, reported in 1926 that the “further north one travels within the limits of Portuguese 
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East Africa, the worse and the harsher is the treatment accorded to the native.”32 Forced labor practices 
continued, while tax rates rose annually, increasingly from two Escudos in 1921 to 85 Escudos in 1928.
33
  
Company officers and police continued to detain and violate large numbers of women (both at their 
homes and when under arrest).
34
 The company owners, meanwhile, hardly invested in the territory’s 
economic, transportation, education, or health infrastructure. Only three hospitals existed in the whole 
concession, and the one in Ibo was in a rented house. Porto Amelia’s port facilities were poorly installed 
and “extremely deficient.”35 The roads constructed during the war were not maintained and there was still 
no railway.
36
 When Joseph Pyke visited Porto Amelia in 1930, he reported: 
Words fail me to express the absolute lack of any work done during the thirty-five years of the 
Company’s life, and I can only quote you the statement of Mr. Vice Consul Allford made to him 
by Robertson Gibb when he called there in 1929: ‘Is this all that has been done? For goodness 
sake put me back on board the steamer – it might go without me.’37 
 
During the same year, the Government Council of the Colony of Mozambique offered the following 
assessment of the Nyassa Company’s failures: 
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The few roads which exist are bad and made with the least possible cost, all of them having been 
made by means of native labour – forced and gratuitous labour. The only telegraph line which 
exists is mounted on wooden posts, sometimes on trees, so that it is continuously damaged and 
interrupted. Improvements in the ports do not exist. Nor are there any lighthouses. Native relief is 
absolutely unknown in the territories.
38
 
 
Nyassa Company and its parent company refused to invest funds until the Portuguese government agreed 
to a thirty year extension of their concession. The Portuguese originally offered to extend the charter if the 
Company gave up its administrative powers. Lord Kylsant refused the terms and pressured the British 
government to aid him in forcing the Portuguese to come to a more favorable arrangement. The Colonial 
and Foreign Offices assisted Lord Kyslant’s campaign out of a sense of obligation to him and anxiety that 
he might sell controlling interests to a German firm.
39
 When the Portuguese chose to cancel the 
concession in 1928, the British government prepared to take the Portuguese government to arbitration 
before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.
40
 The trial never happened and the 
Portuguese government assumed authority over northern PEA.
41
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 Nyassa Company, its investors, and employees focused on short-term profits and exploited 
readily available resources. Exploitative plantations, isolated bomas, poorly maintained roads, and 
vacated African villages and shambas defined much of the northern PEA landscape. Southern 
Tanganyika, in comparison, seemingly offered a more stable and potentially profitable landscape in the 
interwar era. The existence of centuries-old trade and familial networks that unified the Ruvuma 
borderland made Tanganyika particularly attractive to migrants. Edward Alpers explained that “when 
individuals and household units in northern Mozambique were faced with what they perceived to be 
excessive exactions, they had available to them a familiar option which represented something more 
positive than a desperate leap into the unknown.”42 An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 migrants crossed the 
unregulated and porous Ruvuma border into southern Tanganyika annually in the early 1920s.
43
 These 
individuals and families were not simply fleeing Portuguese oppression, but also choosing to relocate “as 
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substitute an appeal to diplomacy and to the assistance of another Government for recourse to the Courts.” See 
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a preferred strategy for survival under colonial domination.”44 The Tanganyika government permitted the 
peaceful settlement of immigrants, but refused to offer active assistance in border crossings or “sanction 
official reception of women and children refugees.”45 In reality, the officers in southern Tanganyika 
exerted no control over the trans-Ruvuma migrations. The migrants instead encountered an ill-equipped 
and undermanned British administration hardly more efficient than its Portuguese counterpart.  
British Rule in Southern Tanganyika – 1920s  
 
 Tanganyika’s administrative structure underwent significant alterations in the mid-1920s in 
accordance with changing British attitudes towards colonial rule. Prior to the First World War, the basic 
objectives of British imperialism were the creation of self-sufficient colonies and the preservation of law 
and order. There was no effort at uniformity and little coordination between the Colonial Office’s 
geographically-structured departments. Each colonial governor could introduce political and 
administrative measures without the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
46
 In the 
immediate aftermath of the war, the first Governor of Tanganyika (Sir Horace Archer Byatt) decided to 
retain the German’s administrative structure and its twenty-two administrative districts. The 
administration consisted of a Governor, Administrative Political Officers, and local African leaders. Each 
Administrative Political Officer exerted executive and judicial authority over a district, while one or two 
European assistants presided over sub-districts.
47
 Local governance fell under the authority of akidas – 
African leaders who had been appointed by the Germans. The unprecedented physical destruction and 
loss of life that occurred during the First World War, however, forced Europeans to question “the 
previously undaunted faith in human reason, progress, and improvement” that supposedly defined 
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Western civilization.
48
 International critics demanded more accountability from imperial governments and 
increased protection of indigenous populations from colonial exploitation.
49
 As anticolonial sentiments 
mounted, Frederick Lugard advocated a new theory of colonial governance – indirect rule. The system 
called for colonial governments to employ “traditional” African leaders to govern Native 
Administrations.
50
 John Iliffe explained that each Native Administration consisted of, 
[…] a native authority – chief, council, or some combination of these – with legislative and 
executive powers; native courts; and a native treasury, which collected all taxes, remitting a 
percentage to central government and retaining the rest to pay the native authority and finance 
local works and services.
51
  
 
The administrations were organized according to tribal identities. According to Iliffe, the British 
mistakenly “believed that every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European belonged to a 
nation.”52 British officers oversaw the administrations and instructed a new class of African elites about 
their duties and responsibilities. Penelope Hetherington argued that the British maintained a paternalistic 
belief that Europeans possessed the superior intellect needed to “civilize” and educate “primitive” 
Africans, who were still at the earliest stages of the development process according to contemporary 
social evolutionary theories.
53
 Lugard believed that indirect rule would encourage the gradual 
incorporation of western ideologies and practices into African societies without causing social, cultural, 
and political instability.
54
  
 Sir Donald Cameron – a trusted lieutenant of Lugard in Northern Nigeria – introduced indirect 
rule to Tanganyika in 1925.
55
 He reorganized the twenty-two administrative units into a provincial 
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administrative system that sought to bring the Territory under stricter supervision and control.
56
 Southern 
Tanganyika was divided into Lindi and Mahenge Provinces in 1926.
 
Lindi Province initially comprised 
the districts of Lindi (Newala and Mikindani sub-districts), Masasi (Masasi and Tunduru sub-districts), 
and Kilwa (Kibata and Liwale sub-districts). The composition of the provinces and districts underwent 
numerous changes during the next six years, including the incorporation of Songea District in 1932.
 57
 
Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching spearheaded the renaming of Lindi Province as the Southern 
Province in 1933. Just as companies today change a product’s name to more accurately describe the item 
and/or invigorate public interest, Kitching believed Lindi Province needed a name change that more 
accurately represented its geographic parameters, while discarding any negative associations with the 
region: “The Province suffers from its name and a letter will reach you shortly recommending that the 
title should be altered to ‘Southern Province’. An alteration is long overdue and a sound case has been put 
up.”58 Seven administrative districts comprised the Southern Province during the remainder of the 
interwar era: Kilwa, Liwale, Lindi, Mikindani, Newala, Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea. A Provincial 
Commissioner (PC) oversaw the province and the subordinate District Commissioners (DC) and District 
Officers (DO), who supervised the districts and Native Administrations.  
 British officers stationed in southern Tanganyika after the war attempted to alleviate famine 
conditions, revitalize foodstuff production, stabilize labor conditions, and establish law and order under 
Native Administrations. The last objective – the creation a new political landscape of Native Authorities 
based upon tribal identities – presented a host of problems due to the proliferation of ethnically-mixed 
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communities. J. Gus Liebenow argued that colonial officers often failed “to comprehend the nature of the 
political (and other) relationships that they [were] attempting to preserve (under Indirect Rule)”.59 
Without proper anthropological training and/or experience in the region, Provincial Commissioner A.M. 
Turnball and his officers conducted short surveys of “traditional” systems, promoted whoever appeared to 
be the most prominent local leader, and created tribal organizations where none existed.
60
 When it came 
to the Wamakonde, the British typically elevated the leader of a chirambo – the mkulungwa – as a 
headman or chief. The British then empowered the leaders with executive and judicial authority over local 
communities, including the rights to fine, imprison, and force disobedient and law-breaking individuals to 
work on communal projects as punishment.
61
 With the leaders selected, the British then reorganized the 
vague borders of the virambo to ensure that every community was subject to the jurisdiction of a Native 
Authority.
62
 The British hoped that within these boundaries, the local population could be counted, their 
movements monitored and controlled, and more taxes collected.
63
 Some African leaders recognized that 
the Native Authority system offered a new avenue to political authority and economic privilege and 
actively assisted the British in the creation of new political and social units.
64
 The appointed leaders, 
however, often struggled to negotiate their intermediary position between the colonial state and local 
communities. In the case of the Wamakonde, the British failed to recognize that the mkulungwa was,  
[…] merely one of the significant political actors within his chirambo and that his role was 
narrowly circumscribed by the authority of the elders who represented their respective litawas 
[kinship group]; by the operation of the vituperative alliances, or utani relationships; by the 
informal bonds created during the puberty rights; and by other forces within his society.
65
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Abuses of power added to tensions between headmen and local communities, who already questioned or 
resented their authority. Such tensions forced the British to abandon the system in the late 1930s and 
1940s.
66
  
 As British officers struggled to monitor the Native Administrations in southern Tanganyika, a 
myriad of other responsibilities overwhelmed them. Liebenow described the physical and mental 
exhaustion British officers routinely experienced:  
A district commissioner had to be, at one extreme, the supreme legislator, executive, and judge 
for over a hundred thousand charges, while at the same time he would have to descend to the 
menial tasks of selling postage stamps, exchanging rat-eaten shilling notes for new ones, and 
instructing Makonde in the art of digging latrines.
67
 
 
In most instances, one European oversaw an entire district stretching hundreds of miles. L.A.W. Vickers-
Haviland, for instance, was the only European officer stationed in the sub-district of Mikindani from 1922 
to 1924. He exerted minimal authority over the district’s export economy, which remained in the hands of 
the Indian commercial community. The Indians’ economic power in Mikindani was made apparent in 
April-May 1923 when they closed their shops as part of a territorial-wide protest against new Trade 
Licensing Laws.
68
 Trade in Mikindani came to a standstill until the protest ended. Despite the disturbance, 
Vickers-Haviland concluded that “no Community could be more loyal and helpful in every way than the 
Indians of Mikindani.”69 Trade revenues rose rapidly through the efforts of the Indian community and the 
introduction of regular monthly steamship services by the British India Steam Navigation Co.
70
 Vickers-
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Haviland also lacked the  power to rectify deteriorating labor relations on the district’s coastal plantations. 
In 1922, Mikindani estates employed 3,000 African laborers. By the next year, locals communities had 
“definitely tabooed the plantations altogether, a few only working as mechanics & clerks.”71 As a result, 
estates recruited laborers from Tunduru, Songea, and PEA. Complaints, however, filled the boma 
regarding labor desertions and “nonfulfillment of contract.”72 Contract-breaches were prosecuted under 
the Master and Servants Ordinance, but the fines issued were useless.
73
 Vickers-Haviland also exerted 
little authority over the Native Administrations in the interior. The lack of roads and assistant officers 
(save two Indian clerks) constrained his mobility almost exclusively to Mikindani town and port. The 
problems that Vickers-Haviland experienced – inadequate staff and funds, unsupervised rural 
administrators, and poor labor relations – grew worse the further one travelled into the interior of the 
Southern Province.   
 The southern administration was not only undermanned, but also unstable and inexperienced. 
Officers frequently rotated in and out of the province during the interwar era. Provincial Commissioner 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
credited the fall to the “laziness” of the Wamakonde, who “only search for the product in times of hardship and 
food shortage.” Since there was no food shortage in 1924, there was no incentive to collect copal. 
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C.H. Grierson complained to the Chief Secretary that it was impossible “to carry on the administration of 
the Province when I cannot know from one moment to another, what staff I am to have.”74 Provincial 
Commissioners also complained about the number of young and inexperienced Assistant District Officers 
and cadets assigned to the southern administration.
75
 Cadets were typically men in their twenties with 
degrees from Oxford or Cambridge in fields such as history, archeology, anthropology, and botany.
76
 
They arrived in Dar es Salaam after attending a year-long Colonial Service Course.
77
 The cadets assigned 
to the Southern Province often lacked the training or knowledge to fulfill the responsibilities of their new 
posts. For example, the young surgeon assigned as Lindi’s Native Sanitary Inspections Officer in 1929 
had “neither knowledge of nor training in health work which he detests.”78 Richard Buswell Allnutt’s first 
                                                          
74
 BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 8 September 1931.  
75
 BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 30 September 1930. 
76
 BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738, Sukumaland. The University of Oxford interviewed many former colonial officers who 
participated in the major agricultural scheme conducted in Sukumaland, Tanganyika, in the 1940s. The records 
offer valuable insights into the reasons and means by which young men entered the Colonial Service in Tanganyika 
during the Depression Era. Many of the cadets – including H.S. Senior, John Edward Seaton Griffiths, Hugh Francis 
Ivo Elliot, and Geoffrey William Young Hucks – were born and/or raised overseas in families with parents and/or 
relatives involved in missionary or colonial services. For example, H.S. Senior was born in Ceylon in February 1908. 
His father was a teacher in the Holy Orders and his mother’s father was the first Anglican Bishop of Japan. Senior 
credited his entrance to the Colonial Service in 1930 to his History degree and participation as a cricketer for the 
Oxford University Authentics. John Edward Seaton Griffiths was born in South Africa and his uncle worked in the 
agricultural department in Kenya. After majoring in law and social anthropology, Griffiths joined the South African 
Native Affairs Department. His uncle’s work and his own experiences in South Africa gave him “a taste for ‘native 
affairs’ work in, preferably, East Africa.” After speaking with a Provincial Commissioner on holiday in Cape Town, 
Griffiths attended the yearlong Colonial Service Course at Selwyn College, Cambridge, in 1930. He recalled that 
most of the cadets attending the course spent their downtime boxing or playing rugby. Hugh Francis Ivo Elliot was 
born in India in 1913. His father was employed in the Indian Civil Service and his mother was the daughter of a 
retired China tea merchant. His paternal grandfather was the Secretary to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
After receiving 2
nd
 class honors in “‘Mods’ and ‘Greats’” from University College Oxford in 1936, Elliot joined the 
colonial service: “In keeping with the family Civil Service tradition and on the advice of the University Careers 
Office, I then obtain a place on the Devonshire Colonial Service Course at Oxford.” Geoffrey William Young Hucks 
decided to enter the colonial service after speaking with an Administrative Officer on leave from Uganda: “when 
he came on leave and told tales of the sort of life he led I became keen on following in his footstep.” He earned 
dual degrees in archeology and anthropology in 1928, attended the Colonial Service Course at Cambridge, and 
headed to Tanganyika. 
77
 BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 358-363, J. Ford, Tanganyika Diaries, “Diary 1923: October 6 – January 15, 1924.” Steamships, 
such as the “Nevasa,” typically unloaded passengers, mail, and cargo at Port Said, Port Sudan, Aden, Kilinidini 
(Kenya), and Zanzibar before arriving in Dar es Salaam. Upon arrival, each cadet was posted in a district for training 
and experience under a two year probationary period. A cadet was promoted to Assistant District Officer if his 
performance was satisfactory and he passed higher tests in Swahili and the territory’s criminal code. For copies of 
tests from the 1920s, see BLCAS Mss. Afr. s. 1047, Vickers-Haviland. 
78
 BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1929. The surgeon’s superior officer allegedly ordered him 
to Lindi to “do nothing.” Mitchell contravened the order and instructed him to protect the water supply from 
162 
 
assignment as a cadet in 1930 was to serve as the agricultural officer over three massive districts – 
Masasi, Newala, and Tunduru. His specialized training in cattle breeding and pasture management was 
largely wasted in the tsetse-ridden districts.
79
 Superior officers tended to distrust the capabilities of young 
officers to operate in isolated posts. Provincial Commissioners Hallier and Grierson, for example, 
questioned whether the young District Officer of Tunduru, G.D. Popplewell, could handle the 
responsibilities of the one-main station, located 215 miles from the provincial headquarters and 120 miles 
from the nearest telegraph line.
80
 Grierson wanted District Officer Troup reassigned from Liwale, arguing 
that “a more experienced officer is desirable for an outstation so far away from the coast, and cut off 
during the rains.”81 More experienced officers, however, were not necessarily an improvement on their 
younger colleagues.
82
 In 1930, Grierson severely criticized the officers holding senior posts:  
This Province has been hardly treated in the way of staff. I have had two persons of whom the 
least one can say is that they were unbalanced; two of who either cannot get on with their juniors 
or allow them to be demoralised, and one whose mental capacity did not equal the requirements 
of his post, all holding senior posts, save one.
83
 
 
Secretary of Native Affairs – Philip E. Mitchell – similarly expressed reservations about the capabilities 
of the southern administration. While he praised some for their energy, wit, and effectiveness, he 
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privately censured others as “stupid and unhelpful,” a scared “invertebrate,” or “a useless sort of 
creature.”84  
 The lack of all-weather roads in southern Tanganyika represented the main impediment to 
administrative efficiency and coordination between British officers, local headmen, and the central 
administration in Dar es Salaam. The Lindi-Songea main road remained the only major thoroughfare in 
the south, but it was still plagued by sandy soils and black cotton patches. The road annually closed for 
five to six months during the rains which swept away bridges and washed out or silted up side drains, 
causing the road to become a water course. Travel during the dry season was little better. Secretary 
Mitchell experienced first-hand the dilapidated conditions of the southern roads while conducting a 
month-long tour of the province in August 1929.
85
 The stretch from Songea to Tunduru took two days and 
deteriorated until it became “really appalling.”86 The next stretch from Tunduru to Masasi (121 miles) 
vacillated from “quiet good, & then appalling bad, & then just mediocre but from neglect is just falling to 
bits.” Mitchell diverted from the main road to Newala and the Makonde Plateau. The excellent plateau 
road worsened as it approached Mikindani on the coast.
87
 The “last 30 miles [were] perfectly appalling.”88 
The coastal road from Mikindani to Lindi was hardly an improvement. Mitchell’s convoy travelled 
relatively quickly from Lindi to Masasi, Ruponda, Liwale, and Kilwa despite the poor quality of the 
roads. The seven hour and forty minute drive from Liwale to Kilwa (155 miles) was considered “very 
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good and the record.”89 Mitchell also criticized of the infrequent coastal steamship traffic offered in the 
south.
90
 Without steamship services or an all-weather road to Dar es Salaam, the province was cut off 
from the economic and political center of the territory for at least five months each year.
91
 
 The lack of transportation infrastructure not only undermined government efficiency, but it also 
facilitated lawlessness in the borderland region. Some of the white civilians who remained in southern 
Tanganyika after the war, such as “Dynamite Dan” Eldridge, took advantage of the lack of authority 
exercised on both sides of the border for their advantage. Former District Officer H.C. Baxter (“Bones”) 
recalled that “Dynamite Dan” and a group of nine bachelors met in Dar es Salaam after the armistice. 
They shared a mutual urge to remain in the territory and became elephant hunters.
92
 All the men 
participated in the southern campaign and knew that the Ruvuma River was excellent elephant country. 
They took up residence on an island in the western section of the river, well aware that neither Portugal 
nor Britain exerted clear sovereignty over the islands.
93
 The group proceeded to purchase one hunting 
license from PEA. The license was much cheaper than those offered in Tanganyika and it allowed the 
holder to kill an unlimited number of elephants, regardless of size, tusk, or sex.
94
 All nine men used the 
same license to shoot elephants on both sides of the river. In order to avoid suspicion from Portuguese 
officers, the poachers legally exported a small portion of the ivory through PEA ports once a year. Porters 
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acquired locally and from PEA smuggled the rest of the ivory to the coast and Zanzibar four times a year. 
Since the British staff was “infinitesimal” and there were few roadways to or along the river, the poachers 
were safeguarded from government interference and prosecution. The poachers prospered for seven years 
before Baxter became the District Commissioner of Songea in 1931. He only learned of the group’s 
existence by accident from a subordinate District Officer.
95
 He then concocted and implemented a clever 
scheme to capture the men’s September consignment of 1,000 lbs. of ivory. The gang pled guilty, paid the 
fine, and disbanded. Baxter noted that ironically two of the men became Inspectors of Police and two 
were employed as Elephant Control Officers in the Game Department.
96
 Underfunded and undermanned, 
the British officers of the Southern Province could not regulate the movement of peoples and trade across 
the Ruvuma border let alone within their assigned districts and sub-districts.  
Colonial Development and the Neglected Southern Province 
 If the southern administration wanted to improve government coordination and tighten its 
authority over southern Tanganyika and the Ruvuma border, it needed to improve the regional road 
networks. Calls for improved transportation infrastructure, however, were being heard throughout the 
British Empire in the 1920s. Colonial states and capitalist investors saw railways, in particular, as 
essential tools to access and profit from the untapped wealth of the British Empire. In 1924, the new 
Colonial Secretary – Leopold Amery – advocated Joseph Chamberlain’s “development” philosophy of 
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“Constructive Imperialism.” Both men perceived Britain’s tropical dependencies as “great ‘undeveloped 
estates’” that the British government “had a moral responsibility” to improve through increased 
agricultural production, infrastructure, and disease control.
97
 They expected increased production in the 
dependencies to open new markets and stimulate British industry and trade.
98
 A new group of colonial 
reformers tempered this “Chamberlainite” enthusiasm. They argued that the colonial governments were 
first-and-foremost “trustees,” that needed to prioritize African health, sanitation, education, and rural 
welfare over material exploitation and profits.
99
 Material “development” could only occur once the health 
and social issues of a colony were rectified. A growing body of scientific experts conducted field research 
into the “human side” of development in the colonies during the 1920s; examining issues of rural health 
care, disease control and sanitation, labor utilization, education, and peasant agricultural.
100
 Most colonial 
governments, however, remained “preoccupied with turning these territories into vibrant producers of 
agricultural commodities and natural resources for the global export market.”101 According to Joseph 
Morgan Hodge, the “Chamberlainite” conception of colonial development that Amery advocated,     
[…] involved increasing the production of primary products for export through improved 
transportation and communication facilities, and the application of scientific research in order to 
maximize agricultural productivity and ameliorate the poor health conditions that were seen as 
holding back the tropical dependencies.
102
 
 
 The East African Commission of 1925 cleverly utilized the “humanitarian” rhetoric of 
“trusteeship” to disguise their “Chamberlainite”-oriented development objectives for Britain’s East Africa 
territories. The Commission portrayed the relationship between Europeans and Africans as “that of a 
guardian to a ward, and that out duty is to protect the interests of someone less capable of safeguarding 
his or her own interests”.103 At the same time, the Commission claimed that Britons were not only trustees 
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for Africa’s “development and advance in civilisation,” but also acted as trustees “for the world of very 
rich territories.”104 It was therefore the responsibility of the British and colonial governments to “develop 
the vast economic resources of a great continent” for all.105 In the case of East Africa, the Commission 
called upon the colonial governments to “insist on orderly cultivation” of high-value cash crops.106 
Colonial officers were expected to improve agricultural efficiency by stopping the nomadic habits of 
pastoral and agricultural communities, introducing fixed land tenure systems, and providing intensive 
instruction in proper seed selection and crop rotation methods.
107
 These efforts to stimulate “native” and 
“non-native” crop production, however, would fail without improved regional transport facilities, 
particularly railways.
108
 Without access to a railway, large areas of East Africa would remain “quite 
undeveloped, in the sense that they are unable to produce profitably any crop for exports,” nor import 
commodity goods from the metropole.
109
 The Commission also shared the commonly-held belief among 
Europeans that railways would “civilize” and “modernize” Africans by bringing them into contact with 
western consumer markets and better health and education services.
110
 Observers favored railways over 
roads because colonial states lacked the materials and funds necessary to construct permanent roads and 
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bridges over long distances in difficult terrain.
111
 A.G. Church detailed the difficulties of constructing 
sustainable all-weather roads in East Africa:  
 [It] would involve an enormous initial expense, and large current expenditure for their 
 maintenance. It would also involve the maintenance of a large army of labourers for road repairs, 
 for even metalled roads cannot withstand the extremes of temperature and the torrential rainfall of 
 Africa.”112  
 
The East African Commission concluded that “A railway, and a railway alone, can develop this valuable 
territory to the full capacity of its population.”113 The Commission insisted that Britain’s “moral 
responsibility” to fund improvements for East Africa’s transportation facilities also offered a great 
financial opportunity: 
To our mind the financing of transport facilities in East Africa not only is one of the finest 
possible investments for British trade, but is a moral responsibility resting upon the Mother 
Country. The development of Africa’s resources is needed by the trade of the world, and it will be 
nothing short of a dereliction of duty if British initiative, both public and private, fails to rise to 
the height of its opportunity.
114
 
 
The Commission concluded that the “initial sacrifice” British taxpayers made to stimulate “development 
of its great tropical possessions” would be repaid in full and more as trade and production intensified 
within the Empire.
115
 
 Like the Germans before them, the British ultimately envisioned the transformation of 
Tanganyika’s socioeconomic and physical landscape into a network of cash crop plantations and peasant 
farms linked by modern railways and governed by Native Administrations under the guiding hand of 
British officers and scientific experts. Tanganyika, however, remained on the periphery of the British 
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Empire.
116
 It received roughly 10% of the £8,875,000 of loans and grants recommended under the 
Colonial Development Fund between 1929 and 1940.
117
 The central administration in Dar es Salaam 
lacked the resources needed to enact colonial development across a territory stretching 365,000 square 
miles. The colonial state instead directed the bulk of its investments towards the Southern Highlands and 
the northeastern highlands of the Usambara Plateau and Mount Kilimanjaro. They preferred Kilimanjaro 
and Arusha due to their proximity to railway services and the existence of Greek, Dutch, and English 
plantations. Arusha coffee planters already produced the most valuable coffee in East Africa, averaging 
£10 per ton more than Kenyan coffee.
118
 Producers in Tabora, Tanga, and Mwanza also cultivated 
profitable groundnuts and cotton exports, but porters were still needed to transport the produce hundreds 
of miles to the railways and ginners along Lake Victoria. Funding, therefore, concentrated on improving 
and extending the Central Line (780 miles from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika) and the 
Tanga Line (237 miles from Tanga to Moshi) into the surrounding cash crop producing districts. Southern 
Tanganyika, meanwhile, was not a popular investment destination for the colonial state or private 
businesses. There was no major railway and the dilapidated Lindi-Songea main road barely deserved the 
name. Since the region lacked high-value export goods, little incentive existed to improve the 
infrastructure. According to Felicitas Becker, exports in groundnuts, beeswax, and cotton remained below 
1,000 tons each in the 1920s. Sisal production grew continuously during the decade, rising from 2,904 to 
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6,833 tons from Lindi between 1924 and 1932 – the latter figure representing nearly 10% of the colony’s 
sisal exports.
119
 Sesame and grains, however, continued to dominate peasant crops.
120
 Sesame from the 
Lindi hinterland and Liwale made up more than half the territory’s sesame exports, but its share in the 
territory’s total grain exports fluctuated from 50% (1924) to 25% (1927).121 Kilwa and Mikindani 
exported copra, while the Makonde plateau produced a large share of the province’s rice. Wartime 
destruction coupled with the lack of high-value cash crops or readily-extractable minerals ultimately 
convinced the central administration in Dar es Salaam to invest their limited resources outside of the 
Southern Province.  
 Without an infusion of capital and manpower, southern Tanganyika’s infrastructure remained 
inadequate to the frustration and detriment of the provincial administration. Provincial Commissioner 
Grierson complained in 1930 that it was “almost impossible to reach the outlying Stations after 
December; which means that for at least five months of the year I cannot visit any place other than the 
coastal Stations.”122 While stationed in Tunduru District in 1931, Assistant District Officer E.K. Lumley 
described how the “water-logged roads were impassable, and the bridges across the two rivers between 
Tunduru and Lindi were down.”123 After the rains abated, it took several months to reopen the roads for 
motor traffic. Anxious to return to Lindi, Lumley attempted to drive his vehicle along the Lindi-Songea 
main road at the onset of the dry season. Three “servants” accompanied him on the arduous journey. They 
only averaged twenty miles a day. They repeatedly dug out the car from “countless boggy sections and 
remove[d] trees that had fallen across the track, some having been knocked over by elephants.”124 
Visibility was “virtually nil” as Lumley encountered tall grass that reached as high as six feet in some 
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areas. The lack of visibility resulted in Lumley nearly plunging down a twenty foot ravine.
125
  The near 
disasters convinced him to slow the rate of travel, which “necessitated frequent stoppages to allow the 
boiling engine to cool.”126 Whereas it took months to reopen roads, it only took a few hours or a day of 
heavy rain to cripple motor transport. District Commissioner Baxter recorded his arduous twenty-three 
day journey from Songea to Lindi at the onset of the rainy season in 1931.
127
 He left Songea on Boxing 
Day accompanied by the District Officer of Songea, a South African mechanic, five African lorry drivers, 
various turn boys (drivers’ assistants), and additional servants. They drove in one touring car, one box-
body, and five lorries. The 400 mile journey normally took five days “travelling comfortably.” The party, 
however, hit a major delay between Songea and Tunduru. After a day of rain, flood waters carried away 
the bridge over the Muhuwezi River, which was 120 yards wide and 8 feet deep at the crossing. The 
travelers hatched an ingenious and dangerous plan to get the vehicles, supplies, and men across the river. 
The cars and lorries were stripped of any parts that would have been ruined by the water. All entry points 
on the engines were blocked with “oil-soaked wads of cotton wool hammered in with mallets.”128 The 
hoods were strapped down and the general superstructures removed. Each lorry’s wire rope (used for 
haulage) was tied together and canoed to one of two islands in the river. Twenty porters stood on the 
nearest island (waste deep in water) and held the wire. One vehicle at a time was slowly lowered into the 
river and pulled to the island. Each car was surrounded by porters and a European to ensure that it did not 
turn on its side. As the vehicle reached the westerly island, the porters occupying the island moved to the 
second island. The entire process was repeated to the second island and again to the eastern bank. In total, 
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the “feat had to be completed another six times, with the second car and the lorries.”129 It took four days 
to move the vehicles and loads. There were no casualties, though the South African mechanic lost his grip 
at one point and was rescued by a canoe half-a-mile downriver. The South African rebuilt the engines, 
replaced the superstructures, and had all the vehicles working within an hour.
130
 
 Lumley and Baxter’s first-hand accounts were not extraordinary; rather, they were emblematic of 
the immense difficulties of vehicular transport in southern Tanganyika during the interwar era. Officers 
assigned to the “lonely,” one-man stations in the interior (like Tunduru) went several months without 
speaking with or seeing other Europeans.
131
 While some men allegedly became “queer” and “mad” in the 
isolated posts, others enjoyed the isolation and viewed the occasional visit by another officer as an 
unwanted intrusion.
132
 In either case, officers made decisions and implemented policies without the 
guidance of the provincial and central administration. The isolation and independence rarely produced 
satisfactory results in eradicating famine conditions and stabilizing/improving tax revenues. The lack of 
an interregional road network also hampered the colonial economy by inhibiting interior-coastal trade 
relations. Southern Tanganyika’s transportation infrastructure ultimately served as a symbol, symptom, 
and justification for the region’s isolation and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the Territory. The 
acute staff and funding shortages that plagued the Southern Province administration, economy, and 
infrastructure during the 1920s intensified with the onset of the Great Depression. 
“Care and Maintenance”: The Depression Era  
 
 The Tanganyika colonial state first balanced its budget in 1926. For the next three years, the 
Territory was self-sufficient and began building up a considerable surplus. The period of stability and 
relative prosperity ended in 1930 when the world depression hit.
133
 A Draft Memorandum from the 
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Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1935 described the disaster that Tanganyika endured during the 
early 1930s:   
Commodity prices fell heavily; the value both of exports and imports were reduced in 
consequence; revenue was adversely affected, and the accumulated surplus had to be used to 
make good large budget deficits, especially the deficits on the working of the railways, which had 
suffered heavily owing to the contraction of traffic, including through traffic to and from the 
Belgian Congo. As a consequence of this position, what may be called development work in the 
Territory virtually ceased.
 134
  
 
Cultivators tried to compensate for the reduction in global prices by increasingly production. The chart 
below, however, illustrates that producers received less value for more produce.  
Table 3.1 Inverse Ratio of Tanganyika Export Quantity vs. Value, 1929-1933
135
 
Export 
Quantity 
1929 
 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Rice, cwts 51,884 90,131 95,095 107,694 125,858 
Coffee, cwts 177,140 230,940 185,020 227,240 254,360 
Groundnuts, tons 7,765 17,333 3,070 15,873 19,177 
Cotton, centals 110,821 82,224 54,349 71,888 113,677 
Sisal, tons 45,728 49,962 55,939 60,554 69,600 
 
Export 
Value 
1929 
£ 
1930 
£ 
1931 
£ 
1932 
£ 
1933 
£ 
Rice 58,985 73,682 51,209 62,939 62,382 
Coffee 588,871 397,040 247,037 463,597 429,523 
Groundnuts 120,448 186,567 28,700 182,010 166,223 
Cotton 487,863 247,413 119,752 183,747 276,864 
Sisal 1,485,593 1,172,315 707,177 698,202 881,772 
 
As prices dropped, trade fell to “a dangerously low level” and revenues from native taxes dried up. A 
“succession of lean years” gripped the Territory.136 All government officials experienced a 10 to 15% 
reduction in their salaries.
137
 All allowances for district travel were also eliminated. According to former 
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District Officer E.K. Lumley, “only the more dedicated men carried out the duty of touring their districts” 
during the depression era.
138
 British officials accepted the pay decrease to avoid the alternative – 
retrenchment. Officers in the Labour Department were the hardest hit, as the entire department was 
disbanded. The Public Works Department (PWD) remained intact, but its expenditure fell from £296,605 
in 1929/30 to £9,600 in 1934.
139
 PWD programs decreased and railway construction stopped.
140
 In order 
to improve the Territory’s tax and revenue situation, the government instituted a “plant-more-crops” 
campaign in 1931. Colonial officials demanded the increased production of cash crops, particularly 
cotton, among local communities.
141
 Non-African agriculturalists maintained their output, but slashed 
wages for African laborers.
142
 The wages for sisal employees in Tanga, for instance, dropped from Shs. 
30 without rations and Shs. 24 with rations in 1930 to Shs. 20 and Shs. 14 respectively by 1932. Wages 
plunged to Shs. 10 without rations by 1933.
143
 The former director of the Labor Department, Orde-
Browne, complained to the International Labour Office that men could not feed themselves and pay taxes 
with such meager wages. Without a Labour Department to protect the rights of African laborers, Orde-
Browne feared that Tanganyika had “sunk to being one of the worst of the African countries for its labour 
conditions.”144 Without adequate funding and staff, the “sole practicable objective” of the Tanganyika 
administration became “bare maintenance.”145 
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 By September 1930, the “trade slump” hit the Southern Province. Sisal prices crashed and cotton 
earned a meager 25 cents per kilo (a third the price from 1929).
146
 The Lindi Province Planters’ 
Association responded by cutting wages for African laborers. Sisal estates similarly reduced the salary of 
African laborers and European staff by as much as 20%.
147
 Coastal estates also reduced their employees 
by 15-20%.
148
 Messrs. Karimjee Jivanjee closed its Narunyu Sisal Estate and dismissed 2,000 laborers in 
Mikindani.
149
 Bartering replaced cash transactions between traders and cultivators in the interior. 
Provincial Commissioner Grierson reported that “Traders upcountry seem to have little or no cash and do 
their best to persuade natives to take cloth.”150 Without money in circulation, tax revenues plummeted. 
Provincial tax collection fell from £57,000 in 1926 to £15,400 in 1931/32.
151
 The government’s “plant-
more-crops” campaign failed to increase cotton production in the south. Becker argued that while local 
producers in southeastern Tanganyika were willing to produce cotton when “they considered it 
profitable,” that was “rarely the case” in the 1930s.152 Cotton instead increasingly became seen as “a 
compulsory crop whose cultivation was directly linked with taxation.”153 
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would increase as the need arose. He denied any decrease in efficiency. The Governor also stated that he was in 
favor of a good wage policy, and the “scandals of non-payment of wages” were over. Weaver concluded to Orde-
Browne that they must now “wait and see how the situation develops.” 
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Table 3.2 Principal Commodities Exported from Lindi prior to Depression
154
  
Export Produce 1927 1928 1929 1930 
Sisal (tons) 2,171 2,374 2,871 3,319 
Cotton (centals) 3,571 4,736 5,339 3,636 
Groundnuts (tons)  346 484 438 264 
Grain (including 
maize) (cwts) 
20,770 82,577 31,846 26,745 
Simsim (tons) 1,693 1,822 2,672 1,980 
Rice (cwts) 4,315 9,475 1,957 14,878 
  
Table 3.3 Value of General Trade through Lindi Port
155
 
Value 1928 (£) 1929 (£) 1930 (£) 
Imports 85,677 97,785 83,007 
Exports 189,252 200,126 129,099 
 
Despite the failure of cotton production, total agricultural export figures from Lindi rose by nearly Shs. 
260,000 between October 1932 and October 1933.
156
 Grains produced by African peasants, especially in 
Masasi and Newala Districts, represented the bulk of the province’s exports.157 The 4,000 tons or more of 
grain annually exported from the province constituted over a third of the Territory’s grain exports.158 
Becker, however, noted that while “peasants’ produce consistently outweighed sisal in bulk in most years, 
sisal outweighed peasant production in value in the 1930s.”159 Sisal exports quickly rebounded from the 
depression with the province’s plantation industry exporting 13,755 tons in 1938 (or nearly 14% of the 
colony’s total sisal exports).160  
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 Although the Southern Province earned the nickname as the “Granary of the Territory,” it 
suffered from recurrent famines between 1928 and 1932.
161
 The threat of famines was common in the 
Southern Province since the war and cost the government upwards of £7,000 in relief.
162
 The famine 
conditions resulted in part from the scorched earth tactics and the forceful procurement of local crops by 
German and Allied forces during the war, which left entire areas of the Ruvuma borderland devoid of 
food crops. The forced conscription of male laborers further disrupted agricultural production and resulted 
in insufficient yields. Erratic, delayed, or excessive rainfall, locusts, and pests (like rats) exacerbated 
famine conditions after the war. Chau P. Johnsen Kelly argued that colonial officials typically contributed 
the recurring food shortages to “African cultivators’ fiscal irresponsibility in crop choices and agricultural 
mismanagement,” rather than erratic rainfall, pests, or other environmental factors.163 In reality, African 
producers aggravated famine conditions by choosing (whether at the insistence of colonial administrators 
or not) to sell more of their foods crops to compensate for poor market prices during the depression. High 
transport costs to the coast ate away at the meager profits they received for their produce. Unable to 
purchase large quantities of food with their cash and with low food reserves at home, African peasants in 
southern Tanganyika became susceptible to hunger.
164
 Food shortages were further aggravated by the 
decision of thousands of men (especially in the interior districts) to abandon cultivation in favor of wage 
employment on plantations along the coast or north along the Central and Tanga railways. The women 
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and elders left behind struggled to produce sufficient grain yields for their own consumption and to sell 
for cash to pay colonial taxes.
165
  
 Colonial officers in southern Tanganyika found themselves in a very difficult position when 
determining how to approach the taxation and famine crises. If they did not collect enough taxes they 
would not have sufficient revenues to maintain the province and would incur the wrath of the central 
administration. If they put too much pressure on locals to produce cash crops in lieu of food crops or sell 
their foodstuffs to get tax money, famines would continue to occur.
166
 The inability of the southern 
provincial administration to implement a unified response resulted in conflict. In at least one instance, the 
central administration was forced to intervene in a famine scandal that gripped Tunduru District in 1930-
1931. Acting Provincial Commissioner Hallier received unofficial reports in November 1930 that famine 
conditions existed in Tunduru District that required immediate government assistance. District Officer 
Dewhurst of Tunduru refuted the reports and argued that local populations made false claims in order to 
evade taxes and obtain free food. Dewhurst was known by the Lindi administration as an “obstinate” 
officer, who disappeared when visitors came to his station and treated the district “as a private 
preserve.”167 Hallier, therefore, decided to send an assistant district officer, E.K. Lumley, to investigate 
the situation. Lumley reported that parts of the district were experiencing a famine. After personally 
surveying the district, Hallier requested Dewhurst’s immediate transfer. He reported to the Chief 
Secretary: 
DEWHURST culpably responsible hunger and now famine conditions at Tunduru which have 
existed over the period of two years and were reported to him by Native Authorities early in the 
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current year and last month when definite assistance was requested he persistently disbelieved 
them.
168
 
 
The Chief Secretary and central administrators initially doubted Hallier’s claims. Earlier evaluations of 
Dewhurst suggested that he maintained good relationships with African leaders and was perhaps “too 
easy going towards his people.”169 Chief Secretary D.J. Jardine instead suspected that Hallier had “gone 
off the deep end again unnecessarily.”170 The Secretary of Native Affairs, Philip E. Mitchell, privately 
shared Jardine’s reservations about the situation: “I have some doubt whether Hallier has not rushed in 
like a bull at a gate & made a mess of things – Nor can I understand the charge of hard heartedness and 
indifference which he makes against Dewhurst.”171 The situation deteriorated further when Dewhurst sent 
Jardine two unauthorized telegrams addressed as the Provincial Commissioner, defending his behavior 
and claiming there were no shortages. Jardine was willing to overlook the “gross break in discipline,” 
believing that it was  “unwise to remove from Tunduru the one man who must know most of the country 
and the conditions of the people, and send somebody else knowing nothing at all of the position.”172 The 
central administration finally intervened when Hallier reported that Dewhurst had curtailed his famine 
relief arrangements.
173
 Jardine assigned Secretary Mitchell to conduct a formal investigation, and the 
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inquiry found in favor of Hallier. Mitchell reported that if Hallier had “not acted with intelligence, vigour 
and efficiency,” the government would have faced “an exceedingly unpleasant situation and there would 
have been great suffering in Tunduru District.”174 As a result of the report, Jardine levied thirteen charges 
against Dewhurst including dereliction of duty, numerous counts of insubordination, and willfully 
misleading the Chief Secretary.
175
 Dewhurst obstinately maintained his opinion that famine conditions did 
not exist in the district and that the issuing of famine relief deprived local populations of their self-
sufficiency. He also justified his insubordination as an effort to stop Provincial Commissioner Hallier 
from committing the government “to enormous unnecessary expenditure and loss of tax.”176 Despite the 
evidence against Dewhurst, no disciplinary charges were brought against him. Jardine concluded that 
Dewhurst had “become unbalanced” due to the “difficulties of the situation and the life which he has been 
compelled to lead in a lonely station.”177  
 The Tunduru famine scandal illustrated a growing divide in how the Tanganyika administration 
approached governance during and after the depression. Whereas Dewhurst distrusted the local 
population and advocated their self-sufficiency with minimal government interference, Hallier and the 
central administration argued for direct government intervention to prevent further food scarcities. The 
Senior Agricultural Officer in the Southern Province (Mr. Latham) proposed plans for colonial 
administrators and scientific experts to “rehabilitate” the famine-ridden and cash-poor province by 
teaching locals “proper” planting techniques, introducing a greater variety of crops (particularly higher-
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value cash crops), and resettling scattered homesteads into centralized villages.
178
 Calls for increased 
government intervention in southern Tanganyika reflected a broader, “radical” redefinition of colonial 
development and rule occurring in the British Empire during the 1930s.
179
 David Anderson explained that 
the Colonial Office in London and administrators in East Africa responded to the Great Depression, 
American Dust Bowl, demographic pressures, and droughts of the 1930s by becoming increasingly 
preoccupied with “the apparent threat posed to the productive capacity of African lands by overcrowding, 
overproduction, and soil erosion.”180 British conceptions of “development” became more 
“conservationist.” According to Joseph Morgan Hodge, colonial agricultural policy rapidly shifted from 
one of developing and exploiting the empire’s resources, “toward a policy whose first objective was the 
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conservation of natural resources in order to safeguard them for future capitalist accumulation.”181 The 
“conservationist” philosophy not only required more rigorous field research and statistical analysis, but 
also intensified government intervention to ensure the reconstruction and “betterment” of rural African 
societies.
182
 Hodge argued that by the onset of the Second World War,  
Development had come to mean planned, state-directed projects for improving agriculture, 
particularly local food production, and providing community welfare and social services in an 
attempt to allay the misery of growing unemployment and poverty and the flow of rural 
emigration, not in Britain, but in the colonies themselves.
183
 
 
The “more active and interventionist strategy to administration” and colonial development of the mid-to-
late 1930s greatly impacted colonial ideologies and practices in the postwar era.
184
 During the interwar 
era, however, the Tanganyika administration hesitated to embrace the more interventionist approach due 
to inadequate funding and personnel. The new approach was also not universally welcomed in the 
Southern Province where district officers and commissioners, like Dewhurst, were accustomed to their 
administrative independence and objected to outside interference. Superior officers in the provincial and 
central government remained hesitant to intervene in local matters, and instead showed a predilection to 
trust the actions of district officers, who supposedly had intimate knowledge of local circumstances. The 
central administration only intervened in the Tunduru scandal when the conflict between Dewhurst and 
Hallier spiraled out-of-control and potentially threatened the well-being of the African population and the 
prestige of the colonial government.
185
 For the rest of the interwar era, it would remain the responsibility 
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of the provincial administration and private investors to tackle the socioeconomic difficulties gripping 
southern Tanganyika. 
Road Driven Imperialism 
 
 Although the southern provincial administration made efforts to intervene in local agricultural 
practices and relocate populations into centralized settlements during the 1930s, the solution most 
commonly espoused to rectify southern Tanganyika’s socioeconomic difficulties was infrastructure 
development – namely road construction. Throughout Africa, colonial administrations and private 
industries increasingly perceived road construction and motor vehicle transport as a more cost effective 
method of stimulating trade and labor markets. Joshua Grace offered four explanations for why colonial 
governments favored road transportation over railways in the 1930s. Railways required “massive amounts 
of labour [that] officials were unable to mobilize” – both in terms of railway construction and carrying 
bulk shipments from the fields and/or mines to the distant lines. Railways also required large capital 
expenditure “that was increasingly difficult to justify during global economic depression and war.”186 
According to Rolf Hofmeier, Tanganyika Railway generated major deficits during most of the interwar 
era. Low traffic volume meant that the railways could not generate enough revenues to cover their 
operating costs, “let alone depreciations and interest on capital.”187 The diversion of Congo traffic to the 
Atlantic Coast during the depression further reduced traffic volumes and revenues.
188
 The third 
explanation Grace offered for why Europeans increasingly disfavored railway transport was because it 
was an “inflexible technology with limited uses outside of the corridors created by tracks.” Finally, 
migrant laborers preferred not to use the state controlled railways.
189
 Motor vehicles, in contrast, were a 
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flexible technology that “facilitated the movement of goods, opened new markets, and expanded the reach 
of administrative officials to previously unreachable areas.”190 From Namibia to Dahomey, French 
Central Africa, and Tanganyika, colonial governments recognized that motor vehicles amplified the 
radius and speed in which a single official could oversee local communities and enforce colonial policies. 
Roads facilitated the introduction of import-export markets and cash economies to remote areas; 
supposedly “civilizing” and “modernizing” the population in the process.191 The state could also better 
control and direct the movement of raw material exports and human resources – namely migrant laborers. 
In the case of interwar Tanganyika, Grace found that some colonial administrators, like Orde-Browne, 
envisioned the creation of a new social landscape centered on roads and motor vehicles that would 
simultaneously solve the “problems” of labor migration, open new markets, and reinforce colonial order: 
He and others envisioned a network of motorable roads connecting the busiest hubs of trade and 
migration. Each hub was to have a ‘labour camp’ where migrants could sleep, eat, receive 
medical care, and even read colonial literature. Built of concrete and timber instead of mud, labor 
camps were designed to stop the spread of disease – especially, tick-borne illnesses – and 
rearrange African bodies through European architecture. Conceivably, this mobile population 
would then carry the good news of modern social services across new roads to their sites of work 
and to their homes.
192
 
 
In regions and territories without formal colonial authority, private British industries often served as 
agents of infrastructure development. According to Karl Ittmann, British oil companies in Trinidad and 
the Middle East acted as “quasi-states” and invested heavily in road construction and transportation in 
order to improve their operational efficiency and exploit resources in inaccessible regions.
193
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officers and civilians also perceived motor vehicles as prestige objects and material manifestations of 
their technological, intellectual, and moral superiority. Erdmute Alber argued that the relegation of 
Africans to spectators when Europeans passed in an automobile “confirmed and constituted the social, 
economic and technological difference between rulers and subordinates.”194  
 Technical and scientific advancements in road construction and maintenance helped promote road 
driven imperialism during the interwar era. The British government first created a Road Board and 
associated laboratory within the National Physical Laboratory (Teddington) prior to the First World War. 
Before the Road Board, all special knowledge of road surfacing materials and methods in Britain was 
confined to road contracting firms, which were mostly owned by or in close alliance with firms that sold 
bitumen and asphalts. In comparison to the private firms, the research conducted by the Road Board 
Laboratory (in conjunction with the Engineering and Chemical Departments) was shared freely with road 
authorities.
195
 All research and road work at Teddington stopped after the onset of the war.
196
 Following 
the war, Colonel R.E. Crompton of Crompton Laboratory petitioned the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR) and the British government to reconstitute the Road Board Laboratory in 
order to develop the “quickest, best and cheapest method” of constructing waterproof road surfaces with 
bituminous materials.
197
 Crompton insisted that there were “very great difference” between road 
construction in the late Victorian era versus the 1920s, and surveyors often lacked proper knowledge of 
road engineering and/or the best methods of applying their knowledge.
198
 He argued, 
It is not difficult for me to show the large sums that have been wasted in the past, and are certain 
to be wasted in the future, if the expensive materials now used for road surfacing are put into the 
hands of Road Surveyors, who are only trained in the old methods of road surfacing, and are 
unacquainted with the modern chemical and physical qualities of the bituminous tare, pitches and 
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similar substances which are used either together or separately. Experience has shown that 
Surveyors who have not this knowledge are at the mercy of the sellers of these materials and that 
they are unable to test for the qualities they require and which tests we were in a fair way of 
standardising at the time that the Laboratory was shut down.
199
  
 
The Road Board and its laboratory were reinstituted in 1920 under the DSIR and quickly became one of 
the leading research and instructional institutions in England regarding the best materials and methods for 
surfacing permanent roads for automobile traffic.
200
 British researchers also shared their data and results 
with the international community at the annual International Road Congress. Founded in 1906, the 
organization offered Road Authorities and Highway Engineers of various countries an opportunity to 
exchange expertise and opinions on “questions relating to Construction, Maintenance, and Organisation 
of Road Systems.”201 The British contingent presented a paper entitled, “The Construction of Roads in 
new countries such as Colonies and undeveloped regions,” at the 6th International Road Congress in 
Washington D.C. (October 1930). The report comprised a compilation of PWD reports from Tanganyika, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ceylon, and the Federated Malay States.
202
 However, 
none of the Directors of Public Works consulted for the paper appeared at the conference.
203
 
 The degree to which research on road materials and construction was conducted in and 
propagated throughout the British Empire is a topic in need of more research.
204
 It was not until 1948 that 
the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) founded the biannual Conference on Civil Engineering Problems in 
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the Colonies (1948-1971).
205
 The conference was first suggested by a British engineer working in West 
Africa – Alexander Macdonald – who believed “more might be done for colonial engineers, that is, 
engineers serving in the colonies.”206 ICE established the conference in response and invited colonial 
engineers to present reports on the problems and advances in road construction and transportation and 
other engineering matters across the Empire.
207
 Seven years after ICE instituted the conference, the Road 
Research Laboratory established a Colonial Section.
208
 Its first task was surveying colonial soils and their 
uses in road construction. Of the 218 individuals taking road construction courses through the Road 
Research Laboratory that winter, forty-four were engineers assigned in colonial territories.
209
 While 
colonial-specific engineering research and professional training opportunities for British colonial 
engineers expanded after the Second World War, there appears to have been few avenues through which 
engineers could access and/or participate in international research during the interwar era. Even if there 
were avenues, most of the men overseeing and conducting roadworks in Tanganyika were District 
Officers – not trained engineers and surveyors. A District Officer in Tanganyika – F. Longland – 
recognized that British officers assigned to “isolated stations” would have to complete the duties of an 
“old-time estate bailiff” without sufficient knowledge or experience: 
For example, they may be required to make surveys, to put a roof on a house, to improve a water 
supply or a road, and to carry out many other similar tasks. It sometimes happens that although 
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such tasks must be carried out there is little or no information concerning methods or materials, 
and little experience to guide one.
210
  
 
He therefore published a pocket-sized reference guide in 1935, entitled Field Engineering: A Handbook 
on Simple Construction, instructing officers on conducting public works.
211
 The text provided information 
about survey instruments and surveying, buildings and building works, building sanitation, water supply 
and power, water lifting plants, irrigation, and roadwork and bridges. The information was based upon a 
compilation of notes from various textbooks, papers, plans, catalogues, and other sources materials.
212
  
Longland’s goal was to present the information as “simply and as accurately as possible.”213 In the case of 
road work, Longland’s text guided officers in determining the proper location for roads in differing 
terrain, determining and measuring gradients and slopes, and setting out a road and its curves.
214
 He also 
gave advice and instruction about road clearing, banks, and surfacing on level and hilly ground. Finally, 
the text instructed readers on locating and constructing fords, causeways, various types of culverts, and 
various types of bridges with different materials (timber, concrete, etc.).
215
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Figure 3.2 Longland’s Sketches for Constructing Road Gradients, Curves and Roads on Hillsides, Culverts, and 
Wood Bridges
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When it came to road maintenance, Longland instructed officers to begin road work at the end of the rains 
due to the “comparative softness of materials.”217 Grass should be cut (not uprooted), and ruts filled with 
dry materials. Longland stressed that dirt roads could not succeed without proper drainage. He insisted 
that if drainage was “neglected they [the roads] will eventually be destroyed. Good drainage may turn a 
bad road into a good one”218 Longland’s advice was easier read than done. District Officers in southern 
Tanganyika struggled to pinpoint the correct timing and methods of road reconditioning after the rains. 
Grass cutting, in particular, caused headaches. The Nachingwea District Commissioner, for instance, 
wanted road work to begin in March. The first step was clearing the grass, which was an “enormous” 
task. Grass cutting was useless, however, until after the April rains. Scrapping the ground would 
minimize the delay, but the practice increased erosion and the sandiness of the road. There was no chose 
but to wait, delaying general maintenance operations and the roads’ reopening.219 In most cases, however, 
there were too few District Officers and Commissioners in the Southern Province to maintain hundreds of 
miles of roads in addition to their other responsibilities. Road maintenance and improvement operations, 
therefore, often fell to Native Authorities and local headmen, who were assigned to maintain specific 
sections of district and village roads. They were responsible for employing local labor in road gangs, 
while the Native Treasuries paid for the upkeep.
220
  
 Despite the challenges of constructing and maintaining roads in difficult climatic and geographic 
conditions with inadequate technological knowledge and equipment, colonial administrators in Africa 
were attracted to road construction because of the low labor costs. Across the continent, Europeans used 
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forced labor to build transportation infrastructure.
221
 Libbie Freed found that colonial officials in French 
Equatorial Africa and Cameroon in the 1920s chose roads because they “could be built cheaply and 
simply, using forced local labor and locally available materials and, often, little expert knowledge, and 
still be considered to ‘work’ as roads, even if they were not ideal.”222 The practice of using forced labor 
came under increasing pressure from the Anti-Slavery Society, League of Nations, and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) during the late 1920s.
223
 As a signatory of the Slavery Convention of 1926 
and Forced Labor Convention of 1930, Britain vowed to end all forms of compulsory or forced labor as 
soon as possible.
224
 Kwabena Opare Akurang-Parry, however, noted that both conventions allowed the 
continuance of forced labor “under exceptional circumstances: if the work at hand is urgent, if it is 
beneficial to the community, and if voluntary labor could not be attained.”225 In the Gold Coast, British 
officials utilized the loop-hole to their advantage. When reclassifying roads in the territory, they made 
sure to indicate that the roads benefited local communities, thus satisfying ILO requirements that “forced 
labor could be used as long as communities from which laborers were recruited gained from it and as long 
as voluntary labor was lacking.”226 The colonial state in Tanganyika implemented similar road 
classification systems and legislation in the 1930s that appeased international criticism of forced labor 
while rationalizing its continuation for public works projects. The Native Authority Ordinance and Native 
Tax Ordinance of 1934 authorized Native Authorities and government departments to requisition labor, 
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including tax-defaulters, for necessary and/or emergency public works projects. Native Authorities and 
headmen were also expected to compel all able-bodied men to complete “annual communal labor” 
projects on local roads. These projects consisted of clearing village and district roads of grass, filling in 
holes, and providing bamboo and ropes for bridges during the dry season.
227
  
 The southern provincial administration in Tanganyika heavily relied upon such compulsory labor 
to complete roadworks during the financially stringent years of the Great Depression. The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and the Colonial Development Advisory Committee allocated £4,000 for road 
construction activities along the Tunduru stretch of the main road in 1931. The funds were approved 
based upon the scheme’s “development” potential – namely facilitating the export of thousands of tons of 
crops to the coast. The money, however, never reached southern Tanganyika. Acting Chief Secretary F.J. 
Durman reported to the Southern Provincial Commissioner in July 1931 that the territory’s financial 
situation had deteriorated so severely due to the Depression that the government could not undertake 
development projects unless “of outstanding importance and urgency.”228 Without government funding, 
the Provincial Commissioner authorized British officers to use tax defaulter labor on the main, district, 
and village roads. The District Officer of Newala was permitted to employ an unlimited number of tax-
defaulters on road work projects in 1931.
229
 All able-bodied men that received famine relief in Lindi and 
Tunduru in 1931 were also forced to work on the main and district roads as repayment for food and the 
next year’s planting seeds.230 One hundred and twelve miles of district roads were “made fit for motor 
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traffic as part of repayment of the relief afforded”.231 When massive tax deficits threatened the province 
the following year, Secretary of Native Affairs Mitchell instructed officers to compel tax defaulters to 
work on roads, brick buildings, and other projects of “solid and permanent value.”232 Mitchell told 
District Officer Lawrence of Songea that he “must get it into his head that every man must pay or work; 
not till that is the practice will things be satisfactory.”233 Mitchell reasoned that the defaulters could repay 
the Shs. 4/- in tax after 16 days of work in the district. At the end of 1932, Provincial Commissioner 
Grierson reported that “some forty-seven miles of roads passable for motor traffic was completed, linking 
up centres along the Rovuma Valley.”234 African responses to roadwork varied. Some apparently 
preferred employment in “native labor gangs” for lengthier construction and maintenance projects 
because it offered a valuable source of income beyond subsistence farming.
235
 Tax-defaulters in Newala 
also appeared to prefer road labor over paying taxes. In 1931, the District Officer complained that tax-
defaulters should be “sent to work with gangs away from their homes, as many tax-defaulters are only too 
glad to do 24-30 days near their homes instead of paying tax.”236 In most cases, however, Africans 
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detested road work and resisted volunteering for road construction operations. Acting Provincial 
Commissioner Hallier, for instance, reported that 67% of the taxes were collected in Kilwa and Masasi 
after a rumor spread that all defaulters would be put to work on the Lindi-Tunduru road and a number 
were called to work on the district roads.
237
 
“Rehabilitating” Southern Tanganyika through Road Construction and the Private Agents of 
“Development” 
 
 Reactions to the wave of road driven imperialism sweeping across the Empire in the 1930s varied 
in Tanganyika. The central administration continued to perceive railways as the “mainstay of the transport 
system,” and instituted strict controls and licensing regulations on road transporters in order to prevent 
road-railway competition.
238
 The legislation did not affect southern Tanganyika because there was no 
competition. Rather, the southern administration pinpointed road construction as the solution for the 
province’s economic and social problems. Road closures were not only an inconvenience for officers, but 
they also disrupted trade and reduced tax revenues. Colonial officers argued that they could retain the 
southern male population and increase the circulation of cash by employing male laborers on road 
construction projects – especially along the Lindi-Songea main road. Improving the Lindi-Songea main 
road, in turn, would stimulate inter-district trade and offer colonial officials more accessibility to the 
interior districts. British officers could better supervise African populations and ensure that locals 
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produced food and cash crops (particularly tobacco). By producing cash crops, the local population could 
earn money locally without having to sell their food crops for cash – therefore breaking part of the famine 
cycle.
239
 The improved main road would also lower transportation costs, thus ensuring that African 
producers in the interior received maximum value for their crops. Producers could then use their profits to 
pay taxes, reinvest in the land, and purchase luxury commodities like calico and beads. This commerce 
would stimulate the expansion of monetarily-based trade networks for the benefit of the colonial 
economy.
240
 The southern provincial administration ultimately believed that by improving the region’s 
road system with African labor, they could eradicate famines, stabilize the population and labor force, 
increase tax revenues, and bring prosperity to southern Tanganyika.   
 Inadequate finances yet again threatened to undermine road development plans in the south. The 
use of cheap/free tax defaulter labor declined during the course of the 1930s as pressure from the ILO and 
League of Nations mounted and the threat of labor strikes and unionism intensified.
241
 While forced labor 
continued on village and district roads, the PWD had to construct and maintain the Lindi-Songea main 
road with paid, voluntary labor. The southern provincial administration, however, had lost all faith in the 
PWD staff and repeatedly criticized the Public Works Inspector and Senior Assistant Engineers for their 
inefficiency. Grierson reported in May 1931 that the Senior Assistant Engineer “will never set the Thames 
on fire, and it is so awkward when he is the Authority for the whole Trunk Road from here to the Songea 
border and has the funds and the direction of work.”242 The PWD allegedly worked only on a 50 mile 
section of the nearly 400 mile road. District Officers in Masasi and Tunduru were willing to maintain the 
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sections passing through their district, but the PWD failed to allocate sufficient funds.
243
 The British 
Treasury, meanwhile, continued to oppose large scale expenditures from loan funds in the aftermath of 
the depression.
244
 It refused to support projects unless they could “be confidently expected to lead at a 
fairly early date to increased revenue (general or railway) more than offsetting the capital and 
maintenance charges involved.”245  
 In order to transform the southern landscape through a network of well-constructed and well-
maintained roads, the British administration turned to the private sector. Just as the Lindi plantation 
community spearheaded the Lindi Tramway during the German colonial era, a private company became 
responsible for the maintenance and improvements of the Lindi-Songea main road during the 1930s. An 
ex-Rhodesian policeman and veteran of WWI – Gerald Sibold – and an ex-army officer – Carnegie 
Browne – founded the Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. (TTCo).246 The men started the company as 
a haulage firm and attained a government contract in the 1920s for the transport of all government loads, 
stores, and personnel in the south.
247
 Sibold and Carnegie Browne were well-known and respected by 
British officers throughout the province. Sibold was District Officer Lumley’s sole European companion 
during his five month stay in Tunduru, and he assisted Baxter’s crossing of the Muhuwezi River.248  The 
lorries in Baxter’s convoy were TTCo property and the South African mechanic was a company 
employee.
249
 In addition to transporting government personnel and loads, TTCo assisted famine relief 
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measures and organized the transportation of migrant laborers from Tunduru to plantations throughout 
Tanganyika.
250
 Carnegie Browne was also very active in Lindi town’s political and economic affairs, 
serving as the secretary for the influential Lindi Province Planters’ Association in 1931.251 Provincial and 
District Commissioners routinely consulted Sibold and Browne about road conditions, construction, and 
operations.
252
 As TTCo took advantage of the void of transportation services in the south, the company 
owners also aimed to profit from the inability of the colonial state to maintain the southern road 
infrastructure. In 1928 and 1929, TTCo received its first minor road maintenance contract for the Lindi-
Mingoyo stretch of the main road.
253
 Sibold also supervised the construction of twelve miles of road on 
both sides of Tunduru village in 1931 because the road foreman “promised by the P.W.D.” never 
appeared. Sibold’s efforts produced “excellent results.”254 When the provincial administration 
contemplated awarding TTCo a maintenance contract for the entirety of the main road in 1933, the PWD 
objected. The inability of a Greek firm to properly maintain the Lindi Tramway between 1930 and 1933 
added to the PWD’s reservations about granting infrastructure contracts to private companies.255 The 
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PWD, however, needed help. Their limited staff employed the “strictest economy both as regards ways 
and means.”256  Provincial Commissioner Grierson argued that the resident Senior Assistant Engineer (R. 
E. Ponsoby) was incapable of maintaining even a short stretch of the main road from Lindi to Mahiwa: 
Ponsonby doles out small allocations when I attack him, but wants to keep most of his money for 
the Lindi/Mahiwa section, as well as the greater part of the balance of the £5000 provided in last 
year’s Estimates. I have written officially on the subject and Ponsonby has departed for Tunduru 
to see for himself. About 20 miles of the road outside of Lindi is good now, but the Mtua to 
Mahiwa section is dangerous in places and bad throughout.
257
 
 
Grierson concluded that a private contractor was a necessity because it was impossible to maintain and 
improve the main road with “a single handed Officer who has numerous other calls on his time, when 
funds are inadequate and lorry traffic heavy.”258 TTCo, in contrast, already had a head office, garage, 
workshop, and transport depot in Lindi. The workshop included equipment rarely found in the Southern 
Province: “a tip-lorry, a hand or power driven concrete mixer, a block-making machine, mason’s tools, 
and a plentiful stock of road-labourers hand-tools of every description.”259 Browne and Sibold’s personal 
relationships with government officers also inspired confidence and improved their chances of earning a 
contract in competition with other tenders.
260
   
 The colonial government ultimately sided with Grierson and awarded TTCo a yearly contract in 
1932 to maintain the entirety of the main road at the price of £2,400. The state also renewed TTCo’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a large quantity of rails. The rails were delivered at a much lower cost than they would have been delivered from 
Europe. 
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contract to provide weekly mail and passenger service from Lindi to Songea.
261
 The company’s 
construction contract got off to an inauspicious start. Grierson visited Songea four months into the 
contract and observed that some stretches were greatly improved, but “the regular maintenance and 
inspection procedure is lacking.”262 Grierson’s report the following month was dire as he suspected that 
TTCo was undergoing a “financial crisis”: 
They seem to be trying to do too much with too little capital and heavy overhead expenses. There 
is not the old personal supervision now, and too many makeshifts. I hope they will weather the 
storm, as they are a most useful local asset.
263
 
 
Despite Grierson’s doubts about Sibold and Carnegie Brown’s ability to manage the company, he 
recommended the continuance of their contract. After all, there was no alternative as the PWD was self-
admittedly incapable of properly managing Tanganyika’s road system: 
The existing road maintenance organization has been stretched to its elastic limit. In some cases 
sections exceeding 200 miles are in charge of a single road foreman. In spite of increased 
mileages, reduced funds and the continually increasing volume of traffic recorded the road 
systems have been maintained in a fair condition throughout the Territory although it has not 
been possible to undertake improvement works to any great extent. Such a positon cannot be 
maintained indefinitely and sooner or later deterioration of roads generally will set in unless 
countered by increased expenditure and supervision.
264
  
 
Grierson concluded that “at £8 per mile, I do not think a more economic or comprehensive scheme could 
be produced” than the arrangement with TTCo.265 The central administration agreed and renewed TTCo’s 
contract in 1933. Carnegie Browne assumed full control over the company during the year due to Sibold’s 
resignation from the company’s board.266 The work completed by road gangs stationed at five mile 
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intervals along the main road was satisfactory enough to warrant the extension of TTCo’s exclusive 
contract until December 1936. TTCo, however, lacked the capital and resources to overcome the natural 
obstacles that had made road construction so challenging in the Ruvuma borderland for the past thirty 
years. Poor soil conditions and numerous streams that crisscrossed the road at various intervals plagued 
road maintenance. The company’s main adversary remained the annual rains. During the rainy season, all 
operations came to a halt. The roads were closed and bridges literally picked up and set aside. From 
March to May, TTCo employed large road gangs to reconstruct and prepare the road and its bridges for 
their reopening in May. The strength of the road gangs declined from July to December as the company 
completed major maintenance tasks.
267
 When the rainy season commenced, TTCo reduced its labor force 
to two bridge gangs.
268
 The rains proceeded to wash away most (if not all) of the year’s work.  
 As the Southern Province’s economy continued to rebound from the depression era, the colonial 
state increasingly disapproved of TTCo’s low maintenance standards.269 The annual closure of the main 
road inhibited year-round trade between the interior and coast, while rough road surfaces drove up 
transportation costs. Senior Agricultural Officer K. Latham explained that grain received Shs. 6/- per kilo 
at Lindi port. It cost a cultivator in Masasi Shs. 5/- to transport his produce by vehicle to Lindi, leaving 
him with a profit of Shs. 1/- per 100 kilograms. In order to earn Shs. 5/- cash, the producer needed to sell 
500kgs locally or make three journeys to the coast (each a week’s duration).270 The situation became more 
severe as the distance from Lindi increased. Traders in the interior would not purchase local grain because 
they could not profitably transport it to the coast. The traders, instead, contracted someone to bring grain 
from Lindi to Masasi – “the very grain which has been labouriously carried down to the coast on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
director of TTCo and temporarily appointed his wife in Sibold’s place. Browne went on to serve as the company’s 
General Manager until 1945. 
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heads of Masasi and Newala (and quite possibly Tunduru or Liwale) natives.”271 Porterage remained a 
common practice among African producers in interior districts like Masasi and Tunduru Districts because 
of the exorbitant costs of motor transport.
272
 The provincial and central administration found this reality 
unacceptable, especially as it deprived the government of potential revenue. The colonial state remained 
convinced that improved roads would reduce transport costs, stimulate rapid and cheap vehicle traffic, 
and thus encourage local producers to cultivate and sell more produce for cash and commodity goods. 
The Tanganyika state and British metropole would profit from the expansion of inter-regional trade 
networks in the form of increased tax revenues, customs duties, and fees associated with a growing 
import-export market.
273
  
 Since TTCo lacked the capital necessary to improve the Lindi-Songea main road to an all-weather 
standard and no viable alternatives existed in the private sector, the southern provincial administration 
petitioned Dar es Salaam for funds.
 274
 The central administration, in turn, asked London for funding to 
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Districts. In addition to soil surveys, other surveys would examine potential mineral and petrol deposits, sources 
for water power, constructing a harbor at Mikindani, and constructing a railway from Mikindani to Mwenzo in 
Northern Rhodesia (through Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, Njombe, and Mbeya). The syndicate proposed that the 
government grant them three years to conduct all preliminary surveys and investigations. If the potentialities 
proved satisfactory, the syndicate would become a public company and the government would reward them a 
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improve the regional and territorial-wide road network. Governor Harold MacMichael argued that a lack 
of investment since the First World War had rendered southern Tanganyika impoverished and 
undeveloped: 
The Lindi Province is at present the least developed area in the Territory and we are of opinion 
that the reason for this is not to be found in the nature of its soil or of its population but in the fact 
that capital expenditure in the province since the war has been practically nil. During the period 
from 1920 to 1929 when the Territorial revenue was at its highest very little money was expended 
in this area. Whereas the Northern and Central areas of the Territory have had the benefit of their 
respective railway systems and the Southern Highlands is able to export its produce along the 
Great North Road, Lindi has had to be content with a single road which at present is barely 
useable even in the dry season.
275
 
 
Chief Secretary Jardine argued that if London took no action, the Southern Province would continue its 
socioeconomic decline to utter ruin:   
[…] at the best a static condition varied by periodic famines and at the worst a progressive 
deterioration leading through increasingly frequent famine relief to a pauperized population no 
longer capable of maintaining itself and so constituting a permanent drain on the resources of the 
Territory.
276
 
 
The economic arguments in favor of the roadway – its ability to stimulate agricultural production and 
exports – ultimately convinced the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Colonial Development 
Advisory Committee to issue a £27,000 loan to improve the Lindi-Masasi section of the main road and 
feeder roads in southern Tanganyika. The funds were part of a larger £253,000 loan awarded to the 
Tanganyika government from the East African Guaranteed Loan to complete ten road improvement 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
concession to carry out all relevant development proposals. The syndicate listed several other conditions, including 
that they be given all the necessary land for a harbor, railway and stations, roads, irrigation, reservoirs and 
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schemes and one telegraph line.
277
 A thousand men were employed on the Lindi-Masasi project when 
road construction commenced at the end of August 1935.
278
 Problems, however, quickly emerged. The 
original project estimates were based upon conjecture. A road survey had never been undertaken by the 
PWD in the Southern Province and there “was no technical data available on which to base a firm 
estimate.” When a detailed survey was completed by December 1935, the revised estimate amounted to 
£36,760; £28,860 for the main road and £7,900 for feeder roads.
279
 The feeder project was immediately 
scrapped. The high cost of transporting permanent materials – such as metal or murram – prohibited their 
use in the region. The Lindi-Songea main road would remain a dirt road for the foreseeable future. 
 Although the government intervened to help the Southern Province acquire much needed funds 
for its infrastructure, the administration resumed its hands off approach when it came to the application of 
those funds. The colonial government terminated TTCo’s exclusive road maintenance contract in 1937, 
and assigned the PWD to maintain the Lindi-Masasi section using the guaranteed loan funds. The central 
administration, however, failed to provide the PWD the additional funds, equipment, or trained personnel 
it needed to properly maintain the section, let alone the larger network of district roads. The government, 
therefore, divided responsibility for the more challenging and sparsely populated sections of the main 
road from Masasi to Songea between two private contractors. TTCo became responsible for the Masasi 
section ending at the Nampungu Bridge in Tunduru, while L. Rousham Roberts of Songea maintained the 
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bridge and the rest of the road to Songea. Both contractors assumed responsibility for all works at their 
own risks and costs, including the supply of all materials and labor.
280
 The Tanganyika Government also 
left the organization of labor to the discretion of TTCo and Roberts with the stipulations that the 
companies would supply all necessary tools and camps, employ sufficient headmen, and submit monthly 
labor returns detailing the number of men employed and conditions of their employment.
281
 PWD 
engineers gave TTCo and Roberts detailed descriptions as to what constituted proper road maintenance 
and construction.
282
 Colonial and PWD officers, however, rarely intervened in the work programs 
designed and implemented by the contractors.
283
 Neither contractor had the resources to conduct year 
round maintenance and construct an all-weather road for vehicle traffic.
284
 Routine labor shortages, in 
particular, crippled TTCo and Robert’s work programs. Roadwork often supplemented household 
production for African laborers. These workers returned to their shambas when the cultivation and 
harvest seasons began. When agricultural prices were high, there was less incentive to return to the 
roadwork. Roberts, for example, struggled to find laborers during the tobacco boom in 1938 and 1939. He 
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recognized that wages of Shs. 8/- per month were no longer appealing.
285
 Despite the obvious limitations 
and failures of TTCo and Roberts’ respective operations, the colonial state had no viable option but to 
renew their contracts until the mid-1940s. The Lindi-Songea main road – the “backbone of the system” in 
southern Tanganyika – thus remained a poorly designed dirt road throughout the interwar era. The 
contractors’ efforts, however, were not pointless. They helped to stimulate the expansion of the region’s 
motor vehicle transportation sector for the benefit of regional traders, local producers, and migrant 
laborers.  
On the Road 
 
 Indians, not Europeans or Africans, were the driving force behind the expansion of motor vehicle 
transport in southern Tanganyika and the wider territory. The Indian commercial class quickly adapted to 
the new political and economic situation in Tanganyika following the First World War. They reorganized 
their businesses towards British and Kenyan capital, and purchased one-third of the German properties 
seized by the Allies during the war.
286
 Successful merchants diversified their businesses and reinvested in 
transportation, manufacturing, construction, and land purchases.
287
 Indian immigration to Tanganyika 
doubled between 1921 and 1931 as the legal status for Asians changed from “native” to “non-native.” 
James R. Brennan explained that the new classification gave Indians a commercial advantage over 
Africans, who could not legally borrow money nor own individual property without administrative 
approval.
288
 Although European planters, businessmen, and colonial administrators continued to feel 
antipathy towards Southeast Asians (as during the precolonial and German colonial eras), the colonial 
state gained a number of advantages by empowering the Indian commercial communities of Tanganyika. 
On the one hand, they could profit from the decades- to centuries-old trade networks that Indian 
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wholesalers and retailers had established between the interior and coast. Indian communities also helped 
to reinforce colonial social and political hierarchies, in which Europeans were at the pinnacle and 
Africans at the base. Perhaps most importantly, Indian businessmen and intermediaries served as valuable 
scapegoats for the state when facing international criticism of colonial economic exploitation, as well as 
African resentment when market economies turned unfavorable as during the Great Depression.
289
 The 
East Africa Commission reported in 1925 that “the bulk of the trade with the natives in East Africa is in 
the hands of Asiatics, Europeans in the main compromising only Government officials, missionaries, 
planters, and the higher professional classes.”290 Over the next decade, Europeans became convinced that 
Indians would retain their commercial supremacy for the foreseeable future. The Report to the League of 
Nations in 1939 stated that entrepreneurial Africans had little hope of competing with Indian wholesalers 
and retailers –  
[…] until trade is regarded as a whole time profession and a shrewd business sense is developed 
after years of practice. At present it is a part-time occupation for a few old men who are without 
any business sense whatever and are as likely to give away as to sell their wares; the result is 
failure. Openings in trade are there for Africans but there are few Africans trained to take 
advantage of them.
291
  
 
When the Tanganyika government tried to curtail Indian commercial dominance by passing 
discriminatory legislation in the 1920s and 1930s, Indian Muslims and Hindus successfully defended their 
rights with a number of effective hartals – shop closures.292 The strikes, however, adversely affected 
Indian-African relations. African consumers resented the shutdowns, which drove up food prices.
293
 
Relations continued to deteriorate during the depression as Indian middlemen dramatically cut the prices 
they offered to African producers in response to the collapse of international prices.
294
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 Despite racial tension and discriminatory legislation, Tanganyika’s Indian commercial class 
continued to solidify its control over the territory’s economy during the 1930s. Robert G. Gregory 
estimated that the Indian population controlled 17% of non-African agricultural land, 90% of township 
property, 80% of cotton and sisal industries, 50% of imports, and 60% of exports during the interwar 
era.
295
 According to Brennan, the Indian merchant community succeeded because it was –  
[…] well-capitalized, attuned to working with minimal government support, and well-disposed 
toward British imperial commerce. They exploited advantages of community and kinship to 
channel information, goods, and capital between villages, provincial towns, and trading centers 
in East African and India.
296
 
 
Indian wholesalers and retailers similarly dominated southern Tanganyika’s economy. Indian 
entrepreneurs, including Karimjee Jivanjee and Mathuradas Kalidas owned many of the coastal 
plantations in Lindi and Mikindani.
297
 They formed the backbone of the politically and economical 
influential Lindi Province Planters’ Association and subsequent Lindi Province Sisal Grower’s 
Association.
298
 Indian wholesalers and retailers also extended their economic networks into the interior 
with the support of newly immigrated relatives. The parents of Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla, for instance, 
came to Tanzania in 1936 to work in their brothers’ business in Newala. The couple eventually 
established their own shop in Newala.
299
 Athomani Wadi Mlaponi of Namatumbusi recalled a symbiotic 
relationship between Indian shopkeepers and African producers outside of Masasi. Indians employed 
Africans, extended credit, and purchased their produce.
300
 In return, Indian retailers and wholesalers 
financially profited from the commerce.  
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 Indian traders were the first to take advantage of the flexibility and speed that motor vehicles 
offered in order to enhance their control over intra- and interregional trade networks. Following a slump 
in imports during the depression, the number of vehicles in Tanganyika increased by 60% from 1934 to 
1939.
301
 By 1939, the Indian population in Tanganyika controlled an estimated 80% of the territory’s 
transportation services, including bus and lorry companies.
302
 In the Southern Province, the average 
number of vehicles on the main road from Lindi to Masasi rose annually from 1935 to 1938. 
Table 3.4 Average Vehicles Per Day on Lindi-Masasi Road, 1935-1938
303
 
Route 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Lindi-Mingoyo 8.3 10.3 20.2 26.4 
Mingoyo-Mtama 6.8 10.4 26.0 19.1 
Mtama-Mahiwa 1.8 12.5 - - 
Mtama-Masasi N/A N/A 23.6 34.1 
Average for Territory (main roads) 16.4 15.8 17.4 19.2 
 
Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching noted in 1936 that “Indian traders have taken full advantage of 
the opportunities which cheap mechanized mechanical transport has thrown open to them and their 
activities are extending in an ever-widening circle.”304 District Officer E.A. Leakey similarly reported that 
there was “no lack of competition in the motor business” in Mtwara as several Indian merchants ran 
lorries for hire at a shilling a mile.
305
 Four ton lorries were observed “racing up and down” the Songea 
section from November to December 1938. The tobacco exported from Songea was matched by a rush of 
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imported Indian duka (shop) cargo from Lindi.
306
 District Officers also noted heavy traffic along the 
Newala-Mikindani and Newala-Mtwara roads. These secondary routes facilitated the export of 
agricultural produce from the Newala District. Unlike other roads in the province, there was no reason to 
close these two district roads during the wet season since they sustained adequate traffic.
307
 From 1933 to 
1939, the number of Indians applying for trading licenses in Newala tripled.
308
 Hussein’s family utilized 
two lorries to export African-produced cashew nuts to Lindi and import commodity goods to their shop in 
Newala.
309
 Motor vehicle transport also enabled Indian merchants to establish dukas in “even the remotest 
villages.”310 The Indian dukas and depots impacted rural Africans’ trading and mobility patterns. Africans 
of all ages and both sexes increasingly sold or exchanged their produce for international good at these 
shops rather than undertaking arduous journeys to the coast.
311
 By 1935, motor lorries transported the 
bulk of African produce from Liwale District, replacing porters and sparring hundreds of individuals “the 
tiresome annual journey to the coast in search of salt.”312 Officials, like Provincial Commissioner 
Kitching, applauded the replacement of foot journeys by motor vehicles, believing that the old form of 
mobility wasted labor and caused food shortages as men left their villages at critical periods in the 
agricultural year.
313
 A growing number of African communities also resettled along the main and district 
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roads to take advantage of the opportunities offered by motor vehicle transport. Kitching considered these 
voluntary resettlements to be “one of the most remarkable developments of recent years.”314 
 As motor vehicles increasingly transported produce and trade goods across the Southern 
Province, African migrant laborers also took advantage of the speed motor vehicle transport offered to 
pursue wage labor employment across district, provincial, and territorial borders. John Iliffe argued that 
the interwar period intensified the trend in Tanganyika “towards greater reliance on long-distance 
migrants from peripheral areas unable to meet cash needs by marketing crops or cattle.”315 While the 
Nyamwezi, Sumbwa, and Sukuma remained the largest migrant groups in the early 1920s, “migrants 
came increasingly from remote, peripheral regions” during and after the depression, including the 
Southern Province.
316
 Since there was no system of labor identification in Tanganyika or labor camps in 
the Southern Province, British officer could not collect accurate statistics about the number of migrant 
laborers, their point of origin, labor routes, and destination. Migration patterns also fluctuated annually 
due to labor, agriculture, and market conditions within and beyond the province. Colonial officers, 
however, were certain that a large proportion of the migrant laborers originated in Masasi, Tunduru, 
Songea, and northern PEA. An estimated 2,210 contracted laborers and 8,000 non-contracted laborers left 
Songea District in 1929. The chief Recruiting Agent in Songea – W.J.T. Leeman –forwarded an estimated 
2,000 laborers by the end of July during a “good average season” (such as 1929).317 For the next fifteen 
years, the number of migrants fluctuated from an estimated 2,500 to 9,500 laborers.
318
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Table 3.5 “Labourers Leaving the Songea District in search of work”319 
Year Contract 
Labor 
Non-contract 
Labor 
Immigrant Labour 
in transit (estimate) 
1929 2,240 8,000 2,000 
1930 1,573 8,000 2,000 
1931 319 5,000 800 
1932 654 4,500 400 
1933 1,010 1,500 500 
1934 59 2,000 600 
1935 577 2,500 1,000 
 
Thousands of men also migrated from Tunduru District because there was no valuable produce or local 
paid employment available.
320
 The estimated 4,000 men who left Tunduru District in 1930 caused a great 
deal of alarm within the provincial administration, which correlated manpower shortages with recurrent 
famines and political instability in the district.
321
 However, over half the migrant laborers that moved 
through the Southern Province originated from PEA. By the 1930s, the annual influx of laborers from 
PEA was no longer a source of tension between the British and Portuguese administrations. Both sides 
recognized that the Ruvuma River served as a border on paper only: 
 The boundary is an administrative but not an ethnologic frontier and the country on either side is 
 populated by natives who are closely connected racially and have many interests in common. 
 Movements of people across the boundary are inevitable in the circumstances and in practice take 
 place on a considerable scale but there rarely give rise to any difficulties and relations with 
 officers of the Portuguese Government have always been of the most cordial nature. The exercise 
 of tolerance and forbearance is necessary from time to time on either side of the frontier, 
 particularly among the native authorities, but this always suffices and nothing in the nature of an 
 incident ever occurs.
322
 
 
District officers initially viewed the PEA migrants with disapproval verging on hostility. Officers 
complained that immigrants stole local food and jobs, failed to pay taxes, and illegally smuggled produce 
to avoid heavy PEA export duties. Provincial Commissioner Grierson noted that migrant laborers often 
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traveled with “their womenfolk and dogs, doing a few weeks’ work at one plantation, and then passing 
further afield, submitting themselves to no control and paying no dues.”323 He also reported in October 
1931 that the Wamakonde in Tanganyika were “greatly disturbed, as numerous thefts and burglaries have 
occurred there recently.”324 The Chief Secretary, however, informed the Provincial Commissioner that it 
was “desirable” for “alien Natives” to settle in the Southern Province and/or enter into contracts to work 
in the province or other regions of Tanganyika.
325
 The southern provincial administration’s disfavor and 
suspicion of the PEA immigrants vanished when it became evident that the migrants provided a crucial 
labor reservoir for the southern economy.
326
 Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching reported in 1933, 
The Mawia have their critics and they are no doubt an unattractive and occasionally a tiresome 
feature in the administrative landscape, but in the present circumstances they are very valuable 
and, indeed, an almost indispensable addition to the economic resources of the Province.
 327
 
 
Plantation owners and industries in southern Tanganyika faced growing competition from plantations in 
the Tanga, Mahenge, and Moshi Provinces in hiring PEA and Tanganyika laborers.  By the mid-1930s, 
recruiters from estates in Musoma, Tanga, Moshi, and Mbeya regularly used motor vehicles to transport 
laborers from villages in the south.
328
 Motor vehicles cut in half the traditional nine to ten weeks it took 
laborers to travel to northern plantations by foot.
329
 Officials remarked that laborers transported by lorries 
arrived at their employment “as fit and strong as when they left their villages and not, as formerly, in a 
state of physical and nervous exhaustion.”330 
                                                          
323
 DSM, Grierson, “Lindi Province,” Annual Report 1931. 
324
 BNA FCO 141/17729, Provincial Commissioner C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1931. 
325
 TNA ACC 16, 13/60, L.S. Waterall (Chief Secretary) to Provincial Commissioner, February 1932, 4. 
326
 BNA FCO 141/17729, Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 9 September 1930, 23 February 1933, and 4 April 1933; 
TNA ACC 16, 13/60, Lindi Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, January 1932. 
327
 TNA ACC 16, 13/25 Annual Labour Reports, “Lindi Province Annual Report of Labour 1933,” Acting Provincial 
Commissioner (Southern Province), 27 January 1934.  
328
 DSM, Kitching, “Southern Province,” Annual Report 1936.  
329
 ibid. 
330
 Ibid. In the north, officials expressed concerns about the new migrants that mirrored concerns expressed earlier 
in the southern districts. The Tanga Labour Officer reported that P.E.A. laborers were “notorious thieves” who 
raided plantations at night. The District Officers of Tanga, Korogwe, and Pangani agreed with the Labour Officer’s 
assessment that the immigrants were “quiet undisciplined and wander about at will from estate to estate. […] I 
look upon these natives without proper control as being a decided danger to law and order.” The Labor Officer, 
however, failed in his attempt to gain administrative support in stopping the flow of immigrant labor. A.E. Kitching 
reported that it was “administratively impracticable to restrict the movements of these immigrants. Further, any 
213 
 
 Poor road conditions, which inhibited transport in the rainy season and drove up transport costs, 
remained the main problem with motor transport. The average cost of transporting migrant laborers (per 
head) by motor vehicle, rail, and/or steamer from the Southern Province to plantations in the Eastern and 
Tanga Provinces were the highest recorded in the Territory in 1931/32.
331
 
Table 3.6 Comparative Transport Rates (rail, automobile, and/or steamer) for Laborers, 1931-32 
From To 
Lindi* 
Shs. Cts. 
To 
Mikindani* 
Shs. Cts. 
To 
Morogoro 
Shs. Cts. 
To  Dar es 
Salaam 
Shs. Cts. 
To 
Handeni  
Shs. Cts. 
To 
Pangani 
Shs. Cts 
To Tanga 
Shs. Cts. 
Songea 19   05 20   50 22  65 26  35 27  45 30  65  31  75 
Tunduru 10   85 12   30 30  95 34  65   35  75  38  95  40  05 
Masasi 4   55   6    00 - - - - - 
Tukuyu - - 22  60 26  30 27  40 30  60 31  70 
Njombe - - 17  90 25  60 22  70 25  90 27  00 
Mwanza - - 14  70 16  90 20  80 24  00 25  10 
Tabora - - 10  40 12  60 16  50 19  70 20  80 
Singida - - 10  00 12  30 15  00 18  20 19  30 
Iringa - - 9   95 13  60 14  75 17  95 19  05 
* “Motor transport throughout. Motor road to Mikindani via Mingoyo.” 
Recognizing that the quick and efficient transport of migrant laborers was essential to the provincial and 
territorial economy, the southern provincial administrations consulted Carnegie Browne of TTCo in 1932 
about the best and cheapest routes to transport migrant laborers by automobile from Masasi, Tunduru, and 
Songea to plantations in Tanga. He suggested two options, but he believed that neither was practical. The 
first required the transport of recruits eastward along the Lindi-Songea road to the coast, and then 
shipping them to Tanga. This option was too expensive. The second option required the recruits to be 
driven westward to Songea and then north via Mahenge, Ifakara, and Korogwe. They would travel the 
rest of the way by rail. Carnegie Browne did not favor this option,  
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[…] on account of the enormous distance, and on account of the fact that lorries, or ‘buses’ or 
even tractor with train of trailers would be unladen for most of the return journey. Furthermore 
the road from Songea to Mahenge is too arduous for the maintenance of anything but a most 
expensive service.
332
 
 
The customary transport of laborers’ wives and families would have further increased costs for labor 
recruiters and estate owners. The impracticality of transporting laborers by road, however, did not 
outweigh TTCo’s ambitions to turn a profit. The company offered to drive laborers from Songea to Lindi 
and Tunduru to Lindi under a government contract for Shs. 10/- and Shs. 7.50 per person respectively.
333
 
The 1930s ultimately witnessed rising competition between transportation firms and labor recruiters over 
the right to transport laborers. The Acting District Officer of Songea observed the disadvantage transport 
companies faced in having to comply with the Traffic Ordinance and Traffic Rules of 1932. Whereas 
companies needed a license to transport passengers and could not drive more than 15 miles per hour, a 
labor recruiter could “put 40 persons or more on board [the exact same vehicle] and drive at 50 miles an 
hour and yet not commit any offence.”334  The Acting D.O. advocated easing traffic restrictions in 1937 
so as to alleviate the territory’s labor difficulties: 
I would put forward the opinion that the solution of the labour problem in this Territory lies in 
rapid, easy and cheap transport to and from the labourer’s homes and the employment areas with 
as great a freedom as possible from obnoxious and irritating restrictions, but the interest of the 
labourers should be protected against the use of unsatisfactory and dangerous vehicles whether by 
transport companies, estates or labour recruiters.
335
 
 
Provincial Commissioner Kitching similarly advocated the introduction of cheap motor transport for 
contracted and independent laborers.
336
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 In 1938, Kitching reported that all contracted and many independent migrant laborers from 
southern Tanganyika insisted upon motorized transport for themselves and their families on their outward 
and homeward journeys.
337
 When assessing the role of motor vehicle transport in Tanganyika, the Central 
Development Committee of 1939 concluded that, 
[…] road transport is the most intimate to man’s life and his activities and the framework on 
 which economic development is erected. Without it no increased production is advantageous, no 
 more intensified form of transport is necessary, no accumulation of wealth is obtainable, and no 
 improvement in social condition is possible. It forms the bridge between labour and its reward.
338
 
 
British officers, however, were unable to effectively regulate the new form of mobility used by traders, 
laborers, and agricultural producers. Migrant laborers chose the location, duration, and conditions of their 
employment based upon their knowledge of labor markets and the needs of their personal economy, rather 
than the desires of the colonial state or private recruiters. Despite their hideous conditions, the Lindi-
Songea main road and various district roads of the Southern Province were increasingly utilized as 
avenues of opportunity and prosperity for Indian traders, African cultivators, and migrant laborers moving 
across district, provincial, and territorial borders.    
Conclusion 
 
 Historians have viewed the interwar era as the period when southern Tanganyika’s isolation and 
impoverishment solidified.
339
 Instability defined life on both sides of the Ruvuma border in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War. Exploitation and violence committed by European officers and African 
police in northern PEA drove thousands of individuals across the Ruvuma border into Tanganyika. Once 
there, they encountered an underfunded, undermanned, and inexperienced British administration 
struggling to rebuild the regional economy and impose law and order. Numerous abuses were committed 
in southern Tanganyika as the administration attempted to stimulate the regional economy and strengthen 
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colonial authority through infrastructure “development” schemes. Unknown numbers of Africans were 
forced to construct roads despite pressures from the ILO and League of Nations to stop compulsory labor 
practices in the 1920s and 1930s. While some Africans utilized road construction to supplement 
household production, many came to view roads as symbols of colonial oppression. Joshua Grace argued 
that the use of compulsory road labor in Tanganyika transformed roads,  
[…] from a technology through which Africans could be turned into controllable, wage earning, 
and tax-paying subjects into hated sites of forced labor. […] First touted as an answer to African 
slavery by abolitionist in the 1870s, in oral histories, colonial road labor is recalled as yet another 
form of enslavement.
340
 
 
The use of compulsory labor ultimately failed to rectify the major deficiencies in the southern roadways. 
The PWD and private contractors similarly failed to implement year-round work programs to improve the 
region’s road system to an all-weather, motorable standard. While many regions in Tanganyika suffered 
from inadequate infrastructure during the interwar era, the dilapidated roads of the Southern Province 
became a powerful symbol of the region’s isolation and poverty.341 The lack of an all-weather road from 
Lindi to Dar es Salaam, in particular, came to represent the region’s literal and metaphysical 
disconnection from the rest of the territory. As Pekka Seppälä explained, the lack of roads was interpreted 
as a lack of modernity; differentiating the active “modern” people of Dar es Salaam and northern 
Tanganyika from the passive, “traditional” people of the southern periphery.342 
 When examining the history of road transportation in southern Tanganyika, however, one 
recognizes that the interwar era was not simply a period of intensified isolation and impoverishment. 
While southern Tanganyika was certainly isolated from and neglected by the colonial state, it remained 
part of a dynamic borderland. Africans, Asians, and Europeans residing in the borderland embraced and 
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exploited the lack of state intervention and services to their advantage. Ex-soldiers (like “Dynamite Dan” 
and the nine poachers) exploited the lawlessness of the border for their personal wealth. Private 
contractors (like TTCo and Roberts) profited from the lack of state-funded road construction and 
transportation services. They helped construct and maintain the main transportation artery of the south – 
the Lindi-Songea main road – while Indian wholesalers and retailers expanded the motor vehicle 
transportation sector in order to strengthen their dominance over intra- and inter-regional trade networks. 
African cultivators and migrant laborers from northern PEA and southern Tanganyika exploited the lack 
of border enforcement, the growing network of Indian dukas, and vehicle transportation services to pursue 
socioeconomic opportunities across provincial and territorial borders. The southern roadways were 
simultaneously and paradoxically symbols of the southern Tanganyika’s alleged backwardness and 
resilience. The roads were poor, yet they served as integral life-lines for wholesalers, retailers, migrant 
laborers, and producers. The interwar era crystalized negative perceptions of southern Tanganyika among 
outsiders, while at the same time the autonomy and self-reliance of the local populace, private firms, and 
district administrators were strengthened. As southern Tanganyika shifted from a marginalized, peripheral 
borderland of the British Empire to a region at the heart of Britain’s “second colonial occupation” after 
the Second World War, these independent firms and entrepreneurs often prospered – building upon their 
existing networks with local communities, traders, and colonial officers.   
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Chapter 4  
World War II and Postwar Colonial Development in Southern Tanganyika (1939-1954) 
 
 The onset of the Second World War signaled a significant shift in British colonial policy as the 
state took a more active and interventionist approach towards trade, agricultural production, education, 
health, and labor throughout the British Empire. Southern Tanganyika, however, remained a neglected 
periphery that received minimal funding from a central administration prioritizing the needs of more 
lucrative and better connected provinces. The Tanganyika government refused to allocate resources to 
improve the region’s infrastructure despite repeated petitions from the southern provincial administration 
and private sector. Scrutiny of private road construction contractors, instead, intensified and threatened to 
undermine the cooperative state-civilian relationship that enabled the restoration and improvement of the 
southern infrastructure and economy during the interwar era. After struggling through another war, 
southern Tanganyika drew attention as the British Empire entered into a new era of colonial development. 
The postwar British state envisioned and utilized colonial development as a way to rebuild the national 
economy and justify the continuance of imperialism. Tanganyika and it southern borderland became the 
central targets of one of the largest development schemes attempted in the Empire, the East African 
Groundnut Scheme. Millions of pounds were invested to transform the agricultural and transportation 
landscape of Tanganyika through mechanized clearing and construction techniques. The construction of a 
new port and railway in southern Tanganyika attracted private investors, who sought to exploit the 
region’s untapped agricultural, timber, water, and mineral resources.  
 The Groundnut Scheme and many of the other development programs implemented in the 
“Cinderella Province” during the 1950s ended in failure. A central reason why the schemes did not 
succeed was because the Tanganyika government and development contractors failed to accurately 
identify and rectify southern Tanganyika’s transportation problems. The British state and development 
planners invested in the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port without devising strategies to deal 
with the adverse environmental conditions and highly mobile labor force that threatened to undermine 
both projects. They also disregarded the immense challenges of reorienting the southern economy around 
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new transportation facilities when the region’s migrant laborers, traders, and cultivators were accustomed 
to utilizing road transportation to pursue opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland. The 
state invested millions of pounds into a poorly designed, constructed, and maintained railway, while 
allowing the roads to gradually deteriorate under the strain of hundreds of vehicles and thousands of tons 
of cargo. The hybrid system of road development collapsed as the British state relied upon new British 
contractors to maintain roads in a region that they neither knew nor cared for, especially once it became 
apparent that the Groundnut Scheme was a failure. The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme and Southern 
Province Railway confirmed to outsiders that southern Tanganyika was incapable of “development.” In 
reality, the state failed because it ignored and/or overlooked local initiative and knowledge. The inability 
of the state to transform southern Tanganyika’s transportation infrastructure, however, unexpectedly 
created an opportunity for an ambitious Indian family to build one of the largest road transportation firms 
in the Territory.  
The Second World War in Southern Tanganyika: Increased State Intervention and Deteriorating 
Transportation Infrastructure 
 
 When Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared war with Germany on September 3, 1939, 
Governor Mark Young immediately enacted war measures in Tanganyika. Arrests of all male enemy 
nationals commenced.
1
 The colonial government called up the military reserves, increased police 
strength, and enacted a host of special ordinances.
2
 As the war progressed and the Allies suffered defeats 
in Southeast Asia, British perceptions of the colonies and their role within the Empire underwent 
significant changes. The British state embraced a highly interventionist approach towards colonial 
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production, trade controls, coordination of money payments, bulk purchase agreements, imperial 
preference, and sterling usage throughout the Empire.
3
 Tanganyika and the other colonies endured higher 
consumer prices and rationing of resources as a result of the Secretary of State for the Colonies ordering 
the extension of import controls in 1941.
4
 People throughout Tanganyika could not attain desirable 
commodities, such as “cooking pots, enameled ware, knives, lamps, and so forth, up to and including 
bicycles and sewing machines […]; piece goods, expensive and shoddy, alone formed a limited 
attraction.”5 The Tanganyika government instituted a system of price controls to prevent the “unnecessary 
increase in prices” and minimize profiteering. The controls were partially successful. There was not a 
dearth of essential goods in southern Tanganyika as during the First World War when most Africans were 
reduced to bark cloth.
6
 The price of some commodities (like cloth), however, skyrocketed.
7
 As import 
prices rose, the prices the state paid for exports from the territory fell.
8
 Tax collections suffered and the 
                                                          
3
 J.M. Lee and Martin Petter, The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy (London: M.T. Smith for the Institute 
for Commonwealth Studies, 1982); and Michael Cowen and Nicholas Westcott, “British Imperial Economic Policy 
During the War” in Africa and the Second World War, eds. David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1986): 20-67. The sterling became the major international currency with Britain’s ascension as the 
world’s premier creditor and greatest exporter of new capital in the 19
th
 century. After the collapse of the gold 
standard during the Great Depression, the British created the Sterling Bloc/Area with its dominions and dependent 
colonies. The Sterling Bloc was intended to maintain the sterling as a stable currency. The Bloc also acted as a 
mechanism to preserve Britain’s access to overseas markets and sources of supplies. In order to defend its 
currency against the dollar, the British instituted a system of exchange restrictions that limited expenditure in and 
imports from the Dollar Area. For more information about the Sterling Bloc, see Allister Hinds, Britain’s Sterling 
Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958 (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001).  
4
 BNA CO 691/184/12 Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences 1940-42, “Provincial Commissioner’s 
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th
-16
th
 May 1941,” 21. 
5
 BNA CO 822/130/2 Labour: Report by Orde-Browne, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, “Labour Conditions in East 
Africa,” (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1946). Orde Browne reported that thefts of stores and houses became 
common as goods became scarcer. 
6
 DSM, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province,” Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of Provincial Commissioner on 
Native Administration for the year 1941 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1942), 40. The price of cloth 
increased 100% by 1941. Foster used the exorbitant cloth prices as justification for not increasing taxation rates in 
the Southern Province in 1944. See BNA CO 691/184/13 Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences 1943, 
“Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, Dar es Salaam, 23
rd
-27
th
 August 1943,” 19. 
7
 BNA CO 691/184/12, “Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, Dar es Salaam, 12
th
-16
th
 May 1941,” 21. The 
importation of essential foods from the United Kingdom was also controlled. For statistics and debates about 
Tanganyika’s monthly allocations and average annual imports, see BNA CO 852/327/3 Food Supplies Tanganyika 
Territory, 1940. 
8 DSM, A.E. Kitching, “Southern Province,” Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1940 
(Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1941). 
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territorial revenue dried up, resulting in drastic cuts in funding and staff.
9
  The government minimally 
invested in regions with clear military strategic importance or the potential to generate significant profits 
in the form of cash crops and mineral extraction. Southern Tanganyika was not a priority, despite serving 
as a vital labor reservoir and food producing region – or the “Granary of the Territory.”10 Former British 
Officer Charles Innes Meek offered a bleak assessment of the Southern Province and its capital of Lindi 
during the war.
11
 As Meek offloaded from the T.R.S. Azania as a new cadet in July 1941, he immediately 
“understood the looks of commiseration” he received in Dar es Salaam when he named his post.12 Lindi 
was “a dump”: 
A squalid little African township, a handful of Indian shops with little to sell as wartime shortages 
got worse; a fringe of European houses along an unappetising beach and some more straggling up 
the hill behind; a seedy little hotel and a club with a single tennis court and a parched nine-hole 
golf course; that was it.
13
  
 
 The Southern Province’s isolation and impoverishment intensified during World War II. The 
hybrid system of road development created during the interwar era began to crumble as conflict mounted 
between the central state in Dar es Salaam, the southern provincial administration, local employers, and 
road construction firms. The southern administration and private sector fought against transportation 
policies issued by the central administration that threatened to cripple the regional economy. As officers 
and employers demanded that the state invest in the southern infrastructure, the Public Works Department 
(PWD) turned against the private firms that maintained the Lindi-Songea main road. The regional 
                                                          
9
 TNA Native Affairs 28887/5 Produce Marketing Under War Conditions Southern Province, Lindi Provincial 
Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 25 July 1940 to 22 October 1940.  
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 BNA CO 691/133/6 Alleviation of Famine Relief in Lindi Province 1933, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir 
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 Meek, Brief Authority, 33. 
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economy and infrastructure suffered as the cooperative relationship between the state and private 
enterprises unraveled.  
 Relations first began to sour when the central administration imposed a territorial-wide 
transportation policy in 1941 to reduce petrol consumption and the “wear and tear on motor vehicles.”14 
The number of private and public vehicles in Tanganyika had risen steadily since the Great Depression. 
Table 4.1 Licensed Vehicles in Tanganyika Territory
15
 
Year Motor 
Cycles 
Taxi  
Cabs 
Other  
Cars 
Total 
Cars 
Public Service 
Vehicles 
Other 
Vehicles 
Total 
Lorries 
1933 510 84 1,630 1,714 187 938 1,125 
1934 483 106 1,758 1,864 239 1,040 1,279 
1935 436 112 1,981 2,093 283 1,212 1,505 
1936 424 118 2,296 2,414 290 1,387 1,677 
1937 448 N/A N/A 2,703 N/A N/A 1,863 
1938 491 89 2,864 2,953 311 1,420 1,731 
1939 490 156 2,812 2,968 311 1,273 1,584 
1940 403 76 2,661 2,737 330 976 1,306 
1941 373 125 2,533 2,660 293 1,004 1,297 
1942 370 116 2,264 2,380 179 1,089 1,268 
1943 345 40 2,235 2,275 144 1,093 1,227 
 
Although motorcars and cycles were looked upon as “necessities in the business and private life of the 
community,” they consumed large quantities of petrol and rubber needed for the war.16 Under the new 
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 TNA ACC 16 Mtwara, 4/9 Communication, Roads: Closing and Opening of Roads and General Instructions, 
Volume 2, Acting Director of Public Works (C.H. Reynolds) to the Acting Chief Secretary, 23 September 1927; and 
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 J.R. Farquharson, Tanganyika Transport A Review (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1945), 17. Michael 
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767 (1942), 874 (1943), 913 (1944), 371 (1945), and 1,716 (1946). (See Michael Havinden and David Meredith, 
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Director of Public Works, McLuckie, found the Territory’s motor transport industry “unhealthy” in 1940 because it 
was “largely in the hands of the American manufactures.” See TNA F2 (Customs and Trade), 25989 Encouragement 
of British Motor Manufacturers, Director of Public Works McLuckie to Surridge, 29 April 1940. 
16
 Farquharson, Tanganyika Transport A Review, 17. 
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transportation policy, only vehicles with a valid permit could travel along the Lindi-Songea main road. 
District Officers could not issue petrol permits for the carriage of goods coastwise by automobile except 
during the rainy season.
17
 Any person caught traveling without a permit was liable to steep fines ranging 
from three hundred to five hundred shillings or imprisonment up to three months per infraction.
18
 Road 
traffic was redirected towards coastal steamship services. The Tanganyika government arranged for the 
T.R.S. Azania to run fortnightly services from Dar es Salaam and Mafia to the three southern ports in 
1941. Provincial Commissioner L.H.L. Foster sent a confidential letter ordering the District 
Commissioners in Lindi, Kilwa, and Mikindani “to see to it that Azania is employed to the fullest possible 
extent for the transport of government and Native Treasury personnel and stores. You must also do your 
utmost to persuade merchants to use the services.”19  
 The central administration’s transportation policy was a complete failure. Local merchants 
refused to use the Azania because the steam line refused to give merchants a customary 10% rebate.
20
 The 
permit system, in turn, could not be enforced due to a lack of personnel. The Senior Agricultural Officer 
reported that local traders “while politely accepting the permits, generally went about their own affairs as 
they pleased.”21 Even if local merchants had reconsidered using steamers, they were unlikely to find any 
in the southern ports after 1941. The Admiralty ordered the suspension of regular steamer services to the 
south in 1942 in order to support Tanga-Dar es Salaam railway traffic. Provincial Commissioner Foster 
reported that the infrequent and erratic nature of the coastal services caused a “considerable loss of 
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 TNA 16, 4/9/Vol. 2, “Warning of Restriction of Traffic on Highways,” Road Authority to Public Works Department 
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 TNA ACC 16, 4/10 Government Steamer Services (Lindi), L.H.L. Foster (Provincial Commissioner) to the District 
Commissioners of Lindi, Kilwa, and Mikindani, 2 September 1941.  
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 DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” Tanganyika Territory: Annual Reports of the Provincial 
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efficiency” throughout the province.22 Approximately 105 tons of groundnuts intended for the Economic 
Control Board rotted at the customs house at Mikindani port because a steamer never arrived. Mtama 
(sorghum) supplies urgently required for famine relief in the Central Province were similarly delayed. 
The Southern Province was prepared to export 35,000 tons of produce in 1942 – 13,000 tons more than in 
1941 – but there was nowhere for it go. With limited storage facilities, dhows worked at “full capacity” to 
export produce within and beyond the province while also fulfilling local needs. As the Southern Province 
struggled to export produce, it also suffered from a lack of essential imports. Kilwa reported that erratic 
shipping in 1943 and 1944 caused chronic shortages on flour, sugar, ghee, wheat, tea, and cigarettes. The 
Kilwa Merchant Syndicate was particularly frustrated when their shipment of Indian textiles arrived two 
months late (September 1944). The Syndicate tried to get a petrol permit, but the Economic Control 
Board refused the application, arguing that the textiles would eventually be sent by the Azania. The 
decision sent repercussion throughout the provincial economy, as coastal merchants were short of money 
at the beginning of the trade season.
23
 The failing transportation system similarly undermined the 
Tanganyika Sisal Growers’ Association’s (TSGA) operations: 
 Traveling by road is objected to by the Authorities on the grounds of consumption of petrol, wear 
 and tears of tyres, while sea facilities are spasmodic and that too with limited passenger 
 accommodation.
24
   
 
 Although it was apparent that mechanized road transportation was the only reliable form of 
mobility available in the Southern Province (besides foot traffic), the central administration refused to 
invest in road maintenance or improvement. There were no metaled roads in the province and practically 
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 TNA ACC 16, 4/10, Provincial Commissioner L.H.L. Foster to Chief Secretary, 13 January 1943, 34. 
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all roads and bridges were closed during the rains.
25
 The only “all-weather” road was the Lindi-Masasi 
section of the main road, but it too frequently closed during the rainy season. The southern provincial 
administration and private enterprises issued a chorus of complaints towards the central administration 
and demanded that it increase resource allocations to improve the southern infrastructure. The Senior 
Agricultural Officer found it ludicrous that roads were annually closed and bridges removed even though 
it was clear that “Lorry transport is the life-line of this province as all produce must come from the 
hinterland to the coast.”26 When Vickers-Haviland returned to the Southern Province as the new 
Provincial Commissioner in 1944, he wrote to the Director of Public Works (DPW) in utter disbelief at 
the state of the Southern Province’s road transportation system: 
 […] it is obvious from what I have already seen that road communications here play such a vital 
 part in the evacuation of produce that considerably more attention must be given to them. I think 
 that you will agree that the condition of many of the roads is far inferior to that of roads of similar 
 grades in other parts of the Territory and the consequent wear and tear on lorries and tyres is most 
 uneconomic and contrary to the Economic Control Board’s policy which is to conserve transport 
 vehicles as much as possible.
27
 
 
The Secretary of the Economic Control Board, F. Crawford, also wrote a letter to the DPW arguing that 
the “fact that the Southern Province is at present the only considerable net exporter of foodstuff merits the 
most favourable consideration being given to their road and transport requirements.”28 The response by 
the Director of Public Works was swift and blunt. While he agreed that the conditions of certain roads in 
the Southern Province were “far inferior to that of roads of similar grades in other parts of the Territory,” 
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 The main bridge crossing the Mbwemkuru River in Liwale District, for example, was literally picked up and set 
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he could not accommodate Haviland’s requests.29 Roads in the Southern Province did not have the same 
military and public service importance as roads elsewhere.
30
  
 
Figure 4.1 Motor Traffic Density, Tanganyika, 1945
31
 
 
The Director concluded that while the “need is fully recognised, and has been the subject of close 
personal study by myself in your predecessor’s time,” no additional staffing, funding, or machinery would 
be made available in the foreseeable future.
32
   
 The PWD tried to redirect frustration from itself and the central state towards the private 
contracting firms responsible for the maintenance of the Lindi-Songea main road. At the onset of the war, 
a few District Officers and private estate owners (like the Honorable A. King of the Ngurumahamba 
Estate) issued complaints about the seasonal work schedules employed by L. Rousham Roberts and the 
Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. (TTCo). They wanted continuous road and bridge maintenance in 
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30
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order to accommodate the rising traffic rates among district officers and private traders.
33
 Tunduru 
District Officer Charles S. Hall’s discontent with the private contractors reached its apex in 1942 when he 
suggested giving TTCo’s maintenance contract to “local Indians.” He believed “that they would make a 
better job than would the T.T.Co. because they have a more personal interest in the road being all-
weather.”34 The DPW used this criticism to his advantage. Rather than focusing on the inability of the 
state to provide resources for the southern infrastructure, the Director conducted a series of road 
inspections that highlighted the contractors’ failings. The DPW’s 1941 assessment criticized TTCo’s 
efforts. He identified numerous examples of “very poor and badly cut” drainage, severe erosion and 
scouring along roadways, rotten bridge bearers, and poor alignments in which the road “twists to no 
purpose.”35 The Director was still dissatisfied by TTCo’s progress the following year, and issued a 
warning that the company needed to improve the road’s alignment, bridges, and erosion problems 
immediately or lose its contract.
36
  
 Neither TTCo nor Roberts shrank from the mounting criticism, but instead vigorously defended 
their operations and the continuation of their contracts. Both contractors blamed the lack of state funding 
for any deficiencies in their operations. Roberts argued that the government’s allocation of seven pounds 
per mile in 1941 was insufficient to conduct extensive repairs, especially on the sandy soils that were 
made worse by rising, heavy vehicle traffic.
37
 More funds were also needed to retain a permanent labor 
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force to conduct year-round maintenance.
38
 Two years later, Roberts again stated that if the government 
increased its rates per mile he could improve his stretch of the main road to “practically all weather, at 
least one could always get along without too much differoulty [difficulty]” within two to three years. 39  
Whereas Roberts adopted a more apologetic tone when corresponding with the colonial state, TTCo took 
a more confrontational stance towards government criticism.
40
 When the DPW requested that TTCo 
construct a permanent bridge across the Muhuwezi River (200 ft. wide and 25 ft. high in flood) in 1941, 
Carnegie Browne flatly refused.
41
 The alternative of operating a pontoon ferry was equally unreasonable. 
Carnegie Browne argued that his company lacked the resources to improve the river banks and purchase 
and install the necessary steel pontoon along a steel cable. TTCo was willing to oversee a pontoon service 
if the Public Works Department installed it. TTCo was also willing to keep the main road open 
throughout the year if the government paid an additional Shs. 4,700 per year so that the company could 
employ the necessary one laborer per mile.
42
 Without additional funds, TTCo could only construct timber 
bridges, earth embankments, and other works “not requiring special technical knowledge.” When the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Maintenance Contract: Returns of Labourers, L. Rousham Roberts to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Return 
Records,” 3 November 1939. Roberts argued that the dilapidated road condition in Songea District was a 
consequence of heavy trucks carrying upwards of four tons of cargo – two tons more than in the 1930s. These 
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 TNA ACC 16, 4/36, “Labour Return Records,” L. Rousham Roberts to the Provincial Commissioner, 13 March 
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 TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), L. Rousham Roberts to Director of Public Works, “Songea-Tunduru Main Road,” 15 
August 1943.  
40
 Roberts submitted detailed progress reports and frequently apologized for failures reported in government road 
inspections. The apologies were quickly followed by a variety of excuses and/or justifications. See Roberts’ 
correspondence in TNA ACC 16, 4/36. 
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DPW renewed his criticism in 1942, Carnegie Browne again went on the offensive.
43
 He not only 
provided evidence that extra gangs had been specifically assigned to the repairs required by the Director, 
but also argued that the Director’s emphasis on erosion wasted money that should have been directed 
towards new road alignments. Carnegie Browne ultimately highlighted the PWD’s lack of local expertise 
and its failure to offer enough funds to allow private contractors to abandon their seasonal work programs 
and construct an all-weather road network in the Southern Province.
44
  
 In the end, Roberts and TTCo maintained their contracts throughout the war, but neither received 
additional funding from the colonial state.
45
 The Tanganyika government and southern administration 
simply lacked a viable alternative to the contractors. The PWD staff in the Southern Province consisted of 
two officers overwhelmed with building construction, sanitation, water works, and road maintenance for 
the Lindi-Masasi section and all Grade “A” district roads.46 Provincial Commissioner L.A.W. Vickers-
Haviland commended the men’s efforts, but bluntly reported that their work was “not adequate to the 
needs of the province,” which was equivalent to the size of England and Wales.47 The undermanned and 
underfunded District Officers similarly struggled to maintain nearly 2,000 miles of District Grade “B” 
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and village roads.
48
 These officers reportedly had the “best will in the world,” yet “lacked the experience, 
training and time to produce the best results for expenditure.”49 Road maintenance funding and operations 
continued to fall to the Native Treasuries, Native Authorities, and local headmen.
50
 In Liwale District, for 
example, a road foreman (named Muhuruti) traveled by bicycle to review and supervise maintenance 
operations throughout the district.
51
 While the District Commissioner credited Muhuruti and a local 
foreman with doing “their best,” they were not properly trained. Inadequate skilled labor, supervision, 
labor camps, rations, and water supplies further inhibited proper road maintenance.
52
 
 Despite rising state-local tensions, the hybrid system of road development in southern 
Tanganyika remained intact throughout the duration of World War II. Private contractors and local 
African communities maintained the roads that served as life-lines for southern Tanganyika’s economy 
and colonial administration. As vehicular traffic rates and the cost of road maintenance rose, however, 
these private agents found themselves without the finances, staff, and equipment necessary to construct 
and/or maintain a sustainable road system against adverse environmental conditions and mounting traffic 
densities. The southern economy suffered as transportation costs rose due to the deplorable road surfaces, 
costly vehicle breakdowns, annual road closures, and recurrent petrol shortages.
53
 Producers and traders 
found it uneconomical to transport low priced foodstuffs by automobile from an area more than 130 miles 
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from the southeastern ports.
54
 The situation was so bad, that it was reportedly “impossible to market 
Songea wheat flour in competition with flour so far away as Australia.”55 As another world war came to a 
close, southern Tanganyika remained a neglected and isolated region within a peripheral territory of the 
British Empire. Provincial Commissioner Vickers-Haviland aptly compared the Southern Province with 
“‘the stone that the builders rejected.’”56 The continual failure of the Tanganyika government to invest in 
the south’s transportation infrastructure not only hampered the economic growth of the region, but also 
had lasting and damaging repercussions for the colonial state’s ambitious postwar development plans.  
Postwar and Positive Development 
 
 The conclusion of the Second World War witnessed a new era in colonial rule and development 
throughout the British Empire. Two visions of colonial development – humanitarian and Chamberlainite 
– reemerged as avenues by which the British government could stabilize, defend, and reinvigorate the 
nation and empire. Under the leadership of Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Office embraced a constructive, 
positive vision of colonial development that aimed to improve the social and economic welfare of 
indigenous peoples in the colonies. The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 were 
passed with the intention of supporting welfare-oriented, colonial development programs. The British 
government publicly embraced the positivist rhetoric and mission of colonial development in order to 
justify the continuance of the Empire against international and colonial criticism of imperialism.
57
 In 
reality, it financed “Chamberlainite”-oriented development schemes that maximized the extraction of 
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colonial resources for the benefit of the British national economy.
58
 The top priorities of the postwar 
British government, Treasury, and Board of Trade were stabilizing and reviving the national economy, 
strengthening the Sterling Area, and balancing payments with the United States.
59
 In order to meet these 
objectives, the British state continued to embrace a highly interventionist approach towards colonial 
production, trade controls, coordination of money payments, bulk purchase agreements, imperial 
preference, and sterling usage throughout the Empire.
60
 The British retained wartime monopolistic trade 
conditions and erected barriers to prevent colonies from spending their colonial sterling reserves, which 
had accumulated in London during the war. The British used the reserves to support the pound and 
stabilize the metropolitan economy. In order to improve Britain’s balance of payment crisis, the colonies 
were also expected to curb imports from and increase exports to dollar areas.
 
After the British government 
failed to restore the pound to full international convertibility in 1947, it dedicated more resources towards 
colonial development schemes that would increase the production and exportation of dollar earning and 
dollar saving commodities.
61
 Atlee’s postwar Labour administration ultimately adopted a pragmatic and 
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paternalistic approach towards colonial development; leaning on Africa as a solution to Britain’s 
economic problems while hiding behind a welfarist rhetoric.
62
  
Putting Cinderella on the Center Stage: Southern Tanganyika and the Groundnut Scheme 
 A more interventionist, centralized, and homogenized colonial state in London oversaw the 
“second colonial occupation” in Africa following the Second World War.63 With the assistance of the 
Colonial Development Corporation, the colonial state organized over seventy major agricultural 
development plans and numerous cooperative farming, resettlement, drainage, and irrigation endeavors 
throughout the Empire.
64
 In order to defray costs and quiet accusations of exploitation, the late colonial 
state encouraged private investors and experts to participate in colonial development schemes.
65
 Private 
enterprises pinpointed Tanganyika as a territory ripe for investment. Frank Samuel, Managing Director of 
United African Company (UAC), was particularly captivated by the economic potential of Tanganyika.
66
 
In March 1946, Samuel advocated a massive, high-cost development scheme aimed at alleviating the 
worldwide shortage of fats and oils. Named the East African Groundnut Scheme, the plan originally 
called for the clearance of 2.5 million acres of unoccupied land in East Africa and the annual cultivation 
of 400,000 tons of shelled ground nuts.
67
 The development program would cost £8 million and produce an 
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estimated 160,000 tons of oil a year.
68
 The British government dispatched an official commission to East 
Africa in June 1946 to determine the viability of Samuel’s scheme.69 The former Director of Agriculture 
in Tanganyika and then Inspector General of Agriculture in the West Indies, A.J. Wakefield, led the 
commission as it completed a nine week tour over 13,000 miles of East Africa by air, road, and rail. The 
Wakefield Mission found in favor of the East African Groundnut Scheme. It set a more ambitious 
objective of clearing 3.21 million acres of land in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Northern Rhodesia by 1952 at 
a cost of £24 million.
70
 A total of 2.4 million acres would be cleared in Tanganyika, yielding 600,000 tons 
of shelled nuts. Fifty-five of the agricultural plots in Tanganyika were located in the Southern Province. 
Southern Tanganyika’s infrastructure required a massive upgrade for the clearing, planting, and 
production operations to proceed on schedule. The commission proposed the construction of a new port 
and railway at an estimated cost of £3,090,000.
71
  
 After a second detailed investigation, the British government decided to proceed immediately 
with the scheme advocated by the Wakefield Mission. The justifications offered in the White Paper (Cmd. 
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7030) – “A Plan for the Mechanised Production of Groundnuts in East and Central Africa” – interwove 
humanitarian and Chamberlainite development rhetoric. The Groundnut Scheme was intended to benefit 
African peoples, East African colonies, Britain, and the Empire: 
‘The progressive health, nutrition, housing, welfare and labour policies that will be integral parts 
of the scheme will not only raise the standard of life of the undertaking’s employees and their 
families; the increased national income and revenue from taxation will also make possible higher 
standards of living and better social services throughout the territories.’72 
 
However, a number of flawed assumptions under laid the Groundnut Scheme (GNS). The planners 
believed that the areas targeted for development were uninhabited “waste lands” that were “virtually 
unchanged from Biblical days.”73 They assumed that Africa was inflicted by an “agrarian problem” that 
required an “agricultural revolution.”74 Without Western scientific knowledge and technology, 
uneducated and incapable Africans would exhaust the soil to a point of no return.
75
 Development planners 
and supporters assumed that “primitive” indigenous communities and their “primitive methods” and tools 
of cultivation could and should be “modernized” with “the whole range of Western agricultural science – 
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the bulldozer, the tractor, soil analysis, fertilisers, rotation of crops and mechanical harvesting.”76 Frank 
Samuel envisioned the Groundnut Scheme as a “dramatic struggle with Nature”77 and an avenue for 
Africa’s ascension and prosperity: 
[The Groundnut Scheme would…] teach the African to be economically productive unit, and at 
the same time to rebuild the fertility of the soil by fertilisers and scientific agricultural methods; 
and so to lay a solid and sure foundation for a steady increase in the living standards of the 
African people.
78
 
 
According to Joseph Morgan Hodge, the Groundnut Scheme was to serve as “a showcase of what science, 
technology, and the state could achieve”.79 Jon Hogendorn and K.M. Scott argued that proponents of the 
scheme believed it would validate the benefits of governmental development policy while serving “as an 
example for the rest of Africa of such long-term benefits as improved productivity, health, social welfare, 
and prosperity”.80 Samuel and fellow development planners disregarded the practical reasons why 
cultivation was not attempted in the development areas – infertile soil, inadequate water, insufficient 
transportation, etc. – and assumed all obstacles would be overcome with technology. They shrugged off 
supply issues and assumed that they could resolve the scheme’s financial problems at a later date.81 They 
also assumed that it would be easy to procure thousands of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled laborers in 
remote locations.
82
 In the case of southern Tanganyika, planners failed to acknowledge that the region’s 
mobile labor force was accustomed to pursuing the best working conditions and wages regardless of 
distance and state objectives.    
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 Part of the blame for the false assumptions rested with the Tanganyika government. Both the 
Governor and Southern Provincial Commissioner approved of the scheme’s agricultural and infrastructure 
development projects.
83
 The Provincial Commissioner even encouraged additional cultivation in Tunduru 
and a railway extension to potential coal bearing areas in Songea.
84
 The southern provincial 
administration confidently predicted that tens of thousands of laborers would voluntarily turn out for 
work as long as they were offered reasonable wages, good working conditions, and an adequate supply of 
consumer goods.
85
 The southern provincial administration also assured Dar es Salaam and London that 
the road networks could handle heavy traffic while the railway was under construction. Although road 
transport was difficult from December to April, it was not impossible. Four-axel trailers and tractors 
could pass over wood bridges and culverts as long as they took precautions. These bridges and culverts, 
however, were designed for lighter two-ton lorries and annually washed away with the rains. London also 
received assurances that the PWD would improve the Lindi-Songea main road to an all-weather standard 
in a few months – a feat not completed in forty years of colonial rule.86 It is not surprising that the 
southern administration largely endorsed the GNS. Even with the foreseeable problems and lingering 
concerns, why would the administration say “no”?  Colonial officials were finally going to receive the 
infusion of finances, manpower, and modern equipment that they had been asking for the last thirty years 
in order to recreate the region’s physical and socioeconomic landscape.87 Provincial Commissioner J. 
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Rooke Johnston was filled with optimism that the GNS and the new transportation infrastructure would 
radically transform the Southern Province: 
As I close this report there is on the horizon a glimpse of a shining future for this neglected, 
‘isolated and backward’ Province, in a project which if successful cannot fail to bring in its train 
great social and economic benefits not only to its inhabitants, but to many more outside its 
boundaries. This project, which almost exceeds the limits of a dream, is the scheme for the mass 
production of groundnuts, in which progressive health, nutrition, housing, welfare and labour 
policies will all play an integral part and will raise the standard of living of all concerned to a 
higher level than has yet been contemplated. It will bring permanent benefits to an area which can 
almost be described as having been blasted and lain moribund since its people were decimated by 
the Germans in the Maji Maji rebellion in 1905-1906.
88
 
As the Groundnut Scheme got underway, Frank Samuel confidently prophesized, “‘I believe that in a 
hundred years’ time the historian of the development of Africa will regard the beginning of this scheme as 
marking the critical date in the agricultural progress of tropical Africa.’”89 The colonial state and 
development planners shared his conviction that millions of pounds, western scientific knowledge, and 
modern machinery could radically transform the East Africa physical and socioeconomic landscape in six 
short years.  
Dilemmas, Delays, and Disappointments 
 
 The United Africa Company Ltd. (UAC) became the Managing Agent of the Groundnut Scheme 
at the invitation of the Ministry of Food in 1947.
90
 They concentrated landing clearing and planting 
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operations in Kongwa (Tanganyika) because of the area’s proximity to the Central Railway. Planners also 
assumed that clearing would be the easiest there.
91
 To the south, development planners focused on 
upgrading southern Tanganyika’s transportation infrastructure before conducting land clearing and 
production operations. Railway construction, however, could not begin until the location of the port was 
chosen.
92
 After months of debate, a small technical mission recommended Mto Mtwara.
93
 The new port 
would have two deep water berths and connect to a 120 mile railway to Nachingwea.
94
 Development 
planners aimed to complete the new port and an oil pipeline from Mtwara to Nachingwea by 1948.
95
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Preliminary construction began in June and July 1947. Foreign personnel employed on the projects 
poured into the province “by every ship, charter plane and East African Airways Corporation.”96 Officers 
in Lindi and Mikindani boma (district headquarters) were overwhelmed every day by new arrivals 
requesting information and assistance.
97
 Progress on the infrastructure projects, however, was virtually 
nonexistent. When the first shiploads of rails (900 tons) were offloaded at the end of 1947, only nine 
miles of railway formation were complete.
98
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the only districts that planes could not yet land. The total cost of 25 flying hours was £55. After the war, the three 
British East African colonies created the East African Airways Corporation as an independent commercial company 
under the supervision of the East African High Commission. Although the company never received monopolistic 
rights over internal air travel in East Africa, it profited throughout the postwar era and began conducting 
international flights to England, Central Europe, and India in 1957. See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell 
Diaries, 1933; BNA FCO 141/17729 Southern Province Provincial Commissioner Monthly Newsletters 1930-35; Rolf 
Hofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, with particular reference to roads and road transport 
(München: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 63 and 71; Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation 1919-1939 
(Machester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 225; and Michael Dale Collins, “Forging a Modern Empire of the 
Air: Race and Gender in Early British Aeronautics, 1908-1933” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2014). 
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Figure 4.2 “Southern Province Railway and Pipeline,” June 1949
99
 
 
Throughout Tanganyika, the GNS was riddled with a myriad of issues, including: an underestimation of 
cost, lack of coordination, challenging physical terrain, fuel and water shortages, and inadequate 
machinery and transportation facilities.
100
 The UAC ultimately missed all of its construction and 
production deadlines for 1947. With only 7,500 acres under cultivation by March 1948 [instead of the 
target of 150,000 acres], the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC or Corporation) took responsibility for the 
Groundnut Scheme in April 1948.
101
 While the OFC was responsible for agricultural operations, private 
contractors conducted all land clearing, engineering, and building operations. The four major contractors 
in the south were John Mowlem and Co., Ltd. [land clearing and building], Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Co. 
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242 
 
Ltd. [Mtwara port], Messrs. Pauling and Company [Mtwara-Ruo railway section], and Taylor Woodrow 
& Co.[oil pipeline].
102
 The OFC and contractors struggled to fulfill their obligations. Deadlines were 
missed while costs rose steadily. The Mkwaya-Nachingwea railway branch opened on October 25, 1948, 
but the Mtwara-Ruo railway branch and Mtwara port remained far from complete.
103
 Only four of the 
2,500 50-ton blocks required for the deep-water berths had been made after eighteen months of work.
104
 
The Southern Provincial Commissioner did not expect the opening of the first deep-water berth until mid-
1951.
105
 His prediction was off by an additional two and a half years.   
 By the end of 1949, only 7,200 acres were cleared in the Southern Province, 50,000 acres in 
Urambo, and 90,000 acres in Kongwa.
106
  
Table 4.2 Expectations vs. Reality: Groundnut Scheme Progress 1947-1949
107
 
Year Original Program 
Acreage Cleared 
Original Program 
Acreage of Groundnuts 
 Actual Achievement 
Acreage Bush-flattened 
Actual Achievement 
Acreage Planted 
1947 150,000 150,000  13,750 7,500 
1948 600,000 600,000  78,400 48,800 
1949 1,455,000 1,230,000  167,000 84,500 
 
The Ministry of Food, Colonial Office, British Treasury, and British Parliament debated ending the 
Groundnut Scheme and accepting the loss of £30 million.
108
 The Minister of Food pressed for its 
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continuance, arguing that the scheme would strengthen the sterling area, improve domestic food rations, 
bring “development” to underdeveloped countries, and ensure global peace by fighting global hunger. 
The Minister admitted,  
[…] in some respects we under-estimated the difficulties of opening up Africa. Quite frankly the 
job has turned out to be bigger than we thought. Yet in the light of all the difficulties and all the 
criticisms I am convinced that today even more than in 1946, we still need to go ahead with this 
scheme.
109
 
 
The Treasury, OFC, and Tanganyika government ultimately reached a tripartite agreement allowing for 
the continuance of the scheme under a revised plan that concentrated on southern Tanganyika.
110
 The 
Groundnut Scheme, however, failed to recover. The OFC conceded in January 1951 that “the original 
aims of the scheme have proved incapable of fulfilment”.111 The OFC proposed another revised plan – the 
Long Term Plan – which involved “a radical change in the whole conception of the scheme.”112 Instead of 
exclusively producing groundnuts and oils, the Corporation would cultivate experimental agricultural 
plots that included food crops.
113
 To keep costs low, the European staff was drastically reduced and hand 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the scheme needed more time. The prestige of the British Colonial Administration would “suffer calamitously” 
in Africa and internationally (particularly in America) if the scheme was suddenly abandoned. One official noted 
that giving up the scheme would seem to prove critics right who said “that all we were after was cheap 
margarine.” The Ministry of Food also believed that the Treasury’s financial recommendations were wrong. They 
would “impose such a strait jacket on the Scheme […] Morale would suffer an intolerable blow and the effect on 
planning and operations would be disastrous.” See BNA CO 691/204/4, “Draft: Note of a Meeting at Dean Bradely 
House on Tuesday, 1
st
 November at 10.15am,” 1949; OFC Memo “Overseas Food Corporation: Memorandum on 
East African Groundnut Scheme,” G.S. Bishop (Ministry of Food) to A.B. Cohen (Colonial Officer) 30 September 
1949; handwritten note by the S.O.S., “The Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme,” 26 October 1949; and Folio #24, 6 
October 1949; Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 212; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 297-300. 
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labor largely replaced mechanical techniques.
114
 The Corporation acknowledged that their optimism for 
mechanical cultivation and disparagement of “traditional” production techniques in East Africa were 
mistaken: 
The short point which I wish to make is that the Corporation’s agriculture in Tanganyika has little 
or no advantage over comparable farming in East and Central Africa and has comparative 
disadvantages which need to be tackled.
115
  
 
The OFC’s new aim was determining if “unproductive bush can be economically developed for 
productive purposes.” 116   
 Although the Groundnut Scheme was in shambles, officials in Tanganyika remained committed 
to the completion of the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port.
117
 The administration argued that 
Southern Tanganyika had “all the natural resources required for general prosperity.”118 The region 
seemingly offered an unlimited supply of land that could be utilized by Africans and “non-natives” in a 
range of enterprises, including the cultivation of exportable foodstuffs and high-value cash crops, the 
production of hydro-electric power, and the exploitation of timber and mineral resources.
119
 The British 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
crops (maize, sorghum, and millet), cotton, and tobacco. The land would be sub-divided into 1,500-6,000 acre plots 
independently farmed by men “who can gain an intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of the land on their own 
farm; peculiarities which vary from farm to farm.” 
114
 BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125). The new plan was estimated to cost £6,000,000. The OFC 
tractor fleet was reduced to thirty. 
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government ultimately approved the Long Term Plan, while two Tripartite Agreements between the 
Tanganyika government, OFC, and East Africa Railways and Harbours Administration financed the 
completion of the port and railway in January 1954.
120
  
 
Figure 4.3 “Mtwara port from the air”
121
 
 
The renewed promise of development invigorated a wave of private investment in southern Tanganyika. 
Thousands of acres of land from Lindi to Songea were alienated as commercial, agricultural, and 
residential plots.
122
 The rising international demand and prices for cashew nuts, in particular, inspired 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mineral prospects – particularly the coal deposits in the southwest – could “be enough to change the whole 
economy of Tanganyika.”  
120
 DSM, S.A.S. Leslie, J.F.R. Hill, and J.R. Farquharson, “Report of Communications Survey Committee” (1950); A.H 
Pike, “Southern Province,” Annual Reports 1951; TNA Native Affairs 39131 Colonial Development Corporation 
Annual Reports, Colonial Development Corporation, “Reports and Accounts for 1952,” 21A; BNA CO 691/213/3 
Groundnut Scheme Amendment of Overseas Resources Development Act 1951, Extract Commonwealth Survey, 
30.3.51, “Addendum The Overseas Resources Development Act, 1951”; and BNA T 220/413 Overseas Food 
Corporation Tripartite Agreement 1953. The 15,000 acres cleared in Nachingwea District were divided into twenty 
farms. Seventeen farms became known as the “Production farms,” while the other three were used for the African 
Tenant Scheme. “Native” agricultural and mechanical ploughing experimental sites were also located Kilwa, Lindi, 
Newala, and Tunduru Districts. See Rizzo, “Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 109-136; and Hogendorn and Scott, 
“Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects,” 186.  
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60,000 acres for tobacco in southern Songea (a total of forty 500 acre plots). During the following year, two major 
leases were issued for 1,000 acres each in Tunduru for tobacco production. There were also plans to alienate land 
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applications to construct plantations and processing plants.
123
 A number of foreign trading houses 
established branches along the coast, including: Messrs. A Baumann & Co., Ltd., Twentsche Overseas 
Maatschappe, van Eeghen and MacLaine Ltd., and Dalgetys Ltd.
124
 Oil and coal prospecting in the 
interior gained renewed vigor as well.
125
 Many of the enterprises, however, collapsed within five years. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Songea. Ex-colonial officers familiar with the region were occasionally employed to oversee these new ventures. 
Former Provincial Commissioner Rooke Johnston, for example, became director of the Southern Province Farms 
Limited in Songea District in 1952 after being employed as a consultant (“African Adviser”) for Taylor Woodrow.  
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December, 1951)” (E/7); and BNA CO 822/553, G.K. Whitlamsmith, Public Relations Officer, “Press Article: 
Development Plans in the Southern Province of Tanganyika,” 22 May 1953. 
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Tobacco production declined and sisal prices plummeted from £240 to £90 per ton in 1952.
126
 The CDC 
and Tanganyika government quietly abandoned plans to exploit coal deposits in southwestern 
Tanganyika, while many of the trading houses abandoned their operations.
127
 The Chairman of the 
Southern Province Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture reported in 1955 that development plans in the 
south had “slowly ground to a standstill. Indeed, in some measure, they may be said to have 
retrogressed.”128  
Failed Infrastructure Development and the Uncontrollable Labor Market of the Borderland 
 
 A central reason why postwar colonial development projects failed in southern Tanganyika was 
because the Tanganyika government, OFC, and contractors failed to accurately identify and rectify the 
environmental and labor challenges that undermined the construction of sustainable, all-weather 
transportation infrastructure in the region.
129
 The OFC knew that the “future development of the Southern 
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complete. Officials increasingly doubted whether the investments were worthwhile considering that oil was 
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was making the change. Sir Reginald Robins – Commissioner for Transport for the East Africa High Commission – 
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African Rail Link Development Survey,” 24 September 1952). For information about the CDC coal exploration and 
debates about the railway extension, see BNA CO 691/215/8 Colonial Development Corporation; TNA Native 
Affairs 39131, CDC, “Reports and Accounts” for 1950, 1951, and 1952; and BLCAS MSS Afr. s. 1751, EAR&H, “North 
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27 June 1952.  
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Province areas depended in the first instance entirely on communications, which were virtually non-
existent.”130 The colonial state and development planners saw railway transportation as the future mode of 
mobility in southern Tanganyika despite the protests of critics and evidence of a growing road 
transportation sector. Opposition to the railway first came from Sir Reginald Robins – former General 
Manager of Tanganyika Railways and Harbours and then General Manager of Kenya and Uganda 
Railways and Harbours. During the early planning phases of the GNS, Robins argued that the Wakefield 
Mission failed to appreciate “the enormous cost of an isolated railway.”131 In addition to the high costs of 
constructing a new railway, there were additional costs of provisioning locomotives, rolling stock, and 
overheads. Without a connection to another railway line – such as the Central Line – the Southern 
Province Railway would be hard-pressed to obtain adequate stores and skilled assistance for its 
construction and operation. Robins concluded that the costs were “totally out of proportion to a short 
railway of about 120 miles.”132 The Chief Engineer of East African Railways and General Manager of 
Tanganyika Railways (J.R. Farquharson) did not oppose the railway, but doubted the viability of 
constructing one from Mtwara.
133
 Farquharson favored a railway from Lindi town and port. It was 
allegedly cheaper and more profitability as it would traverse a populated area producing 10,000 tons of 
crops. Lindi port had the added advantages of existing banks, shops, limited port facilities, and a “fair 
road system.”134 Farquharson insisted that the Lindi route was the “dream of the railway location engineer 
and the transport economist – an evenly graded valley going straight from the production area to the sea – 
giving a falling grade for the export traffic and an even rising grade for the lighter import traffic.”135 
While Governor William Denis Battershill endorsed Farquharson’s choice, three foreign harbor and 
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Office, to C.B., 5 October 1946. 
132
 Ibid.  
133
 BNA MAF 83/1800 East African Groundnut Scheme: Transport Problems and Maps of Lindi Area, J.R. 
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shipping experts convinced London to invest in Mtwara.
136
 The railway suffered as a consequence.  A 
survey determined that it was impossible to construct a railway directly from Mtwara to Nachingwea 
because of the Makonde Plateau. The railway had to follow the Lukuledi Valley, and the difficult terrain 
and soil conditions south of the Lukuledi River required heavy work.
137
 Planners also had to split 
construction work between Mtwara and Lindi because Mtwara could not handle the thousands of tons of 
imported construction materials and mechanical equipment. One railway branch ran from a temporary 
dock at Mkwaya to Nachingwea, while the second connected Mtwara to Ruo.
138
  
    
Figure 4.4 Mkwaya Port
139
 
 
 Sir Reginald Robins’ earlier warnings about the high cost of constructing and operating an 
isolated railway and new port came to fruition. The price for both rose from £1.25 million, to £4.55 
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 Mkwaya was located just south of Mingoyo and up the Lukuledi River from Lindi Creek.
 
Planners initially 
planned on using Mingoyo pier (just as during World War I). The pier, however, could only handle 300 tons per 
day. A 600 ft. long lighterage quay was constructed at Mkwaya. A 20,000 ft
2 
storage area was established near the 
landing beach, while a separate 150 ft
2 
area was designated as a fuel dump. Development planners hoped that the 
Mkwaya branch would “‘facilitate the construction of the Valley section and provide as early as possible a 
transport route of some considerable capacity from the Coast to the cultivation areas.’” The two lines would 
eventually converge at Ruo. See BNA MAF 83/1804, cable to Martin, 14 July 1947; BNA CAB 129/23/18, Strachey, 
“East African Groundnuts Scheme: Review of Progress to the end of November, 1947” (or TNA Native Affairs 
36826/ Vol I); BNA CO 822/553, G.W. Baker, A Review of Development Plans 1953; and BNA CO 822/139/1, 
“History of the Southern Province Railway Line,” extract from Tanganyika Standard, 27 October 1949.   
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million, and over £6.5 million by 1953.
140
 The haste to complete the railway as quickly as possible led to 
costly mistakes. The high cost and scarcity of steel after the war forced contractors to use timber sleepers 
rather than steel sleepers.
141
 The Forestry Department and railway engineering staff, however, knew “little 
or nothing about their [local timber] suitability for railway sleepers.”142 They estimated that hardwood 
from the interior would last six years and coastal mangroves would last twelve years. In reality, the 
hardwoods lasted anywhere from six months to four years after being placed on the road bed due to dry 
rot, white ants, and pinhole borera. Large quantities of the hardwood also “deteriorated badly while still in 
stack.”143 The mangrove timber resisted ants, but splintered at the spikes. The splintering meant that the 
rails could not hold “true to gauge and making the permanent way dangerous.”144 The sleepers also 
deteriorated rapidly because none of them were subjected to preservative treatments before being laid. It 
was too expensive to replace the timber sleepers with steel by 1953 as the cost had doubled to Shs. 60/- 
per sleeper.
145
 The General Manager of East Africa Railways and Harbours admitted  in 1955 that the 
railway had been built “far too hurriedly and far too cheaply” over some of the “worst country possible” 
and that it “would be foolish to say there would not by any more trouble in future years because there 
would be.”146  
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 TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to the Governor, 2 November 1946; BNA BT 193/43, Tanganyika and Kenya, 
Transport Advisory Council, Council Memorandum No. 290, “Southern Province Railway and Port: Revised 
Estimates,” 4 August 1953. Steel sleepers were nearly triple the price of local timber sleepers: Shs.29/- versus 
Shs.11/50. The timber came primarily from the Central Railway, coastal areas, and Southern Province. An 
additional 66,000 tons came from the Rhodesian War Stores Disposal Organisation, but it was softwood and failed 
more rapidly than the local timbers.  
142
 BNA BT 193/43, Transport Advisory Council, Council Memorandum No. 290 . 
143
 Ibid. 
144
 Ibid. 
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“Southern Province,” Annual Report 1956.)  
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African Laborers’ Responses to the GNS 
 The railway scheme also failed because the state and private employers could not stabilize the 
labor population in the Ruvuma borderland. Laborers in southern Tanganyika and northern Portuguese 
East Africa (PEA) were accustomed to traversing the porous and unregulated territorial border to pursue 
the best employment opportunities. During the Second World War, economic factors pushed laborers 
away from southern Tanganyika and pulled them to the north, south, and west. In 1942, the southern 
provincial administration noted a growing trend among migrant laborers limiting their employment in the 
Southern Province. They worked only long enough to procure adequate cash and provisions to travel to 
the sisal estates along the Central and Tanga Railways.
147
 Migrant laborers preferred employment in the 
north because of better wages, housing, rations, and labor conditions.
148
 An investigation by the Labour 
Department in September 1944 reported that conditions on all of the southern sisal plantations (with the 
exception of Kikwetu Estate) were “atrocious.”149  Migrant laborers from Tanganyika and PEA knew that 
labor conditions were better elsewhere: 
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 DSM, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province,” Annual Reports 1942; and TNA ACC 460 Ministry of Labour, 541/18/ 
Vol. 2, “Notes on Visit to Southern Province (?) November to 1 December 1944: Portuguese East Africa Labour,” 
23. Laborers often sold their partly completed vipande at “present value” prices to other laborers, who carried 
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James Currey, 2005), 127; TNA ACC 460, 4/25/6 Inspection Report Kikwetu Sisal Estate Ltd., Lindi (1939-55), “Lindi 
Province: Kikwetu and Mtwero Estates,” 16 May 1939; TNA ACC 16, 13/25 Annual Labour Reports, District 
Commissioner Lindi to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Report, 1942,” January 1943; Provincial Commissioner, 
“Southern Province Labour Report 1943,” 7 February 1944; DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” 
Annual Reports 1943; and Rizzo, “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 216. 
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Colonial Office about the role of colonial governments for providing workers’ housing, education, hospitals, and 
other welfare facilities. Orde-Browne argued that the colonial government put too much of the responsibility on 
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The average Mawia immigrant has now a very shrewd idea in the comparative labour conditions 
prevailing in the Northern Areas, compared with this Province, and this information is furnished 
by Mawia labourers returning to Portuguese East Africa.
150
 
 
Laborers were also attracted north by the efforts the Tanganyika Sisal Growers’ Association’s Labor 
Bureau – SILABU. The TSGA created the centralized recruiting and forwarding agency in 1944.151 
Networks of local agents recruited contracted (attested) laborers to work for a fixed term – averaging nine 
months – on designated plantations in return for free transport to and from the estates, rations, housing, 
and wages.
152
 SILABU utilized motor vehicles to quickly and efficiently transport thousands of migrant 
laborers throughout the Territory.
153
 By 1950, the Ruvuma borderland formed “part of the nucleus of the 
labour reserve for the territory.”154  
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District Officer of Liwale, laborers from PEA, Songea, and Tunduru converged at Naapata and then continued up 
the Mlembwe valley to the Matanau and north to Mpapuli Juu via Mkanya. The labor route then divided west 
(towards Morogoro and Kilosa) and east (towards Utete, Dar es Salaam, and onward). The Labour Commissioner 
offered a slightly different labor route for the PEA migrants in 1945. He claimed that most migrants found their 
way to Mtama (45 miles west of Lindi) and headed to Mingoyo. Three routes diverged north from Mingoyo and re-
converged at Mtandi, across the Mbwemkuru River. Migrant laborers then followed the telegraph line to Kilwa 
Kivinje and headed north to Dar es Salaam (some using the coastal road via Muhoro). The journey from Lindi or 
253 
 
 High prices for “native” produce, uncontrolled markets, and increased labor opportunities in PEA 
drew laborers south across the Ruvuma during the war.
155
 High-paying mining jobs also attracted PEA 
and Tanganyika laborers to South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia.
156
 Poor working 
conditions and wartime conscription policies, meanwhile, pushed African laborers away from southern 
Tanganyika.
157
 The southern provincial administration expressed concerns when PEA migrants failed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mikindani to Dar es Salaam took anywhere from ten to fourteen days. These migrants often travelled without 
adequate rations, accommodations, and medical facilities. British officers advocated vehicle and railway transport 
because laborers arrived in better physical and mental condition in comparison to the arduous foot journeys. For 
an excellent historical analysis of labor migrations from Njombe, see Giblin, A History of the Excluded. For archival 
documentation about labor migrations, see DSM, “Southern Province,” Annual Reports 1939 and 1942; TNA ACC 
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return to Tanganyika in large number after the war despite rising taxes, increased forced labor practices, 
and the establishment of disadvantageous food controls in PEA.158 British officers attributed the low 
migration rates to Portuguese border restrictions, better consumer markets in PEA, and an intensification 
of mining recruitment activities.
159
 Labour Officer Kenny-Dillon warned that unless labor conditions in 
the Southern Province improved to the level found in the Central and Tanga areas, the borderland would 
not attain its net labor requirements and would lose its surplus labor supply from PEA.
160
 Despite the 
warnings, the southern estates felt little incentive to improve their wage rates and working conditions after 
the war since their labor forces remained adequate and there was virtually no oversight from the Labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
those who claimed exemption for some reason were then given a hearing in which the District Commissioner had 
the assistance of representative Elders for the area concerned.” Once selected, the men were moved to the main 
camps for medical inspection, allocation, registration, etc. Accepted men were vaccinated, quarantined for 
disease, supplied with blankets, and sent to their respective units. The terms of service and number of conscripted 
laborers for non-military operations rose from 8,420 in 1942 to 26,256 in 1945.  After being strongly opposed to 
conscription, the sisal industry “was reluctantly compelled to ask” for laborers in 1943. Orde-Browne credited the 
industry’s reversal to the increased international demand for sisal. In 1945, the industry procured 11,816 
conscripted workers. Conscription for the sisal industry in Tunduru, however, was “most unpopular” and the 
Native Authorities refused to help. Young men also fled to the bush or across the Ruvuma into PEA. Since there 
was no system of identification in Tanganyika, it was impossible to collect accurate statistics about where the 
conscripted laborers originated from. See  BNA CO 691/184/6 Compulsory Labour Service 1940-42; BNA CO 
691/184/7 Compulsory Service Reports 1942; and BNA CO 822/130/2, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, “Labour 
Conditions in East Africa,” (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1946). 
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Mozambique, 464 and 471. Taxes in PEA were Shs. 16/- versus Shs. 7/- in Tanganyika. A kilo bag of mtama cost Shs. 
20/- in PEA versus Shs. 12/- in Mikindani. Forced labor practices increased as the Portuguese administration 
relaxed restrictions on recruitment methods in 1942.
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255 
 
Department.
161
 The southern sisal industry only increased its wages to those found in Tanga in 1948 in 
response to rising competition with GNS contractors.
162
  
 The southern provincial administration estimated that 180,000 persons were available for 
employment in the Southern Province at the onset of the Groundnut Scheme. On paper, this labor supply 
was adequate to meet the needs of the scheme, port and railway construction, and local employers.
163
  
Table 4.3 Estimated Labor Requirements, Southern Province, 1948 
Mkwaya-Nachingwea Railway 3,500 
Balfour Beatty (Mtwara Harbor) 3,000 
John Mowlem (OFC Contractor) 3,500 
Paulings & Co. Ltd. (Mtwara-Ruo railway) 4,000 
Taylor Woodrow (Oil Pipeline) 1,000 
Total 15,000 
 
Labor demands, however, exceeded labor supplies from 1947 to 1952.
164
 The railway and port contractors 
experienced the largest deficits and highest turnover rates. Messrs. Pauling & Co. Ltd. and Messrs. 
Karageorgelis & Co. had few laborers completing more than one or two kipande for railway 
construction.
165
 The East African Railways & Harbours fell 50% short of their labor requirements for the 
Mtwara-Ruo railway construction project in 1950.
166
 The turnover rates for Pauling and Balfour Beatty 
reached as much as 50% during the same year.
167
 Without adequate labor, completion of the railway was 
delayed year after year.
168
 Seasonal labor fluctuations also frustrated all contractors as they found their 
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operations short 2,000 to 3,000 laborers after turning away workers a few months before.
169
 The 
magnitude and timing of these fluctuations corresponded with the annual agricultural cycle. Most casual 
laborers worked for GNS contractors long enough to earn sufficient cash to supplement their subsistence 
agriculture. As Matteo Rizzo explained, “Employment on the scheme was considered, by the large 
majority of workers, as a supplement, not an alternative, to small farming gains.”170 As a result, the 
success or failure of an agricultural season often dictated labor turnout for the GNS and ancillary projects. 
Rizzo argued, 
The oscillating fortunes of small farmers in the province depended above all on the fluctuations 
of rainfall, which were then, in effect, the main determinant of labour supply: a bad harvest year 
was followed by expanded labour supply, and an average or good year by labour supply 
inadequate to employers’ needs. Attempts by employers to prolong workers’ stay in employment 
by increasing wages compounded rather than resolved the problem, as workers simply earned 
their ‘target’ income more quickly.171 
 
The first year of the scheme, for example, witnessed a record harvest. Temporary bulk storages were 
overflowing and Lindi port was inundated with thousands of tons of produce awaiting export. By the end 
of the 1947, Lindi looked like a town “waiting to be bombed, the streets are lined with sacks stacked six 
to ten feet high of produce waiting for shipping and shipping is very slow in arriving.”172 The massive 
harvest was offset by a dearth of consumer goods in local shops. With money in hand and little to buy, 
there was no incentive for wage labor.
173
 The labor turnout in 1952, in comparison, was satisfactory due 
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December 1949.” Planting typically occurred between October and February, and the harvest season lasted from 
April to July.  
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to a cyclone destroying crops in April and the rise in Poll Tax rates from Shs. 5/- to Shs. 18/-.
174
 Seasonal 
fluctuations, however, still occurred (as can be seen in the chart below). 
Table 4.4 Seasonal Labor Fluctuations: Monthly Labor Position, Southern Province, 1952175 
Employers Jan  Feb March Apr May June July Aug Sept Dec 
Sisal Industry 12,926 14,871 16,683 17,842 18,128 17,360 17,262 16,050 13,513 13,904 
OFC 5,786 6,964 7,262 7,003 5,424 4,812 4,736 4,307 3,548 2,550 
Mtwara Port*  1,269 1,239 1,152 1,156 958 987 976 1,126 1,008 799 
Railway 
Contractors** 
1,209 1,376 1,356 1,424 1,295 1,296 1,300^ 900 796 465 
East African 
Railways & 
Harbours  
- - - 320 253 209 750 1,060^^ 1,419 970 
* Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Ltd. 
** Messrs. Karageorgelis & Co. and Tanganyika Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.  
^ Karageogelis finished its contract and dismissed its workforce of 400 men. EAR&H employed the discharges.  
^^ EAR&H assumed authority over the Mikindani-Ruo railway section. 
 
Labor supply finally exceeded demand in 1953 due to a drought and the reduction in labor requirements 
among the OFC and contractors.176 With employment opportunities dwindling, the labor supply generally 
exceeded demand in the Southern Province for the rest of the decade.  
 The GNS did not radically alter the labor market in the Ruvuma borderland; rather, most local 
laborers exploited new employment opportunities according to existing labor patterns that combined 
seasonal employment with subsistence agriculture. Increased access to free motor vehicle transport via 
labor recruiters made it easier for laborers to travel to the coast to work a few months, pay their taxes, and 
purchase goods at larger shops before returning home for the cultivation and harvest seasons.
 
Rather than 
creating a permanent labor force, the GNS amplified African laborers’ bargaining power over the labor 
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 ACC 460, 491/Vol.2, “Excerpt from Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ending 31 March 1952 by Labour Officer 
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 Statistics compiled by the monthly labor reports submitted by the Southern Province Labour Officer to the 
Labour Commissioner found in TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2 Labour Matter Southern Province (17.2.50-18.355). 
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Labour Officer Lindi’s Monthly Report for the Month of April, 1953 and August, 1953,” 243; and TNA ACC 460, 
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Inspection Reports GNS SP), “Labour Officer Quarterly Report […] Ending June 30, 1952.”  
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market. Africans took advantage of the competitive labor market, switching between jobs and playing 
employers off one another to get the best pay and work conditions.
177
 Labour Officer West reported, 
There is no doubt that the labour in the Lindi District now peregrinate where the work is easiest, 
moving from U.A.C. to John Mowlem, the Railway contractors, and the sisal estates, and 
although not proved, it is practically a certainty that many of these labourers have current labour 
cards with two or more of these employers.
178
 
 
Contractors tried to attract more laborers by seeking the support of African leaders and reducing daily 
workloads.
179
 Railways to the north, for example, expected an ordinary laborer to excavate 100 cubic feet 
of earth per diem. John Mowlem & Co., Ltd., in comparison, expected a laborer to excavate only 27 cubic 
feet per day. The “Greeks” were forced to reduce their workloads to match Mowlem’s “ridiculously low” 
requirements.
180
 The low labor output brought railway construction to a “standstill.”181 In order to reach 
their deadlines, contractors intensified their reliance on machinery. Elevated graders, for instance, could 
construct embankments at 200 cubic yards per hour.
182
 Machines, however, were more expensive – 
costing up to eight times more than manual laborers.
183
 They also broke down rapidly. Only 22 of the 113 
tractors in the Southern Province were serviceable in July 1948.
184
 The OFC and contractors reverted to 
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manual labor practices following calls for more economic methods of construction and cultivation during 
the Groundnut Debate (1949) and Long Term Plan (1951). Labor requirements consequently rose and 
switched from skilled and semi-skilled employees to unskilled manual laborers.
185
 Demand, however, 
continued to exceed supply.
186
 Earthworks for the railway and port remained extremely unpopular with 
African laborers.
187
 African workers also resisted the reversion to manual labor techniques. According to 
Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike, there was “no doubt that the African is no longer content to work 
continuously on heavy work without the assistance of machines.”188 Contractors employed private 
recruiters and utilized the Territory’s “Labour Exchange” program to import laborers from outside the 
Southern Province.
189
 The OFC even considered employing local lepers to rectify their labor difficulties 
in 1951.
190
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Balfour Beatty, 7 January 1950; and BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, “Quarterly Report on Labour 
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th
 September 1949,” 5 November 1949. 
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 Whereas as some African laborers exploited the employment opportunities generated by the 
GNS, many continued to work for the sisal industry.
191
 SILABU annually forwarded between 10,000 and 
20,000 adult men and dependents from the Southern Province to sisal plantations in Tanganyika.
192 
 
Table 4.5 SILABU Contracted African Laborers, Southern Province 
Years Total Contracted Labor Labor Forwarded out of the 
Southern Province 
Proportion 
from PEA 
 Men Dependents Total Men Dependents Total Male Laborers 
1948
193
 1,671 529 2,200 1,323 467 1,790 N/A 
1949
194
 6,398 2,434 8,932 5,172 2,054 7,226 N/A 
1950
195
 3,325 929 4,807-
8,138 
778 526 1,304-
2,400 
N/A 
1951
196
 9,969 6,645 16,614 5,651 4,886 10,537 N/A 
1952
197
 9,113-
9,974 
6,250-
10,057 
15,363-
20,031 
5,749-
6,896 
4,684- 
7,005 
10,433-
13,901 
5,010
198
 
1953 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
By October 1954
199
 5,169 4,118 9,287 2,989 2,673 5,662 4,954 
By October 1955
200
 5,408 3,828 9,236 2,869 2,468 5,337 4,666 
 
SILABU’s unauthorized recruiting efforts across the Ruvuma border also attracted PEA migrant laborers, 
whose numbers began to rebound in 1951 due to higher wages offered in southern Tanganyika, improved 
consumer markets, and lower Poll Taxes (Shs. 30/- versus Shs. 100/- in PEA).
201
 The Portuguese did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 In addition to shortages, the OFC also contended with desertion. It tried to remedy the situation by 
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actively oppose their subjects finding employment in southern Tanganyika, but they strongly objected to 
“the exodus of Mawia to the Central and Tanga Lines because it is felt that only a small percentage of 
these people ever return home.”202 Tension between the British and Portuguese was partially alleviated by 
a number of diplomatic visits across the Ruvuma.
203
 The British credited good diplomatic relations with 
enabling the annual flow of PEA migrants.
204
 In reality, British-Portuguese relations had a minimum 
impact on trans-Ruvuma migrations. Economic factors instead dictated the direction and volume of labor 
traffic as it had before and during the Second World War. Africans consciously chose the location, 
duration, and conditions of their employment based upon their knowledge of labor markets and the needs 
of their personal economy. The sisal industry retained its dominance over the Ruvuma borderland labor 
market because it had built a reputation among laborers of providing free transport and better wages, 
housing, and working conditions than their competitors.
205
 SILABU’s network of local recruiters and 
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occasional turned into incidence of violence and detention. See BNA FO 371/97238, Secretariat Dar es Salaam to 
British Consulate Beira, 31 December 1951. 
203
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Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 1950.  
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Conditions in East Africa,” (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1946); and TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, “Labourers from 
Portuguese East Africa,” A.C. Donne (Labour Commissioner) to Labour Officer Tanga, 18 October 1940. 
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Report, 1951, by the Labour Officer Lindi,” 153; and 8/94/Vol. 2, “Extract from Handing over Notes LO Lindi,” 32. 
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forwarding offices used all manners of propaganda to attract laborers – including mobile loud-speakers.206 
SILABU also established relationships with air, shipping, and road transportation firms to assure that 
laborers arrived to the estates regardless of the season.
207
 SILABU’s success, however, was not 
ubiquitous. Jim Giblin found that many migrant laborers from Njombe felt SILABU stripped them of 
their autonomy.
208
 Giblin contended that sisal laborers used “manamba” as a term of self-reference in 
order to convey –  
[…] their feeling that SILABU had deprived them of their dignity and autonomy by subjecting 
them to medical examination and classification, loading them aboard guarded lorries and 
delivering them to plantations. It conveyed their resentment of a bureaucracy that demanded the 
surrender of autonomy and acceptance of regimentation as the price of avoiding the perils and 
hardships of long walking journeys.
209
 
 
Large number of laborers, therefore, chose to walk from Songea to Kilosa (via Ifakara) in order to retain 
their autonomy and avoid medical examinations, government regulation, and unfavorable contracts.
210
  
 The power that African laborers from the Ruvuma borderland exerted over the labor market in 
southern Tanganyika contrasted sharply with the uncoordinated and conflicting approaches that 
government officials and private employers adopted to rectify the labor difficulties that undermined the 
GNS and its infrastructure projects. The OFC and contractors frequently blamed their labor difficulties on 
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one another, the colonial state, and local Africans.
211
 The Labor Department and southern provincial 
administration, in contrast, held local merchants and development contractors culpable for the labor 
problems. Retail traders were accused of not increasing the quantity and quality of their inventories. Local 
Africans had money, but shops were full of “third-rate cloth and goods which the African is unwilling to 
buy in quantity; bicycles, gramophones, sewing machines, reasonable shoes, trousers, coats, sweaters, etc. 
and even decent Dietz lamps cannot be bought but every shop seems to be full of trash.”212 The province 
needed high-grade trade goods to “skim off some of the surplus of floating money.”213 Without trade 
incentives, Africans were less inclined to turnout for wage-labor employment or increase their agricultural 
production. The government also blamed the OFC and contractors for their “short-sightedness” in not 
supporting a central labor recruiting and distribution agency in 1948. Without a universal recruiting 
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mechanism, competition between employers intensified.
214
 The Labour Department also critiqued the 
contractors’ low wages, poor working conditions, terrible housing accommodations, inexperienced 
European managers, and inadequate recruiting efforts.
215
 African laborers typically resided in 
overcrowded, make-shift camps comprised of tents or grass huts with poor sanitation.
216
 In a few rare 
instances, the accommodations for European employees were worse and resulted in poor productivity and 
morale.
217
 Many of the Europeans were ill-qualified for work in Tanganyika. None of Mowelm’s 
European staff in 1948, for example, spoke Kiswahili reliably. The provincial administration complained 
that most were “fresh from home and have not yet learnt how to handle Africans.”218 Governor Surridge 
reported that many of the European employees were attracted by high pay and had “no interest in Africa 
or the Africans.”219 Labor Officers argued that poor supervision resulted in labor wastage.220 In 1950, the 
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OFC published a reference book, “Task and Man Management of African Labour,” in order to help 
inexperienced European supervisors and employers get the highest standard of output from their African 
laborers.
221
 The Tanganyika government also blamed labor shortages on the OFC and contractors’ poor 
recruiting efforts, which failed to attract PEA laborers.
222
 Messrs. Pauling and Balfour Beatty employed 
400 PEA laborers in 1950 and the OFC employed sixty in 1951.
223
 The sisal industry, in comparison, 
employed between 3,000 and 7,000 PEA laborers annually. 
 Dissent, however, existed within the colonial ranks over labor matters. Some members of the 
southern provincial administration advocated embargos on labor recruitment and emigration, especially in 
respect to SILABU’s operations. They argued that southern Tanganyika should no longer be considered 
“a labour reservoir for the rest of the territory.”224 As during the 1930s, British officers argued that the 
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migration of thousands of workers and dependents threatened to produce famines and social unrest.
225
  
Masasi District, for instance, feared an impending famine because nearly 40% of its male population was 
away from home in 1950. Those men who resided in the district were increasingly living off the cash they 
obtained from wage labor rather than farming.
226
 Famine was likewise feared in Tunduru District as an 
estimated 60% of the district’s male population (ages 18-40) was absent at any one time.227 Food crop 
yields declined as those women and elderly who were left behind were unable to perform the heavy 
manual labor required to improve the land during the dry season.
228
 Not all women stayed behind as 
“grass widows.”229 Thousands took their children and accompanied their husbands to the coast or further 
north. District officers were equally concerned about these family migrations which threatened to denude 
interior districts of their populations.
230
 The central administration in Dar es Salaam, however, hesitated 
to restrict labor migration. Tanganyika law permitted the free flow of voluntary labor in the Territory.
231
 
The state refused to institute a stricter pass system similar to those found in Kenya because officials 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“necessary to conserve every potential worker. Indeed it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Province 
will, in future, become an importer of labour” (Annual Reports 1950). 
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suspected that the United Nations would condemn such policies and neighboring colonies would retaliate 
by closing their borders or instituting unfavorable immigration quotas.
232
 The Tanganyika government 
was also concerned about interfering with SILABU’s operations since the sisal industry supplied the bulk 
of the territory’s revenue.233 The government tried to limit the outflow of labor from the south by setting 
recruiting limits for SILABU. In 1951, SILABU was permitted to recruit 1,800 contracted laborers in 
Songea and Tunduru, 700 from the Makonde Plateau, and 3,000 from the rest of the Southern Province.
234
 
The quotas, however, did not apply to uncontracted volunteer laborers. It was estimated in 1952 that for 
every four laborers recruited, there were five “volunteers.”235 Accusations were levied against SILABU 
that they exceeded their quotas by purposefully mis-categorizing laborers as volunteers when they were 
actually recruits.
236
  
 Faced with an ineffective quota system, some District Commissioners took matters in their own 
hands. The administration in Tunduru District discouraged SILABU propaganda and enacted the cheti 
cha njia pass/licensing system to prevent labor emigrations and SILABU recruitment.
237
 All migrant 
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District Commissioner Anderson shared his predecessor’s belief that the district was disintegrating due to the 
exodus of men and dependents. He was particularly concerned with out-of-province migrations. Whereas most 
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laborers had to obtain a cheti cha njia from their Native Authority and pay taxes before they left the 
district. A man could not attain the pass unless he arranged support for his dependents while away. 
Anyone caught without a cheti was liable to a fine of Shs. 50/-.
238
 The pass policy provoked backlash 
from SILABU and the GNS contractors who recruited from Tunduru.
239
 The General Secretary of 
SILABU met with District Commissioner Anderson in October 1951 in an attempt to resolve the conflict. 
The Secretary’s mission failed. He found that Anderson had “very decided views and no amount of 
arguing will alter them. He is quiet outspoken and perfectly honest in expressing the opinion he has 
obtained in consultation with local Chiefs and Native Authorities.”240 The General Secretary also failed to 
find support in Lindi. Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike shared Anderson’s views and insisted that the 
“development of the Province is being neglected by denuding it of its manpower, for the benefit of other 
parts of the Territory.”241 Anderson continued to “place obstacles in the way of Africans” seeking out-of-
district employment during the following year. He instructed all chiefs and wakilis that no one could leave 
without a cheti cha njia. Chief Mataka, thereafter, instructed his subordinates to immediately suspend 
issuing passes until he notified them.
242
 SILABU’s Area Manager and the General Secretary called upon 
the Provincial Commissioner to stop Anderson from his “unwarranted interference” with SILABU 
operations.
243
 A.H. Pike was torn. On the one hand, he still wanted to stop the “drain of migrant labour 
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from the Province.”244 On the other hand, he knew it was illegal to prevent the free flow of voluntary 
labor in Tanganyika.
245
 The government could ask SILABU to withdraw their recruiters from Tunduru 
after they met their annual quotas, but they could not prevent SILABU from accepting and transporting 
voluntary laborers.
246
 
 The Tanganyika government and Labour Department ultimately supported SILABU. The colonial 
state wanted to control the mobility of African laborers in the postwar era, and it recognized that SILABU 
offered an avenue through which the state could better monitor and stabilize labor markets and 
recruitment. The bureau lessened instances of unauthorized, illegal recruiting by headman from the 
northern estates.
247
 It also made labor migration more efficient by providing free transport by air, rail, and 
road. In the end, the Labour Department recognized that migrant laborers existed well before SILABU 
and restrictions on recruiting would not stop their migrations. African laborers from Tunduru were 
already getting around the cheti cha njia policy by walking to Songea or Masasi and signing up at 
SILABU offices. Some of the migrants proceeded directly from Tunduru to Kilosa along the “old 
walking” routes.248 As long as SILABU promised to prioritize local employment in the south over the 
northern estates, the Labor Department welcomed its recruiting and transportation networks.
249
 Southern 
employers unhappy with the situation needed to improve their wages, rations, accommodations, transport, 
and welfare facilities to attract and retain a permanent labor force.
250
 The government proceeded to raise 
SILABU’s annual recruiting quota to 15,000 men in the Southern Province (excluding Lindi and Mtwara) 
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from 1953 to 1955, a level SILABU never reached.
251
 In the end, the infrastructure scheme envisioned for 
the south collapsed because the British state and development contractors failed to recognize the 
autonomy and initiative of African laborers. Construction of the new railway and port suffered because 
the colonial government and private employers could not resolve how to approach labor issues in the 
Ruvuma borderland and create a large, permanent labor pool. African laborers instead exploited the 
competitive labor market for their own benefit and utilized motor vehicles to pursue economic 
opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland.  
The Unexpected Rise of Automotive Transport and Collapse of the Southern Road Network 
 Despite its objective of reorienting and modernizing the southern infrastructure around the 
Southern Province Railway, the GNS inadvertently solidified road transportation as the predominate form 
of long-distance mobility in southern Tanganyika. From the onset, the scheme stimulated a massive 
increase in motor vehicle traffic. With thousands of tons of cargo arriving by ocean-going steamers and 
no railway to the interior, development planners had no choice but to use automobiles.
252
 Motor vehicle 
traffic in the south increased from a pre-scheme amount of 200 lorries a month to well over 2,000 in 
1948.
253
 A PWD census on the Lindi-Songea main road determined that an average of 581 OFC vehicles 
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utilized the Lindi-Masasi section per day in 1949.
254
 By comparison, the highest traffic density of any 
road in the Territory in 1947 was 65 vehicles per day on the Arusha-Moshi road.
255
 
Table 4.6 Traffic Rates, 1949
256
 
Road Vehicles (per day) 
Lindi-Mingoyo 66  
Mingoyo-Nanganga 580 
Nanganga-Masasi 30 
Nanganga-Ruponda 13 
Lindi-Kikwetu 27 
Mingoyo-Mikindani 77 
Mikindani-Mtwara 81 
Mtama-Mkonde 43 
Lindi Township 330 
 
     
Figure 4.5 “Tanganyika Territory: Motor Traffic over Main & Grade ‘A’ Roads,” 1946 and 1947
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258
 
 
Although a large percentage of vehicular traffic in southern Tanganyika was related to the GNS and 
ancillary projects, a growing number of private lorries appeared in the province.
259
 Labor recruiters used 
automobiles to transport laborers from the interior districts to the development sites and coastal 
plantations. Coastal traders and producers in Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea Districts similarly accessed 
one another by road because the Southern Province Railway only provided access to the OFC agricultural 
sites and the small consumer market in Mtwara. Provincial Commissioner H.S. Senior reported in 1950 
that there was “little inducement for the public to use this form of transport [railway] because the 
terminus is in no way connected with areas of production.” A seventy mile railway extension from 
Nachingwea to Lumesule Juu was supposed to tap into the Tunduru and Songea traffic, but frequent 
railway closures caused by washouts, erosion, and rotten wood sleepers confirmed the greater reliability 
and flexibility of automotive transport.
260
 Producers and traders exploited the growing fleet of motor 
vehicles to move their goods through the established trade center of the Southern Province – Lindi town. 
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Lindi housed the major trading houses and wholesalers in the south. Mtwara, in comparison, had one 
small building and a few banks erected along Broadway.
261
 Lindi’s “large consumer public” was partially 
the consequence of the GNS as thousands of tons of imports and exports passed through the port while 
Mtwara harbor was under construction for seven years.
262
 
 Roads deteriorated as the colonial state invested its resources into the floundering railway rather 
than the flourishing road transportation sector. The southern road network began “showing every sign of 
extreme strain” by 1948. The heavy volume and weight of the five- and ten-ton vehicles destroyed road 
surfaces.
263
 Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike reported in 1948 that the road surface of the Lindi-
Songea main road was “ground to powder; all it needs is a few inches of rain to turn it into a quagmire 
and then all work will have to stop.”264 The “all-weather” categorization of the Lindi-Masasi section was 
also a misnomer – “Intrepid hardy drivers manage to force their vehicles through to Masasi at all times of 
the year, but during the rains this is impossible for the average driver.”265 Songea was only accessible 
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during the rainy season by fortnightly air flights.
266
 The conditions of district roads were no better and 
perhaps worse. Three Grade “B” District Roads carried large amounts of traffic – Lindi-Dar es Salaam, 
Lindi-Mikindani-Mtwara, and Songea-Njombe roads. PWD Engineer Sgd. K.L. Hardaker estimated that 
the Mingoyo-Mikindani-Mtwara road carried over 3,000 vehicles a month in the dry season.
267
 It became 
unusable after half an inch of rain.
268
 Sir P.E. Mitchell (then Chairman of the East Africa High 
Commission) half-heartedly joked about the road conditions after travelling from Lindi to Mtwara to 
inspect the harbor and railway progress: “‘Not so bad, not so bad. In no place were they more than waist 
deep.’”269 The condition of the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road was equally poor. A.H. Pike insisted that the 
road was “hardly worthy of the name.”270 It also became impassable after a half-inch of rain due to the 
black cotton soil and numerous streams. The road closed for at least seven months from December to 
June.
271
 When open, the large volume of coastal traffic bottlenecked at the Rufiji River ferry. Only one 
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vehicle crossed the river each hour.
272
 Bridges were also a “constant source of worry” throughout the 
province as they suffered “substantial damage” from numerous and overweight vehicles.273 
 The southern provincial administration repeatedly argued that poor road conditions and annual 
roads closures were “one of the principal factors limiting development” and economic growth of southern 
Tanganyika.
274
 Mechanical equipment could not be efficiently transported to agricultural sites. High 
freight rates for exporting produce from the interior hindered the profitability and expansion of African 
and European cultivation. It was roughly £3 per ton cheaper to transport cassava 6,600 miles by sea from 
Lindi to London than the 386 miles by lorry from Lindi to Songea.
275
 Agricultural schemes in Tunduru 
were “held up through lack of all-weather communications,” while Songea District was deemed “too 
remote and without adequate communications to attract new settlers.”276 Many of the foreign trading 
firms established along the coast in the early 1950s departed because of the failure of the British colonial 
administration to provide the “elementary necessities for development” – namely adequate, all-weather 
roads. It was too expensive to transport consumer goods inland so as to stimulate African participation in 
the market economy. The Colonial Development Corporation briefly funded a road haulage firm in the 
Southern Province and Southern Highlands, but it collapsed a year later. The CDC concluded in 1951 that 
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road transportation in the south was “definitely unprofitable.”277 The poor condition of the roads drove up 
freight rates and vehicle maintenance bills which made road transportation unprofitable. Most of the 
second-hand automobiles operating in the south were unfit to handle the rough dirt surfaces. Damaged 
vehicles were left derelict for months because of a lack of spare parts. In order to compensate for the 
shortages, damaged vehicles were often “cannablized.”278 
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Figure 4.7 Damaged OFC Vehicles in Nachingwea
279
 
 
 The roads deteriorated due to the collapse of the hybrid system of road development employed in 
southern Tanganyika since the interwar era. Cooperation between the colonial government and local 
private contractors unraveled during the GNS. The state rejected local assistance – most notably TTCo – 
and road maintenance reverted to the Public Works Department (PWD). Since the PWD still lacked the 
resources necessary for wide-scale, mechanized construction, the Tanganyika government authorized new 
British contractors to manage the main roads in the southeast.
280
 The UAC received a government 
contract in October 1947 to reconstruct the first 100 miles of the Lindi-Masasi road.
281
 The UAC 
employed Messrs. Pauling & Company and Messrs. Mowlem & Company to fulfill the contract. The two 
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contractors also employed road crews to improve the Lindi-Mikindani road and its branch to Mkwaya.
282
 
The OFC adopted the contract when they took responsibility from the UAC. The OFC and subcontractors, 
however, had no experience working in the region nor did they feel a sense of obligation to the 
Tanganyika government or the Southern Province. Whereas local contractors like TTCo had to retain an 
amicable relationship with colonial officers and fulfill their obligations in order to maintain their 
contracts, the OFC was under the authority of the Ministry of Food and British Parliament.  The 
Corporation did not answer to the Tanganyika Government and willingly exploited their connections with 
powerful figures in London to force the Tanganyika government to accommodate its needs.  
 Antagonism between the OFC and the Tanganyika government emerged in 1949. The OFC 
accused the Tanganyika government and PWD of failing to provide “an adequate system of all-weather 
roads.”283 The Corporation believed it deserved all-weather infrastructure since it paid the government an 
estimated Shs. 429,979/- in licensing and Shs.1,005,743/- in petrol duties.
284
 The Secretary of State 
advocated for the OFC and applied pressure on the Tanganyika government to provide better 
infrastructure. The Acting Chief Secretary of Tanganyika (F.A. Montague) responded by ordering the 
Director of Public Works (DPW) to rectify the road situation immediately: 
I am now to state that urgency and importance is attached to this matter in view of assurances 
which this Government have given to the Secretary of State that everything possible will be done 
to improve the particular roads mentioned, as well as other public roads in the Southern Province 
used by the Overseas Food Corporation, their contractors, and railway contractors.
285
 
 
The PWD insisted that they could keep many of the southern roads open year-round (or at least reduce the 
closure time), but they needed more staff, machinery, and funds.
286
 When Montague petitioned the OFC 
and contractors to contribute their resources, the OFC retorted that they were under no obligation to 
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maintain any road other than those within their specified development areas.
287
  The OFC was only 
prepared to help the PWD at a price. The Corporation tried to negotiate a new cost-benefit or fixed price 
contract to bring the Lindi-Nanganga-Nachingwea road to an all-weather standard. The Tanganyika 
government recognized that this was practically the same stretch of road that the OFC was already 
contracted to maintain.
288
 The PWD reported that the OFC failed to complete any maintenance work on 
the contracted section.
289
 The OFC responded that the earlier contract was plagued by a “considerable 
amount of misunderstanding and lack of co-ordination.” OFC engineers determined that the rate of £900 
per mile was insufficient to construct an all-weather, non-bituminized surface for the weight and density 
of traffic using the road.
290
  
 The OFC’s offer received mixed reviews in Lindi and Dar es Salaam. Some colonial officers 
argued that the Corporation did not deserve preferential treatment over other tax payers, many of whom 
had contributed to the colonial state longer than the OFC. Road works were “gradually being done as 
funds, staff, etc. permit, but on this basis the O.F.C.’s requirements should take their place on the list after 
the urgent requirements of many undertakings which have been paying taxes before the O.F.C. was ever 
heard of.” 291 The Director of Public Works (McLuckie) also pointed out that the Corporation vehicles 
caused most of the road damage in Tanganyika. Others shared McLuckie’s rejection of the new contract, 
who found it “astounding that an organisation with such a reputation for extravagance would even suggest 
such an idea.”292 All members of the Tanganyika government agreed in theory that the OFC should “be 
treated on the same basis, and if they want anything better they must pay.” The circumstances in 
practicality were more complicated. The government and PWD needed the Corporation, just as they 
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needed TTCo in the 1930s and continued to depend upon L. Rousham Roberts in Songea. The department 
possessed “neither the staff nor the equipment to set up maintenance work and the only solution is to 
make agreements with the contractors on the spot similar to the one made in respect of the Lindi-Masasi 
Road in 1947”.293 The government had to decide how far it was willing to compromise with the OFC.294 
 Chief Secretary A.M.B. Hutt ultimately offered the Controller of Finances for the OFC (J.F.G. 
Troughton) a contract whereby the Corporation would maintain the Lindi-Masasi and Mingoyo-Mtwara 
roads at a price of £1 per mile per annum per vehicle per day in excess of 20 vehicles but not exceeding 
200 vehicles.
295
 Troughton rejected the proposal. He argued that the Corporation’s sole responsibility was 
to produce groundnuts. It was the government’s responsibility to improve the roads so that the GNS could 
succeed for the “great benefit to the national income and taxable capacity of the Territory.”296 
Furthermore, the Corporation threatened that if the government failed to improve the roads or offer a 
more agreeable contract, they would “make the strongest possible representation to H.M. Government in 
the U.K. through the Ministry of Food.”297 Frustration grew in Dar es Salaam. Chief Secretary Hutt 
questioned whether the Corporation “seriously contend that an adequate road system for a territory of 
360,000 miles can be built up at short notice.” Tanganyika’s revenue, after all, was only £6.5 million. It 
was clear to Hutt that the OFC was “more interested in our [government] paying for roads than in 
effecting any immediate improvements of them.”298 No agreement was reached. The PWD resumed 
control over road maintenance despite the fact that local officers had “neither enough maintenance money 
nor enough machinery to make any attempt to deal with our main road problem.”299 Tensions temporarily 
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eased when the OFC loaned the PWD equipment for road maintenance operations, including scrapers, 
graders, and Diesel road rollers.
300
  
 The government’s aggravation with the OFC resurged when the Corporation demanded that the 
government reimburse them Shs. 31,866/- for reconstruction work on the Lindi-Mohumbika bridge.
301
 
The OFC demanded an additional £13,500 for construction and maintenance along the Mahumbika-
Nachingwea Road. The Corporation also vigorously petitioned that all of their vehicles be partially 
exempted from licensing requirements and fees.
302
 The Tanganyika colonial government responded in 
disbelief. In the case of the bridge, the DPW found OFC vehicles culpable for the collapse of two bridges. 
A PWD engineer had entered into a verbal agreement with an OFC officer that the Corporation would pay 
for the reconstruction of one bridge while the PWD fixed the other. The PWD estimated that the OFC 
incurred a cost of Shs. 5,000 – not Shs. 31,866.303 The bridge incident made it clear to the Tanganyika 
government that entering into any future “gentleman’s agreements” with the OFC was “obviously 
dangerous.”304 The OFC agreed to a settlement of £300 for the bridge, although “it was not seen as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the protracted delays in delivering orders from the U.K. (12-18 months or more). The department’s vehicle fleet 
(lorries, cars, and motor cycles) rose from 150 to 173 the following year, but its supply of spare parts was 
unsatisfactory, especially in respect to the ex-military vehicles of American make. The government relied upon 
local agents to get much needed supplies. The government decided the following year that Bedford would be the 
“future standard Government vehicle.” Difficulties with spares were expected to continue until the fleet was 
standardized. By the end of 1949, the department’s mechanical plant included 12 heavy motor graders, 6 heavy 
tow graders, 12 light tow graders, 2 heavy scrapers, 3 heavy tracked tractors, 3 light tracked tractors, 18 wheeled 
tractors, 16 stone crushers, 19 power rollers, 31 drag rollers, 30 concrete mixers, 18 tar sprayers and boilers, 37 
mowers, 24 trailers, 13 tile machines, 14 pugmill and block machines, and 11 road rippers (etc.). See BLCAS 754.14 
s.5, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department,” 1946-1949.   
300
 TNA Native Affairs 39007, “Extraction from the Minutes of Meeting of the Southern Province Coordinating 
Committee held on the 15
th
 April 1950.”  
301
 TNA Native Affairs 39007, J.F. Troughton to Hon. Member for Finance, Trade, and Economics, 24 October 1949. 
The work was completed by Mowlem & Co. under PWD supervision. 
302
 Vehicles solely used for agricultural purposes were exempt from licensing under the Traffic Rules 1932. The OFC 
recognized that they could not fully exercise the Rule since their vehicles used major highways to convey 
personnel, produce, and merchandise (food and agricultural implements). The Corporation, therefore, requested 
exemption for 90% of its fleet with the promise to continue paying customs duty on petrol consumption. See 
Native Affairs 35744 Groundnut Scheme Motor Vehicles: Licensing of, G.L. Allaway, Chief Transport Officer, OFC to 
C.S., 17 January 1950; TNA Native Affairs 39007, OFC to Acting Member for Communication, Works, and 
Development Planning Robertson, 30 October 1952; and Commissioner of Police to Provincial Superintendent of 
Police (Lindi), “Licensing of O.F.C. Vehicles in Southern Province,” 7 November 1952.  
303
 TNA Native Affairs 39007, Director of Public Works to Secretariat, 21 November1949. The costs were incurred 
when removing the damaged concrete and reinforcing the concrete deck. 
304
 TNA Native Affairs 39007, Chief Secretary to EOD, date?. 
282 
 
adequate.”305 Reimbursement for the corporation’s road work on the Mahumbika-Nachingwea road was 
not settled quickly or easily. The DPW estimated the cost at £1,750 – not £13,500. The Corporation 
refused the government’s offer of £2,800 as a “contemptuous rejection of our claim.”306 The debate 
continued well into 1950. The Tanganyika government gained some much needed support against the 
OFC from the journal, Roads and Road Construction. The journal published a blistering article in March 
1950 criticizing the OFC’s handling of road transportation in Tanganyika.307 The OFC reportedly 
constructed only 25 miles of main roads and 403 miles of secondary roads while operating 1,536 lorries, 
733 trailers, 57 cars, 168 jeeps, 185 Land Rovers, 11 motorcycles, and all land clearing and agricultural 
equipment. The company spent £164.12s per mile for new road construction versus £1.3 million worth on 
its vehicle fleet.  Even when considering the depreciation of the fleet’s value, the Corporation spent ten 
times more on vehicles than on roads. The article concluded that:  
Investment of the taxpayers money by the OFC in a modern fleet of vehicles is of little use if, at 
the same time, the Corporation neglects to provide adequate roads on which the fleet can 
operate.
308
 
 
 Despite the journal’s harsh review, the OFC continued to quarrel with the Tanganyika 
government over their rights and responsibilities in regards to road transport. The debates increasingly 
shifted from road construction to road ownership and vehicle licensing. The government initially awarded 
the Corporation licensing exemptions in the Southern Province.
309
 The issue reemerged in 1952 when the 
government offered to maintain the OFC’s private road from Masasi to Nachingwea. Public traffic was 
already using the road because of its better alignment than the old government road. When the 
government considered reclassifying the road as a public highway, the OFC put up “private road” signs. 
The OFC did not want to pay the vehicle licensing fees that would come if the road was made public. The 
OFC used the road as leverage – threatening to restrict access unless the government exempted them from 
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licensing fees. The OFC wanted the double advantage of not paying for road maintenance or licensing 
fees. The Tanganyika government was fed up. The Acting Assistant Governor of Tanganyika found the 
OFC “extremely tiresome in this matter,” while the DPW reported that a “typical bit of nonsense is going 
on over the public use, or non-use, of the 11 miles of O.F.C. Ridge Road at Nachingwea.”310 The DPW 
continued, “What benefit is it to the Colonial Empire if two of its servants cannot agree to provide the 
obvious answer in this case?”311 
 The conflict between the Tanganyika government and contractors also embroiled the southern 
provincial administration. The PWD and central administration increasingly dictated to the southern 
provincial staff how they should maintain roads and govern motor vehicle transport. The PWD, for 
example, instituted a territorial-wide road permit system in January 1951.
312
 Any vehicle over 3.5 tons 
operating on main roads and 1.5 tons on district roads required a permit from the Road Authority.
313
 In 
the Southern Province, no lorries over five tons would receive a permit to operate from Tunduru to 
Songea. No permits were issued throughout the province during the rainy season.
314
 Problems quickly 
emerged with the application of the mandate. Provincial Engineers in Songea and Lindi issued permits 
without checking with district officers about road conditions in neighboring districts, which led to road 
damage and rising tempers.
315
 In other instances, southern officers rejected the external interference and 
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refused to recognize the PWD’s authority over their roads. Tensions mounted between the PWD’s 
Southern Provincial Engineer and the District Commissioner of Mikindani when the former accused the 
D.C. of “high handed action” in regards to the maintenance and reopening of the Lindi-Mtwara Road. The 
Provincial Engineer insisted that the road was his concern and he would decide when it would reopen “be 
they right or wrong.” He continued: 
Likewise the responsibility for maintaining the road is mine, and it is difficult work. If damage is 
done to the road by heavy vehicles now it means the road will be worse than it need be for the 
rest of this year and my department takes the knocks for it, and the general public suffers. 
I have had your co-operation in the past, and you mine, and I hope this will continue. But I want 
it clearly understood that the decisions affecting the roads I control must be mine, and cannot be 
anyone elses.
316
 
 
Although the conflict was settled “amicably,” it underscored the lack of cooperation between Dar and the 
southern provincial administration.
317
 District Officers and Commissioners were accustomed to their 
isolation and conducting business as they saw fit. While the officers believed that they knew what was 
best for their districts, they also knew that they needed help. After all, the provincial staff in 1950 was 
“only adequate for keeping the Province on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis and not adequate for 
expansion.” 318 With a meager staff, it was “impossible” to conduct development plans.319 The officers 
ultimately wanted help on their own terms. The OFC, PWD, and Tanganyika government, however, also 
wanted to shape the southern transportation infrastructure on their terms. Each party blamed the other for 
the deteriorating road conditions and was unwilling to invest resources necessary to dramatically improve 
the situation. Colonial development plans and the economy of southern Tanganyika suffered as state-
civilian cooperation dissipated and turned into conflict. 
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 Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the PWD struggled to improve southern Tanganyika’s 
main transportation artery from Mtwara and Lindi to Songea without adequate funds, equipment, and 
manual labor. With the exception of 1954, the department’s expenditure rose steadily until the end of the 
decade. 
Table 4.7 Public Works Department’s Annual Expenditure and Revenue, 1948-1959320 
Year Expenditure (£) Revenue (£) 
1948 845,396 62,128 
1949 1,273,176 65,037 
1950 2,258,247 75,882 
1951 2,677,448 91,738 
1952 3,566,732 105,422 
1953 4,977,497 143,746 
1954 (1/2 year) 2,265,998 81,988 
1954/55 4,484,903 223,436 
1955/56 5,629,350 260,529 
1956/57 6,808,628 317,820 
1958 6,639,115 404,461 
1959 6,210,671 NA 
 
The department’s Road Branch also became increasingly mechanized with a wide range of graders, tip 
trucks, tractors, excavators, stone crushers, rollers, concrete mixers, tar sprayers, and other equipment. 
Director of Public Works, G. Morgan, decided to slowly consolidate the department’s mechanical 
equipment into units (construction, betterment, and tipper units) in 1950, rather than allowing individual 
machines to be loaned out across the territory – a common practice that he believed was “most unreliable 
and inefficient”.321 Road Construction Unit 1 of the PWD was deployed to Lindi in April 1951 in order to 
improve the Lindi-Mingoyo section of the main road to an all-weather, bitumen standard.
322
 The unit was 
supposed to use a mechanized road plant offered by the OFC, but a lack of spare parts undermined 
operations. The following year witnessed a massive rise in costs and scarcities “of all engineered 
resources, materials, plant and labour” across the Territory:  
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The local price of cement, obtainable at between £5 and £6 per ton in the United Kingdom, 
reached £17.5s. per ton in Dar es Salaam and even more alarming heights in the more remote 
areas of the territory. The “Abadan Affair” resulted in increases in prices of fuel oils and 
lubricants and in bitumen products of the order of 12% and 25% respectively above 1951 levels. 
Engineering plant cost increases varied between 25% and 50% over the past three years.
323
 
 
Although the PWD’s supply situation – in terms of vehicles, machines, and spare parts – improved during 
the rest of the decade, it was clear that road work would never become fully mechanized in 
Tanganyika.
324
 Director Morgan reported in 1951, “Mechanization is likely to play an increasingly 
important part in road improvements and construction, but it cannot replace hand labour on petty day-to-
day tasks.”325 Three years later, Morgan’s successor, F. H. Woodrow, argued that wherever mechanical 
road maintenance was carried out, “a large number of labourers would still have to be employed and this 
will normally amount to a force averaging ten thousand men.”326 Woodrow repeated the sentiment in 
1959, insisting that a “certain amount of hand work by labour resident along the roads will always be 
necessary.”327 The PWD’s labor supply, however, deteriorated annually between 1955 and 1959. The 
department could not find sufficient workers nor keep them employed. The department partially overcame 
these deficiencies by intensifying its reliance on prison labor.
328
   
 Three years after the Lindi-Mingoyo project began, the Road Construction Unit was recalled 
having completed only fifteen miles of improvements – five miles of which were bituminous and the rest 
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graveled.
329
 The entire section was finally bituminized in 1955, but problems with erosion and “slips in 
high embankment and cuttings” (due to poor soil conditions) were already apparent the following year.330 
Director Morgan proudly reported that biweekly transport service was carried out from Lindi to Songea 
without interruption during the rainy season for the first time in 1953.
331
 Three years later, however, 
massive amounts of rain caused the destruction of the bridges spanning the Muhwezi and Lumesule rivers 
– bringing transportation from Songea to Lindi to a halt for multiple months.332     
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Figure 4.8 Destruction of the Muhuwezi River Bridge by Flood Waters, Tunduru, 1956
333
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 The Southern Province did not receive its own “Grader Patrol” for road work – consisting of three power 
graders, two tow graders, two wobbly wheel rollers and supporting tippers – until 1956. By 1959, the 
PWD reported that all major river crossings in the south had permanent bridges and bitumen surfacing 
had begun from Mingoyo to Mtama. The vast majority of the Lindi-Songea road, however, remained dirt 
surfaced and susceptible to climatic conditions. The Dar es Salaam-Lindi road and most of the rest of the 
southern road infrastructure closed annually for five to six months during the rains, thus isolating 
countless villages, towns, and the entire province from regional, territorial, and global markets.   
Turning Failure into Opportunity 
 The failure of the colonial state to promote road transportation for the benefit of the colonial 
economy, administration, and “development” schemes turned into a lucrative opportunity for one Indian 
family in Lindi.
334
 The Amin family exploited the transportation vacuum left by the state to create the 
dominant passenger and cargo transport firm in southern Tanganyika. Beginning in the 1930s, Indian 
retail and wholesalers increasingly took advantage of the flexibility and speed that motor vehicles offered 
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to maintain their control over intra- and interregional trade networks. By 1939, the Asian community in 
Tanzania controlled an estimated 80% of territory’s transportation services.335 Those Indian retailers and 
wholesalers who purchased and operated automobiles in the south typically owned one or two vehicles to 
conduct import-export trade.
336
 Whereas most traders utilized motor vehicles to improve the efficiency of 
their businesses, Savailal C. Amin took advantage of the dearth of transportation services in the south to 
create a profitable transportation firm. Amin originally emigrated from India to Mombasa in search of 
employment during the First World War. He worked in a bank before finding employment in the colonial 
postal service. As a Post Master, Amin served in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.
337
 While working as the 
Lindi Post Master in 1943, Amin met the co-owner and General Manager of the Tanganyika Transport 
Company Ltd. (TTCo) – Carnegie Browne. While TTCo still maintained its transportation contract for 
government employees and mail, its road construction business was in shambles. As discussed earlier, 
TTCo came under increasing scrutiny from the colonial state during the war about its inability to maintain 
the Masasi-Tunduru main road year round. TTCo finally lost its maintenance contract in December 1944. 
The criticism and contract withdrawal might have been why Carnegie Browne “severed all connection” 
with TTCo in 1945.
338
 He sold his shares and controlling interests to Savailal C. Amin.
339
  
 Amin was unable to run the company’s operations since he still worked for the government, and 
instead hired his twenty-two year old son – Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (or Dirubhai) – as the company’s 
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General Manager.
340
 As Dirubhai assumed authority over the Tanganyika Transport Company (henceforth 
Teeteeko), he utilized existing social and business networks to rebuild Teeteeko as a passenger and cargo 
transportation firm.
341
 In addition to their close personal relationship with the Indian trade community, the 
Amin family cultivated connections with colonial administrators – socializing with officers and throwing 
them farewell parties when they transferred from the province.
342
 Dirubhai utilized these networks to 
ensure the continuance of the company’s transport contract for government loads, personnel, and mail. 
The company fleet of five, 5-ton lorries also began transporting demobilized African troops to their home 
districts after they returned from wartime service to Lindi.
343
 The Groundnut Scheme spurred more traffic 
and profits for the company. Before the development contractors’ vehicles arrived in Lindi, the 
contractors hired Teeteeko to transport their men and materials to and from Nachingwea.
344
 Teeteeko 
continued to transport produce for the OFC after the company’s fleet arrived.345 Teeteeko also offered 
services to local producers, traders, and passengers. From May to December, the company transported 
maize, pulses, groundnuts, sesame, cashew nuts, and other produce to the coast. The profits Teeteeko 
generated allowed Dirubhai to expand the company’s operations; purchasing hundreds of new vehicles 
and establishing branches in Dar es Salaam and Songea run by his brother and father. Dirubhai introduced 
the region’s first bus services from Lindi to Mingoyo in 1948.346 By the following year, six buses were 
running between Lindi-Dar es Salaam, Lindi-Songea, Songea-Njombe, Songea-Mamba Bay, and Songea-
Lituhi.
347
 Teeteeko was not only moving produce and passengers, but it also profited from an agreement 
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with the TSGA to transport migrant laborers.
348
 Ten to twelves vehicles were hired to transport recruits 
along the Ruvuma River to SILABU camps in Masasi, Newala, and Tunduru. Teeteeko vehicles then 
brought the recruits to Lindi and Dar es Salaam.
349
 Those who went to Dar es Salaam were distributed to 
plantations in Morogoro, Tanga, and Central Provinces. The “big business” of moving manaymba lasted 
from June to December.
350
 Teeteeko survived the “slack season” during the rains by continuing to 
transport government personnel across the province.
351
 Dirubhai insisted that the colonial government 
remained very helpful “because they knew that I was doing much of their work, government work, nearly 
100%.”352 By the time of Tanganyika’s Independence in 1961, Teeteeko was the only major transportation 
firm in the south offering government officers, farmers, traders, and migrant laborers reliable road 
transport across district and provincial borders.
353
  
Conclusion 
 
 By 1956, the Southern Province Railway was generating an annual operating deficit of 
£195,000.
354
  The Southern Province Railway Working Party determined that most traders and cultivators 
from Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea Districts utilized motor vehicle to transport their goods to Lindi, 
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rather than by rail to Mtwara. The commission bluntly reported that local Africans “did not ask for the 
port of Mtwara or the railway to be built and who could happily continue to trade profitably without either 
installation.”355 The commission had no simple solutions for diverting the “roadborne” traffic. They 
rejected the idea of constructing a railway branch to Masasi because of the high cost and the presence of 
“well served roads.” They also recommended against restrictive legislation on road traffic.356 The 
commission concluded that “considerable development of African production has taken place and will 
take place without a railway. A railway does not in itself bring development to an agricultural area which 
is already productive.”357 The Southern Province Railway, Groundnut Scheme, and several other colonial 
development projects implemented in southern Tanganyika following the Second World War failed 
because the colonial state and development planners repeatedly ignored the autonomy of the local African 
labor populace and the integral role that road transportation fulfilled in the borderland region.  
 Perceptions of the Southern Province as a backwards, unprofitable, and isolated periphery of 
Tanganyika dated back to the interwar era, intensified during the Second World War, and informed how 
the late British state approached the region when planning and implementing the Groundnut Scheme.  
During the war, the central administration ignored petitions by local officers and the private sector to 
invest in the region’s road network, which served as the province’s economic and administrative life-line.  
Local-state tensions increased as the colonial state shifted blame for the failing infrastructure on the 
private contractors entrusted with the maintenance of the Lindi-Songea main road. With the hybrid 
system of road development on the verge of collapse, private contractors and African communities 
struggled to maintain roads with inadequate resources and in the face of adverse environmental conditions 
and a growing volume of heavy vehicular traffic. Southern Tanganyika’s peripheral position within the 
Territory and British Empire, however, experienced a radical reversal following the Second World War. It 
received a massive infusion of manpower, machinery, and finances as the British aimed to utilize Western 
scientific knowledge and technology to transform the region’s socioeconomic and physical landscape; 
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revolutionizing agricultural production in the process for the benefit of local peoples, Tanganyika, East 
Africa, Britain, and the Empire. The British state and development planners confidently believed that by 
constructing a new railway and port in southern Tanganyika they could transform the forgotten periphery 
into a productive and modernized region. These planners, however, neither fully understood nor respected 
the environmental, social, and economic forces that had been at work in the borderland region for 
centuries. Joseph Morgan Hodge argued that, 
[…] the men who dreamed up and inexplicably pushed on with this colossus among misguided 
projects in the face of mounting evidence of failure, were, like Goethe’s Faust, driven by an 
insatiable and illusory vision of what was possible which blinded them to the basic economic and 
ecological facts.
358
 
 
The British state abandoned its trust in local knowledge and capabilities in favor of the “expertise” 
promised by contractors and trading houses that flooded into the Southern Province in pursuit of profits. 
These companies, however, lacked the experience, networks, and patience needed to operate in a region 
that had experienced approximately forty years of neglect and isolation from the central administration. 
Conflict abounded between the state and foreign “experts,” who owed no loyalty to Tanganyika or the 
Southern Province. Conflict, however, bred opportunity. The highly mobile people of the Ruvuma 
borderland exploited the conflict and competition that existed between and among colonial officials and 
private contractors – playing employers off one another to get the best working conditions while 
continuing to engage in seasonal employment to supplement subsistence farming. Entrepreneurs, like 
Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, exploited the lack of transportation services in the south 
(whether by rail, road, or ship) to create a thriving cargo and passenger firm that grew to dominate the 
southern roadways.   
 In the end, the new landscape imagined by GNS planners went unrealized. There was a new port, 
but it struggled to compete with Lindi. The railway generated deficits instead of profits as its structure 
rapidly fell apart. Travel by air and sea provided the only access to the province during the rains as most 
roads continued to close for six months each year. The lack of an all-weather road across and beyond the 
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Southern Province prevented the region’s economic and agricultural growth. Chau P. Johnsen Kelly 
argued that the province’s poor roads in the postwar era were “the single greatest obstacle to the region’s 
greater economic development and integration into the state.”359 The highly public nature of the GNS’s 
collapse as a financial disaster helped to solidify and propagate opinions of southern Tanganyika as an 
unprofitable periphery. In actuality, the state failed because it overlooked and underestimated the 
initiative and knowledge of the local populace.  
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Chapter 5  
Issues of Identity and Belonging – The Road Transportation Sector in Postcolonial Southern 
Tanzania (1960s-1980s) 
 
 In 1961, Tanganyika officially declared independence from Britain and entered a union with 
Zanzibar three years later to form the United Republic of Tanzania.
1
 The early years of independence 
were filled with expectation as the postcolonial state – led by President Julius Nyerere and the 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) – promised economic development and social equality. 
Southern Tanzania quickly entered the national spotlight as it became embroiled in anti-colonial struggles 
and African liberation movements in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. The Tanzanian government 
utilized wartime measures as opportunities to try to transform the region according to the state’s socialist, 
ujamaa vision following the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Despite southern Tanzania’s integral role in the 
state’s strategic, economic, and social programs during the 1960s and 1970s, the postcolonial state failed 
to rectify the region’s transportation issues. Like its colonial predecessors, the postcolonial state lacked 
the funding and resources to overcome the immense challenges of constructing an all-weather regional 
transportation network.  
 While offering analysis of the underlying problems of road construction and maintenance in 
postcolonial southern Tanzania, this chapter primarily examines the region’s road transportation services. 
It assesses how the Tanzanian state gradually replaced the south’s private, Indian-dominated 
transportation sector with state-run, regional cooperatives between the 1950s and 1970s and the 
consequences of these actions. Despite mounting pressure from African cooperatives and labor unions, 
Indian communities retained and extended their control over southern Tanzania’s transportation, 
commercial, and real estate markets following national independence. As Asian-African relations 
deteriorated in the mid-to-late 1960s, Indian automotive firms and operators utilized their dominance over 
the transportation sector to defend their financial interests and negotiate a new place within the nation. By 
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offering their vehicles in support of agricultural cooperatives, anticolonial war efforts, humanitarian 
relief, and nation-building operations, the Indian population in southern Tanzania challenged popular anti-
Asian discourse that portrayed them as exploitative parasites. They instead intended to prove their value, 
allegiance, and belonging to the nation. The alliances created between the private transportation sector 
and the Tanzanian government collapsed in the early 1970s. The state not only stripped the Indian 
community of its decades-old dominion over transportation, but also their control over the housing, 
wholesale, and retail markets. A new age of the state-controlled transport began. A decade of economic 
crises followed and concluded with the liberalization of the Tanzanian economy and transportation sector. 
The chapter concludes by examining how African drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania utilized 
their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to adapt to the turbulent economic decades of 
the 1960s to the 1980s and improve their socioeconomic status as “modern” men. 
End of Empire and Tanzanian Independence 
 
 The 1950s not only witnessed a proliferation of colonial development projects across the British 
Empire, but also the rise of Asian and African nationalism. Frederick Cooper argued that British labor 
policies and colonial development schemes facilitated the collapse of the Empire rather than ensuring its 
continuation. The promotion of African trade unions and improved labor welfare provided avenues 
through which African labor and political leaders could demand more entitlements, including rights to 
sovereignty.
2
 The use of authoritarian force by postwar colonial states further escalated local-state 
tensions and the popularity of nationalist movements.
3
 The collapse of ill-conceived and expensive 
development projects (most notably the East African Groundnut Scheme) intensified British 
                                                 
2
 D.A. Low, Eclipse of Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and 
African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
and Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in 
International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, ed. Frederick 
Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64-92. African politicians in the 1950s 
and 1960s tied the universal rights of workers to citizenship arguments and contended that Africans should 
manage the social change that the Europeans advocated. 
3
 Low, Eclipse of Empire, 164-214; James Scott, Seeing Like and State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1998); and Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: 
War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52 (Oxford: James Currey, 2000). 
298 
 
disillusionment towards colonialism. Britain’s continued investments in the Empire made little financial 
sense once the three colonies with the largest sterling reserves and highest production of dollar-earning 
goods gained independence (Ghana 1957, Malaya 1957, and Nigeria 1960).
4
 In the end, many members 
of the British state believed that it was cheaper to give up the formal Empire and try to maintain influence 
over the new African states through government channels and multinational corporations and 
development agencies.
5
  
 In the case of Tanganyika, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) spearheaded the 
nationalist movement in the mid-1950s.
6
 Arising out of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), 
TANU aimed to gain national independence “by means of popular support and the threat of disorder”.7 
The first phase of nationalist growth occurred between July 1954 and November 1955 with the 
politicization of Dar es Salaam and mobilization of TANU supporters “beyond the commercially 
prosperous areas to food-producing and labour-exporting regions.”8 Nyerere also worked closely with the 
Asian Association “to secure Asian financial and electoral support for both TANU and non-African, 
TANU-sympathetic candidates.”9 Asian-African relations, however, were tenuous at best in the 1950s. 
Postwar price fixing and restrictions on crop marketing fueled popular antagonism towards Indians.
10
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African-Asian relations deteriorated further as TANU rejected constitutional multiracialism.
11
 According 
to James Brennan, “African development was becoming popularly interpreted as African self-sufficiency 
and freedom from non-African economic forces.”12 Incidents of violence towards Asian businessmen in 
1960 (including shop destruction in Moshi and the murder of an Asian man near Morogoro) convinced 
some Asians to “cut their losses and leave the Territory”.13 There were also reports of “an increased 
exodus of Asian and European money” from Tanganyika and a “rush, mostly by Hindus, to take out, or 
renew, passports” as a result of a “number of aggressive and irresponsible statements by minor TANU 
leaders” about non-Africans.14 Brennan argued that Nyerere regretted TANU’s exclusion of non-Africans 
and demonstrated a “political empathy rarely seen among African nationalist leaders of his time”–  
He worked closely with non-African politicians and once famously attempted to reframe the 
racial-national question as one of ‘Tanganyikan’ nationalism by stating that the path to 
democracy was ‘to say we have 123 tribes in Tanganyika, the youngest and relatively the most 
educated being the European and Asian tribes.’15 
 
When speaking to an African and Asian crowd in Newala in 1956, Nyerere argued that the Wamakonde’s 
poverty was not a product of Asian manipulation and exploitation, but of poor investments by Africans:   
Do you ever see Asians, who come all the way from India, remain poor? No! They may come 
barefoot, but after they have been here a little while they are riding around in fancy cars. Why? 
                                                                                                                                                             
es Salaam perpetuated public humiliation for Africans. For example, Africans had to wait in long lines to renew 
their ration cards once a week. Non-Africans, in contrast, renewed their cards by mail once a month. Brennan 
concluded that racial inequality in food and housing “formed the foundation of popular racial politics in Dar es 
Salaam” (100). Richa Nagar argued that the social, political, economic, and spatial isolation that the colonial racial 
order created between Asians and Africans reinforced stereotypes that Asians were “exploitative,” “cunning,” and 
“greedy,” and Africans were “lazy” and “backward.” Nagar also insisted that the colonial racial hierarchy 
obfuscated the immense diversity in Tanganyika’s Asian community (in terms in class, caste, gender, religion, and 
origins) and solidified the myth of Asian homogeneity. See Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 375; Giblin, A 
History of the Excluded, 186-87; James Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of 
Tanganyika, 1914-1956,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 19, no.2 (1999): 24-39, 29; 
Brennan, Taifa, 86 and 99; and Richa Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East XVI, no. 2 (1996): 62-80, 64-65. 
11
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Because they can always rely upon their brothers to help them get a start in business instead of 
everyone having to fend for himself. And then, instead of spending their little money on pombe 
[beer], fine clothing, and soft chairs, they pinch themselves even further until they are really able 
to afford their fancy cars. […] If you got together and bought a lorry instead of bicycles, you 
could all be as rich as Indians.
16
 
 
Brennan concluded that Nyerere was unable to directly challenge TANU’s “racial exclusivity, based on 
racial imagination of continental origins and ‘homelands,’” and was instead forced to defend himself 
against criticism that he was too “multiracial.”17 Although there was no marked increase in the outflow of 
Asian funds and population early in 1961, the British acknowledged that there was “undoubtedly, an 
undercurrent of uneasiness amongst the Asians who remain apprehensive about their ultimate position in 
an independent Tanganyika”.18 
 In southern Tanganyika, TANU membership was “miniscule” prior to Nyerere’s visit in July 
1956.
19
 Nyerere’s appearance marked the first major TANU recruitment drive in the south. Although 
TANU gradually gained political dominance in the region after 1956, none of the southern towns formed 
“main centers of TANU strength and action” as in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tabora, Arusha, and other 
northern towns.
20
 In the case of the Wamakonde of southeastern Tanzania, J. Gus Liebenow argued that 
“geographic isolation, compounded by lethargy and the political fractionalization of Makonde leadership, 
had relegated the Makonde to the role of passive responder to vital decisions made elsewhere in the 
territory.”21 Iliffe contended that TANU “polarised local politics” in Masasi.22 The organization also 
experienced resistance from Yao rulers in Tunduru, who strenuously opposed TANU’s resolution to 
disband chiefs after independence and give their authority to executive officers.
23
 Despite some 
opposition, TANU achieved sweeping victories in the south and across the Territory during the 
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Legislative Council election of 1958-59. This election paved the way for the transfer of power from the 
British to a new national government.
24
 With British policy in East and Central Africa in crisis in 1959, 
the new Conservative leader of the Colonial Office, Iain Macleod, abandoned Britain’s gradualist 
approach towards decolonization and worked with Nyerere to accelerate Tanganyika’s path towards 
independence.
25
 Tanganyika received complete internal self-government in May 1961 and formal 
independence on December 9, 1961.
26
 Two years after Nyerere oversaw the formation of Tanganyika as a 
democratic republic (December 9, 1962), Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to form the United Republic 
of Tanzania. 
 New Government – Persistent Economic and Infrastructure Problems 
 The top priorities of the Tanzanian government in the first years following independence were 
building national unity, economic development, Africanizing the state, and assisting anti-colonial 
struggles elsewhere in the continent.
27
 The state banned political parties based upon tribal identity and 
abolished the position of traditional chief in 1961 in an effort to unify the nation’s multiethnic population 
and solidify TANU’s authority. Elected district and village councils replaced the Native Authorities the 
following year.
28
 Africanization of the civil service also began immediately. The number of Africans 
posted in senior and middle grade posts rose from 1,170 to 1,821 between 1961 and 1962, while the 
number of non-Africans dropped from 3,282 to 2,902.
29
 When Liebenow returned to Mtwara, Newala, 
and Lindi Districts in 1967, he observed the wide-scale Africanization of government and missionary 
positions.
30
 Despite calls to speed up the Africanization of the national economy and education system, 
the government moved “gingerly” during the first two to three years out of “fear of losing the talents and 
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capital of Europeans and Asians – whether residents or expatriates.”31 The national government had more 
pressing concerns with trying to stimulate and diversify its struggling, agricultural-based economy. 
Tanganyika was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a “gross domestic product estimated at 
£21 per head”.32 Whereas the average cash income per head in Tanganyika in 1961/62 was estimated at 
£12 and £20 (“if the value of subsistence production is taken into account”), Kenya’s rate was £26 and 
£34 and Uganda’s rate was £16 and £22.33 Agriculture and domestic livestock represented over half the 
gross domestic product in Tanganyika and approximately 80% of the territory’s export earnings just prior 
to independence. The main agricultural exports were sisal (30%), coffee, and cotton (combined for 35-
40%).
34
 Southern Tanganyika’s economy continued to rely upon agricultural exports, particularly cashew 
nuts. The region’s cashew exports rose from 1,312 tons in 1947 to 41,288 tons in 1960.35 Production grew 
steadily in the 1960s and 1970s with the value of raw nut exports rising from TShs. 36 million in 1961 to 
TShs. 196 million in 1974.
36
 The lack of diversification in the regional and national economy, however, 
left both susceptible to global market fluctuations. When comparing the economic prospects of Britain’s 
three East African colonies, the Colonial Office reported that Tanganyika and Uganda were “more at the 
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mercy of commodity price trends than Kenya because the market in Kenya crops is more a quality market 
and because the development of secondary industries is further advanced in Kenya and the economy is 
more diversified.”37 The British concluded that Tanganyika had “a long way to go before its people have 
the wealth and resources which its East African neighbours enjoy today.”38 The World Bank encouraged 
the Tanzanian government to continue to promote peasant cash crop production while investing in 
“settlement schemes where African capitalist farmers could be guided ‘under close supervision.’”39   
 British civil servants drafted Tanzania’s First Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64), which 
emphasized the formation and development of import substituting industries.
40
 An estimated £24 million 
was earmarked towards “agriculture and pastoralism, communications, and secondary and technical 
education, while leaving industrial development to private enterprise.”41  An estimated 60% of the budget 
was devoted to economic services and “services which should increase the country’s wealth”.42 The 
government also vigorously supported African cooperatives. African cooperatives in Tanzania dated back 
to the 1930s when farmers worked together in order “prevent crop disease, facilitate marketing, and 
generally advance their group interests.”43 Following World War II, many African cultivators and traders 
in southern Tanzania pooled their resources to form cooperatives that could buy, sell, and transport 
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produce and piece goods. They aimed to challenge Indian economic domination over produce and 
commercial markets, which had been strengthened by the policies of the Economic Control Board (staffed 
by Europeans and Asians) and its quota system for controlled goods.
44
 British officials estimated that only 
twenty African retailers received a portion of the government quotas in the Southern Province prior to 
1947.
45
 Dissatisfied with the colonial system, Manzi Matamula formed a trade group in 1948 with African 
shopkeepers and small itinerant traders in the Southern Province. Liebenow described how Matamula 
traveled between Lindi and Songea, “collecting produce orders, making bulk purchases at the coast, and 
delivering the produce.”46 African retailers in southern Tanganyika also began demanding that the 
colonial state award equal distribution of quota goods between African and Indian retailers in 1947. 
Indian wholesalers and retailers were willing to allocate 5% of the provincial quota to African traders, but 
African traders protested until they were awarded 25-30% of the provincial piece-goods quota.
47
 The 
British administration in southern Tanganyika felt “great satisfaction” that African traders were clearly 
“breaking into the non-native monopoly in the distributive trades.”48 The number of cooperative unions in 
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Tanganyika rose from three in 1944, to 79 in 1949, and 691 in 1960.
49
 Most African retailers and 
cultivators in the interior districts, however, still depended upon Indian middlemen to transport their 
goods to and from the coast. Many Africans in southern Tanganyika lacked the cash and credit required to 
buy their own vehicles.
50
 The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme (GNS) in 1951 further hampered African 
access to credit and temporarily bolstered Indian commercial dominance in the region.
51
 Even 
Matamula’s operations depended upon the support of sympathetic Asian businessmen, who rented him 
vehicles. The cooperative movement, however, experienced a boom after independence. Between 1961 
and 1964, cooperatives in Mtwara Region rose “from virtually nothing” to nearly 100% coverage in 
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1964.
52
 The cooperative share of the region’s cashew crops rose from 10% in 1961 (2,500 tons), to 55% 
in 1962/63 (25,626 tons), and 87% in 1963/64 (36,814 tons). The number of primary marketing societies 
increased from 50 to 104 between 1962 and 1964. Their activities were coordinated under the 
Mtwara/Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Union after 1963. By the following year, the union had branches 
in Masasi, Newala, and Lindi, and from these branches “the primary societies receive[d] the services of 
cash distribution, supply of safes, scales, gunnies etc., in fact, all the services of secondary organization, 
including produce transport.”53  
 In order to ensure the success of African cooperatives and the growth of the general economy, the 
Tanzanian government prioritized infrastructure development.  The state largely adopted its predecessor’s 
road policy of constructing a nationwide, integrated, high-standard network of trunk roads. After World 
War II, the colonial state’s ideal road design for Tanganyika consisted of a “grid of four north-south and 
three east-west arteries that were to traverse the whole country.”54 The colonial government aimed to 
improve “a limited mileage of the most important trunk roads to a high standard with a solid base and an 
18-feet bitumen surface.”55 Most of the road projects of the 1950s were concentrated in the northeastern 
parts of the Territory, i.e. Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Morogoro, and Coast Regions. Rising construction 
costs forced the government to adapt their road policy towards “low-cost roads” after 1955. Rolf 
Hofmeier explained: 
Apart from the complete new construction of the high-standard bitumen roads and of closing still 
existing gaps in the trunk road network it was an urgent necessity during this period (and also 
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later until the present) to structurally improve existing roads particularly in regard to alignment, 
drainage and bridges.
56
  
 
The Tanzanian government similarly aimed to construct a nationwide system of “low-costs roads” while 
improving the nation’s trunk road network of three north-south and three east-west arteries (including the 
Southern Trunk and Link Road from Dar-es-Salaam to Lindi-Mtwara-Songea-Njombe).
57
  
Table 5.1 “Proposed expenditure on roads during First Five Years Plan period”58 
Northern Trunk Road £1,173,375 
Western Trunk Road £1,000,000 
Eastern Trunk Road £928,000 
Southern Trunk Road £257,000 
Central Trunk Road £231,900 
Great North Road  £98,500 
Total Trunk Road £3,688,775 
Major Link Roads £1,515,625 
Major Feeder Roads £4,890,600 
Minor Feeder Roads £935,000 
Miscellaneous £770,000 
Total £11,800,000 
 
The Ministry of Communications and Transport (Comworks) became responsible for administering and 
maintaining the nation’s trunk, territorial main, and local main roads (amounting to nearly 10,500 
miles).
59
 The engineers assigned to the Roads and Aerodrome Division of Comworks (headquartered in 
Dar es Salaam) designed road and bridge work and supervised major construction projects.
60
 Regional 
Engineers were responsible for routine maintenance works, emergency measures, and the execution of 
construction works for all trunk and main roads, aerodrome, and public works projects within each 
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Region.
61
 District Councils oversaw maintenance and improvement operations for district roads, while 
city and town councils managed all township and urban roads.
62
 Small road gangs executed most of the 
routine road maintenance during the 1960s and early 1970s, including the cleaning of embankments and 
ditches, refilling potholes, and manually grading road surfaces.
63
  
 Although the Tanzanian government spent approximately TShs. 740 million on road investments 
between 1961 and 1970/71, insufficient funding, trained personnel, and mechanical equipment 
undermined road maintenance and improvement operations as it had during the colonial era.
64
 The 
Tanzanian government contended with “serious manpower” deficiencies after many of the colonial 
officers left the country in the late 1960s. Only six of seventeen Regional Engineers were fully 
qualified.
65
 The lack of trained experts was one reason why foreign consulting firms typically conducted 
feasibility studies of major infrastructure projects in Tanzania.
66
 The men hired for routine maintenance 
also lacked proper training and experienced acute shortages in mechanical equipment and vehicles. Every 
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five road crews (or gangs) were supposed to have one to two lorries at their disposal, yet Comworks 
vehicles were continually out of order due to “bureaucratic hindrances” in attaining spare parts and the 
“generally bad organization of servicing and maintenance.”67 Hofmeier reported that the lack of vehicles 
in 1968 was “so acute that these lorries are hardly ever available and that the job of the road labourers 
under this present system is confined to pure manual work.”68 Saidi A. Mtutile’s father, for example, 
worked as a road foreman for construction projects in Kilwa, Masasi, and Lindi during the 1960s. His 
construction crews primarily used hand tools, rather than bull dozers and graders.
69
 Many of the district 
councils across the nation failed to dedicate the standard rate of TShs. 400/- per mile for road 
maintenance on district roads.
70
 According to Hofmeier, District Councils did very little maintenance of 
local roads “since their finances are normally completely exhausted with other duties.”71 The central 
government tried to rectify the problem in 1967/68 by gradually incorporating district roads under the 
authority of the Comworks. A lack of money, maintenance machinery, and vehicles prevented wide-scale 
implementation of the program under the First Five-Year Plan.
72
 As during the German and British 
colonial eras, the Tanzanian government relied upon private contractors to conduct all major construction 
projects. Hofmeier explained, “in general the direct construction activities of Comworks are confined to 
medium-sized and smaller projects that are normally financed out of local Tanzanian funds. Even for the 
completion of these projects Comworks often employs local firms as contractors.”73 
 In southern Tanzania, the central state closed the Southern Province Railway in 1962/63 due to 
the rail’s exorbitant annual financial deficit.74 The government instead focused on improving the Mtwara-
Mingoyo and Lindi-Masasi roads to an engineered-gravel standard during the first three years of 
                                                 
67
 Ibid., 209. Hofmeier explained that spare parts could only be obtained through government stores.  
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Interview with Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015). 
70
 Hofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, 215. 
71
 Ibid., 207. 
72
 Ibid., 216. The program began in Mwanza, Mara, and Shinyanga Regions.  
73
 Ibid., 227. 
74
 Ibid., 77. The annual deficit in 1961 was £245,000. Portions of the track were relocated to Uganda.  
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independence. The roads’ surface quality, however, remained of “a fairly low standard.”75 Between 1964 
and 1968, road improvement projects were conducted along the Njombe-Songea-Tunduru-Masasi road to 
meet the requirements of road transportation operations between Mtwara and Zambia (operations which 
will be discussed later in the chapter).
76
  The mountainous conditions between Njombe and Songea, 
however, prevented “fundamental improvement”.77 The government instead invested in a bitumen road 
from Dar es Salaam to Tunduma (on the Zambian border), to the detriment of the Mtwara port and 
southern economy.
78
 The conditions of district and local roads in southern Tanzania were hardly better, 
and in most cases worse. According to Liebenow, government officials in Mtwara “complained of the 
costs and time involved in keeping the feeder roads cleared of the bamboo, wild rubber, and vine-covered 
thickets which constantly intrude upon any cleared area.”79 Despite the efforts of district councils to fund 
district road improvement projects, officials still struggled to reach remote areas during the rains due to 
road and bridge washouts.
 80
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 Ibid., 82. 
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 Ibid.; and Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania, 288. 
77
 Hofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, 82. 
78
 Ibid., 82-83; and Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania, 289. Monson noted that the 
Americans were building a paved highway from Dar to Zambia while the Chinese were constructing the TAZARA 
railway. Jamie Monson, Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and 
Livelihoods in Tanzania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 1-2. 
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 Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania, 289. 
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 Ibid. District officers also received minuscule petrol allowances, which were typically exhausted by the middle of 
each month “and touring came to halt.” According to Liebenow, petrol shortages resulted from the government 
prioritizing Zambia and Mozambique-related operations. 
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Table 5.2 “Expenditure of District Councils for Road Maintenance in 1966” (in TShs.)81 
District Total Revenue 
(including grants 
from Central 
Government)  
Total 
Expenditures 
Expenditure 
for road 
maintenance 
Share of road 
maintenance out 
of total 
expenditure (%) 
Expenditure 
per mile of 
district 
roads  
Kilwa 1,321,000 1,422,000 114,000 8.1 375 
Lindi 2,778,000 2,796,000 142,000 5.1 640 
Masasi 4,266,000 4,397,000 147,000 3.4 835 
Mtwara 1,746,000 1,563,000 88,000 5.6 760 
Nachingwea 1,099,00 1,278,000 30,000 2.3 200 
Newala 3,600,000 3,822,000 190,000 5.0 1,900 
Tunduru 1,391,000 1,326,000 101,000 7.6 665 
Songea 2,007,000 2,124,000 101,000 4.8 725 
Tanzania 193,088,000 194,643,000 6,434,000 3.3 605 
 
Only two main roads were usable year round in Mtwara District in 1967.
82
 Mtwara regional development 
officers and the Mtwara Development Committee repeatedly pinpointed inadequate transportation and 
water infrastructure as the major impediments to economic development and health advances in the 
region from 1967 to 1970.
83
 Poor infrastructure prevented peasant access to government services and led 
“to enormous administrative problems by preventing the tasks of planning, surveying, and assessing 
development progress” in a systematic way during the 1960s and 1970s.84  
 Citizens of southern Tanzania often complained to national newspapers that the lack of 
transportation infrastructure – particularly an all-weather road to Dar es Salaam – epitomized their “literal 
and symbolic exclusion from substantive national membership.”85 Whereas the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road 
annually closed for five to six months throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a complete bitumen road system 
was constructed between Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, Moshi, and Arusha between 1966 and 1969.
86
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 Hofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, 340. The table above is an abbreviated version of 
the one offered in Hofmeier’s appendix. A few comparative rates include: Rufiji (1,646,000; 1,560,000; 94,000; 6.0; 
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Priya Lal argued that southeasterners juxtaposed the region’s poor infrastructure with the central state’s 
principles of socialist equality and its development promises for the “Cinderella” region in order to gain 
more national resources. According to Lal, “In calling for the construction of a Southern Link road, these 
citizens simultaneously portrayed the region as a discrete unit worthy of investment and called for the 
erosion of its separateness.”87 The state responded to popular discontent in southern Tanzania by 
authorizing a number of feasibility studies for the construction of an all-weather, 300 mile road to Dar es 
Salaam. The Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency published a survey report in 1971 that estimated 
construction costs at TShs. 261,447,000. Three years later, no construction work had been done.
88
  
The Southern Road Transportation Service Sector (mid-1950s to mid-1960s) 
 As the Tanzanian government struggled to improve the south’s transportation infrastructure in the 
1960s, it exerted minimum authority over the region’s Asian-dominated road transportation services 
sector. Despite the horrid conditions of the southern roads, the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. 
(Teeteeko) transported government and private goods, mail, and passengers to all the major townships in 
the south, Mbamba Bay, Njombe, and Dar es Salaam by 1956.
89
  The company’s General Manager, 
Dhirajlal (Dirubhai) Savailal Amin oversaw the expansion of Teeteeko’s fleet from 5-10 vehicles to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ramifications,” in The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern 
Tanzania, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 58-74. 
87
 Lal, African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania, 153.  
88
 S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye offered an analysis of the Tanzanian state’s struggles to complete an all-weather 
road from Lindi to Dar es Salaam in, “The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti Road: Political Ramifications.”  
89
 TNA ACC 460 Ministry of Labour, 4/25/4 Tanganyika Transport Co Limited, Lindi (30.1.54-20.9.61), Labour Officer 
Lindi to Labour Commissioner, “Transport Changes,” 22 August 1955; and Southern Provincial Commissioner 
“T.T.Co-Government Contracts,” 23 August 1956. Colonial officers were contracted to use Teeteeko vehicles along 
the following routes in 1956: Lindi-Kilwa-Dar es Salaam; Lindi-Nachingwea; Lindi-Masasi-Tunduru-Songea; Lindi-
Mkwaya-Mtwara; Songea-Mbamba Bay; Songea-Njombe; Songea-Lituhi; and Mtwara-Newala-Masasi. Teeteeko 
also maintained a contract to clear and forward government stores and goods at the ports of Lindi and Mtwara at 
a rate of Shs. 6/- per ton (weight or measure) with a minimum of Shs. 2/-. Dirubhai established major branches in 
Dar es Salaam and Songea under the authority of his brother and father. Smaller offices also opened in Njombe, 
Masasi, and Mtwara between 1945 and 1964. Dirubhai’s mother and sisters were not involved in the business. 
According to Dirubhai, women were not involved in businesses in the 1940s and 1950s. Today, in contrast, most of 
the upcountry stores are operated by women. Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 
2015). 
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nearly 200 hundred lorries and buses between 1945 and 1964.
90
 The company’s employees 
correspondingly grew from 20-30 to between 200 and 250.
91
 Labor unionism offered the most significant 
obstacle to Teeteeko’s continued economic growth during the late 1950s. 92 Labor unions targeted 
Teeteeko because they recognized that an agreement with the company – one of the largest employers of 
African laborers in the south – would help strengthen union claims against other smaller transport 
employers in the region and the broader regional labor market. The Tanganyika Transport and Allied 
Workers Union (TT&AWU) issued demands on behalf of Teeteeko’s employees in 1957, including; work 
hours, rights of termination, holidays, paid leave, and off-season pay (during the rainy season).
93
 The 
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Sd. J. Dickson, Labour Officer (Morogoro), “Inspection report Tanganyika Transport Co. 
Limited, Lindi,” 28 October 1942; and interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). 
Teeteeko was a customer of Shell Company. Teeteeko supposedly did not experience petrol shortages, and was 
looked after “very well” by Shell. 
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 Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). 
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 According to John Iliffe, collective labor consciousness and solidarity among Tanganyika Africans grew between 
1929 and 1947. Unionization began with civil servants and moved through the service and transport sector before 
reaching industrial workers in the 1950s. Many of the first registered trade unions were established during the 
Second World War, including the African Cooks, Washermen, and House Servants Association (1939), Tanganyika 
African Government Servants Association (1944),
 
African Teachers Association (1944), and Railway African 
Association (1944).
 
The first well-document union among automobile drivers appeared in 1944 in the Southern 
Highlands. While drivers had excellent communication avenues, Iliffe argued that it was difficult for them to form 
coordinated labor organizations because drivers were “excessively dispersed, mobile, and individualistic.” 
Dockworkers, in comparison, were more successful at building solidarity and conducting union strikes. Southern 
Tanganyika experienced strikes at Lindi harbor and among transport workers in 1947 and 1948. African trade 
unionism temporarily declined after a disastrous strike in Dar es Salaam in 1950. Brennan described how a strike of 
some 1,500 casual dockworkers on the morning of February 3, 1950 turned into a violent mob of 400-600 people 
in Mnazi Mmoja. In the aftermath, many African trade unions deregistered or collapsed. There were no registered 
African trade unions in the territory after the African Tailors Union closed in 1951. Brennan, however, noted that 
some unions carried on illegally. Educated men with close ties to the territory’s leading African nationalist parties –
TAA and TANU – revived unionism in the mid-1950s. These leaders sought to “create a labour movement from 
above, on a territorial scale, and with the overt leadership which most earlier labour actions had lacked.” The 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour was launched in October 1955, precipitating a massive growth of unionization 
among Tanganyika workers (reaching 42% by 1961). Iliffe contended that the greatest impact was felt among 
“dispersed, largely unskilled, and often migrant sisal workers” (540). See Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 
396-404 and 537-39; Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 316; and Brennan, Taifa, 115. 
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, “The Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union Lindi Branch,” 2 September 1958. 
T&AWU demanded a 45 hour work week where employees worked 7:30am-noon and 14:00-17:00pm (Monday-
Friday) and 7:30am-noon (Saturdays). The employees would receive overtime if they exceeded 45 hours. When an 
employee was not working during the rains, he would receive half pay. T&AWU also demanded that employees 
receive double pay for working on holidays, including: New Years, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Mohamedan Year, 
Queens Day, Christmas, and Boxing Day. After one year of continuous employment, an employee should receive 
fourteen days of leave with full pay at the full rate. Those who worked for two years continuously should receive 
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union also demanded a dramatic increase in wages per month: Shs. 500/- for drivers, Shs. 400/- for skilled 
mechanics, Shs. 200/- for carpenters, and Shs. 90/- for turn-boys (drivers’ assistants).94 Negotiations in 
September 1958 soon stalled as the General Secretary of TT&AWU allegedly used profane language and 
threatened to finish off Teeteeko “in no time.”95 Dirubhai refused to negotiate until the General Secretary 
apologized for his “rude insulting behavior.” Dirubhai eventually withdrew the request and instead asked 
that the secretary refrain from using profane language in the future.
96
 Negotiations proceeded slowly as 
Dirubhai found the demands to be too numerous and difficult.
97
 TT&AWU responded by threatening to 
unleash a strike, even though it was unclear whether Teeteeko employees could legally strike.
98
 The 
agreement signed by both parties on October 6, 1958 did not meet the union’s demands, but did create a 
precedent for future negotiations and helped legitimize TT&AWU in southern Tanganyika.
 99
 After 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 days, and three year employees should receive 72 days of leave. Those men on monthly contract should be 
notified a month in advance of their employment termination. 
94
 Ibid. Additional wage increases included: semi-skilled mechanics (Shs. 250/-), kulis/coolies (Shs. 90/-), grease 
boys (Shs. 75/-), masons (Shs. 200/-), and night watchman (Shs. 100/-). During Carnegie Browne’s management in 
1942, drivers were receiving Shs. 60/- to Shs. 110/- per month plus a bonus of Shs. 10/. The turn-boys received 
between Shs. 15/- and Shs. 18/-. There were only ten lorries operating at that time between Lindi and Songea. See 
TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Sd. J. Dickson, Labour Officer (Morogoro), “Inspection report Tanganyika Transport Co. 
Limited, Lindi,” 28 October 1942. 
95
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (Teeteeko) to General Secretary of the Tanganyika Transport and Allied 
Workers Union (TT&AWU), 22 September 1958. 
96
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (Teeteeko) to the President (TT&AWU), 16 September 1958; and 
Managing Director (Teeteeko) to General Secretary (TT& AWU), 22 September 1958. Dirubhai also asked that the 
union president join the negotiations, but this request was denied. The president was Mustapa Mohammed. He 
wrote to Dirubhai on September 23
rd
 expressing his surprise that Teeteeko refused to negotiate with the General 
Secretary. He urged the men to continue the negotiations and promised to the look into the matter. See TNA ACC 
460, 4/25/4, General Secretary (Muhidin) to Managing Director (Teeteeko), 24 September 1958. 
97
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (Teeteeko) to General Secretary (TT&AWU), 29 September 1958.  
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, General Secretary (Muhidin) to Managing Director (Teeteeko), 16 September 1958 and 3 
October 1958; and TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Commissioner (K.L. Sander) to Ministerial Secretary, Ministry for 
Social Services, “Trade Dispute [Arbitration and Settlement] Ordinances 1950: Schedule of Essential Services,” 6 
October 1958. A strike might have been unlawful if the colonial state determined that Teeteeko provided essential 
services as a contractor for the East Africa Posts and Telecommunication Administration. Before the colonial Legal 
Office made a ruling on the matter, the labor negotiations were settled. 
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, “An Agreement by Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union and the Tanganyika 
Transport Co. Ltd., concluded in Lindi on the 6
th
 October 1958, and which shall have effect as from the 1
st
 
November 1958.” The wage rates were not half of what the union requested: Shs. 175/- for drivers, Shs. 90/- for 
skilled mechanics, Shs. 90/- for carpenters, and Shs 50/- for turn-boys. The work hours for workshops and offices in 
Lindi, Dar es Salaam, and Songea were set at 7:30-noon and 14:00-17:00 (Monday-Friday) and 7:30-noon 
(Saturdays).  Drivers and turn-boys, however, still had to work the hours required by the company. They were 
entitled to a rest period at the end of each trip and a minimum rest of four to six hours per day. When a driver was 
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settling with Teeteeko, the union immediately entered into negotiations with other transporters in Lindi 
and Mikindani.
100
   
 Within five months, TT&AWU expressed dissatisfaction with the agreement and redirected 
complaints against Teeteeko. The colonial Labour Office in Lindi was unwilling to interfere, instructing 
the union that they had to reopen negotiations if they wanted to make amendments.
101
 TT&AWU’s 
successor, the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU), terminated the agreement with Teeteeko 
in October 1959 and demanded new terms.
102
 The union’s Regional Secretary initially demanded that the 
minimum wage for unskilled laborers be set at Shs. 80/- a month. Teeteeko found the raise unaffordable 
and Lindi’s colonial Labour Officer was inclined to agree. Teeteeko countered at Shs. 60/-, but the union 
raised its demands to Shs. 150/-. 
103
 A pattern of labor demands, threats of strikes, and failed negotiations 
continued throughout 1959-60.
104
 The colonial Labour Department watched the proceedings nervously as 
they recognized that a strike could cause serious damage: “As Tanganyika Transport Co. are the main 
                                                                                                                                                             
not working during the rains, he would receive Shs. 75/- per month. A turn-boy would receive Shs. 5/- per month. 
The drivers and turn-boys would receive double wages on holidays, but the holidays were limited to Idd-el-Fitr, 
Idd-el-Haji, Christmas, and Boxing Day. The company did not have to give notice of termination for men who 
worked for Teeteeko for less than a year. Those who worked a year or more would receive a one month notice. 
Additional wages increases included: kulis/coolies (Shs. 90/-), grease boys (Shs. 50/-), watchman (Shs. 60/-), office 
boys (Shs. 60/-). The drivers were also awarded a safari allowance if they traveled outside the normal published 
route. 
100
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, “Extract from Monthly Report from Labour Officer Lindi for month October 1958.” 
101
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Commissioner to Labour Officer Lindi, “Agreement between the Tanganyika 
Transport Co. Ltd and the Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union”; and Labour Officer Southern Province 
(John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, 23 March 1959. 
102
 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute: Tanganyika 
Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union,” 26 July 1960. 
103
 Ibid. Labour Officer Hennessey reported that the Regional Secretary was willing to accept a minimum wage at 
80/-, but the union headquarters demanded no less than Shs. 100/-. 
104
  Dirubhai, for example, was prepared to counter at Shs. 65/- (13% raise) at a meeting on 22 July 1960, but the 
union representatives appeared an hour and fifteen minutes late. The parties agreed to another meeting on the 
27
th
. Two days before the meeting, T&GWU threatened a strike for August 16
th
 because Teeteeko had failed to 
respond to union demands. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Regional Secretary T&GWU to Managing Director (D.S. 
Amin) Teeteeko, 25 July 1960; D.S. Amin (Teeteeko) to the Regional Secretary, 26 July 1960; and Labour Officer 
(John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute: Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General 
Workers Union,” 26 July 1960. (D.S. Amin refers to Dirubhai.) 
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haulers, passenger carrier and mail contract holders in the Province a strike could be serious.”105 Teeteeko 
and T&GWU reached a settlement on August 15, 1960 with the company agreeing to increase the 
minimum wage to Shs. 70/- per month.
106
 Less than a week later, the union issued further demands, 
including: turn-boy wage rates at Shs. 100/- per month, fourteen day leave, five public holidays, one 
month termination notice, and safari pay.
107
 Dirubhai was frustrated, but decided to start negotiations with 
the assistance of a third party rather than eliciting the help of the Labour Office.
108
 According to Lindi’s 
Labour Office, Dirubhai described the August-September 1960 “negotiations as ‘agreement by 
blackmail.’”109 The company simply could not afford a strike. Teeteeko concluded the bitter negotiations 
on September 5
th
 having agreed to pay unskilled workers a minimum wage of Shs. 100/- and drivers a 
minimum wage of Shs. 250/- per month. All workers already paid over Shs. 250/- would receive a raise of 
Shs. 30/-, while workers paid between Shs. 100/- and 250/- would receive a wage increase of 12.5%. 
Additional benefits were met regarding leave, medical, and holidays.
110
 Dirubhai bluntly notified the 
southern provincial administration that the colonial government had to increase its contracted passenger 
and cargo transport rates with Teeteeko in order to compensate for the losses the company incurred by the 
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute: Tanganyika 
Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union,” 26 July 1960. 
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Ltd.,” 19 August 1960. 
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repercussions to his business. 
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 TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute Tanganyika Transport Co. 
Lt. and Transport and General Workers Union,” 5 September 1960. 
110
 Ibid.; and Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 23 September 1960. The agreement also 
stipulated that all workers employed for twelve continuous months would receive 14 days of annual leave. 
Employees would receive two full months of sick leave, and the company would pay all medical expenses. 
Employees would receive double pay if they worked on Sunday and/or all public gazette holidays. The wages for 
clerks and semi-skilled employees rose to Shs 200/- and 175/- respectively. The company also had to introduce a 
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wage raises.
111
 When looking back on the union disputes in 2015, Dirubhai did not recall any difficulties 
working with the unions. Negotiations were admittedly tough, but they always came to terms and no 
grievances occurred afterwards.
112
 The colonial records, however, offer a different version of the events. 
Labour Officer John Hennessey reported in July 1960 that Teeteeko privately admitted that it would have 
been better if it had never worked with the unions two years earlier and that it was impossible to deal with 
“irresponsible and unrealistic union officials.”113  
 To what extent did the labor union agreements improve the work conditions of Teeteeko 
employees and impact the large transportation sector in southern Tanganyika? Elders’ memories and 
assessments of the trade unions were mixed. While some praised the unions for listening to workers’ 
complaints and getting solutions, others did not see any benefits.
114
 If a driver wanted a higher wage, he 
still had to negotiate with the owner directly.
115
 Labor disputes also failed to impact Teeteeko’s operations 
and dominance over the southern road transportation sector. The company remained unrivalled in offering 
relatively inexpensive and reliable long-distance passenger transport along the main roads within and 
beyond southern Tanganyika, especially among students and government personnel traveling on 
warrants.
116
 Migrant laborers continued to utilize Teeteeko’s services to reach the sisal plantations along 
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 Before the agreement could be enforced, Teeteeko employees went on strike on September 19
th
. The men 
returned to work once they were assured that they would be paid the negotiated amount. See TNA ACC 460, 
4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Transport & General Workers Union and 
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 Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 
2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). 
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116
 Interview with Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola 
(Lindi, 29 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 
September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Athomani recalled using Teeteeko buses 
to attend school in Masasi in the 1950s. Shaiba was another student-user during the 1960s. He was born in 1954 
and was attending Standard I when Tanzanian independence occurred. He still recalls celebrating Empire Day with 
school competitions. He remembered that some vehicles would be designated as student-only buses. These buses 
delivered students to and from their homes during holidays.  
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the southern coast and north in Tanga.
117
 Unionism also did not hinder the expansion of the road 
transportation service sector among Indian businessmen, traders, and creditors in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Chekacheka, Mtwara Roadways, A.P. Kanji, K.J. Motors, and Tanzania Transport Company (not 
to be confused with Teeteeko) all offered transportation services from Lindi or Mtwara during the 1960s. 
Their vehicle fleets and operational areas, however, were much smaller in comparison to Teeteeko, whose 
supremacy over interregional cargo and passenger transport remained intact.
118
 In the coastal towns, 
Indian and African entrepreneurs also began establishing small-scale, independent transport businesses 
that consisted of one or two vehicles transporting passengers within the town and surrounding villages. 
Hofmeier reported a similar trend across the nation in the late 1960s, wherein a “fairly large number of 
smaller operators with just one or two vehicles” offered local transport, while a few large, specialized 
transportation firms dominated the transport business.
119
 
Table 5.3 “Size Distribution of Road Freight Transport Industry” in Tanzania, Nov. 1967120 
 Number of 
License Holders 
Number of Lorries 
and Tankers 
Average size of 
vehicle fleet 
Licenses with 1-2 
vehicles 
1,462 (92%) 1,735 (62%) 1.2 
Licenses with 3-9 
vehicles 
118 (7%) 515 (18%) 4.4 
Licenses with 10 or 
more vehicles 
17 (1%) 549 (20%) 32.3 
Total 1,597 (100%) 2,799 (100%) 1.7 
 
Although the African labor unions failed to fundamentally transform the landscape of the southern road 
transportation sector, the unions lessened the power that Indians exerted over the transportation labor 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Although most of the interviewees said the price of travel with Teeteeko was cheap, they also explained 
that acquiring money was very difficult during the 1950s-1970s. Rukia A. Mrope, for example, recalled that 
migrants from Mozambique often walked from Masasi to Lindi with their goods and children on their backs 
because they could not afford vehicular transport. On the other hand, she remembered that Teeteeko allowed 
relatives to pay for passengers on arrival rather than at the time of departure. Interview with Rukia A. Mrope 
(Lindi, 15 September 2015). 
117
 Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015). 
118
 Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 
2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015); Athomani 
Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015). 
119
 Hofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, 155. 
120
 Ibid. 
319 
 
market. The Tanzanian government, meanwhile, contemplated ways in which they could align with the 
Indian firms and gradually exert their authority over an industry that had operated relatively 
autonomously during the previous thirty years.    
Ujamaa and African Liberation Movements 
 During the course of the 1960s, the Tanzanian government became increasingly antagonistic 
towards private trade and individual wealth accumulation.
121
 President Julius Nyerere announced the 
Arusha Declaration in 1967, officially instituting the Tanzanian socialist policy of ujamaa or 
“familyhood.” Ujamaa rejected capitalism and strove for national self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
through rural development. It “promoted agricultural production and the distribution of state services by 
encouraging rural resettlement into communal villages throughout the country.”122 In the aftermath of the 
Arusha Declaration, all commercial banks, insurance companies, milling industries, and food-processing 
industries were nationalized.
123
 The state revoked licenses for large Asian import-export traders and 
encouraged the amalgamation of local cooperatives into large regional cooperatives.
124
 It empowered the 
regional cooperatives with preferential bank credit and control over crop marketing.
125
 The Co-operative 
Societies Act in 1968 stripped Asian private traders of their influence over agricultural marketing.
126
 
Richa Nagar contended that the Ismailis who established shops in remote rural areas were hit hard by the 
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changing market conditions and forced to relocate their businesses to larger towns.
127
 Cooperative unions 
also threatened small African traders because they “monopolized both the purchase of key crops and the 
transporting of these crops in government-subsidized vehicles.”128 According to Liebenow, the Makonde 
grew increasingly pessimistic towards cooperatives by the late 1960s. They suspected that the government 
used unions to monitor earnings “in order to levy higher taxes.” They also believed that fixed prices “gave 
them less freedom of choice than they had had under the old system of bargaining with the Asians.”129 
Giblin argued that the Tanzanian government gradually transformed cooperatives from tools to challenge 
racial economic inequalities during the colonial era into “instruments of control” for the state over rural 
private enterprises.
130
  
 The ways in which ujamaa was interpreted and implemented in southern Tanzania were 
intricately linked with the anti-colonial campaigns being conducted in the borderland.
131
 During the 
1950s, anti-colonial sentiment rose steadily across the Ruvuma border in Mozambique. The Portuguese 
colonial government authorized the Polícia Internacional e de Defensa do Estado (PIDE) to suppress 
anti-colonial groups and arrest those who organized or participated in political meetings, particularly 
intellectuals and students.
132
 Northern Mozambique became a hot bed for anti-colonialism after 
government troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators at Mueda in June 1960 – dubbed the “Mueda 
massacre” and the “Mozambican version of Sharpeville.”133 Tanzania’s independence spurred the 
militarization of the Ruvuma border as the Portuguese feared that Tanzanians entered Mozambique with 
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the intention of spreading nationalist rhetoric and supporting nationalist organizations. Portuguese 
officials were also concerned that migrant laborers were returning from Tanzania indoctrinated with 
nationalists ideologies promoted by labor unions.
134
 A British report in May 1961 stated that the –  
Portuguese are conscious of a developing threat and are taking energetic steps to strengthen 
internal security. Troops are being increased and dispersed along the Nyasaland and Tanganyika 
border: communications and airfields are being improved and the civil population is being 
alerted, trained and armed.
135
  
 
Five months later, another British intelligence report indicated that the Portuguese were erecting barracks 
and forts along the Ruvuma border.
136
 Many Mozambican nationalist leaders, however, migrated to 
Tanzania (especially Dar es Salaam) because of the nation’s support for Pan-Africanism and African 
liberation movements.
137
 The three regionally and ethnically-based liberation movements in Mozambique 
unified into the O Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (the Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo) in 
June 1962.
138
 With the support of the Tanzanian government and President Julius Nyerere, Frelimo 
established military bases in southern Tanzania. Trained, armed, and advised with the assistance of 
foreign powers (including the Soviet Union, China, and Algeria), Frelimo deployed male and female 
forces across the Ruvuma to engage in guerrilla warfare beginning in 1964.
139
 During a visit to southern 
Tanzania in 1966, American Ambassador Burns reported that,  
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Many of the tribesmen drift back and forth across the Mozambique border regularly. Among 
them there are now substantial numbers who have been actively engaged in the fighting against 
the Portuguese. Many of these individuals come for a rest in Tanzania, and return to Mozambique 
after a short stay with relatives.
140
  
 
Mozambican refugees also flocked north across the Ruvuma border to find shelter from the devastation 
caused by colonial troops and Frelimo guerrilla fighters. The Tanzania Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) 
resettled over 40,000 Mozambican refugees in settlements in southern Tanzania.
141
 Thousands more 
resided with friends and relatives. In addition to supporting Frelimo, the Tanzanian government also 
sought to assist land-locked Zambia. International economic sanctions placed on Southern Rhodesia after 
its declaration of unilateral independence in November 1965 precipitated an economic crisis in Zambia. 
Most of the nation’s petroleum – which was crucial for the Zambian copper industry – came from 
Rhodesian refineries. In an effort to lessen Zambia’s dependence upon apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia, 
and colonial Mozambique, the Tanzanian government offered an alternative import-export trade route to 
the Indian Ocean through Tanzania.
142
 Tanzania agreed to import oil to Zambia and export its copper and 
foreign trade goods through the ports of Mtwara and Dar es Salaam.
143   
  Southern Tanzania entered the national and global spotlight as the site where Tanzania would 
defend its sovereignty and fulfill its “commitment to global anti-colonialism”.144 As the war in 
Mozambique progressed, however, the elastic quality of the Ruvuma border and mobility within the 
borderland became increasingly constrained. Charlotte Miller argued that the border became a 
problematic space for the Tanzanian government as it tried to welcome refugees and “freedom fighters,” 
but also defend against security threats that imperial forces, spies, and mercenaries presented to 
Tanzanian sovereignty and unity.
145
 Some TANU leaders feared that Tanzanian border residents might be 
susceptible to Portuguese propaganda and colonial indoctrination because of their isolation from the rest 
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of the nation.
146
 MPs for Songea and Tunduru warned about popular dissent as a result of the 
government’s development failures in the south, especially its neglect of the region’s infrastructure.147 
Widespread local support for the nation-state and anti-colonialism was revived in 1967 following reports 
by the Tanzanian government that Portuguese commandos had laid land mines in Tanzania and attacked 
Tanzanian border residents.
148
 While Europeans doubted the validity of these stories, they recognized that 
the accounts produced “widespread security-consciousness (pronounced spy-phobia) all along the 
southern border of Tanzania.”149 Second Vice-President Rashid Kawawa instructed southern Tanzanians 
to be vigilant – preventing anyone from crossing the border from Mozambique no matter their business, 
and reporting migrations to the police.
150
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Figure 5.1 Two newspaper articles addressing Tanzanian defense in the southern borderland
151
 
 
Men and women between the ages of 18 and 50 were recruited for border duty, while the Tanzanian 
government posted soldiers of the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) in camps throughout the 
borderland.
152
 The Tanzanian government also reinforced Mtwara with “anti-aircraft guns and some 
armoured cars or Bren-gun carriers.”153 William Wilson of the Canadian High Commission observed 
Zanzibari troops manning road blocks around Mtwara and stopping vehicles to examine the passengers’ 
identity cards. These troops “exhibited excessive suspicion of everyone, especially non-Africans.”154 
Wilson and many other foreign visitors to the southern region found their mobility increasingly restricted 
by the state and its forces: 
No official statement has ever been made that the Southern Region is a prohibited area (apart 
from the orders to the civil aviation authorities
155
) but special difficulties are certainly made for 
                                                 
151
 BNA FCO 31/169, “Be Vigiliant, Look out for Infiltrators,” The Nationalist, 14 April 1967; and “Tanzanians Ready 
to Fight- Kawawa,” The Nationalist, 26 May 1967.  
152
 BNA FCO 31/169, “Border Guards,” extract from The Standard, 27 July 1967; and Lal, “Between the Village and 
the World,” 200-201. 
153
 BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson (Canadian High Commission, British Interest Section) to R.H. Hobden (East 
Africa Department, Commonwealth Office), “Situation in Mtwara,” 17 October 1967. Wilson doubted the validity 
of stories regarding Portuguese-planted mines along village tracks in southern Tanzania.  
154
 BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson, “Situation in Mtwara,” 17 October 1967. 
155
 In September 1967, all aircraft (beyond East African Airways scheduled flights) were order to receive permission 
from the Second Vice President’s Office to travel to southern Tanzania. Mr. Adams of Smith Mackenzie had his 
aircraft impounded in Mtwara despite carrying a letter of authority from Second Vice President Kawawa. See BNA 
FCO 31/169, T.E.F. Williams (Canadian High Commission, British Interests Section) to R.H. Hobden (East Africa 
 
325 
 
visitors to the area. Quite apart from my own experiences, the representative here of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees has been prevented from obtaining access to the refugee camp in the 
area.
156
 
 
The mobility of Mozambican refugees was also constricted. Those who did not find refuge with relatives 
were concentrated into one of five refugee camps in the south where their movements could be monitored 
and their labor utilized for the benefit of the Tanzanian state.
157
 Both the Tanzanian and Mozambican 
states also tried to regulate the mobility of their citizens/subjects by relocating rural communities into 
centralized settlements - ujamaa and aldeamentos villages.
158
 By 1968, local Tanzanians living near the 
Ruvuma were being relocated into vijiji vya ulinzi (defense villages) in order that Tanzanians could better 
defend themselves and the nation against “imperialist infiltration”.159 According to Priya Lal, these 
villages were “expected to morph into ujamaa villages practicing collective agriculture.”160 The young 
men stationed to defend the villages and borders became enforcers of national development policies and 
the compulsory villagization drive in 1973.
161
 Lal detailed the dangers of empowering young militant men 
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without proper oversight and clear criteria as to who constituted an enemy of the state and what was anti-
ujamaa behavior: 
 […] young men frequently assumed the power of judgment along with the ability to enforce it. 
Whereas the targets of militant power and sometimes violence during Operation Vijiji were 
peasants who refused to comply with villagization policy, on other occasions, those persecuted 
included South Asian shopkeepers accused of black market profiteering, wealthy landowners, or 
even farmers deemed lazy.
162
 
 
Negotiating a Place in the New Nation 
 As the Tanzanian state placed its southern borderland at the heart of its strategic and socialist 
policies, it encountered a major problem – a lack of transportation services. The national and regional 
governments lacked the resources to fulfill all transportation operations required for the anti-colonial 
campaigns, ujamaa rural development, cooperatives, and local necessities. The transportation cooperative 
created in the Mtwara Region during the early 1960s – the Lindi Transport Society – failed despite the 
support of the other cooperative organizations.
163
 The government responded by petitioning the help of 
the largest private transportation firm in southern Tanzania, Teeteeko. Second Vice President Kawawa 
approached Dirubhai in 1964 and “encouraged” him to merge Teeteeko with three regional agricultural 
cooperatives – Mtwara Regional Cooperative Union, Matengo Cooperative Union, and Mbinga 
Cooperative Union.
164
 Dirubhai agreed to the union, but retained his majority shares (51%).
165
 Two years 
after the merger, Dirubhai relocated Teeteeko’s headquarters and main garage to Mtwara, which served as 
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the south’s economic and administrative capital.166 Many of the large Indian wholesalers also shifted their 
operations to Mtwara after the Tanzanian government decided in May 1962 that Mtwara port would 
service all ocean-going traffic in the Southern Province and Lindi port would only service coastal dhow 
traffic.
167
 Lindi town suffered rising unemployment and steady economic decline as a result.
168
  
 Dirubhai acknowledged that the merger with the cooperatives jeopardized his continued control 
over Teeteeko, but it proved an economically profitable and politically savvy decision in the short-term. 
Teeteeko gained a virtual monopoly on agricultural produce exported by the cooperative unions from the 
south. Teeteeko vehicles exported cashew nuts, cassava, and sesame from Masasi, Nachingwea, and 
Newala Districts, and imported duka cargo and cement from Dar es Salaam and Mtwara. The company 
annually transported nearly 135,000 tons in cashew nuts alone.
169
 Teeteeko also exported tobacco, maize, 
and groundnuts from Tunduru and Songea Districts, including the produce generated by the Tropical and 
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Coffee Unions in Songea.
170
 The company maintained its monopoly over long-distance passenger 
transport as well – carrying government officials, students, traders, and ordinary civilians on their daily 
mail and express buses.
171
 Teeteeko’s rivals – including Mwana Hirji Transport Company – struggled to 
stay competitive.
172
 According to Dirubhai, the road licensing board protected Teeteeko from unwanted 
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not travel prior to independence out of fear of Mumiani. The Mumani hid in the bush, attacked women traveling 
alone, and drained them of their blood. My research assistant, Zuhura Mohammed, heard similar tales of Mumiani 
among sisal plantation workers in Tanga. The colonial government needed blood for injured soldiers during World 
War II, but local people were unwilling to contribute. Red Cross vehicles abducted people and drained them of 
their blood. Abdalla offered no explanation for the disappearance of the Mumiani, but he insisted that travel was 
safe in the current day. Luise White has been a leading figure in scholarship concerning the representations and 
symbolic meanings of Mumiani, roads, motor vehicles, and automobile operators (including fire fighters and 
ambulance drivers) in oral histories in Africa. See Luise White, “Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor 
in East and Central Africa,” Representations 43 (Summer 1993): 27-50; Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: rumor 
and history in colonial Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); and interview with Rukia A. Mrope 
(Lindi, 15 September 2015); Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015); Abdalla Issa 
Naenda (Lindi, 1 October 2015 (Mitwero, Tanzania); Musa Said Omar, 5 October 2015; Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 
October 2015); and Victor Said and Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015). 
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competition by denying applications that threatened Teeteeko’s market.173 Liebenow argued in 1967 that 
the “operations of the cooperative societies and the Tanganyika Transport Company were gradually 
removing Asians from the more lucrative economic activities, and they were finding it difficult to 
diversify their interests to keep pace with the Africanization of the economy.”174    
 Political necessity also drove Dirubhai’s decision to merge with the cooperatives. Anti-Asian 
rhetoric intensified in political and popular discourse during the course of the 1960s. A 1966 article in The 
Nationalist detailed the myriad of reasons why Indians did not belong to the nation and prevented its 
prosperity, including: their refusal to participate in nation building activities, ujamaa rural development, 
learn Kiswahili, attend national functions, Africanize their businesses, and set fair prices for African 
producers and consumers.
175
 Brennan insisted that the Arusha Declaration spurred a national debate as to 
who belonged to the nation and the ujamaa family.
176
 Citizenship was increasingly defined by an 
individual’s commitment to combating exploitation and parasitism. Who then were the exploiters within 
the nation? Many politicians, the media, and the general public targeted the Indian community, which had 
long been perceived as the unpopular, untrustworthy, and privileged “other” within African 
imaginations.
177
 Lal similarly argued that following the Arusha Declaration, Asian Tanzanians “were 
implicated by a racialized national imaginary that colored them as both ‘foreign’ and frequently actively 
opposed to the principles of ujamaa.”178 Lal continued that  the “embedded nativism of the ujamaa 
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imaginary legitimated even more radical enactments of racism in the name of nationalism,” including the 
harassment and expulsion of many Asians from major Tanzanian cities immediately following the Arusha 
Declaration.
179
 Asian traders and businessmen, in particular, were targets of verbal and physical assaults 
because they were portrayed in print media and by politicians as exploitative parasites and “blood 
suckers.”180 Black Tanzanian parliamentarians frequently called for their expulsion, while the press 
inflamed anti-Indian sentiment with stories of Asian exploitation and collaboration with imperialists.
181
  
 The “climate of fear” created in Asian communities was palpable in southern Tanzania in 1967. 
Although Indians in Mtwara had built a thriving commercial community, Liebenow found that only 
members of the Aga Khan Ismaili community “appeared to be optimistic about their prospects for 
continued residence.”182 In order to ensure the continuance of his transportation business, Dirubhai sought 
to align his company with the mission of the new nation-state and build relationships with government 
officials as he had with their colonial predecessors. By agreeing to merge Teeteeko with the African 
cooperatives, Dirubhai proved his and his family’s allegiance and value to the nation. Teeteeko not only 
assisted the state by moving cooperative produce, but it also hired unemployed TANU members. Clement 
K. Njaidi, for example, joined the TANU youth branch in Mtwara after working on sisal plantations in 
Tanga for three years.
183
 The Regional Commissioner did not have enough money to support the youth 
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members, and instead found them local employment. Clement received a job with Teeteeko as a turn-boy 
(driver’s assistant) transporting cargo across southern Tanzania.184 Teeteeko also offered its transportation 
services in promotion of the liberation struggle in Mozambique. The company dedicated anywhere from 
20 to 40 vehicles to transport goods arriving in Mtwara to Frelimo bases in Nachingwea.
185
 Former 
Teeteeko drivers remembered transporting male and female, Tanzanian and Frelimo soldiers to camps in 
Nachingwea, Masasi, Tunduru, and throughout the bush along the Ruvuma border. Former drivers also 
recalled moving military goods shipped from China to Mtwara.
186
 Teeteeko transported refugees on open 
board lorries and distributed medical supplies, food, and clothing to refugee camps.
187
 Dirubhai insisted, 
“The southern region could not move without Teeteeko. That was the situation.”188 The situation made a 
strong argument against anti-Asian discourse and in support of the Amin family’s value to the nation. 
 Other Indian firms and operators in the southern transportation sector also employed their 
vehicles to assist liberation struggles and nation-building activities. The Tanzania Transport Company 
(TZT), for example, was an Indian-owned firm that transported Indian duka cargo to the interior and 
groundnuts from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. A large portion of TZT’s profits, however, came from 
exporting copper from Zambia in exchange for sugar and clothing.
189
 According to Hofmeier, several 
small private transporters began importing oil to the Zambian border in the middle of December 1965. 
                                                                                                                                                             
originated from Burundi. Clement relocated to Mtwara and worked as a driver for Teeteeko from 1974 until its 
collapse.  
184
 Ibid. 
185
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Tanzania, Zambia, and a subsidiary of the Fiat concern founded the Zambia Tanzania Road Services Ltd. 
(ZTRS) in April 1966 in order to better meet Zambia’s import-export requirements. The firm quickly 
became “the largest road transport company in the whole of Africa” with 450, 30-ton lorry-and-trailer 
units.
190
 Private transporters, however, continued to assist operations. An estimated 2,000 vehicles were 
employed full-time at the peak of operations in early 1968: 
All transporters together in 1967 carried about 270,000 tons of copper from Zambia to the coast 
and moved 234,000 tons of petroleum products and 51,000 tons of general cargo in the reverse 
direction into Zambia.
191
 
 
TZT drivers endured at least a two week journey from Mtwara to Tunduma and back with the Zambian 
copper.
192
 The company also transported Frelimo soldiers to the border and refugees to camps like 
Rutamba. Two drivers recalled transporting weapons from a Frelimo base – Farm 17 in Nachingwea – to 
spots along the border.
193
 Smaller Indian businessmen similarly employed their vehicles in service of the 
nation – whether transporting refugees, Zambian copper, humanitarian relief aid, or TANU members.194 
Victor Said, for example, worked as a private driver for an Indian businessman from Nachingwea. The 
Indian employer aspired to become a politician within TANU, and therefore frequently loaned his Land 
Rover to the TANU branch in Lindi for free – transporting office workers to various meetings and 
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campaigns.
195
 Indian creditors and investors also helped African entrepreneurs break into the 
transportation market. Mohamed Selemani, for example, was an African driver who decided to start his 
own passenger transport business in the late 1960s. He began by renting one vehicle from an Indian 
businessman, and then expanded with a couple more. African men and women utilized Selemani’s 
services to travel to villages outside of Lindi town to cultivate and harvest their family shambas (farms) 
and/or conduct local trade.
196
 Local African passengers preferred the smaller operators because of their 
accessibility. Whereas the smaller operators allowed people to pay as they jumped on and off, Teeteeko 
required that an individual purchase a ticket from one of their offices.
197
 
 Indians in southern Tanzania ultimately utilized their motor vehicles as tools to generate profits 
and protect their assets against an increasingly antagonistic government and general populace. By 
transporting cooperative produce, Zambian copper, refugees, TANU passengers, and military forces, 
Indian businessmen contradicted stereotypes about Asian propensities towards greed and disinterest in the 
nation. Indians in southern Tanzania employed their resources to make a compelling claim that they 
belonged to and were needed in Tanzania. Indian vehicle-owners, however, knew that they were 
negotiating a fine line between allies and enemies of the state. They remained open to allegations of 
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“exploitation” and stereotypes as “blood suckers” because they financially profited from renting out their 
vehicles. When accusations were leveled against Indian transportation firms, they were quick to defend 
themselves by using nationalist rhetoric about interracial cooperation. When TZT, for example, came 
under accusations of discriminating against African employees, its Indian managers and shareholders 
immediately petitioned the Minister of Communications, Transport and Labour: 
We make this offer in all humility, for we are proud of the close co-operation that exists in our 
Company between shareholders of different racial origins and from different walks of life. […] 
We sincerely hope, Sir, that you will help us extricate ourselves from the suspicions that have 
been created against us. We look upon you for your paternal guidance and, should you come to 
the conclusion that the content of our Company or any member of our Company is not beyond 
reproach, we shall willingly submit ourselves to any admonition or punishment that you may 
feel we merit.
198
 
 
Rather than hampering the nation’s development, the Indian transportation sector in southern Tanzania 
helped to fulfill the state’s national and pan-African objectives.  
End of an Era 
 The government’s relationship with Dirubhai and the rest of the Indian transportation sector in 
southern Tanzania was an alliance of necessity. The state was overtaxed with commitments in Zambia 
and Mozambique, as well as its ujamaa campaign. The government lacked the incentive or means to 
directly interfere with Teeteeko’s operations and the larger industry in the 1960s. By November 1968, 
Teeteeko had 350 employees and 150 vehicles operating over 2,000 miles. Their vehicles carried at least 
100,000 passengers a year and handled “about 90% of the transportation business in the Ruvuma and 
Mtwara regions.”199 Teeteeko and the EAR&H Road Services in the Southern Highlands formed the two 
largest transportation firms in the country at the onset of the 1970s, controlling nearly 7% of all vehicles 
and 9% of overall tonnage of commercial goods transported by road.
200
 The Nationalist reported that 
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Teeteeko’s “success is a tribute to the determination, hard work and nation-building spirit of the people of 
this vast region.”201 Dirubhai, however, believed that a take-over of his majority shares was inevitable.202 
According to an article in The Nationalist, the company merger in 1964 gave the three regional 
cooperatives the option of taking over the company complete in 1970.
203
 Indications that the state was 
preparing an assault on the private transportation sector were clear by 1970. When addressing a crowd in 
Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere discussed the necessity of ensuring that buses were tools for the people 
rather than tools for individual capitalist profits: 
Something foundational for our economy, like buses, should be our buses and not those of some 
official who says, ‘That’s my bus.’ Your bus? And the driver inside, the same person may say, 
‘That’s my driver.’ Your driver? Is it possible for you to have your own driver? A driver is only 
able to be a driver of the socialist community, not ‘your’ driver.204 
 
During 1970, the Ministry of Communication, Transport, and Labour collaborated with the three regional 
cooperatives to purchase Dirubhai’s controlling interest of Teeteeko. The buyout was finalized in 1972-73 
at a price tag of TShs. 1,800,000.
205
 Dirubhai contended that the cooperatives wanted to control the 
company and did not want outsiders.
206
 Although Dirubhai did not receive payment until ten years later, 
he immediately handed over all vehicles, parts, buildings, and repair garages. The company was renamed 
Ushirika Teeteeko, and proceeded to absorb the other Indian-owned transportation firms operating in the 
south – including TZT and Mwana Hirji.207 The collapse of the Indian-dominated transportation sector in 
southern Tanzania was quickly followed by the collapse of the Indian-dominated wholesale and real 
estate markets. After the government nationalized wholesale trade in 1970, it passed the Buildings Act of 
1971. The legislation nationalized all housing worth over TShs. 100,000 and not entirely occupied by the 
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owner.
208
 Between 1971 and 1974, a total of 2,484 buildings worth five hundred million shillings were 
acquired and brought under the control of the National Housing Corporation.
209
 Dirubhai recalled waking 
up one morning, reading the paper, and learning that he had lost his properties in Lindi, Mtwara, Tunduru, 
and Songea to nationalization.
210
 The government allowed Dirubhai to continue living in his rental 
property in downtown Lindi, but he had to pay rent as an “ex-owner.”211  
 
Figure 5.2 One of Dirubhai’s properties in downtown Lindi that was nationalized in 1971.  
Note the family logo top-center – “Amin Building 1951” – and the national housing logos below the second floor 
patio – “Shirika la Nyumba la Taifa.”
212
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Figure 5.3 Previous Teeteeko headquarters and garage in Mtwara
213
 
 
Dirubhai was not the only victim of nationalization. The urban landscape of downtown Lindi still tells the 
story of nationalization. Many buildings with the names of the wealthy Indian families are covered over 
with the national housing stamp.  
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Figure 5.4 Two additional Indian properties that were nationalized in 1971 (Ghana/Market Street, Lindi). Note 
the family logos top-center and the national housing logos painted on the balcony and over the family name.
214
  
 
The Indian population found itself powerless to prevent or oppose the legislation that devastated their 
interests in Tanzania. Dirubhai simply explained that the orders came from the top and there was no 
arguing with them.
215
 Brennan argued that the 1971 act “permanently alienated large numbers of Indians 
who had invested their life savings in housing, in part to demonstrate their long-term commitment to the 
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independent nation.”216 Housing nationalization in Tanzania and the forced expulsion of all Indians from 
Uganda in 1972 led to a mass exodus of the Tanzanian Indian community.
217
 The total Indian population 
in Tanzania was cut in half, declining to 60,000 in 1973. Many members of the Hindu and Ismaili 
communities from southern Tanzania emigrated to Canada and the United Kingdom.
218
 Dirubhai’s wife 
and brother were among them, leaving for the U.K. in 1972.
219
  Dirubhai stated that his brother, Yeshvanj, 
“started his life there” as a post office agent.220 Dirubhai, however, stayed behind. Richa Nagar argued 
that it was common practice in Tanzania for one or more family members to remain and maintain any 
property not nationalized.
221
 Dirubhai invested his remaining assets in a sisal plantation at Mkwaya that 
an Indian family sold in 1972 before heading overseas.
222
 The era of the private, Indian-dominated road 
transportation sector in southern Tanzania had come to an end and a new era of state-controlled 
transportation had begun.  
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Figure 5.5 Dhirajlal (Dirubhai) Savailal C. Amin at his home near Mkwaya (Lindi), October 2015
223
 
 
Seizing Opportunities: African Drivers and Mechanics in Southern Tanzania 
 
 One group profited through the rise and collapse of the Indian-dominated transportation era in 
southern Tanzania – African drivers and mechanics. When first introduced to East Africa, motor vehicles 
were supposed to be “tools of empire” and a “technology of intimidation and domination” that would 
transform African societies and economies according to European designs.
224
 According to Jan-Bart 
Gewald, motor vehicles and airplanes were “seen by colonists as a material manifestation of their 
technological superiority and hence by extension their natural moral superiority, which in turn legitimated 
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their right to rule.”225 Historians, however, have illustrated how Africans appropriated motor vehicles to 
their advantage. From Namibia to Ghana, African drivers utilized motor vehicles to forge new identities 
as “modern men,” wealthy entrepreneurs, and political citizens during and after colonial rule.226 
Tanzanian men were similarly aware of the socioeconomic mobility offered to them by employment as 
drivers and mechanics. Joshua Grace argued that Tanzanian African male and female drivers, mechanics, 
and itinerant traders appropriated automobiles as tools to accumulate wealth, elevate their social rank, and 
contest racial and gender social orders created by colonial and postcolonial states. Grace found that most 
first generation African drivers and mechanics in Dar es Salaam began their careers working for the 
colonial government during and after World War I. Following WWII, the Public Works Department 
(PWD) became an important center for Africans to train and work as drivers and mechanics.
227
 Grace 
contended that African men from various social and education backgrounds strove to become drivers 
because they saw it as “the bridge from daily wage labor to monthly salaries, paid leave, and ultimately, a 
new kind of colonial citizenship.”228 While the British refused to consider African drivers as skilled 
laborers, they were paid as “a highly qualified group of colonial employees because of their attachment to 
an important tool of empire and for their role in a wide range of colonial development projects”.229 Many 
young African men gained access to PWD garages through family connections or by proving their worth 
in lesser positions within the PWD (such as working for PWD road gangs or as porters). Entrance into the 
driving profession was highly restrictive. Grace found that colonial drivers constituted roughly one per 
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cent of the territory’s population.230 Ex-British soldiers and Asians typically monopolized the high-
ranking positions, while Africans employees filled roles as “native assistants.”231 
 While some African drivers in southern Tanzania started their careers working for the PWD, 
opportunities were scarce because the region’s PWD remained minuscule throughout the colonial era. The 
mechanical training and English skills Mohamed Saidi Msusa acquired as a driver for PWD proved very 
valuable when the Groundnut Scheme got underway in the late 1940s. He worked as a driver for John 
Mowlem, Balfour Beatty, and Messrs. Paulings on port and railway construction projects.
232
 Most drivers 
in southern Tanganyika, however, learned their craft by working as turn-boys for Indian employers. 
Although a turn-boy’s main responsibility was to operate the vehicle when the driver became tired or ill 
on safari, he also assisted with repairs, loaded cargo, washed vehicles, and cooked while on the road.
233
 
When the lorry became stuck in the mud, the turn-boy was expected to get out and push.
234
 If a truck 
struggled to ascend the hills in Songea and Njombe Districts, the turn-boy jumped out and put blocks 
behind the wheels. He unloaded the cargo and helped push the vehicle up the hill. He then returned for the 
cargo left below and carried it up to the waiting vehicle (sometimes with and sometimes without the help 
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of the driver).
235
 After two to three years of practical training, turn-boys were typically promoted to 
drivers. Said Mohamed Shahame and Juma Hemed Alli (Polo) began their careers working as turn-boys 
for Fadhil Ladha, transporting goods and building materials around the Lindi area.
236
 Dadi Mkonyoka 
Yusufu, Mohamed Nasoro, and Husein Mohamed Mzaina also began their driving careers as turn-boys 
for small Indian-owned businesses in and around Lindi town.
237
 Young men in the interior districts relied 
even more heavily upon employment with local Indian duka owners as they were often the only ones who 
owned vehicles. Born to a family of farmers in the rural village of Lukwika (Masasi), Athomani Wadi 
Mlaponi began working in an Indian duka at Nangomba. Part of his responsibilities included driving to 
Lindi to collect shop goods and traveling to surrounding villages to buy maize and other produce.
238
 
Wilium Njaidi, in comparison, began his career as a turn-boy for an Indian-owned sawmill in 
Nachingwea thanks in part to the recommendation of his uncle, who already worked as a driver for the 
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mill.
239
 Victor Said also began his driving career as a turn-boy for an Indian-owned saw mill in Newala, 
but his journey to the position was more challenging due to his lack of familial networks.
240
 Victor was 
born in the rural village of Chilolo in the 1930s. After primary school, he decided to become a driver, but 
there were no vehicles operating nearby. Villagers were still carrying their produce by foot to Masasi 
town and the Indian dukas. Victor decided to leave without his father’s permission and travel by foot to 
Newala to find employment as a turn-boy.
241
 He knew no one and failed to find a job. He left for 
Nachingwea after hearing about employment opportunities with the Groundnut Scheme. When he failed 
to find work yet again, he returned to Newala and finally found employment with a saw mill. He worked 
as an office messenger and cleaner before switching positions to machine cutting timber. The owners 
decided to make Victor a turn-boy after Victor suffered a work accident.
242
 After several years of training, 
Victor eventually became a driver and transported lumber to Lindi and neighboring worksites.
243
  
 Working as a turn-boy represented not only a rite of passage into the driving profession, but also 
a rite of passage into manhood. As a driver, a young man was able to accumulate the wealth and prestige 
needed to enter manhood – purchase a home, get married, and provide for his family(ies).244 Drivers also 
gained sexual experience by visiting prostitution houses while on the road.
245
 Traveling extensively and 
returning home with food and goods from across Tanzania elevated a young man’s prestige within his 
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home community.
246
 By taking on turn-boys, drivers elevated their rank within the profession and created 
networks of dependency that they could rely upon in the future. Grace argued that the “turn boy system” 
became an important African “institution” as it built relationships “of reciprocity among maturing African 
men.”247 Experienced automotive mechanics and carpenters also created networks of reciprocity by 
training younger men.
248
 Grace argued that apprenticeship in repair garages provided young men with 
technological knowledge and “a flexible set of technical skills they could use for a variety of trades as 
well as social networks that provided the human and material resources necessary for different stages of 
their lives.”249 Opportunities to learn from experienced mechanics in southern Tanganyika during the 
1940s and 1950s, however, were limited. Some men, such as Selemani Rashid Ngozi, paid experienced 
“Swahili” carpenters Shs. 100-200 to learn their craft.250 Juma Said Aly, in comparison, received his 
training as a mechanic from a South African while working in Arusha during the 1950s. Although the 
men did not speak the same language, they communicated through basic words and a numbering system 
for the spare parts. Juma ultimately learned by doing and found employment as a mechanic for Teeteeko 
from 1957 to the early 1970s.
251
  Whether by learning from Europeans or fellow Africans, young drivers 
and mechanics gained valuable technological skills that allowed them to successfully enter adulthood 
with high-paid and high-valued employment.
252
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 With their training complete, drivers and mechanics sought out the best pay and working 
conditions. The largest employer of drivers in southern Tanzania up to the early 1970s was Teeteeko. 
Teeteeko drivers were split into two categories – cargo transport and passenger transport. The passenger 
lorries were further subdivided into express buses and mail lorries.
253
 Teeteeko employed drivers from 
every district in Tanzania and targeted experienced drivers.
254
 Mohamed Saidi Msusa, for example, had 
nearly twenty years of experience driving vehicles for the Groundnut Scheme and Public Works 
Department prior to his employment with Teeteeko.
255
 Dirubhai also recruited skilled European 
mechanics released from the Groundnut Scheme, as well as skilled mechanics originally from the 
Seychelles, India, and Kenya.
256
 Dirubhai insisted that the repair garage was essential for the company’s 
success: “If your garage is doing well, you are doing well.”257 Teeteeko also hired local African 
mechanics and carpenters, such as Juma Said Aly and Selemani Rashid Ngozi. Juma Said Aly recalled 
being regularly deployed to repair broken down vehicles on the road.
258
 Drivers had limited resources to 
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fix minor problems while in transit.
259
 When encountering a major problem, drivers were forced to wait 
for a passing vehicle or walk to the nearest government station to call their garage at the coast. Some 
assistance was available at small garages and petrol stations in Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, Njombe, and 
Iringa, but these repair garages often lacked the supplies or technical knowledge necessary to fix major 
problems.
260
 Teeteeko carpenters, meanwhile, constructed, installed, and repaired custom-designed 
seating for open board lorries at the Lindi garage. Prior to the 1980s, the seats in most vehicles consisted 
of a wood or steel bench covered with a sponge-like product.
261
 With the assistance of machine tools, the 
carpenters constructed seating for thirty to forty passengers (depending upon the size of the vehicle) that 
ranged from first to third class.
262
 Selemani Rashid Ngozi recalled that construction and installation 
averaged one month and 10-15 days after the vehicles arrived from Dar es Salaam (having been imported 
from abroad).
263
 Damaged seats could be repaired or replaced in a single day.
264
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Figure 5.6 Part of the former Teeteeko garage in Mtwara
265
 
 
Fortunately for those drivers, mechanics, and carpenters who could not find jobs with Teeteeko, the 
private transportation sector was growing in the late 1950s and 1960s. Omari Issa Chiluma’s career offers 
insights into the various employment opportunities available for African drivers in southern Tanzania. 
After learning to drive from his brother (a Teeteeko driver), Omari worked as a turn-boy for a 
construction business in Lindi (1952-55). He then switched employers and transported migrant laborers 
from Tunduru to coastal sisal plantations from 1955 to 1957.
266
 He briefly worked for Teeteeko 
transporting migrant laborers and agricultural produce during the dry season of 1957 before obtaining a 
job with another road construction firm operating along the Masasi-Mtwara road (1956-67). During the 
1970s, Omari exported Zambian copper and bronze for Dunstan M. Zacharia.
267
  
 All of the drivers interviewed stressed a sense of mutual responsibility among drivers regardless 
of their employers. While many drivers from the 1950s and 1960s boasted that earlier vehicle models 
were stronger than those used today, they admitted that their jobs were physically challenging, 
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exhausting, and occasionally dangerous.
268
 Drivers expended a lot of energy steering and manually 
shifting vehicles over horrible roads conditions.
269
 When road and climate conditions were good, the 
journeys were relatively quick. During the dry season, it took two days to reach Songea from Lindi and 
two days to reach Dar es Salaam from Songea.
270
 It took a day to travel to Dar es Salaam from Lindi if the 
Utete ferry was operating and not overloaded with users. It was more common for drivers and passengers 
to wait one to two days before crossing the Rufiji River.
271
 The journey’s duration quickly multiplied after 
a minor rainfall. The black cotton soil found throughout the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road rapidly turned into 
heavy mud and brought traffic to a standstill.
272
 Drivers and passengers could be on the Lindi-Dar es 
Salaam road anywhere between three days and two weeks depending on road and weather conditions.
273
  
When the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road closed during the rainy season, traffic was diverted towards coastal 
shipping or the far western route via Iringa, Njombe, and Songea.
274
 The journeys from Lindi to Songea 
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and Songea to Dar, however, took a week each during the rains.
275
 The long duration was not just a 
consequence of distance, but more so a result of the difficult terrain and poor road conditions. While 
conducting a safari in southern Tanzania in September 1966, American Ambassador Burns described the 
poor conditions of the Lindi-Songea and Songea-Njombe roads: 
 
The drive from Masasi to Songea was long and dusty. Once beyond Tunduru we began to climb 
and the landscape changed from flat, dry, scrub brush to rolling hills, flowing streams and more 
abundant foliage. Some of the views on this route were spectacular and worth the discomfort of 
the dusty, twisting, rough road. 
 
[…] The road to Mtwara [from Songea] is long, bad at the best of times, and virtually impassable 
during most of the long rainy season. The road which connects Songea to the Great North Road is 
even worse. It twists through the mountains on steep gradients with numerous difficult turns. 
 
[…] The road from Songea to Njombe is the most difficult section of the road which links 
Mtwara with the Great North Road. The road winds through mountains with steep gradients, 
numerous hairpin turns, and it is said to be very treacherous during the rainy season. It climbs 
from 3,800 feet at Songea to well over 7,000 feet before reaching Njombe, which is at 6,500 
feet.
276
  
 
While navigating the treacherous mountain roads in Songea and Mbeya Districts, African drivers had to 
reduce their speed and monitor their gears, which were known to fail among the heavy cargo and 
passenger lorries.
277
 When traveling along the Lindi-Songea main road, drivers had to be careful of mud 
and uneven road surfaces. Drivers occasionally asked their passengers to disembark and help push the 
vehicle out of muddy sections. If the vehicle could not be extracted, another would be sent forward to 
continue the safari.
278
 Without the benefit of passengers’ manual labor, cargo drivers often had to wait for 
the roads to dry and river currents to recede before proceeding; sleeping in their trucks and preparing food 
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for themselves in the meanwhile.
279
 If a driver did become stuck in the mud or his vehicle broke down, 
other drivers were quick to come to his aid. Some drivers even drove in convoys in order to assist each 
other.
280
  
 The sense of mutual responsibility between drivers did not solely pertain to offering assistance 
when a vehicle broke down. Drivers typically gave their colleagues and relatives free fares around the 
region, and sometimes provided the guest driver with free food.
281
 Drivers also agreed to look in on one 
another’s families. While some drivers remained single during their careers, many married and owned 
shambas for family consumption and to supplement wages.
282
 Some drivers hired individuals to protect 
and cultivate their fields, but in most cases, the wife was left in charge to maintain the home and 
shamba.
283
 During the ujamaa era, the “onus of maintaining food security” often fell on women 
throughout Tanzania.
284
 Women were expected to fulfill the role as homemakers and “custodians of social 
welfare” of their families, villages, and the nation.285 Victor Said’s wife – Fatuma Juma Akini – reflected 
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upon the benefits and detriments of being married to a driver. It was prestigious, especially when he 
returned to their rural village in the vehicle with various goods from distant places. When Victor was on 
safari, however, people would express concern about her being without a husband for many weeks 
(perhaps indefinitely if an accident occurred).
286
 Victor and the other husbands tried to leave enough 
money and food stockpiles with their families to last the duration of their safari.
287
 Drivers also sent 
money home – asking a colleague to drop off the funds when passing by the home village or town.288 
Many of the men, however, had multiple wives and families. Husein Mohamed Mzaina, for example, had 
to provide for his four wives and their children in Lindi, Tunduru, and Dar es Salaam.
289
 If the food and 
money ran out, his family would pay for goods on credit until he returned.
290
 More research is needed into 
the experiences of drivers’ wives, who might have been a new iteration of the “bush widows” from the 
colonial period. Whereas the wives of migrant laborers could accompany their husbands to sisal 
plantations during the colonial era, the wives of drivers remained at home to care for their families during 
the economically challenging decades of the 1970s and 1980s.
291
   
 Drivers also looked after one another by not reporting when a fellow driver made a mistake or 
broke regulations while on safari.
292
 The typical reasons for a driver’s termination were damaging the 
vehicle (due to neglect or carelessness), driving intoxicated, stealing or losing cargo in transit, and 
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transporting unauthorized cargo and passengers.
293
 The latter practice was common, especially among 
drivers of the smaller, independent transportation enterprises found in urban towns (notably Lindi and 
Mtwara).
294
 Some drivers preferred working for the smaller transporters because they had freer work 
schedules and more negotiation powers vis-à-vis their bosses in comparison with drivers working for 
large firms, especially Teeteeko. One of the dangers for working for these small transport operators, 
however, was the unreliable and unstable pay. Wage rates fluctuated monthly with the profitability of the 
enterprise. Drivers responded by skimming a portion of the passenger fares and/or pocketing money given 
by extra passengers and cargo picked up in route.
295
 Although Teeteeko drivers received stable and 
regular pay, they also transported illicit cargo and passengers for individual profit. The practice was much 
riskier because Dirubhai was frequently on the road checking that drivers were on schedule, sober, and 
transporting authorized cargo only.
296
 In one alleged instance, Dirubhai stopped a cargo lorry covered 
with a tarp and asked the driver if he was carrying any passengers. The man denied the accusation. 
Dirubhai responded loudly in Kiswahili that if the driver was telling the truth, Dirubhai could shoot his 
gun into the cargo. Men immediately jumped out of the back of the truck and ran. The driver was 
terminated.
297
 Dirubhai admitted that his random inspections left drivers “always afraid that if they are not 
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going on time, they will be caught.”298 Dirubhai rewarded the hardworking, “good” drivers (who 
completed their routes quickly) with newer vehicles and supervisory positions.
299
 Even these “good” 
drivers, however, tried to make unrecorded profits in transit.
300
 The drivers took precautions – keeping 
informed of Dirubhai’s location and reselling the tickets of passengers who disembarked on the way.301 
Teeteeko’s mechanics similarly made money on the side by fixing vehicles on the road or in the garage 
after work hours.
302
 Few of the small transport operators in southern Tanzania employed a mechanic. 
Teeteeko mechanics requested permission to work on cars outside of the company fleet in order to 
generate more income for themselves and the company.
303
 Grace found similar evidence of drivers 
transporting illicit cargo and mechanics conducting repairs outside of normal work hours in Dar es 
Salaam. Drivers participated in parallel markets in order to create their own economic networks and earn 
the profits necessary to “produce the type of gendered adulthood they desired.”304 Mechanics, meanwhile, 
perceived the extra evening and weekend work hours as a “critical and enjoyable time of experimentation 
and modification.”305 
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Negotiating the New Transportation Era (1970s-1980s) 
 The collapse of the private, Indian-dominated transportation sector in the 1970s ushered in an era 
of instability and opportunity for African drivers in southern Tanzania. Ushirika Teeteeko absorbed many 
drivers, but few stayed very long. Within seven years, the company was in shambles. Previous employees 
accredited Ushirika Teeteeko’s rapid demise to poor management, derelict vehicles, and irregular 
salaries.
306
 Rather than a strong central manager – like Dirubhai – multiple managers ran Ushirika 
Teeteeko. Communication among and between these managers and the drivers were poor and operations 
suffered.
307
 At least one former driver accused some of the managers of worrying more about their own 
interests than those of the company.
308
 Documentary evidence points to inept accounting as another 
contributing factor to the collapse of Ushirika Teeteeko.
309
 As expenses grew larger, employees’ pay 
became irregular and unreliable.
310
 Many experienced drivers left to find better working conditions and 
regular salaries.
311
 Some went to work for the state and private employers in southern Tanzania. Victor 
Said temporarily returned to his shamba outside of Masasi, before finding work as a driver for an Indian 
businessman in Masasi. He went on to work for the Cashew Nut Authority, collecting and transporting 
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cashew nuts from Tunduru, Newala, Nachingwea, and Masasi until 2003.
312
 He favored working for the 
government over private businessmen because it offered greater job security and employee rights. 
Athomani Wadi Mlaponi also preferred employment with the government. While working for 
TANROADS, Athomani received national holidays and worked standard hours.
313
 Mohamed Saidi Msusa 
did not enter the government sector, but rather worked as a driver with the Finnish International 
Development Agency (FINNIDA) in southern Tanzania from 1980-83 before retiring to a life of 
farming.
314
 Still other drivers and mechanics took their skills outside of southern Tanzania. Juma Said Aly 
went to Dar es Salaam in the 1970s and worked as a mechanic with the large firm, Tanganyika Motors, 
for twenty years.
315
 He eventually returned to Lindi and purchased a home. Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu found 
employment in Tanga as a driver with a salt works company after TZT was incorporated with Ushirika 
Teeteeko. He eventually worked for the government. The job offered less pay, but more security.
316
 The 
owners of Ushirika Teeteeko allegedly tried to revive the company by offering Dirubhai the position of 
General Manager, but he refused.
317
 Ushirika Teeteeko’s vehicles were auctioned off in 1978-79, and the 
company split apart into regionally-based cooperatives in 1980, including: Kaumu in Mtwara, Kauli in 
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Lindi, and Rideco in Songea. When asked about Teeteeko’s collapse, Dirubhai simply stated, “We were 
not happy, but what can we do? It is not in your hand.”318  
 Ushirika Teeteeko’s struggles corresponded with the growing economic crisis that gripped 
Tanzania from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. After nationalizing the building and wholesale sectors, 
the government established the National Price Commission and declared villagization compulsory nation-
wide in 1973.
319
 During the same year, a global recession tied to an oil crisis triggered a slump in 
Tanzania’s cash and food crop production and exportation.320 The following two years witnessed the 
decline in agricultural production and worsening imbalance of payments.
321
 Food shortages were apparent 
in the southeast by 1973, while production levels for southern Tanzania’s top export – cashews – fell 
dramatically after 1974.
322
 Production rates declined from a high of 145,080 tons in 1973 to 115,864 tons 
in 1974 and 40,550 tons by 1979.
323
 Nation-wide food shortages and distribution problems intensified 
throughout the country in 1976, partially as a result of Operation Maduka. The government instituted the 
policy in an attempt to replace private retailers with communal owned (ujamaa or ushirika) shops in 
every village.
324
 The Regional Working Committee in Lindi District gained supervisory authority over the 
distribution of essential items in rural areas, and private shop-owners were given ten days to close their 
shops.
325
 Implementation of Operation Maduka slowed considerably once it became apparent that rural 
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communities were suffering from severe shortages of foods and commodity goods.
326
 A series of 
domestic and international incidents in 1979-81 further intensified nation-wide scarcities and inflation.
327
 
The East African community collapsed in 1977, forcing the Tanzanian government to invest funds in 
establishing new aviation, harbor, and railway administrations and other central services. Tanzania waged 
a war with Uganda (1978/79) that increased defense spending by 137%.
328
 The massive spike in global oil 
prices in 1979 and drought conditions in the early 1980s further undermined Tanzania’s economy. The 
government’s relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also collapsed in 1980 after the 
latter insisted that Tanzania agree to a structural adjustment program. International assistance to Tanzania 
subsequently dropped from $702 million in 1981 to $487 million in 1985.
329
  
 Communities throughout southern Tanzania experienced shortages of essential items (especially 
sugar, rice, and cloth) as a result of the national economic crisis.
330
 My research assistant, Zuhura 
Mohamed, recalled acute shortages of meat. No butcher existed in Lindi in the late 1970s, and families 
only ate meat to celebrate Eid or Christmas (if available and affordable). Goat meat might appear at a 
wedding.
331
 Rukia A. Mrope (Zuhura’s mother) recalled women waiting in lines outside ushirika stores in 
Lindi all day for sugar and rice, but many returned home empty handed and were forced to wait another 
month for more supplies to arrive.
332
 Individuals also paid their relatives waiting in line to buy extra 
goods, and fights occasionally broke out between women who tried to leave stones as place markers in the 
lines. Villagers outside Mtwara, in comparison, would supply rural shopkeepers with money to procure 
items from the Regional Trading Corporation (RTC) – a wholesaler supplying ushirika shops and dukas 
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in rural villages.
333
 Communities in Mtwara similarly pooled their money and selected a leader to get 
goods from the RTC.
334
 Often there were not enough supplies, and villagers were left to wait a month or 
more to try again.
335
 While living in a remote village outside of Masasi, Fatuma Juma Akini recalled a 
time when all the women wore the same kanga – both in color and material.336 Fatima was fortunate that 
her husband (Victor Said) worked as a driver for the Cashew Nut Authority at the time and had ready 
access to food through the ushirika shop.
337
 Rukia was also fortunate that her husband worked in the local 
ushirika store and set aside five kilos of sugar for the family.
338
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Figure 5.7 Victor Said, Fatuma Juma Akini, and Zuhura Mohamed, Namatumbusi (Masasi)
339
 
 
 Large numbers of young men from the southeast migrated to northern cities, especially to Dar es 
Salaam, to work as traders or wamachinga in response to the food scarcities, lack of industrialization, and 
agricultural production crises during the 1980s.
340
 Some African drivers and entrepreneurs, however, took 
advantage of the parallel markets that emerged and thrived in Tanzania as the “formal” economy worsened and 
shortages became more acute in the late 1970s and 1980s.
341
 Musa Said Omar offered insights into how individuals 
became involved in and negotiated parallel markets during the late ujamaa era in southern Tanzania. Musa first 
entered the trade economy in 1964 by selling coconuts from his father’s shamba in Mitwero to Lindi town. Musa 
eventually expanded the business, transporting his family’s and neighbors’ coconuts to markets in the interior 
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districts and Dar es Salaam.
342
 During the mid-1970s, Musa became a middleman between traders in Lindi and 
African rice and maize producers in Tunduru and Songea Districts. Musa’s operations began with him finding a 
machine owner in Lindi who was willing and able to grind the raw rice and maize into a finished product. The mill 
owner agreed to finance the enterprise, paying for Musa’s transport to and from the interior villages. Musa traveled 
to the interior during the harvest season accompanied by five or six young, independent traders. While each man 
might have his own machinist and buyer(s) in Lindi, they traveled and organized their activities as a team. They 
targeted villages without go-downs or ushirika shops, and collected farmers’ stock door by door. When Musa and 
the other traders gathered enough produce, one man returned to Lindi and requested a lorry. The lorry was privately 
owned and operated – not a part of the state-controlled cooperative fleet. The bags were brought to the machinist, 
who turned the raw goods into finished products. Musa then sold the produce to Indian and African wholesalers in 
Lindi.
343
 Musa split the profits between himself and the machinist (reimbursing him for the transport and grinding 
operations). Musa spent two to three months upcountry, starting with the rice harvest and finishing with the maize 
harvest. Depending on the size of the harvest and the market, Musa might make two or three trips to the coast.
344
  
His business became more difficult after 1974 as the Tanzanian government passed legislation restricting inter-
regional trade. The government instituted road blocks, gates, and check points between Lindi and Tunduru to 
enforce the policy. Traders found it difficult to get authorization (kibali) to conduct lawful trade. When a trader 
received permission, he overestimated the number of bags he would transport so that his colleagues could sneak 
their loads in with the authorized load.
345
 Other traders attempted to smuggle the goods from the interior to the coast, 
often bribing the police at the checkpoints. Grace found that drivers elsewhere in Tanzania bribed police and border 
patrols, hid illicit goods with authorized cargo, and drove at night to move goods across borders and checkpoints.
346
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Musa Said Omar successfully continued his trade because one of his relatives worked as a policeman in Masasi. 
Musa only abandoned the trade when he became manager of the ushirika shop at Ng’apa in 1983.347 The willingness 
and ability of drivers and traders in southern Tanzania to circumnavigate government controls on road transportation 
and exploit parallel markets mirrored the actions and attitudes of drivers and traders during the colonial period, 
especially those who ignored transportation restrictions during the Second World War.   
 The Tanzanian government implemented increasingly severe measures to curb nation-wide food 
shortages, high inflation, and illicit trading in 1979-81. The state also criminalized drivers.
348
 Rather than 
viewing drivers as “modern men who contributed to national development by putting things in motion,”349 
they became “economic saboteurs” who harmed the nation by facilitating parallel markets and spreading 
HIV/AIDS.
350
 Matteo Rizzo described the case of Francis Owino, who operated a successful private 
transportation and timber distribution business from Nachingwea during the 1960s.
351
 Owino was arrested 
in 1974 and his lorries confiscated because he attracted workers from the Nachingwea Trading 
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Corporation (NATCO) to his forestry business by offering substantially better pay. Owino successfully 
challenged his imprisonment and regained his lorries, but they were once again seized and “lent” to the 
government to assist in the Tanzania-Uganda war effort (1978-80).
352
 The government also cracked down 
on traders and local government officials with the passage of the Economic Sabotage Act (No. 9 of 1983). 
The act intended to stop hoarding, overpricing, and other types of “economic sabotage.” It gave extensive 
powers to officials to investigate and detain individuals suspected of black marketing and hoarding. 
Special tribunals were set up to try offences, but they frequently ignored rules of evidence and denied 
defendants bail or legal representation.
353
 Brennan described the government’s war on “economic 
saboteurs” in March 1983 as the “darkest moment for Tanzania’s Indian population.”354 More than half of 
the 4,216 saboteurs held in prison were South Asians, “charged with hoarding, smuggling, and 
profiteering.”355 Two prominent Indian businessmen in Lindi – Dirubhai and Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla – 
recalled that groups of police (typically seven or ten men) ransacked homes and shops and confiscated 
items – including watches and tooth brushes – from traders in Lindi, Mtwara, and Newala. 356 Rasall’s 
home and shop were checked by the police, but he was not arrested like so many others. Rasall recalled 
that the Indian and African men who were detained stayed in prison for a nearly a year before being 
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called before a judge and released. Many of the Indian detainees left Tanzania, and none of them received 
compensation for the goods taken, which amounted to millions of shillings.
357
  
Liberalization and the Next Era of Transport in Southern Tanzania 
 The 1980s crackdown failed to alleviate scarcities and convinced many Tanzanians that the 
“black market was better than not having anything.”358 With the national economy on the brink of 
collapse, the Tanzanian government repealed the Economic Sabotage Act and took steps towards 
implementing an IMF structural adjustment program in 1984.
359
 Nyerere resigned as president in 1985 
and the new president (Al Hassan Mwinyi) embraced the free market capitalism advocated by the World 
Bank and IMF.
360
 The national economy became export-oriented, businesses were privatized, and controls 
on prices and production levels were gradually scaled back and/or disbanded.
361
 The government’s 
decision to liberalize the economy in the mid-1980s and 1990s transformed the transportation sector in 
southern Tanzania yet again. Some African transporters, who had created large, profitable transport firms 
during the ujamaa era, experienced economic decline following liberalization. Dunstan Olotu Zakaria 
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Masumbuko, for example, explained to Matteo Rizzo that the devaluation of Tanzanian currency between 
1983 and 1996 left him unable to purchase new vehicles with foreign currency. He also struggled to keep 
his fleet operational as the cost of spare parts (largely imported) skyrocketed.
362
 Masumbuko’s business 
further suffered against an explosion of transport competition as a myriad of small-scale African owners 
and operators sought to profit from the collapse of the cooperatives.
363
 While some Africans operated 10-
15 buses, most only owned one or two vehicles.
364
 Former drivers of Teeteeko and TZT were among those 
that bought vehicles and operated successful businesses.
365
 For example, former Teeteeko driver, Wilium 
Njaidi, purchased a vehicle and transported cashew nuts from Masasi to Mtwara and maize from Tunduru 
and Songea to Masasi, Nachingwea, and Newala until 2004.
366
  Musa Said Omar hired these independent 
vehicles as he returned to his inter-regional trade after the collapse of the ushirika shops.
367
 The 
prevalence of African drivers gave the impression that road transportation in Southern Tanzania had 
entered another era; however, many Africans were yet again obtaining credit and motor vehicles from 
Indian financiers and businessmen. Another former Teeteeko driver, Husein Mohamed Mzaina, borrowed 
two lorries from an Indian creditor in Dar es Salaam in order to start a business transporting produce 
(coconut, mango, rice, and maize) and passengers across southern Tanzania.
368
  Husein paid the creditor 
TShs. 2,800 per month for a total of TShs. 70,000. 
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 Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015). He stopped trading in 1992 due to an eye disease.  
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Figure 5.8 Pictures of one of Husein Mohamed Mzaina’s vehicles and his radio/cassette player.  
During the interview, Bwana Mzaina played two of the cassettes he used to draw public attention.
369
  
 
James Brennan argued that many of the Indian traders who remained in Tanzania after nationalization had 
positioned themselves to take advantage of the liberalized economy: 
Those Indian traders who remained, however, profited from numerous gray or black-market 
opportunities, and found themselves ideally placed to take advantage of liberalization policies 
initiated in the mid-1980s. Urban wealth would be rebuilt within parallel informal markets by an 
even more wary and cosmopolitan Indian commercial community.
370
 
 
While the Asian community amounted to less than 100 in Lindi town after the 1970s, those Indian 
business owners who stayed behind emerged from the economic crisis with their businesses largely intact. 
They quickly rebuilt their credit in order to invest in a plethora of new economic endeavors. Rasall, for 
example, utilized the profits from his wholesale business in downtown Lindi to purchase a downtown 
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petrol station in 1989 (where you can still find him at work).
371
 In contrast, many small-scale African 
vehicle owners or their children (who inherited the businesses) became overwhelmed by the financial 
responsibilities of operating a private transportation business.
372
 As the supply of vehicles began to 
exceed demand, men like Juma Hemed Alli were unable to run a profitable business and sold their 
vehicles.
373
 Many men retired to a life of farming after decades as drivers. Additional research is needed 
to determine the extent to which the road transportation sector in the southern Tanzania has been 
controlled by African or Indian creditors and businessmen since the government liberalized the economy 
in the 1980s. More research is also needed into the role that international financial organizations and 
construction companies fulfilled in the planning, funding, and execution of road construction projects 
across southern Tanzania and the nation following liberalization – such as the Mkapa Bridge between 
Lindi and Dar es Salaam during the 1990s.  
Conclusion 
 The postcolonial era of the 1960s to the mid-1980s was yet another period of intense instability, 
conflict, and opportunity in southern Tanzania. The implementation of ujamaa, villagization, and 
neighboring liberation movements had ambiguous impacts on the region’s physical and socioeconomic 
landscape. Intensified import-export relations with Zambia had the opportunity to generate an economic 
boom for Mtwara. The government invested in improving the Mtwara-Songea main road and upgraded 
the Mtwara airport to an international standard in order to assist with the air lift of Zambian copper. The 
airport, however, was never used for this purpose and Hofmeier recognized in 1967 that there was “little 
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chance of it being used for any international traffic in the foreseeable future.”374 The government instead 
invested millions into an oil pipeline, bitumen road, and railway from Zambia to Dar es Salaam – 
bypassing the southern region entirely.
375
 The impact of the war in Mozambique on southern Tanzania 
was similarly ambiguous. Joanna Tague argued that Mozambican refugees played a critical role in nation-
building operations in southern Tanzania. Refugees physically transformed the region’s landscape – 
improving the social, economic, and health care infrastructure by building roads, school, clinics, farms, 
and cooperatives.
376
 The state’s response to the refugees, meanwhile, shaped its conceptions and 
application of socialist rural development.
377
 The war also gave the borderland region renewed strategic 
importance as the site where the new national government would defend its sovereignty and fulfill its 
promise of anti-colonialism. Investments in the region’s infrastructure to facilitate the movement of 
troops, weapons, and supplies abated once the war ended. Perhaps the war’s greatest impact in southern 
Tanzania was that it created a climate of insecurity that allowed the central state to enforce villagization 
on an unprecedented scale. The impact of villagization, however, was also ambivalent. Lal argued that 
while some southern Tanzanians experienced ujamaa and villagization “as a form of dislocation and 
loss,” others “seized it as an opportunity for accumulating status, wealth, and personal security”.378 
Villagization provided some individuals with proximity to state services, access to power, new 
independence from “generational hierarchies,” and “augmented forms of mutual assistance and 
sociability”.379 Individuals and communities, however, also suffered from a lack of access to their private 
farms, conflict and corruption, loss of status, and land ownership disputes.
380
 In the end, many 
simultaneously viewed ujamaa and villagization from negative and positive perspectives – as an 
experience of disruption and opportunity. Lal concluded that, 
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[…] the villagization process exhibited continuities with as much as ruptures from the longer life 
histories of elderly men and women in the Mtwara countryside, which were marked by repeated 
adjustments to both gradual and sudden changes throughout the region.
381
 
 
 Southern Tanzania ultimately emerged from the wars, socialist development schemes, and 
economic woes of the 1960s-1980s with its stigma as an underdeveloped, backward, and isolated 
periphery still intact. Southern Tanzanians and outsiders continued to associate the region’s inadequate 
transportation infrastructure – particularly the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road – with the region’s 
peripheralization and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the nation. Despite a TShs. 150 million 
loan from Japan in 1980 for construction of an all-weather road from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam, the road 
remained incomplete and closed annually during the 1990s. Frequent mechanical breakdowns, shortages 
of equipment, “dubious” contractors, adverse climatic and geographic conditions, high costs, and 
inadequate funding undermined road construction and maintenance as it had throughout the colonial 
era.
382
 Pekka Seppälä argued that the Tanzanian state and “northerners” often interpreted inadequate road 
communications in the south as a sign of the region’s lack of modernity: 
Those who are cut off physically are also perceived to be cut off from the strivings towards 
change. The simple question of isolation expressed by the lack of a road appears also as a 
constitutive element of a cultural relationship where the centre is differentiated from the 
periphery; modern people are distinguished from traditional people; and active people are 
differentiated from passive.
383
 
 
The lack of all-weather access to the rest of the nation reinforced perceptions of southern Tanzanians as 
“others” and the “mythology of Mtwara as a stagnant, isolated periphery” among local citizens and 
outsiders well into the 2000s.
384
   
 Southern Tanzania’s roads not only tell the story of state neglect and the region’s 
peripheralization, but also the dynamism of Indian and African entrepreneurs living, working, and moving 
across the peripheral region. The postcolonial era brought opportunities and perils for Indians and 
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Africans involved in southern Tanzania’s road transportation service sector. Led by Dhirajlal Savailal 
Amin, Teeteeko helped pioneer inter-regional automotive transport in southern Tanzania during the 
twentieth century. For decades, it was the only large company providing relatively cheap and reliable 
passenger transport to the major southern towns and Dar es Salaam. It also transported thousands of tons 
of produce from villages to go-downs and markets in major towns and coastal ports.
385
 In addition to 
pioneering the expansion of large-scale, commercial road transport in the south, Teeteeko supported a 
generation of African drivers and mechanics. Teeteeko and the rest of the Indian transportation sector 
utilized their control over motor vehicles in the south to try to negotiate a place of belonging within 
postcolonial Tanzania. Despite their efforts to align their business interests with the international and 
domestic interests of the Tanzanian government, the Indian transportation sector failed to defend itself 
against a highly interventionist postcolonial state that increasingly perceived Asians as exploitative 
outsiders who threatened to undermine that state’s visions of a socialist Tanzania. African drivers and 
mechanics utilized their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to survive and prosper 
during the turbulent era of state-controlled transport and nation-wide economic crisis that followed in the 
1970s and 1980s. Many of these men went on to fill the void created in the transportation sector when the 
cooperatives collapsed in the 1980s, operating countless private, small-scale, cargo and passenger 
transportation enterprises across southern Tanzania. These drivers also passed their skills on to the next 
generation, teaching relatives and turn-boys – male and female – how to drive and maintain vehicles.386  
 Most elders agreed that road transportation improved after the collapse of Teeteeko and the 
cooperatives because more employment opportunities emerged for drivers, while passengers and 
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producers had more transportation service options.
387
 A vast variety of private buses, lorries, piki-pikis, 
boda-bodas, and other automobiles exist in the major towns of southern Tanzania today. With few 
records available, Teeteeko survives in the memory of a dwindling generation of employees and 
passengers. During our first interview, Dirubhai shared his surprise at learning that someone wished to 
speak to him about Teeteeko: “I was amazed. Who is that at this hour remembering this company?” 
Dirubhai never returned to the transportation sector after he lost Teeteeko in the 1970s. He instead 
concentrated on his plantation, transforming the land from sisal, to timber, and finally cashew nut 
production.
388
 One wonders why Dirubhai remained in Tanzania. All but one of his children reside in the 
U.K. and America, and his life is not necessarily easy in Tanzania. Every two years he spends over 
$3,000 to renew his residency permit, and the government continues to buy out his land piece by piece. 
Yet, Dirubhai has no thoughts of leaving. Whether people remember him or not, Dirubhai helped build 
the southern region and larger nation over the past sixty years. He sees Tanzania as his home – for better 
or worse. 
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Conclusion 
 
 My fieldwork ended similarly to how it began with two long bus trips west from Masasi to 
Songea (461 km) and then north-east from Songea to Dar es Salaam (940 km). My journey to Songea in 
October 2015 could not have been more different than the one from Dar es Salaam to Lindi described in 
the introduction. In comparison to the large bus liners found in Dar es Salaam, the small bus I boarded in 
Masasi had no undercarriage for cargo, reclining seats, DVD player, or air conditioning. Whatever could 
not fit in the upper storage rack was shoved under the seat. With my knees pressed firmly against the seat 
before me, the bus disembarked Masasi station at six in the morning. Within thirty minutes of leaving the 
town, the bus diverted from the main road onto an extremely bumpy frontage road. It would not 
reencounter a tarmacked road for another 15 ½ hours when it finally reached the outskirts of Songea 
town. Travelling no faster than 20-30 mph, the conditions of the road became so poor at times that I felt I 
was breaking into seizures or preparing to explode from a rocket. The incessant rattling of my open 
window nearly drove me mad, but the intense heat prevented me from closing it. My only attempts to 
close the window came when large construction trucks barreled past, pouring dust throughout the bus’s 
compartment. My efforts failed and by the end of the journey, my skin and clothes were covered in an 
inch thick layer of dirt. There was no space to spread out as my bench – designed for two bodies – 
accommodated three. I could not complain about the cramped quarters for at least I was sitting. Village 
after village, people crammed aboard and stood for hours – trying to keep their balance and ignore the 
oppressive heat. The brief lunch break at Tunduru at 1:00 pm provided much relief for all the passengers.  
 My own emotions fluctuated from denial (the road could not be like this the whole way), to 
disbelief, anger (how could the road be this bad in the current day), and grudging acceptance (this is how 
it is – deal with it). Passengers explained to me that these conditions were not so bad; try coming during 
the rainy season when the roads and bridges were washed out. It was not until 3:00 pm (seven hours in 
and nearly eight hours to go) that my frustrations turned to respect. Respect for the drivers and passengers 
who made this journey day after day in order to make a living. Respect for the drivers and passengers who 
came before them – who struggled upon worse road conditions from the 1920s to the 1960s. Respect for 
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the construction crews led by Chinese contractors and supervisors who were working on the roads as we 
drove by. They were trying to bring hundreds of miles of road to an all-weather, bitumen standard in the 
face of adverse terrain and climatic conditions – a feat that had not been accomplished in over hundred 
years and which could bring immense improvements to the southern economy and social networks. While 
bumping along the Masasi-Songea road, I again encountered the parallel narratives of road transportation 
in southern Tanzania – one of a region’s peripheralization and impoverishment, and the other of local 
initiative and optimism for a better future.    
 During the past decade, local populations in southern Tanzania have continued to express 
conflicting feelings of frustration, resentment, and optimism when contemplating the region’s existing 
conditions and future prospective for economic growth. In 2013, domestic and international news 
agencies reported on violent “gas riots” in Mtwara. The first protests occurred in January in response to 
the Tanzanian government’s plans to construct a 310-mile gas pipeline from Mtwara’s off-shore, nature-
gas concession to Dar es Salaam.
1
 A gas processing plant would also be constructed in Dar es Salaam. A 
meager portion of the project’s total income (0.3%) would be allocated to Mtwara. While the government 
struggled to justify the allocation amount, it insisted that Dar es Salaam had the requisite facilities “to 
convert gas to electricity and upload it to the national power grid.”2 While protests occurred in Mtwara, a 
delegation (the “Mtwara Elders”) traveled to Dodoma to “publicly demand that the gas be processed and 
converted within Mtwara.”3 Mass demonstrations resumed in May after the Tanzanian Parliament 
published its budget confirming construction plans for the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline.
4
 The violent 
demonstrations that gripped Mtwara town in January and May resulted in the burning, stoning, and 
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vandalization of shops, government buildings, automobiles, and the houses of prominent politicians and 
journalists.
5
 The May protestors also reportedly blockaded and damaged the Mikindani Bridge into 
Mtwara and turned against journalists, who they believed failed “to properly report their grievances” and 
“sabotage[ed] the interests of Mtwara residents.”6 Riot police used tear gas and live ammunition to 
disperse demonstrators.
7
 An unknown number of citizens and police were injured and killed in the unrest 
and door-to-door searches that the Tanzania People’s Defence Force conducted in the aftermath of the 
May demonstrations.
8
 Schools and businesses were closed for multiple days, and some residents 
reportedly fled the town.
9
 These protests did not dissuade the government’s construction plans, and the 
pipeline was completed in early 2015.   
 In the immediate aftermath of the May violence, there was some speculation that “foreign forces” 
might have been behind the unrest – intending to thwart the Chinese-financed pipeline scheme.10 
Resistance to the pipeline and the government’s development plans, however, had deep historical roots. 
Priya Lal insisted that “the turmoil in Mtwara brought older and deeper questions about citizenship and 
development to the surface of national politics”.11 The central state argued that Mtwara residents were 
being selfish by putting their interests and those of the region above the needs and prosperity of the 
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nation. President Jakaya Kikwete insisted that Mtwara’s natural-gas resources belonged to the entire 
country, not just southern Tanzania.
12
 Residents in Mtwara, however, wanted a local processing plant 
because it would have stimulated new jobs, increased trade, and improved transportation and electrical 
infrastructure. Improved infrastructure would have encouraged additional private investment in the south. 
Southern Tanzanians perceived the government’s decision as further evidence of their second-class 
citizenship within an impoverished and neglected region. While some of the elders that I interviewed in 
Lindi in 2015 harbored similar negative perceptions of the state and its lack of support for the south, 
many unexpectedly expressed optimism for southern Tanzania’s economic future. These elders associated 
the completion of the all-weather, tarmacked road from Lindi to Dar es Salaam as proof of the town’s and 
region’s prosperous future. Men and women could now comfortably, safely, and reliably travel to and 
from Dar es Salaam in a day.
13
 Cultivators and traders could sell perishable produce (like tomatoes and 
mangos) at the highest price in Dar es Salaam without fear of it rotting in-transit as was common in 
previous years when trips were delayed two or three days.
14
 Lindi residents also gained improved access 
to goods from Dar es Salaam and neighboring districts thanks to the improved road networks.
15
 The 
discovery of off-shore, natural-gas north of Lindi town also provided impetus for much of the elders’ 
optimism. The perspective of oil production already attracted new businesses and stimulated building 
construction in 2015 – all of which generated new employment opportunities.16 Government plans to 
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revive Lindi port were underway, and there were suggestions that the southern railway and Lindi airport 
would be reconstructed in the coming years.
17
  
 
Figure 6.1 Construction Progress on Lindi Port, September 2015
18
 
 
When asked of Lindi’s future prospective, Dirubhai confidently stated “very bright. Very bright.”19 Such 
enthusiasm, however, sharply contrasted with the sentiments expressed by international petroleum 
workers in Mtwara. They explained that oil exploration and production firms were drastically scaling 
back their operations (in Mtwara and abroad) due to the collapse of global oil prices in 2015-2016. It was 
unlikely that construction of oil production and distribution facilities in Lindi would begin in the near 
future. I was left to wonder whether southern Tanzanians would once again have to endure the 
disappointments of unrealized hopes and unfulfilled state promises in the years to come.   
 When contemplating the fluctuating fortunes of southern Tanzania and the larger Ruvuma 
borderland region during the past three centuries, this dissertation argued that the region’s real and 
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perceived peripheralization began as a consequence of colonial warfare in the early 20
th
 century. Prior to 
the imposition of German and Portuguese colonialism, southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique 
formed a dynamic and thriving frontier region where a variety of ethnolinguistic groups migrated and 
interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. Gold, slaves, and ivory exports transformed 
Kilwa and Lindi into two of the most prosperous ports along the East African coast at various times 
during the precolonial era (14
th
-19
th
 century). International trade attracted European explorers and 
missionaries to the Ruvuma region in the nineteenth century. Through their expeditions and interactions 
with local populations, Europeans reimagined the region’s landscape and aimed to replace long-distance 
slave caravans with “modern” railways and roads that would transport lucrative cash crops and minerals 
to coastal ports and international markets. Pro-Christian, pro-European “big men” and “sultans” would 
ensure the success of a monetized colonial economy and enforce law and order by serving as colonial 
administrators.   
 Europeans, however, lacked the resources to make their “development” visions a reality during 
the initial decades of colonial rule. German and Portuguese authority failed to penetrate the interior of 
southern German East Africa (GEA) and northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA). The Ruvuma borderland 
remained a dynamic frontier where local leaders, traders, and ordinary individuals exploited the two 
colonial systems; taking advantaging of competitive markets and utilizing alliances with Europeans to 
strengthen their authority within existing political and economic power structures. Indian merchants and 
investors also profited as colonial intermediaries, while gradually expanding their commercial networks 
between the interior, coast, and international markets. The Maji Maji uprising and Portuguese 
“pacification” campaigns during the first decade of the 1900s brought significant changes to the 
socioeconomic, political, and physical landscape of the Ruvuma borderland. With the exception of the 
Mueda Plateau, most African women and men residing in northern PEA were brought under the authority 
of the highly exploitative Nyassa Company regime. In an effort to maximize profits and minimize costs, 
the company made little-to-no effort to construct new transportation infrastructure, build hospitals, and 
improve transportation, education, and health infrastructure or social services. The company abandoned 
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its large-scale agricultural “development” schemes and reconceived northern PEA as an unprofitable 
periphery and labor reservoir for South African and Rhodesian mines and local plantations. Across the 
border, the political and economic networks that sustained the Kilwa trade corridor collapsed in the 
aftermath of the Maji Maji rebellion. German retaliation against rebellious local leaders and the Ngoni in 
Songea left regional power structures and patronage networks in shambles. Traders and plantation owners 
also suffered financial ruin as their goods and crops were destroyed or looted. The collapse of the ivory, 
slave, and rubber trade and the lack of a fertile hinterland for cash crop production prevented Kilwa’s 
economic revival. As a consequence of the rebellion, the German administration increasingly pushed the 
south to the periphery. They retracted funding for a planned railway, believing it unwise to invest in such 
an “unruly” region. The Maji Maji rebellion, however, did not guarantee southern GEA’s 
peripheralization and impoverishment. Unlike their Portuguese counterparts, Europeans in the south 
remained committed to transforming the region into a lucrative agricultural landscape. They applied 
political pressure and personal funds to construct a “modern” transportation infrastructure of engineered 
roads and railways that linked the interior to the coast. Local inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland, 
meanwhile, responded to colonial violence and instability by migrating to more secure areas of the 
borderland or immigrating out of the region – as they had in the century proceeding. Trade routes were 
reoriented towards Lindi, which grew in economic importance as a major exporter of agricultural 
produce. Local leaders entered into mutually advantageous alliances with German authorities so as to take 
full advantage of the political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion.  
 The First World War brought an unprecedented level of devastation and instability to the Ruvuma 
borderland. Unlike the slave raiding parties of the nineteenth century and small colonial expeditionary 
forces of the 1890s-1900s, the large German and Allied forces lingered in the borderland for months and 
years with no aim beyond the defeat of their enemy. Using modern weaponry and scorched earth tactics, 
the colonial armies destroyed the resources they could not consume. Few areas of the Ruvuma borderland 
were spared from colonial raids, and several were repeatedly plundered. The region’s productivity further 
declined as the Allies and Germans forcefully conscripted the male population as soldiers, carriers, and 
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laborers. Local women, children, and elders struggled to meet their basic subsistence needs in the wake of 
the violence, destruction, and encroachment of wildlife. Existing trade networks and power structures 
crumbled. Local leaders struggled to maintain their large followings (the foundation of their power) and 
build alliances with competing German, British, and Portuguese forces. Impoverishment and famine 
defined the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war.  
 The Nyassa Company responded to the wartime devastation by continuing their exploitative labor 
and taxation practices and refusing to invest in the region’s economic, transportation, education, and 
health infrastructure during the interwar era. The British tried to transform the socioeconomic landscape 
of the newly Mandated Territory of Tanganyika by creating Native Authorities organized along “tribal” 
affiliations and under the authority of “traditional” leaders. The territorial economy fixated on the 
exportation of high-value agricultural produce within imperial markets. Southern Tanganyika, however, 
lacked the manpower, environmental conditions, and transportation infrastructure to produce and export 
large quantities of cash crops in comparison to their northern neighbors along the Tanga and Central 
Railways. The southern provincial administration could not force locals to produce cash crops out of fear 
that such policies would aggravate existing famine conditions, whose alleviation cost the government 
thousands of pounds. Administrators also struggled to prevent the annual migration of thousands of male 
laborers, who sought wage employment on sisal plantations along the southern coast and to the north in 
order to pay colonial taxes and purchase imported commodities. Although southern Tanganyika arose as 
the “Granary of the Territory” during the interwar era, its southern ports slid into obscurity within 
imperial markets. Felicitas Becker argued, 
At the core of the economic decline of Southeast Tanzania lay the simple fact that sesame and 
millet were not as profitable as slaves and ivory had been; and the harbours of the area more 
marginal to the transport networks of the twentieth than to the Indian Ocean trade of the 
preceding centuries.
20
  
 
The central administration in Dar es Salaam and private businesses had few economic incentives to invest 
in southern Tanganyika; rather, they prioritized those regions that seemed to promise the quickest and 
                                                          
20
 Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca. 1890-1950” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 
2011), 322. 
380 
 
most profitable returns on investment, specifically the cash crop producing regions along the railways. 
The dilapidated roads of the Southern Province not only served as a powerful symbol of the region’s 
isolation and poverty, but also an important justification for the state’s neglectfulness.  
 Southern Tanganyika experienced a brief reversal of fortunes after the Second World War as it 
became the central target for the East African Groundnut Scheme. Despite a massive infusion of money 
and manpower, the scheme collapsed within five years. Its failure was partially a result of the inability of 
government officials and development planners to properly identify the transportation needs of the region 
and implement a construction program that could overcome the soil and climate conditions that inhibited 
infrastructure improvements for the past forty years. The British Treasury, Overseas Food Corporation, 
and Tanganyika government reached a tripartite agreement that allowed for the completion of the new 
Southern Province Railway and Mtwara Port after the Groundnut Scheme was abandoned. Their decision 
was no longer driven by the hopes of major economic profits (considering that southern Tanganyika’s 
only promising export at the time was cashew nuts). Rather, the British hoped to save face within the 
international community, which had suspected that postwar colonial development was a misnomer for 
colonial exploitation. In the final decade of colonial rule, the railway’s deficit grew annually and the 
Public Works Department made limited improvements to the regional road infrastructure without 
adequate funds, equipment, and manual labor. The vast majority of the Lindi-Songea road remained dirt 
surfaced and susceptible to climatic conditions. The Dar es Salaam-Lindi road and most of the rest of the 
southern road infrastructure closed annually for five to six months during the rains, thus isolating 
countless villages, towns, and the entire province from regional, territorial, and global markets.  
 Southern Tanzania’s inadequate transportation infrastructure continued to serve as a symbol, 
symptom, and justification for the region’s isolation and impoverishment throughout the postcolonial era. 
The Tanzanian government abandoned the southern railway and concentrated on improving the region’s 
road infrastructure as part of their efforts to assist neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. Government 
investments, however, were short-lived and inadequate to overcome the region’s natural obstacles. There 
was little incentive to continue investing in the southern roads once the war in Mozambique ended and the 
381 
 
movement of troops, weapons, and supplies ceased. The government further neglected the south after it 
chose to build a multi-million dollar oil pipeline, bitumen road, and railway from Zambia to Dar es 
Salaam with the help of foreign investors and contractors. Repeated promises by the colonial state to 
improve the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road to an all-weather standard went unrealized decade after decade. 
Southern Tanzanians pinpointed their region’s inadequate transportation infrastructure as the cause for 
their economic misfortunes and the main inhibitor to economic improvement. They used poor roads as 
proof of the south’s marginality and government neglect so as to “claim a bigger piece of the proverbial 
national cake.”21 The region’s lack of infrastructure simultaneously served as a justification for the central 
government and private businesses to invest elsewhere in Tanzania. The poor roads also validated 
stereotypes first propagated in the colonial era that southern Tanzania was incapable and/or undeserving 
of “progress” and “modernity.” These long-standing stereotypes and local-state tensions underscored the 
animosity that emerged during the Mtwara riots of 2013.  
 When examining the history of road transportation in southern Tanzania, however, another 
narrative exists beyond that of the region’s gradual peripheralization and impoverishment. Inhabitants of 
southern Tanzania and the broader Ruvuma borderland region utilized their mobility as a survival strategy 
and means of prosperity for centuries. Mobility facilitated trade and social interactions since Ruvuma-
Rufiji language communities first began settling across southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique 
during the second millennium C.E. It enabled populations to relocate in response to famines, droughts, 
infertile soil, population pressure, warfare, raiding, and undesirable authority. Mobility continued to serve 
as a crucial strategy during the tumultuous nineteenth century when the region was integrated into global 
capitalist markets driven by international demands for ivory and slaves and underwritten by Asian 
creditors and traders. Slave and ivory traders continually reoriented their long-distance caravans towards 
the most advantageous markets in order to maximize profits. Local communities escaped slave raiding 
and corresponding famines by relocating to geographical strongholds or the protection offered by strong 
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local leaders. African “sultanates” and “big men” along the Lindi and Kilwa trade corridors incorporated 
slaves and refugees to build their power and influence. They also exploited alliances with Asian 
merchants and European missionaries and explorers, whose perceptions of the borderland were shaped 
through trade networks and expeditions. Local communities also depended upon their mobility to escape 
the violence of colonial “pacification” campaigns during the first decade of the twentieth century and the 
adverse environmental conditions that followed in their wake.  
 Whereas most southern Tanzanians and northern Mozambicans could not escape the violence of 
the First World War, they used their mobility to negotiate the instability and opportunities created in the 
war’s aftermath. Cultivators, traders, migrant laborers, and European hunters exploited the lack of border 
enforcement along the Ruvuma River to evade colonial policies and exploit competing markets to their 
advantage. European entrepreneurs, like Carnegie Browne, Gerald Sibold, and L. Rousham Roberts, also 
took advantage of the weakness of the British southern provincial administration to build successful road 
construction and maintenance firms during the interwar era. The introduction and expansion of motor 
vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s offered an important tool for local populations to take 
advantage of what economic opportunities existed within the peripheral borderland and pursue better 
labor and trade markets beyond it. Indian wholesalers and retailers spearheaded the expansion and success 
of road transportation in the south as they employed automobiles to expand and strengthen their trade 
network between the coast, interior towns, and rural communities. African producers and migrant laborers 
living in proximity to the main and district roads utilized the motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic 
opportunities along the coast and northern plantations. Although some individuals and communities 
associated the southern roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of migrant 
laborers’ autonomy, others perceived them as pathways and tools for social and economic advancement. 
In the postwar era, the highly mobile populace of the Ruvuma borderland exploited the competitive labor 
and trade market created during the Groundnut Scheme. Increased access to motor vehicle transport via 
labor recruiters made it easier for workers to travel to the coast to work a few months, pay their taxes, and 
purchase goods before returning to their farms. A few African entrepreneurs took advantage of inflated 
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prices to build successful businesses and eventually purchase cars to expand their trade networks. The 
southern road transportation sector, however, largely rested in Indian hands prior to the 1970s. The failure 
of the Southern Province Railway coupled with the lack of state-sponsored, road transportation services 
provided an excellent opportunity for Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Dirubhai) to create 
the dominant passenger and cargo transport firm in southern Tanganyika. By the time of Tanganyika’s 
independence in 1961, Teeteeko was the only major transportation firm in the south offering government 
officers, farmers, traders, and migrant laborers reliable road transport across district and provincial 
borders. 
 Automotive ownership and knowledge was even more valuable in the postcolonial era. Indian 
businessmen, like Dirubhai, used their motor vehicles as tools to defend their financial interests and 
negotiate a new place within a nation that exhibited growing hostility towards its Asian population. By 
offering their vehicles in support of state cooperatives, anticolonial war efforts, humanitarian relief, and 
nation-building operations, the Indian population in southern Tanzania tried to prove their value and 
allegiance to the nation and nation-state. Their efforts ended in failure as their properties were seized and 
businesses replaced with state-run cooperatives. African men, meanwhile, sought out careers as drivers 
and mechanics. Working as turn-boys or workshop apprentices not only offered young men the skills and 
knowledge necessary to acquire high-status, high-paying jobs. Their apprenticeships also served as a rite 
of passage into manhood. As a driver or mechanic, a young man was able to accumulate the wealth and 
prestige needed to purchase a home, get married, and provide for his family(ies). By taking on turn-boys 
and apprentices, drivers and mechanics elevated their professional rank and created networks of 
reciprocity that they could rely upon in the future. African drivers and mechanics also utilized motor 
vehicles to challenge colonial racial stereotypes of Africans as mentally inept and “unmodern” – 
stereotypes that were especially predominate for men from the peripheral south. Drivers and mechanics in 
southern Tanzania instead forged new identities as “modern” adult men. The knowledge, skills, and 
networks that they attained during the Indian-dominated transportation era proved extremely valuable 
during the turbulent economic period of the 1970s and 1980s. When so many people were struggling to 
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find work and feed their families, drivers and mechanics were typically able to find gainful employment 
in the government or private sector across the territory. Following the liberalization of the Tanzanian 
economy in the mid-1980s, many drivers and mechanics utilized their skills and knowledge to build 
successful, small-scale transportation businesses (often with the backing of Indian creditors). Motor 
vehicles continue to serve as important tools for traders, laborers, and entrepreneurs pursuing 
socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond southern Tanzania today. 
 In the end, roads and motor vehicles are not simply technologies that humans use to move people 
and goods from one place to another. The physical use of and imagined meanings that we imbue upon 
roads and automobiles impact human interactions and perceptions of one another and our physical 
environment. European colonists, for instance, perceived and used automobiles and roads as tools to 
“civilize” and “modernize” African lands and peoples. Indian and African traders, drivers, mechanics, 
cultivators, and migrant laborers instead appropriated motor vehicles to contest racial stereotypes and 
discriminatory social orders while pursuing socioeconomic opportunities. In the case of southern 
Tanzania, roads became physical manifestations and representations of the region’s impoverishment and 
peripheralization in the minds of local residents and outsiders from the colonial era to the current day. At 
the same time, they serve(d) as testaments to the region’s dynamism and local innovation in the face of 
neglectful or exploitative state authority.  
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Road Conditions and Construction Work along the Masasi-Songea Main Road, October 2015
22
 
 
Figure 6.2 Lindi-Songea Road entering Masasi, Masasi bus station, and exiting the town 
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Figure 6.3 Construction progress on Masasi-Songea Road (outside Masasi) 
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Figure 6.4 Examples of various stages of road construction work on Masasi-Songea Road 
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Figure 6.5 Two bridge construction projects along Masasi-Songea Road 
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Figure 6.6 Typical road conditions, Masasi-Songea Road 
 
Figure 6.7 Conditions within the bus 
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Figure 6.8 Roadwork at elevation (between Tunduru and Songea) 
 
Figure 6.9 Chinese workers’ camp (highlands outside of Songea) 
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Figure 6.10 Passengers disembarking before the men pushed the bus back on the road (Songea District)  
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